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IABSTRACT
Singapore and Taipei both have witnessed the re-orientation of urban redevelopment
policy in their historical centres since the mid-1980s. The new planning policy has two
important aspects. One is the re-invention and re-interpretation of historical and spatial
icons, which are often associated with the ideological construction and moral regulation
of the nation-state. The other is the state intervention in the production of the built envi-
ronment, which involves the rejection of an intensive use of land, and the preference of a
controlled-growth in historical urban centres. This alternative paradigm does not only
encounter the reclaim of the historical built environment once is neglected, but a legacy
of the entire economic, social and symbolic systems that are designed for pursuing
growth and development. There is a dilemma which concerns the apparent contradiction
between the use of land resources to foster economic growth and the necessity to pre-
serve physical structure for political and symbolic purposes.
This thesis attempts to explore the interplay of economic interest, political power and
national identity in the transformation of Singapore and Taiwan in the post-1980 era,
through analysing policies and consequences of the re-invention and re-investment in his-
torical urban centres. This thesis provides a historic perspective of the structural setting
in which the complicated relationship between the nation-state, the economy and society
is constructed. It identifies a set of causal relations which have created specific condi-
tions shaping the logic of urban policy, the planning regime, the property market and
cultural practice in both countries. This thesis also reveals how the internal dynamics and
conflicts of these structural and institutional factors, together with the historical and
spatial development of the locality, have produced direct or indirect impacts on the
policy decision-making process, the formulation of planning strategies, and the imple-
mentation of these strategies. At the end, this thesis suggests that the interplay between
economic interest, political power and national identity in this planning process, is a
meaningful relationship and not just a historical coincidence. By considering this planning
process as the outcome of an endless negotiation between these different and conflicting
forces, this thesis sheds light on the nature and the transformation of the nation-building
process in two different spatial situations and historical contexts.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1. The Context
Singapore and Taiwan have both experienced colonialism for a period in history before
becoming sovereign states. The history of Singapore can be traced back to the creation
of a trading empire - Malacca Sultanate in the Malay Peninsula in the fifteenth century.
This island became a British colony after a treaty signed between the British government
and the Sultan of Johore - Riau in 1819. The colonial control lasted more than a century
and ended in 1957. This island was granted an autonomous status and obtained its first
self-government. Taiwan was first claimed by the Spanish and then by the Dutch in the
early seventeenth century. The Chinese began to govern this island in the late seven-
teenth century when the Chin Dynasty formally designated Taiwan as a prefecture to the
Fujian Province. Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 when China was defeated in the
Opium War. The Japanese ruled this island until the end of the Second World War when
the Cairo Conference declared that Taiwan should be returned to the Republic of China.
After the Second World War, a number of independent states in Asia were born
within the region's conflicting geo-political politics: the territorial struggles between
nationalists and imperialists, the confrontation between local nationalism and Japanese or
Chinese nationalism, the conflicts between different ethnic groups, and the ideological
competition between capitalism and communism. The creation of Singapore and Taiwan
as independent and sovereign states was also conditioned in sets of intertwined forces
operating in particular historical circumstances. The People's Action Party (PAP) took
over the self-government of Singapore in 1959, after excluding the left-wing faction from
its own organisation. At this juncture, the widespread of the Communist influence in the
Malay Peninsula forced the Federation of Malaya to formulate a new political agenda
that could enhance the tacit alliance among anti-Communist political parties, and could
create a common market in this region. Singapore, together with Sarawak and Sabah
decided to joint the Federation of Malaysia as member states in 1963. Yet during the
period of unification, the PAP was excluded from the political arena in the Federation
due to a long-standing hostility and suspicion to the Chinese in the Malay world. The
ethnic and political tensions embodied in this region also turned Singapore into a major
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target while Indonesia began military attack on Malaysia. The merger only lasted two
years. Singapore cut adrift from the Federation and claimed its independence in 1965.'
After Japan's surrender in 1945, Taiwan was temporarily governed by the Chinese
nationalist troops. The Chinese nationalist party (KMT) fled to Taiwan in 1949 after
losing the battle with the Communist in the civil war. At that time, the international
situation turned extremely unfavourable to the KIMT regime. The United States had
supported the KM1' in China but currently saw there was no future for the regime in
return to the mainland. The collapse of the KMT and the take-over of Taiwan by the
Communist Red Army seems to have been inevitable. However the outbreak of the
Korean War in 1951 and the subsequent change in the US foreign policy somehow
helped the regime to survive. The military support from the United States put China's
invasion of Taiwan out of the question and consequently, legitimised the KMT's
governing of this island.2
Having said these, it is clear that Singapore and Taiwan obtained their sovereignty by
default, without relying on popular uprisings of society, as occurred in the revolutionary
democratic states in the Western world. The population of Singapore is of Chinese,
Malay and Indian origins, with the Chinese comprising almost two-third of the entire
population. These ethnic groups are divided by languages, religions and ideologies, and
have little in common to develop emotional ties with each other. The hostility between
the Malay and the Chinese was exaggerated when the Japanese occupied this island in
the period 1942-45 and during the short period of unification within the Federation of
Malaysia. Taiwan was in a more difficult situation. The nationalist party tended to mis-
treat the Taiwanese as collaborators with the Japanese. The confrontation between
Chinese solders and local residents in 1947 evolved into a massacre during which ten
thousand Taiwanese killed by the nationalist troops with another ten thousand died in
prison or disappeared. 3 Although the Taiwanese are of Chinese origin, the massacre
created an enduring antagonism between mainlanders and Taiwanese. The withdrawal of
the nationalist party from China brought about one and half million mainlanders to
Taiwan. These mainlanders came from thirty-five different provinces of China and
'For discussion on Singapore's independence see Chiew, S., 1990; Chan, F.,, 1986; Goh, L., 1987
2 F discussion on the geo-political politics in this region See Kerr, 1965; Mayers, 1986
For discussion on the 1947 Massacre see Wang, J., 1988; Li., I., 1987; Moser, 1985
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belonged to several different dialectic groups. They suddenly found themselves within a
political territorial form not of their choosing or to their liking. Hence, for the state elite
in both countries, the task of national integration was monumental as the key elements of
a sense of unity were not existent among the populace. Nationalist discourse thus had to
be carefully reconstructed because cultural elements that could serve to aspire nationalist
sentiment, might also stimulate sub-national regionalism at the same time.
Another difficult task for both countries was that the national economy appeared to
be on the verge of breaking down. The growth of traditional trade in Singapore had
already approached its limits in the late 1950s.4 The separation from Malaysia marked the
end of the common market and cut off Singapore's access to raw material and resources
in this region. The confrontation with Indonesia caused a sharp decline in Singapore's
port activities and a remarkable withdrawal of foreign investment. 5 The British also
decided to remove their armed forces from Singapore in four years time after 1967. It
would cause a loss of one quarter of economic activities on this island, which was
previously associated with the military establishment. Taiwan's economy was not in a
better condition. The Japanese-built infrastructure was already seriously damaged during
the war. The end of the markets in China and Japan meant that it could no longer depend
on trade to obtain the key inputs for its economy. Foreign trade and investment dried out
and the industrial production capacities were almost completely destroyed. The massive
influx of refugees caused a sudden surge in demand, yet the national economy was at a
standstill. Defence expenditure soaked up most of the government's income as a hostile
atmosphere still persisted between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.6
Having inherited office, the immediate tasks for both governments were first, to
preserve the territorial legacy in the face of a variety of centrifugal forces; second, to
forge a conmion identity and to prevent sub-national regionalism from forming; and
third, to prove that they are capable to govern so as to generate mass prosperity for
society. It is clear that the PAP and the KMT were left with little choice but to adopt at
maximum speed policies that would guarantee political unity and economic viability.
They initiated mobilisation campaigns involving the whole population in the name of
See Fong, P., 1985; Chiew, S., 1990; Chang, H., 1976
See Ong, W., 1977
6 See Wong, K.. 1988
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struggle for national survival'. 7
 Developmentalist doctrine came to dominate the official
agenda. For the PAP, through delivering an 'economic miracle', it can evoke a sense of
pride in national achievement and then win acceptance of its right to rule among the
populace. For the KMT, being successful in economic development can bring the regime
to an international recognition. Through the creation of a strong economy in Taiwan that
the Chinese Communist Party might not be able to achieve in China, the KMT can win a
moral, if not a militaiy victory. Economic growth, for both countries, is a national goal
and a common national interest.
The political regimes in Singapore and Taiwan have been characterised by their
commitment to economic development, and also by using the developmentalist discourse
as a means to obtain internal integration. As economic development and social cohesion
have assumed paramount importance in the public domain, planning policies, as forms of
state intervention, have also been subject to these objectives. Planning policies have been
formulated to provide infrastructure for economic and residential activities, to ensure the
efficiency of allocation of land use, to maintain equal distribution of goods and services,
and to enhance political stability and social harmony. To serve the symbolic function of
the state, the physical structure of the capital city has been largely transformed into
modernist forms of spatial organisations. It has demonstrated the achievement of the
government, indicated promise for the future, and engendered a sense of national pride
among citizens. As progress and modernisation have been the major aspiration of the
whole country, there have not been too many chances for historic buildings to survive.
The remarkable economic expansion and relatively equal distribution of income have
made the development experiences in Singapore and Taiwan stand in stark contrast to
other developing countries. However, in the late 1970s, both countries began to face a
new set of challenges from both internal politics and the global economy. First, the
existing development strategy for the export-oriented economy reached its limits.
Second, the one-party state and its authoritarian rule were challenged by an increasing
demand for political liberation. Third, the ideological basis of the state was weakened by
the down-turn of the economy and the conflict among cultural identities. At this juncture,
both of Singapore and Taiwan saw increasing interests in 'searching the national past' - a
discourse which used to be seen as having some double-edged effects in their context.
For a detailed discussion see Seah, C., 1984
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The political and cultural motivations behind the search for historic heritage were very
different. In Singapore, this process was mainly encouraged by the state as one part of a
larger nationalist project. It attempted to convert the attention on historical heritage into
a patriotic duty. In Taiwan, this process began in a cultural movement which aspired to
an alternative nationhood, and then was encouraged by a political movement which
attempted to break the existing power structure. It seems that for both countries,
economic achievement along is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the attainment
of national consolidation. Thus, a common identity needs to be rebuilt on other grounds.
However, there must be a meaningful relationship between these changes and not just a
historical coincidence. The differences of motivations behind the scene also need to be
explored and explained.
The historical built environment is among the most important evidence of history.
Thus, in the search for national memory, the call for the preservation of the historical
built environment is an outcome that one can anticipate. Singapore and Taiwan both
have witnessed a re-orientation of urban redevelopment policy in their capital cities since
the mid-1980s. The modernist thinking of urban development promoted in the previous
period has been to some extent modified. The historical built environment has assumed
to play a constitutive part in the process of urban transformation. This policy seems to
symbolise a start of a new era in which an alternative paradigm of urban redevelopment
can be based on 're-invention' and 're-valuation' of the past. Intriguingly, in Singapore -
a place where land is relatively scarce - this policy has covered a total of 5,200 shop-
houses, with 1,900 of them were located in the central area. It is estimated that more
than 100 hectares or 6 per cent of the land in the central area has been hold for conser-
vation. In Taipei, the scope of this policy is smaller. It has covered a land area of 12
hectares where remained a total of 297 shophouses. It may be argued that economic
growth has made it affordable for the government to use valuable land in the central area
of the capital city for conservation. Yet one should be aware that although the economies
in Singapore and Taiwan have been faced with some difficulties, there have been no signs
suggesting that the pro-growth regimes are to be changed. Hence, one can reasonably
expect a dilemma which concerns the apparent contradiction between the use of land
resource to foster economic growth and the necessity to preserve physical structure for
political and symbolic purposes. The underlying logic of the formulation of a conserva-
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tion-based redevelopment policy is very complicated, and offers an intriguing illustration
of the interplay of forces of political power, economic interest and cultural identity.
More interestingly, this alternative paradigm does not only encounter the reclaim of
the historical built environment once is neglected, but a legacy of the entire economic,
social and symbolic systems that are designed for pursing growth and development. The
implementation of this policy has produced very different outcomes in two cities. In
Singapore, although a range of social actors has displayed various interests, the planning
process has been technocrat-rational in which professional expertise in a bureaucratic
system has initiated decisions and influenced the general direction of the policy. It has
turned urban conservation into a useful field of investment, and has transformed the
historic district into an enclave for small offices seeking location near the downtown
core. In Taipei, this process has involved not only the effort of the planning authority to
promote urban conservation, but also consistent challenges made by the local community
to the designation of their neighbourhood as a 'historical district'. Much of the planning
process has been directed not towards the achievement of policy goals but towards
negotiation of compromise or the resolution of conflicts between organisations and
among interests groups. The conflict cannot be reconciled for fifteen years since its
beginning. The inefficiency of policy has caused frustration among officials, politicians
and the public. The differences of policy outcomes in the two countries need to be care-
fully examined and explained in more subtle ways.
There exist two groups of literature focusing respectively on the political economy
and national identity in the Asian newly industrialised countries. The first group of work
concentrates on economic achievement and authoritarian control of these countries. In
the search for one single explanation of the economic success of the 'Four Little-
Dragons' in Asia, the differences between these countries are dismissed. The second
group of work addresses the importance of cultural symbolism in the nation-building
process. Their explanations tend to be over-simplistic as the political and economic
determinants are ignored. Our understanding of the ways in which developmentalist and
nationalist discourses operate together in the Asian context is very limited. Most of these
scholarly works only deal with single aspect of the nation-building process, rather than
tacking the mutual relationship between economic development, national identity and
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political stability in its entirety. Thus, exploring such complicated relationships is the goal
of the larger project on which this thesis is based.
The historical built environment has been frequently discussed by geographers
interested in debates surrounding national identity. They address the role of historical
heritage in the reinforcement of linguistic, ethnic and racial elements in the construction
of a national identity. In most attempt to interpret the form, the places have been reduced
to purely cultural symbols, detached from social and economic forces that help to
produce them. The separation of material and symbolic domains results in a considerable
void in our understanding of historical preservation, particularly in the urban context of a
fast-growing region. In recent years the significance of urban conservation in the trans-
formation of many Western cities has been a subject of urban studies. Urban conserva-
tion is seen as a useful field of investment for the tourist industry or a means of self-
expression for the new middle class. Both of them are closely associated to the de-
industrialisation process and the growth of the service economy. There is very little
documentation of this subject for cities in the Asian newly industrialised countries. Many
concepts developed in this group of literature are bound to the Western experience and
are inadequate to apply directly to another context in time and space. Hence, to
understand the phenomena that have been addressed above, one needs first to produce
contextualised interpretations rather than accepting any existing explanations.
1.2 Research Question
This research is an attempt at exploring the interplay of economic interest, political
power and national identity in the transformation of Singapore and Taipei in the post-
1980 era through analysing policies and consequences of the 're-invention' and 're-
investment' in historical centres in both cities. In doing so, I address myself to three sets
of questions. The first set of questions is concerned with the structural setting in which
political, economic, and cultural mechanisms interacted with each other in the nation-
building process: How did the developmentalist and nationalist discourses operate in the
nation-building process? What kind of strategies were formulated by the state to make
the economy successful in the trend of global capitalism? How did the state organised
local society in order to get its goals accomplished? How was the nation-statehood con-
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structed and what kind of official ideology was promoted in their particular historical
circumstances? The second set of questions is concerned with the institutional setting in
which urban policy, planning regime, property market and cultural practice joined toge-
ther to create specific conditions which made a conservation-based redevelopment policy
a possible proposition: How did the alliance of state intervention and economic develop-
ment negotiate through urban policy and spatial development? Why did the historical
preservation movement emerge when it did and to what extent its appearance had any
relation to the current nationalist discourse? How did the state solve the dilemma
involving the contradiction between the use of land resource to foster economic growth
and the necessity to preserve the historical built environment for political and symbolic
purposes? The third set of questions is concerned with the particular spatial and social
settings in which the conservation-based redevelopment policy was in force: What kind
of role and function did the historical centre play in the overall urban development? How
did the changes in historical and spatial circumstances give rise to the conservation-based
redevelopment policy? How was the conservation-based redevelopment policy formu-
lated and implemented? How did this policy change the social and economic characters
of the historical centre? What role did the state, interest groups and the local community
play in the planning process? How was the planning process shaped by specific political
mobilisations and conflicts?
1.3 Research Strategy and Data Base
There is no single body of theory and no one paradigm can be expected to provide all the
answers to the questions I have posed. Therefore I have to borrow concepts from
different intellectual traditions, including literature on the nation-state and the construc-
tion of national identity; peripheral development and the capitalist developmental state;
the role of the state in capitalist space economy; and the state, society and the process of
policy-making, for my analysis. This approach should not be confused with a test of any
of the general perspectives. It aims to bring together a wider range of perspectives that
can contribute to the interpretation of my observations.
I adopt a historical and contextual approach to the analysis, as a result of the belief
that social events are situated in specific time-space settings. They are determined by the
development in the previous stage, and themselves also provide for the emergence of
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new outcomes. To understand the causes and the changes, one needs to observe social
events in the context of a longer time span. I analyse the structural setting in which the
complicated relationship between the state, society and the economy is constructed. This
can help fully to grasp the wider political and economic context in which state policies
are formulated and implemented. I also analyse the logic of urban planning, the planning
regime, the property market and cultural practice. The institutional setting of urban
development is produced by the operation of forces in a particular context, yet its
internal dynamic is also crucial for bringing changes. However, although the above
analysis can help to identity a set of causal relations and the influences that they
produced, it would be wrong to assume that the planning process is the necessary out-
come of forces conditioned in the structural and institutional settings. Although the state
always makes efforts to achieve its policy objectives, the implementation of a state policy
is more complex and subtle, showing evidence of both compliance and resistance,
accommodation and conflicts. One should be aware that individual agents' decisions also
have consequences on policy implementation. Individual agents make their decisions
depending on a subjective definition of the situation. The interpretation of people's
experience allows one to reduce the risk of taking the structural constraints for granted.
However, the interpretation also must be balanced by an understanding of the contextual
features that structure individual experiences.
This research was conducted by the following methods. The first one was a docu-
mentary research. It was based on secondary data and written sources, including existing
literature, official documents, statistics, newspapers, government archives and civil
organisations' bulletins and internal documents. Information was cross-checked and
verified from different sources until they could be accurately reconstructed. The second
one was field survey. This aimed to reconstruct the events on the basis of primary data
and to directly observe social phenomena in their natural setting. The case-study areas
selected for this research were the Chinatown Historic District in Singapore and the
Dadowchang Special Zoning in Taipei. Three different kinds of surveys were conducted
during my field work in January—March and July—October in 1995. First, I carried out a
land and building survey in two case-study areas covering a total of 1,408 shophouses.
This survey focused on the progress of building restoration, property values and land
use. Second, I conducted a questionnaire survey in specific areas targeting a total of 529
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private owners, tenants and property developers. The main purpose of this survey was to
collect information about land ownership, restoration costs, land values and property
prices since the data of the property market at neighbourhood scale was extremely
limited. Moreover, I conducted in-depth interviews with a total of 36 key informants. I
selected these key informants on the basis of an extensive knowledge obtained from
written materials, observations, and also from a small number of introductory interviews
with people who have had an overview of the situation. The list of interviews included all
significant actors in the planning process: representatives from planning authorities,
politicians, members of civil organisations, and opinion leaders from the local communi-
ties. My interviews were loosely structured, making it possible to cover key areas
without preventing respondents from introducing new information that may be unique to
them or their situation. In viewing of the fact that most people tended not to show their
personal opinions towards contentious issues, I often debated with interviewees at the
end of interviews in order to obtain their true opinions. I also conducted four group
interviews with members of civil organisations which have been influential in the planning
process. The purpose was to include a variety of opinions for cross-checking the infor-
mation obtained from individual interviewees. Each interview lasted between one and
two hours. The information was recorded in tapes or on written notes. At the end, all
information from interviewees were re-examined with data from other sources.
The analysis of data unfolds in a series of logical stages and bases on different
sources of information. It begins with a historical analysis of the nation-building process
in Singapore and Taiwan, using information from a combination of different kinds of
written sources and documents. The analysis then proceeds to examine the institutional
context for capturing the characteristics of urban policy and the planning regime in both
countries. Three kinds of data are the best sources available for the inquiries: official
documents provided by the authorities; information gathered from press clippings; and
the statistical yearbooks published by the governments and other institutions. In this part
of the analysis, the data compiled from the statistics are disaggregated in order to capture
dimensions of interest to the analysis. The analysis then focuses on major trends in the
planning regime and the property market in the post-1980s era, attempting to find out
the reasons that initiate the change in urban redevelopment policy in Singapore and
Taipei. As the previous analysis already indicates several directions for this part of the
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study, the statistics used here are more specific. In other words, only information that
will yield the most comprehensive explanations are selected.
The analysis moves to the policy-formulation process, linking the evolution of the
conservation movement to the origin of the conservation-based redevelopment policy.
This part of the study relies heavily on the combination of written sources and quotations
of interviews. The interview data are crucial for analysing the decision-making process
because informants' ideological position, behaviour and attitude can be best measured in
their natural setting. However, special attention needs to be paid to the conversion of a
taped-speech into a written text. The conversion is not only about transformation from
oral and often colloquial speech to written text, but is also related to the transformation
from local languages to English. The sentences in the interviewees' speech have to be
carefully reconstructed in order not to lose their original meaning. In a few cases, the
interviewees did not give permission to record the interviews. Their speech can only be
reconstructed from my written notes. Hence, the quotations from interviews are only the
closest possible approximation of what were actually said by interviewees. I have made
maximum effort to conserve the meaning of speech, although some modification and
reproduction are unavoidable.
To understand the social and economic context of the case-study area and the role it
plays in the development process of the city, there follows a historical and spatial analysis
of the locality. The analysis emphasises the historical development of the locality in
relation to the city as a whole. It is heavily based on archives and existing literature. The
statistical data generated from government archives, together with computer files pro-
vided by other organisations, are used to measure the changes in property development,
land use and land values, at city, district and neighbourhood scale. This analysis is
followed by a subsequent study of the transfonnation of historic areas after the planning
process. It mainly relies on primary data collected by field survey. The data on the prog-
ress of restoration, public and private investment in conservation, the use of shophouses
after restoration, monthly rent and the selling prices of shophouses, are used for
measuring the impact of the policy. Moreover, information obtained from in-depth
interviews provides another important basis for the analysis of the role that different
social agents have played in policy implementation.
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1.4 Organisation of the Thesis
This thesis contains seven chapters. This brief introductory chapter presents the research
questions and research design of the thesis. Chapter two sets out the principal concepts
of the study and places them within the context of current debates in the literature. Chap-
ter three is a historical analysis of the nation-building process in Singapore and Taiwan
from economic, social and cultural aspects. The purpose is to provide a perspective of
the major transformation of the nation-building process in the post-1980 era, and to pave
the way for the analysis of the conservation movement and the urban redevelopment
policy developed later. I first discussed the role of the state in the development of the
national economy and the development strategies used to create competitive advantage
in the trend of global capitalism. The conflict and alliance between the state, foreign
capital and local enterprises, as a result of the nature of the political economy, are also
examined. I then make effort to explain the social and cultural context in which the state
obtained relative autonomy to accomplish its developmental goals. In doing so, I explore
the power consolidation process initiated by the state, and the means used to manage its
relationship with political dissidents, the local power elite, ethnic groups, trade unions
and other social forces in society. I also focus on major issues of political and cultural
identities in both countries, unfolding the public agenda for the construction of a nation-
statehood.
Chapter four examines how the alliance of state intervention and economic growth
negotiated through urban policy and spatial development. The main aims are first, to
explore the mutual relationship between construction investment, urban policy and
planning regime; second, to shed light on the very conditions that enabled an alternative
paradigm of urban redevelopment to emerge in the post-1980 era and third, to provide
grounds for the explanation of the consequences of the planning process discussed in the
later chapter. I first examine the cyclical development of construction investment in the
economic context and the role that urban policy played in initiating this development.
The relationship between the state and the market in spatial development is also
analysed. I provide a historical perspective accounting for the development of the
planning regimes in both countries, with particular attention paid to the agendas regard-
ing urban redevelopment in Singapore and Taipei. In the final part of this chapter, I focus
Chapter One
	 24
on the nature of urban planning and the property market in the post-1980 era, explaining
how the underlying logic of spatial development could make the conservation-based
redevelopment policy a practical proposition at this stage.
Chapter five focus on the re-orientation of urban redevelopment policy in Singapore
and Taipei in the post-1980 era. The major purposes are first, to explain the origin of the
conservation movement in the late 1970s and its influence on the transformation of urban
policy. Second, to unfold the interplay of economic interest, political power and cultural
force in the formulation of the conservation-based redevelopment policy. In doing so, I
first analyse, from both structural and historical perspectives, the role of historical heri-
tage in the nation-building process. I then discuss the underlying political, social, and
cultural motivations that gave rise to the conservation movement. I also give a detailed
analysis of the formulation of conservation-based redevelopment policy in the mid-1980s.
Particular attention is paid to the varied interests emerging during the policy-making
process, and also the state's responses to the pressure brought by conflicting interests.
Chapter six reveals the impact of the conservation-based redevelopment policy and
does so through an examination of the transformation of historical urban centres in
Singapore and Taipei. The purpose is to arrive at an understanding of the actual practice
of the policy and a series of external forces that determine the outcome of the policy. I
start with an examination of the historic development of two case-study areas - the
Chinatown Historic District in Singapore and the Dadowchang Special Zoning in Taipei.
I analyse the development of the physical environment and the local economy in these
two historic centres. The changes in land use and property values of both areas are
carefully examined, in order to understand their market position in the process of urban
spatial development. To discover to what extent the development of localities have been
transformed by the policy, I study the progress of restoration and the changes in property
values and land use. This aims to be a straightforward empirical description involving a
vast amount of evidence. I also identify the active agents involved in the planning
process, including environmental groups, land-based interest groups, local community,
and analyse the political, economic and cultural interests of each party. At the end, I also
explain the formulation of these interests and their contribution to influencing the policy
directions.
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This research attempts to explore the interplay of economic interest, political power and
national identity in the transformation of Singapore and Taipei in the 1 980s through
examining the planning process involving the 're-invention' and 're-investment' of the
historical centres of both cities. My objective in this chapter is to develop a theoretical
framework required for understanding this process. The complexity of my research
questions, as demonstrated in the introductory chapter, means that one cannot reach a
satisfactory approach without combining different aspects from various sources of
theories. Thus I travel through four distinct bodies of literature covering discussion of
the nation-state and the construction of national identity; peripheral development and the
capitalist developmental state; the interaction among the state, capital and the production
of the built environment; and the political process of policy-making in relation to the
state and society. The purpose is to try to answer the research questions I posed from
different aspects, and by discussing them subsequently, will piece together a broad
theoretical framework for the analysis.
2.1 Nation Formation: Civil-Territorial or Cultural-Symbolic?
The concept of nation is a modern creation first appeared in the late eighteenth century in
Europe.' The origins of nation and nationalism have been frequently debated. 2 The
creation of modern nation as a new form of political and cultural community, can be
attributed to the search for a new form of group symbolism, as a replacement of
traditional forms of ritualised collectivity (Hobsbawn and Ranger, 1983); the revolution
in the regional division of labour and the control of administration, as an inevitable
consequence of industrialisation and modernisation (Geniler, 1983); and the development
of mass education systems, printing technology and standard mode of communication
For discussion on historical development of the nation see Armstrong, 1982; Gellner, 1983; Hroch,
1985; Smith, 1986, 1991; Seton-Watson, 1977; Greenfield, 1992; Tilly, 1975; Hobsbawm and Ranger,
1983; Hobsbawn, 1989, 1990; Balakrishnan, 1996.
2 The formation of the nation owes much to an 'ideology' to 'invent' the nation which does not exist.
Nationalism is a territorially-based form of ideology and politics linking historically and culturally
defined 'nationalist sentiment' to 'political statehood'. Discussion on nationalism see Gellner, 1983;
Hutchison, 1994; Woolf, 1991; Kohn, 1944, 1965; Smith, 1979; Carlton, 1960; Boyd, 1972
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(Anderson, 1983). However, at the time of the French Revolution, the primary meaning
of nation was political rather than ideological. It equalled the people and the state. A
nation was conceived as a union of individuals governed by one law and represented by
the same law-giving assembly (Kedourie, 1960, p.5). There was no logical connection
between the body of citizens and the identification of a nation on ethnic and linguistic
characteristics. The essential foundation of the new nation was a matter not of identity,
but of political principle and collective citizenry.3
However, since the Revolution, the concept of nation was gradually reshaped due to
the internal struggle and the wars with other nations. The 1795 French Constitution
claimed that the legitimate form of nation was on the basis of 'popular sovereignty'. It
meant that a public vote of the people was enough for its independence and sovereignty
to be recognised (Woolf, 1996, p.10). To divide its enemy states, the French state tended
to convince particular regions with strong identities that any group of individuals who
imaging they belong to the same community should have the right to ask for indepen-
dence. The essentialist conception of nation was firstly justified because for 'the people'
to secure a claim to power, they had to be defined. The late eighteenth century witnessed
a rapid development in understanding the laws of nature. It at the same time stimulated
the enquiry of human species in science and history. There was an explosion of interests
in the evolution of human race and their linguistic and cultural diversity. The definition
and classification of race were investigated and legitimised by scientific laws. In many
regions, the revolution in ethnic consciousness and the demand for legitimate political
expression of ethnic identity crystallised into a desire to create a state on the basis of
ethnic ties. However, it was with the unification of Italy in 1870 and Germany in 1871,
the search for and justification of the ethnic and linguistic roots of nation became
intensified. The German intellectuals sought to defme their sense of nation independently
of the dominant French value of the Enlightenment and the Revolution by arguing that a
nation was the fundamental unit of 'humanity' defined by language, religion, custom and
tradition and race. Its survival was dependent on its ability to control its own affairs.
Under this influence, the concept of nation became closely associated with ethnic,
religious, linguistic and cultural identities (Hobsbawm, 1990, pp. 102-30).
See Renan, E., 1939 (reprinted in H. Bhabha, 1990)
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Historically, the formation of nation can be divided into two routes, depending on the
sovereignty of the state and the foundation of national identity. The first route is the
'territorial and civil' model of nation-formation. The territorial and civil nation relies on a
governed territory and membership in a common political culture for its self-definition.
The sense of national unity is mainly generated by social and political participation,
namely, by the practice of citizenship rights.4
 There are three different forms of citizen-
ship rights: civil rights, political rights and social rights, being developed in different
degree and at different time in history (Marshall, 1973, pp. 65l22).S The practice of
citizenship rights can engineer a sense of belonging and facilitate political and social
integration. However, it seems that the nation-state guarantees citizenship rights but in
very different degrees and combinations, depending on the historical circumstances. For
instance, social rights are emphasised and perform a key integrative function while the
political regimes want to prevent the extension and realisation of civil and political rights
(Barbalet, 1988, p.9!; Giddens, 1985, pp. 203-5). A mixture of citizenship rights thus
can always be found as a result of different regime strategies (Mann, 1988, pp. 188-209).
The second route is the 'ethnic and genealogical' model of nation-formation, which
bases on the transformation of pre-existing ethnie and ethnic ties into ethno-nations. A
nation is generally created through vernacular mobilisation which seeks to bond together
those who deemed to have common ethnic origin, language, culture and historical past.
This process produces an 'organic and mythical concept' of nation, emphasising on
common ancestry and genealogical myth (Kohn, 1967). In practice, the ethno-nation
generally represents the consolidation of a dominant ethnic core and ruling class over
subordinate ethics and classes. This does not imply that members of a nation are not
bound by common duties or do not have uniform citizenship rights. The major difference
is that the unity of the people is not cemented by the idea of common citizenship and
political symbols, but mainly by national myths of origins (Smith, 1986, pp. 101-2; 1991,
p.83).
4 See Oommen, 1997; Turner, 1993; Hall, 1995; Steenbergen, 1994; Vegal, 1991.
Civil rights refer to the rights of the individual; the freedom of speech and faith; the right to own
property; the right to conclude valid contracts and to justice. Political rights mean the right to participate
in the exercise of political power as a member of a body. Social rights refers the right to economic
welfare and security; to share in the social heritage; and to have an acceptable standard of living. See
Marshall, 1973
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Although the debate on the definition and the origin of nation continues, a view
shared by most of the scholarly work is that a nation is a territorially bounded unit of
population which forms a political and cultural community with common symbols, legal
rights and duties for all members. The creation of a nation may follow a civil-territorial
or an ethnic model, or a mixture of both, depending on the circumstances at particular
time in its history. Yet after a nation is formed, it always combines civil-instrumental and
cultural-symbolic means in varied degrees (Breton, 1984, 1988). The territorial and civil
nation requires shared meanings and values to bond all members to society and to tell
them their rights and duties (Bellah, 1967; Coleman, 1974). The so-called 'civil religion',
composing of a set of belief, rites and symbols, is seen as a 'purely civil confession of
faith without which a man can not be a good citizen or a faithful subject' (Rousseau,
1963, p.114). These meanings and values have to be communicated by common
language and culture through an education system. If there are no common culture and
language existing in the political community to reinforce and reproduce the collective
sense of identity of its citizens, they would have to be created (Johnston, Knight and
Kofman, 1988, p.8). Under certain circumstances, the nation-state does not permit its
citizens fully to practice their citizenship rights, or even the practice of citizenship rights
may not be enough to generate a sense of unity. The alternative way of securing national
solidarity is through discovering and revitalising of ethnic ties and sentiments. If there is
no common ethnic experience to serve the required purpose, it will have to be invented.
This is generally achieved by creating 'spiritual kinship' or 'ideological descents' from
similar values and ideals in the past (Smith, 1986, p.134, 147).
A nationalist discourse or any collective discourse is constantly insecure and does not
always have a vision of integrity (Handler, 1988). As the nation-state seeks to promote
one single identity within the bounds of its territory, it could at the same time marginalise
those who refuse to be assimilated or eliminated (Penrose, 1993, pp. 27-47). The self-
construction of nation can stimulate separatism or territorial disintegration while those
who are marginalised seek to promote an alternative construction of the nation in an
effort to change their inferior position. 6 Just as nationalist discourse is a potent force for
territorial integration, as in the formation of the nation-state, it can provide a source of
6 See Anderson, 1985, Johnsonm 1982; Williams and Kofman, 1989; Johnson, knight and Kofman,
1988.
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collective identity opposed to that of the dominant group and offer a rational for some
alternatives of political and territorial organisation (Johnson, 1994, p.54).7
2.2 Inventing Places: History, Symbol and Identity
As the preliminary remarks suggest, nation is not a natural entity but largely an
ideological construction of people and place. Nation is not only something that is
invented by nationalists, but is something that is felt or imaged by its citizens. This
embodies political and cultural projects and the means for putting these projects into
practice. All nation-states want to promote a single identity that bounds its territory. To
achieve this, the nation-state has been deliberately engaged in ideological engineering,
aiming to generate a personal and cultural feeling of belonging to a nation among its
citizens. In the name of social collectivity, heavily centralised versions of culture, history
and geography have been imposed on citizens through the mass media, education system
and administrative regulations (Gellner, 1983, p.169; Anderson, 1989, p.36). The
process has been described by various scholars as 'the production of national myth'
(Citron, 1991); 'the invention of tradition' (Hobsbawn and Ranger, 1983) or 'the fic-
tional ethnicity' (Balibar, 1990). In order to pursue this argument, we need to turn to the
discussion of national identity.
The pursuit of national identity by the nation-state involves endless re-interpretation,
rediscovery and reconstruction of the 'national past' (Wright, 1985; Taylor, 1988).
Every nation edits its own past: a narrative composed of not only the origin, birth,
beginning and ancestry of nation but also of its liberation, decline and rebirth. The
biography is selectively reconstructed on the basis of traditional myths, memories, values
and symbols taken from epics, chronicles, documents or material artefacts of the period,
and then shared by people who have never seen or heard of one another, yet who regard
themselves as having a common history (Diaz-Andreu and Champion, 1996, p.4; Wilk,
1985, pp. 307-26).
' For instance, one part of a nation-state can claim a separate nationhood and the right to a separate
territory, such as the Welsh and the Scottish in the United Kingdom, and the Catalans in Spain. One
ethnic group which is currently split up can claim to its own states, such as the Kurds in Iraq, Iran and
Turkey. People living in one state may assert that they and their territory should be part of another state,
such as the Nationalist in Northern Ireland.
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This is an unique process not only in what the nation chooses to remember, but in
what it feels forced to forget (Lowenthal, 1994, p.50). Some nations emphasis on the
continuity of linguistic and cultural roots for their construction and existence. They claim
themselves to be rooted in the remotest antiquity and insist on the continuity of their
history. These so-called 'memory nations', attempt to make people believe their commu-
nity has existed for many centuries; thus nationalism has its roots in the past (England,
1992, pp. 299-320). However, history is not always a matter for congratulation, but is
also comprised of shameful episodes and tragedies. Some nations want to emphasise
themselves as standing at the starting point of a new era. They launch massive efforts to
break with the past and to construct as great a distance as possible between the old and
the new eras. The solution often lies in altering their names or changing their time
consciousness by declaring the year of independence as the time of their birth
(Lowenthal, 1985, pp. 105-13; Zerubavel, 1981, pp. 82-96). In this view, people are
bound together as much as by 'forgetting' as by 'remembering', a process that is describ-
ed as 'collective amnesia' (Anderson, 1989). However, it seems that the 'national past' is
not a given, but forever re-invented to answer the present needs and aspirations. The
connection between present and past is a source of power, the power to offer legiti-
macy.
A nation needs proud icons to give a visible unique aspect of the state. The visible
symbols of national identity are not only comprised of holy flames, flags and material
relics, but above all monuments and landscape. It is argued that a nation is not simply
located in space, but often finds its unifying symbols and criteria of 'belonging' in the
particular landscape of its territory (Anderson, 1988, p.1 8). For instance, almost every
nation praises its special landscape features in its national anthem. The Americans have
sought to promote certain type of landscape images, such as the 'Great Desert' or thern
'Wild West'. The English have often found their unique identity in the 'English Rural
Landscape'. Landscape images, often reproduced and interpreted by a cultural elite in
their paintings and texts, are archetypal icons valued by the nation (Lowenthal, 1994, pp.
15-2 1). Recent writings have suggested that public monument is another means of the
S A great number of studies have been carried out in England (Daniels, 1993; Matless, 1990; CoIls and
Dodd, 1986); Wales (Gruffudd, 1995); Ireland (Nash, 1993b); Canada and the United States
(Holdworth, 1986, Zelinsky, 1986, 1988); Europe (Lowenthal, 1975, 1994); Japan (Takeuchi, 1994) and
Indonesia (Ragaz, 1994).
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self-expression of a nation and its dominant political power. The mass production of
public monuments in capital cities such as Moscow, Berlin and Rome by the totalitarian
regimes, has been an important source for understanding the emergence and articulation
of a nationalist political discourse (Hall, 1988, pp. 175-202). To demonstrate the value
of the political regime and national pride, public monuments have often been built in a
setting which allows them to be seen from a vast distance. Furthermore, public monu-
ments have been the centre for practising a powerful 'ritual complex': festival pavilions,
display of flags and gun-salutes. Public monuments have been normally located in
superficial space where collective participation in public festivals, meetings and cere-
monies can take place. Through collectively participating in rites and ceremonies, the
people can come to feel a sense of national pride. In this view, public monuments and
superficial space have combined to create a sacred place for 'national worship', a place
the mass become 'nationalised' (Mosse, 1975, p.7; p.50).
A nation also needs visible icons to remind people their common heritage and to
anchor national myths in shaping national identity. The ideological fUnction of landscape
is significant. Even in the modern time, places are named to remember ancient tribes and
deeds, or perform as sites of shrines, reminding people of memorable events, such as
battles, the birth a saint, or the death of a local hero. These places are 'maps of meaning',
forming the visual foundation for national myths (Clark, 1976; Jackson, 1989). The
development of archaeology has been closely linked with national myths. 9 The material
relics discovered by archaeologists then displayed in museums can provide the visible
evidence for the national past (Mangi, 1988). The appearance of the nation-state since
the late nineteenth century created the notion of 'national antiquities', stimulated the
establishment of museum institutions, and turned the study of antiquities into a scientific
discipline. From that time onwards, many nation-states have administered the studying,
teaching and research of archaeology with a very clear aim of restoring the original
documents and to create national history. However, while archaeologists look to justify
the ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious or cultural roots of their nation, the emphasis of
archaeology depends on specific symbols adopted as the basis for the definition of the
nation. Some nations pay particular attention to race and ethnie. Archaeology thus has
General discussion see loll, 1990; Veit, 1988; Arnold, 1990; Kristiansen, 1992; Diaz-Andrru and
Champion, 1996.
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been used as a means of finding ancient human remains to justify the presence of a
particular race in a territory. Other nations might emphasise history and culture. The
material relics discovered by archaeologists thus have been used mostly to demonstrate
the continuity of traditions or languages.
The historical built environment is both an important evidence of history and a visible
icon for a nation. It provides the ground for a nation to relate ancient customs, tradition,
culture and civil conditions to its present nationalist discourse. The power of the histori-
cal built environment in the nation-building process has been best illustrated by the post-
war reconstruction of some Polish and German cities (Diefendorf, 1990). It is argued
that in these cities, the maintenance, restoration and recycling of buildings and townscape
are results of the anxious call for national memory. However, not all of the historical
built environment is to be preserved. As mentioned before, the 'past', that the historical
built environment represents, has to be carefully selected to fulfil the nation's current
purpose. Historic preservation thus has been greatly manipulated by the nation-state. In
most of the cases, the nation-state tends to enhance its own monuments but plays down
or destroys those with opposing values.'0
The above discussion suggests that every nation-state intends to create one single
identity out of individual differences, class cleavage and cultural diversity which are the
reality of most national population. However, it is misleading to think that popular
consciousness would be easily manipulated to suit the needs of the nation-state, readily
absorbing concepts like nationalism and patriotism. In most of the circumstances,
people's identity is variable, overlapping and situational (Young, 1976, p.65). It can be
combined with nationalist sentiment, or be in conflict with it in varied ways. Hence, it is
important to consider the self-understanding of the people in a meaningful interpretation
of history and symbols. The process by which national identity become constructed and
reproduced through history and symbols is complexly negotiated, and involves not just
the efforts of the ruling elite to secure ideological control. Historical and spatial icons are
also the 'field' in which people's collective identity is constructed and communicated
(Winbery, 1983; Johnson, 1995). They could constitute a radical and subversive entity,
defining people's sense of culture alienation. From this view, they are particularly crucial
for ethnic and other groups whose autonomy is limited and who want to resist the official
'° See Miliward, 1984; Brunn and Williams, 983; Kalman, 1982; Tunbridge, 1984.
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definition of the nation that has excluded and marginalised them. A struggle over the
interpretation of historical and spatial icons ultimately becomes a struggle over political
power (Duncan, 1993, p.247).
2.3 Nation-State or 'State without Nation'?
The formation of nations in Asia has been conditioned by this region's conflicting nature
of geo-political politics (Antlov and Tonneson, 1995, p.12). Nations such as China,
Japan and Thailand were formally sovereign and independent. The emergence of nation-
alism in these countries in the early twentieth century was a result of the resistance to the
spread of Western imperialism (Dates, 1985; Grabowsku, 1995; Duara, 1990). They
became modern nation-states through cultural self-determination and transformation of
the previous political system. This process needs both the inclusion of significant ethnic
minorities and the modernisation of the bureaucratic state (Ali, 1993, pp. 3-21). How-
ever, most countries in Asia were formally colonised by the great imperial powers." The
nation-building process is more complicated than is assumed in the conventional routes
of nation-formation.
First of all, the boundaries of these colonies were decided by the diplomatic relations
between the great powers (Anderson, 1991, pp. 178-85). They were thus arbitrary
creations and made no reference to the political and ethnic conditions of local societies;
the existence of many social groups with highly diverse ethnic origins, religions and
languages, as a product of formal patterns of migration and settlement (Hodder, 1992,
p.28). Hence, many different ethnic cultures were forced to be governed by one single
administration, or one ethnic culture was forcefully split by territorial boundaries. The
colonial regimes might have prevented the surface of ethnic conflicts through their skilful
administration or repression. Yet they could not eliminate the pre-existing regional
difference within their territories.
Many ex-colonies sought to eject foreign rule and substitute a new state for the old
colonial territory after the Second World War. During their independent movements,
nationalist sentiment played an important part in mobilising social movements and in
The British established a general control over the Malayan Peninsula and the northern coast of
Borneo. The East Indian archipelago was occupied by the Dutch. The French dominated the mainland
Southeast Asia. The Spanish and the Americans controlled the Philippines.
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stimulating the transition to independent statehood. In much the same way, the concept
of 'self-determination', which served to inspire mainstream nationalism, stimulated sub-
national sentiments among ethnic groups. The ideological, regional and ethnic conflicts
began to unleash (Leifer, 1971, pp. 11-50). After independence, a new nation was
created within the territorial form established by colonialism, and thus was obliged to
take difficult political situations as given. With only a few exceptions, the nation-state
was faced a monumental task in creating a nation from among the many diverse elements
of its plural society (Yadav, 1986; Bahadur, 1986). Those who seized power came to
realise that any interpretation of origins that had concrete reference to the past was likely
to stimulate as much as tensions as harmony because of the diversity of cultural differ-
ences involved. The move towards a national unity could intensify group tensions with
society and lead to so-called 'nationalism within nationalisms' (Geertz, 1973, Pp. 237-
45). Hence, once formal independence was achieved by nationalist movement, it is not
clear how far these earlier expressions of nationalistic sentiments have survived to
become the basis of state-formation (Tarlor, 1976; Prasad, 1976; Weidemann, 1991).
The reality of 'state without nation' made it inevitable that the political elite in these
post-colonial states looked for alternative models of national integration (Bhambhri,
1986; Case, 1995; Pabottingi, 1995). The concept of nation adopted by the ruling elite
was basically civic and territorial, aiming to bring together disparate ethnic populations
into a unified political community. National identity was rarely constructed on a single,
clearly bounded culture group to which all citizens claim membership. Some nations
adopted a dominant-ethnie model, in which the new national identity was built on the
basis of the culture of the core ethnic community. Others sought to create a supra-ethnic
political culture for the new political community. This model contained a number of
equally small ethnic communities and there was no dominant ethnie (Smith, 1991, pp.
110-16).
However, for many countries, the more practical way to achieve internal solidarity
was to establish a viable and integrated political order in its territory and society, rather
than waiting on the attainment of national identity. The process of state-building was
perceived as the primary instrument of nation-building. They became so-called 'state-
nations', heavily relying on a strongly developed administrative apparatus to achieve
political integration (Giddens, 1985, p.Z72). The development of a centralised bureau-
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cracy often led to de facto one-party, one-leader state - a central and hierarchical
authority with power concentrated in the hand of its 'benevolent dictator'. The state
often became obsessed with exaggerating the threats to national existence, whether real
or imaging, in order to justif' their internal control (Christie, 1996, p.23). Moreover,
there was always a temptation for one state to adopt an aggressive foreign policy and to
make short-term internal political gains by exploiting the ethnic difficulties of a neigh-
bouring state (Morrison and Suhrke, 1978; Leiferi, 1983). The political regimes in these
countries thus devoted great efforts to develop military capacity while seeking to
neutralise the effects of such action of others. This reflected and reinforced the general
atmosphere of insecurity across the entire geographical region. The turbulent nature of
the regional politics in turn justified the use of organised violence or strict political
control by the repressive state.
2.4 Developmentalism and the Construction of Statehood
For many of the post-colonial states, one of the major obstacles to political integration in
the beginning was the stagnation of the economy (Mortimer, 1973; Nartsupha, 1978;
Arief and Sasona, 1980). It is widely recognised that material deprivation and appalling
human conditions can easily give rise to a rejection f the political regime and to attempt
at its overthrow. Thus, the common problem for the ruling elite in these countries was
how, within a limited space and time, to engender popular support of citizens who were
not only diverse in identity but also frustrated in terms of material expectation. For some
post-colonial states, the urge towards economic development was a logical consequence
of national impetus. In order to pursue this argument, we need to turn to the issue of
peripheral development, which is equally important for the post-colonial states but is
rarely been systematically discussed by scholars engaged in debate on nation-building.
2.4.1 The Enquiry of Peripheral Development in the Global Economy
In the view of many Latin American scholars and neo-Marxist writers on imperialism,
economic development in developing countries did not arrive as assumed in the writing
of neo-classical economists. Many developing countries in Latin America suffered from
the decline in primary export prices and worsening balance of payment crisis, followed by
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war-time disruption and continuing shortages of manufacturing imports. These problems
were seen to be caused by the unequal trade relations between the industrialised and the
developing countries in the capitalist system (Prebisch, 1950; Baran, 1957; Frank, 1969).
The trade pattern created an exchange system by which the advanced capitalist countries
could extract raw material from the developing countries and sold them manufacturing
goods in return.' 2 Accordingly, the developing countries encouraged specialisation in
production of agricultural and mineral commodities for export, and heavily relied on
income generated from these primary products for capital accumulation. Their incentives
for industrial development were undercut by the import of manufacturing goods from the
industrialised countries. Their productive apparatuses were mostly controlled by foreign
capitals. The expansion of exports required the continued acceptance of the products in
the centre. All these created the reliance on core market, capital and technology in the
long-run. The expansion of production in the developing countries thus was externally
conditioned, depending on the development and expansion of core economies. The trade
relations produced exploitation and stagnation rather than growth in the developing
countries (Baran, 1957; Frank, 1969; Amin, 1974; Emanual, 1972).
To escape deteriorating trade relations, some developing countries, such as Brazil,
Mexico and Argentina, adopted an import-substitution strategy for industrialisation. This
meant to replace industrial import with domestic industrial production under tariff
protection. The state used policy instruments, such as offering subsidised credit, con-
trolling competing imports, regulating entry to the industrial sector, providing a captive
market for domestic products, in order to assist domestic industrialisation. This strategy,
usually covered industries which produced non-durable consumer goods, appeared to
generate promising results in the initial phase. These countries displayed a relative rapid
growth of the manufacturing sector. Yet after the satisfaction of the market demand for
these consumer goods, industrial growth began to slow down. The tariff protection in-
evitably created monopoly rents or scarcity premiums. The domestic capitalists formed
'distribution coalitions' and engaged in lobbying or corruption to capture the rents. As
12 It is argued that the real wages and domestic costs of production in the two contexts were different, so
were the income elasticity of demand for primary and manufacturing goods. The industrialised countries
drew the developing countries into a system of 'unequal exchange', through which economic surplus
was extracted from the periphery and kept in the centre in the form of profit and higher wages. See
Emrnanual, 1969, 1972; Amin, 1976.
Chapter Two
	 37
the state was captive to these coalitions or exposed to the ravages of rent-seeking
activities, its policy instruments became less and less effective (Krueger, 1973; Olson,
1982). Mostly importantly, import substitution still required heavy inputs of foreign
machinery, technology and raw material. This led to fiscal deficits in a form of repeated
balance of payment crises. Some neo-Marxist economists thus arrived at a conclusion:
economic development of the peripheral countries in a world capitalist system was
entirely dependent on the industrialised countries. Such a conceptualisation, which
became known as the 'dependent theory', suggests that the more dependent they were
on the capitalist advanced countries, the less the chances of their survival as independent
nations (Baran, 1968; Frank, 1969).
However, there was a growing evidence showing that some developing countries
were actually able to breaking the bond of dependence by achieving some degree of
industrialisation (Santos, 1969; Evans, 1979; Cardoso, 1979). The dependent nature of
the developing countries within the world capitalism needed to be redefined. An alterna-
tive conception of the peripheral development appeared in the late 1 960s, suggesting that
the developing countries could achieve some forms of development by using the dynamic
of the increasingly diversified system of the global economy. As an alternative explana-
tion to the dependent theory, the concept of 'dependent development' did not imply this
is a phase that all peripheral countries would be able to reach. Dependent development
was possible only if there was a strong nation-state carving out space for local capital to
play in the global economy. Some empirical evidences indicated that in these countries,
the nation-state formed a 'triple alliance' with multinational companies and the local
bourgeoisie, and adopted a development strategy of domestic industrialisation which
could serve the interests of both parties (Evans, 1979; Gillespie, 1984). The effectiveness
of state intervention led these countries into a 'semi-periphery' position in the world
system of economy (Wallerstein, 1974). Their development experiences opened a new
room for studying of the role the state played in pursuing economic growth. I will
discuss this in more detail in the next section.
Although the theories of dependent development and world system addressed the
possibility of development in the periphery countries, the opportunity seems to have been
conditioned in the structural change of global capitalism. The change in the origin and
destination of foreign investment as a result of the increasing globalisation of production
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in the 1 970s, paved the way for the rapid industrialisation of some developing countries.
A growing number of manufacturing firms in the industrial advanced countries found
their operation become less profitable. They started to restructure themselves through
changing the production techniques, developing new products, or creating new regimes
of regulation. Some of them began to look for less-expensive source of labour and more
profitable conditions for production overseas. The globalisation of capital markets and
the advance of communication technology both enabled manufacturing firms to formu-
late a new production system through global corporations. Many firms moved to certain
developing countries in order to entry the market, or to exploit cheap labour to produce
goods for re-export to the home country or to the third market. This led to an integration
of different types of labour, who received divergent levels of wages and located in
various parts of the world, into corporate orgamsations operating on a world scale
(Frobel et al, 1980; Blueston and Harrison, 1982; Myilas, 1982). In this view, it is the
decentralisation of the manufacturing industry by multinational corporations from the
core countries makes industrialisation in the peripheral countries possible.
2.4.2 The Capitalist Developmental States in the Asian Context
There have been a number of Asian countries taking advantage of the changes in the
global economy to enter into rapid industrialisation process since the 1970s. The
economies of Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea have grown at spectacu-
lar double-digit rates. These countries have increased their capacities to meet develop-
ment objectives, obtain full employment and maintain lower levels of income inequality
(Field, 1984, pp. 74-83). Their common experience has challenged the conventional
wisdom of dependency theory and has led to a major rethinking of the position of the
developing countries in global capitalism) 3 Their success has been associated with the
inflow of foreign investment, caused by the relocation of manufacturing firms, parti-
cularly those in the textiles, garments and electronics sectors, from the core countries to
the peripheral countries (Deyo, 1981, 1987; Gereffi, 1982). All of the four countries
have relied on foreign investment in the export-oriented manufacturing sector for
obtaining their economic growth (Henderson, 1989; Scott, 1979). The price and quality
Johnson (1982) and Henderson (1983) on Japan; Amsden (1990) and Luedde-Neurath (1988) on
South Korea; Amsden (1985), and Gold (1986) on Taiwan
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of labour force in these countries have been considered to be other crucial factors for
their development. The presence of vast reserves of cheap and disciplined labour has
provided these countries with a major competitive advantage in developing labour-
intensive manufacturing industries. The later stage of development has more relied on the
availability of educated labour for producing higher value-added goods. These countries
have been able to offer highly skilled engineers and technicians at lower wages through
social reproduction provided by the state (Heyzer, 1986; Henderson, 1989).
However, it should be noted that there are several pre-conditions for these countries
to achieve success. They are ex-colonies which have been able to take advantage of their
colonial heritage during their post-war development.' 4 Taiwan and South Korea experi-
enced agriculture reform, primary industrialisation and infrastructure development under
the Japanese control. They inherited a well-established industrial infrastructure, an
effective agricultural extension system, a highly-organised health service and an educated
populace. Hong Kong and Singapore were entrepots and naval stations under the British
control. As centres for international trade, they both inherited the notion and practice of
modern capitalism and benefited from pre-existing networks of trading houses and
specialised services. They were also endowed with an elaborate bureaucracy and a well-
functioned legal system in the post-war development. The geo-politics in this region also
helped to create the ground for industrial development in Taiwan and South Korea. Due
to their privileged status - as front-line allies against Communist expansion - in the post-
war US security arrangement, Taiwan and South Korea received massive foreign support
in forms of financial aid and military presence. Financial aid in particular, relieved the
burden of the huge defence budget in both countries, and helped them quickly recover
from the devastation caused by the war. Financial aid was the major source of domestic
capital formation in their initial stages of development, enabling both countries to grow
without the usual balance of payment constraints.'5
The early remarks already suggest that development in the periphery countries largely
depends on whether the nation-state has learned how to use the dynamics of global
capitalism for its own development purposes (Evans, 1979, p.33). The growing aware-
ness of the significance of state intervention has encouraged many scholars to explore the
'4 Amsden, 1979, 1985, 1989; Cumings, 1987; Gold, 1986; Haggard, 1986; Myers and Petries, 1984.
' Lim, 1982; Amsden, 1979, 1985; Riedel, 1988; Wade, 1990; Haggard, 1988; Little, 1979.
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nature of the state in the Asian context. They have found that Japan's development
experience could offer an interesting illustration. The feature of the Japanese state has
been the prototype of the 'capitalist developmental state'. The state has been constituted
of a group of development-oriented elite, for whom to break out of the stagnation of
dependency and under-development has been a 'national goal'. It has had a higher degree
of bureaucratic autonomy to protect its development objectives from giving away to
political pressures which might undermine long-term national economic growth. The
state has encouraged a close collaboration between the public and the private sectors
through a powerful planning agency or board. It has heavily invested in health and
education, and has applied policy measures to ensure equal distribution of the wealth
gained through high-speed growth. It also has used incentives and persuasion rather than
commands so that economic intervention has been based on the price mechanism of the
market rather than administratively assigned prices. The intervention of a development-
oriented state, rather than a free-market regime, has been the driving force of Japan's
economic growth (Johnson, 1982).
The concept of the 'capitalist developmental state', although extrapolated mainly
from the Japanese experience, has been applied to explain state intervention in Singa-
pore, Taiwan and South Korea (Vogal, 1979; Johnson, 1982; Dove, 1986). The creation
of the developmental state in these countries owed much to the geo-political context of
their birth. These countries started from volatile social and political situation as a result
of tensions and conflicts in geo-political politics. After the Second World War, Taiwan
was under the military threat of China as a result of the split between the communist
party and the nationalist party ending in a communist victory. Singapore declared its
independence from Federal Malaysia and was threatened by Indonesia's aggressive
foreign policy. Korea also struggled to solve the confrontations between communists and
non-communists, but was fmally divided as a consequence of the United States - Soviet
Union conflicts. The initiate stage of the nation-building process was characterised by
territorial struggle, ideological conflicts or ethnic tension. Under the threat of internal
divisions and external enemies, the state-building process seems to have been the key of
survival for these countries.
Hence, in these countries, the state needed to display its power to resist external
threat, and its ability to keep the whole country together. It also needed to demonstrate
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efficiency and performance - a success of some kind. For the state elite, this could be
achieved by delivering a economic miracle and a fair distribution of the created wealth
(Fukui, 1992). The primary aim was not only to help the whole country break away from
external dependence and internal under-development, but also to ensure internal harmony
by mobilising the whole populace into a collective process of building a 'rich and strong
country'. Hence, to become competitive in the world economy, for these countries, is not
only a 'national goal', but first their way of 'surviving' (Castells, 1992; Wade and White,
1984). Namely, the state pursued development objectives, and heavily relied on
economic development to secure political legitimacy and to assert national identity.
Economic growth in these countries is not achieved through the mechanism of the
free operation of the market, as assumed in neo-classical economic theory.' 6
 It depends
on the capitalist developmental state manipulating and influencing the economy in order
to realised national aims. 17
 The state has responded to and anticipated opportunities in
the new international division of labour, set up long-term development objectives,
adjusted itself to changing market conditions, and directed capital and labour out of
declining sectors and into more competitive ones. The state's intervention has not only
aimed to remove serious obstacles to economic development, or to dilute the effects of
market failures, but to ensure the international competitiveness. As such, the state has
directly invested in education, human skills, technological innovation and physical assets,
to reduce the cost of production. It also has taken major decision in disregard of short-
term efficiency as indicated by existing factor prices. Through manipulating the factor
prices, it has created a comparative advantage for the industrial sector in the world
market. The law of the market thus has been operated under the constraints of guidance
imposed by the state. The so-called 'governed market', does not rely on direct state
'6 Writing from a neo-classical paradigm, various scholars considered the performance of these countries
as a result of free-market capitalism. The state intervention in the market is relatively limited. It does not
control over resource allocation, but aims to provide a suitable environment for capital to perform their
functions. In doing so, the state adopts more relative market-oriented policies by liberating import,
keeping realistic exchange rate and providing incentives for exports. The major drive of economic
performance is due to the action and efforts of the private sector responding to the situation in the free
market. It is the 'free-market' approach chose by these countries made development experience standing
in contrast to countries such as India, Indonesia and Communist China, where national economic
heavily relied on central planning. See Viner, 1953; Bauer and Yamey, 1957; Rostow, 1961; Chen,1979;
Porter, 1990; Little, 1979; Fei, 1983; Balassa, 1981; Bhagwati, 1978; Milton and Friedman, 1980;
Patrick, 1977.
' 7 Deyo, 1987; Morishima, 1982; Wade and White, 1984; Evans and Alizadeh, 1984; Amsden, 1989.
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ownership of key industries, but a solid state-business partnership, in which the state has
had the upper hand over local firms and foreign capital (White and Wade, 1984, p.5).
The effectiveness of state intervention does not only need an elaborate, efficient
administrative apparatus, but a regime which can resist pressure brought by interest
groups and can effectively control labour.' 8
 The capitalist developmental state is a
'strong state' which is not bounded by interest groups or rentseeking activities) 9
 This
character is built up in very unique circumstances: massive social dislocation which
weakens existing patterns of social control; the existence of serious military threat from
outside, which increases the demand for asserting political order throughout society;
support from the international system; the existence of a group of bureaucrats who are
independent from interest groups; and skilful leaders whose ideology favours strong state
control (Migdal, 1988). Most importantly, the state has obtained its sovereignty without
relying on the support of the existing powers in local society. Therefore, it has been able
to resist influences from external forces. The state has had very high degree of autonomy
and authority to define national goals. It also has had unusual power to get those goals
accomplished, without having to enter into the power negotiating process (White and
Wade, 1988).20
The capitalist developmental state is also an 'authoritarian state' for which repression
is a means that necessary to achieve political stability and long-term predictability of the
system. The state has placed strict control on the trade unions and the political
opposition. The use of organised violence to overwhelm the opposition has been very
often when integration by persuasion fails. It has prevented social groups emerging from
acquiring autonomy from the state. However, to what extent the state needs to rely on
authoritarian intervention has been determined by the existing or anticipated crisis in
18 Amsden,1985; Barrett and Chin, 1987; Johnson, 1982, 1987, Evans, 1987; Deyo, 1987b; Wade,
1988,1990; Winckler and Greenhalgh, 1988.
19 The distinction between the 'strong state' and the 'weak state' is subjective, but basically these two
kinds of states differ in their capacity to handle the pressure put on them.
The existence of the 'strong state' is the critical point that differentiates the development experiences
between the Asian NICs and other developing countries. For instance, in many Latin American
countries, the state came to power in situation where existing groups already had considerable autonomy
from the state and a capacity to exercise influence against it. The state could only put it down by the
exercise of great violence. Under these circumstances, the state had a very limited autonomy from the
interest groups.
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historical circumstances. 2' Recently the state has gradually recognised that the exclusive
reliance on repression is costly and does not always convey the image of political stability
required to attract foreign investment. It is anticipated that the repressive and authori-
tarian regime will be modified through the use of political devices such as democratic
constitutions.
2.5 Investing Places: Capital, the State and the Production of
Built Environment
2.5.1 The Periodic and Locational Switch of Building Investment
The production of the built environment is seen as one element of the productive forces
of the capitalist economy. Land and real estate have been created as commodities and
scarce resources in a capitalist system through the operation of the market. The
development of land and real estate does not only provide necessary infrastructure for
production but itself can contribute to generating surplus value and realising profits.
However, the demand for capital investment in the production of the built environment
has its fluctuation over time. The 'building cycles', also known as waves of building
investment associated with the 'Kuznets cycles', span between sixteen and twenty years.
They exist between the short-run movement of the business cycles (seven to eleven
years) and the vely long Kondratiff cycles (over fifty years). As a form of capital
investment, the production of the built environment seems to have a subtle relationship
with the logic of capital accumulation. There are three different propositions pertinent to
the present discussion on this articulation: 1) the production of the built environment acts
as a parallel circuit to that of industrial production, serving the cyclical needs to offset
the decline of profit; 2) it mainly plays a secondary role in capital formation, assisting the
circulation of capital between the circuits; 3) it operates according to its own logic and
sometimes can be contradictory to that of capital accumulation.
21 Japan has used the least amount of political authoritarianism to achieve stability for economic growth.
It has been termed as 'soft authoritarianism' to distinguish it from 'hard authoritarianism' in countries
such as South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (Johnson, 1987, pp. 140-47).
For discussion on the building cycles see Dewey and Dakin, 1947; Long, 1940; Gottlieb, 1976;
Cooney, 1960; Lewis, 1965.
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The growth of building investment is seen as a rational response to the continual
need for capital expansion. Profit-making is essential in the capitalist production process,
since it provides the main source of accumulation fund and will give industrialists the
incentives to reinvest. Yet there has always been a cyclical decline in profit rate, caused
by the internal contradictions of capitalist production, such as the rise of organic
composition of capital, the imbalance between aggregate demand and supply, the
shortage of labour, or the changing balance of power between workers and capitalists.
Accordingly, the entire accumulation process slow down. For capitalism to reproduce
itself, the accumulation process must be sustained. Hence, as the profit rate in one sector
of the economy is falling, it is likely that there will be some attempt to shift investment to
the most profitable opportunities. The solution for a falling rate of profit in the primary
circuit of production has been found in a 'secondary sector', involving the production of
the built environment, the extraction of urban rent, the setting of land values and the
organisation of urban space for collective consumption (Lefebvre, l97O).
The production of the built environment could be a supplant of the 'primary circuit of
capital', or even be a dominant sphere of capital formation. The construction industry
itself employs an immense and low-paid labour force and has low organic composition of
capital - both can help to counter the tendency of the decline of profit. The expansion of
the construction industry and real-estate development can stimulate the demand for the
products generated by industrial production, thus can help the expansion of certain
sectors of the manufacturing industry (Baran and Sweezy, 1966; Ashton, 1978). Also,
the built environment has the ability to be turned over to a variety of uses when the
present use is no longer adequate. During the recession, the barrier presented by the
fixed capital in the built environment can be more easily broken down. As the profit
obtained in industrial production declines, industrialists seek for steady, secure and the
highest rate investment in the built environment for their capital. The transition from
In the capitalist production process, industrialist put its capital into a production process in which
commodities are produced through a mechanism consisting of labour power, means of production and
raw material. After production, industrialist will sell commodities to gain not only the initial payment
but extra amount, surplus value. For discussion on different approaches to the decline of profit rate in
this process see Devine, 1986; Wolf, 1987; Reati, 1986.
' Lefebvre's work has been summarised in the writing of Harvey 1982, 1985; Soja, 1989 and
Gottdiener, 1987.
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industry-based production to urban-based production is describe as 'the urban
revolution' (Lefebvre, 1970, pp. 260-65).
The second proposition sees the production of the built environment playing a
secondary role, only responding to the over-accumulation crisis in the primary circuit.
The accumulation process of capitalist production depends on a number of factors: the
existence of a surplus of labour, the good access to further supplies of the means of
production such as machines, raw materials and physical infrastructure, and the well-
functioned market to absorb the increasing quantities of goods which are produced. As
mentioned previously, the accumulation process is rarely smooth but constantly creates
contradictions, such as the over-production of commodities due to the competition
between capitalists, the falling rate of profit caused by the price mechanism and the
increase of real wages, or the accumulation of surplus capital (money capital) because of
the lack of profitable investment. Hence, there has always been a tendency to over-
accumulation in which too much capital is produced with respect to the opportunities to
reinvest that capital profitably. The crisis must be resolved if the capitalist economy is to
continually survive (Harvey, 1975a, 1982).
The over-accumulation tendency can be temporarily overcome through the circula-
tion of capital, namely, through the switch of capital from the 'primary circuit' of
industrial production into the 'secondary circuit' and the 'tertiary circuit' . This
circulation is mediated by financial capital which can move more freely and can provide
the necessary support at the initial stage of investment (Harvey, 1975b, Hula, 1980). The
'secondary circuit', also known as the 'property circuit', is specially addressed to land
and real-estate development (Walker, 1981, p.384). There is some evidence suggesting
that the surplus capital of productive sector moves into the production of the built
environment, particular on the eve of a crisis (Whitehand, 1972, pp. 39-55). From this
point of view, there must be a surplus of capital in the primary circuit of production, in
order for capital to flow into the production of the built environment. The production of
the built environment is determined by the rhythm and periodicity of capital circulation.
Industrialists will tend to increase their surplus value gained from production process. The surplus
value is either consumed by industrialists or is reinvested (accumulated). For a brief discussion of
classical Marxist theory of accumulation see Devine 1986, PP. 4-5.
The secondary circuit consists of the formation of fixed capital and consumption fund. The third
circuit comprises investment in science and technology, and a wide range of social expenditures. See
Harvey, 1982.
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The third proposition provides a different view from the previous assumptions. The
production of the built environment is seen as having its own dynamic, and is to a large
extent independent of the logic of the primary circuit of production. The property circuit
is unstable and contradictory in nature. As mentioned before, the primary source of
building investment is mediated through the operation of financial capital. Financial
institutions, including commercial banks, insurance companies, investment trusts and
mortgage companies, extract their capital from a variety of sources and channel them
into property development for profit gain. The formation of the credit system, the
movement of the interest rate, and the growth of money supply thus can affect the
various waves of investment in the building environment. Also, financial institutions
make individual decisions of where and when to invest. Although they seek the high-rate
of return for their investors, depositors and shareholders, their decisions can sometimes
be irrational from a cost-accounting and profit-making approach. There have been
extremely irrational swings in land and real-estate investment. Moreover, land and real-
estate development has always offered an incentive to a variety of investors, including
landlords, developers, home-buyers, for their personal gains. The different factions of
interests involved in the built environment add swings in the investment in the property
circuit (Feagin, 1987, pp. 179-82).
The property circuit does not necessarily aid the primary circuit as assumed. It should
be noted that capital invested in the built environment is fixed and immobilised for a long
period of time. The unplanned growth and unproductive development of the built
environment both will exaggerate the crisis in the primary circuit. The over-investment in
the built environment can raise the cost of industrial production and force the relocation
of certain industries. This is particularly significant during the property boom, which is
often accompanied by the excessive supply of space, high inflation, and rise of the
interest rate (Gottdiener, 1987, pp. 192-94). The investment in the property circuit can
reach its limit when investment is no longer profitable. For instance, the built environ-
ment no longer serve current use and return profit, yet they can not be removed easily,
especially when land is monopolised by private owners, or the existing physical assets on
land have not run out their economic life. This ties up land over a long period in one
specific use. Therefore a physical asset becomes the 'prison of capital' (Harvey, 1975a,
p.13), acting as a barrier to further growth.
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It seems that the production of the built environment has a double-edged effect, can
assist accumulation, or can be barriers to accumulation and in turn cause further crisis.
The over-accumulation crisis can occur in the secondary circuit as that in the primary
circuit. The crisis needs to be solved for the property circuit to perform its function. The
saturation of investment in the property circuit has been resolved by a process of capital
devaluation (Smith, 1982, PP. 140-50). That is, a substantial devaluation of the exchange
value of physical assets which destroys the value and opens longer-term possibilities for
investment. Hence, there has been a periodic and systematic shift in the location of
capital investment in the built environment. The socio-spatial outcome of this process is
the uneven development of space and the differentiation of ground rent (Walker, 1981,
pp. 384-410).
The ground rent surface of the city, as assumed in neo-classical theory, is an outcome
of the myriad decision of individuals, each seeking to satisf' his own interest. The prices
of land in any location in the urban area are subject to first, the scarcity of similar plots or
location and the buyers' willingness to bid for land. Individuals and firms seek a location
which can minimise their operation costs (land rent and transportation cost) and
maximise their benefit. Land value is at a peak at the urban centre with a declining
gradient on all sides toward the periphery. However, there is some empirical evidence
suggesting that the ground rent structure is highly even, reflecting on a bimodal curve of
ground rent declining with increasing distance from the centre (Hoyt, 1933).V The
differentiation of ground rent structure in the city is associated with the shift of capital
investment between the suburbs and the inner-city area. The valley curve is deepened and
broadened as a result of the general expansion of the urban area, in particular the
development of the suburbs (McDonald and Bowman, 1979). It indicates that as capital
flows into the suburbs and looks for available land for investment, the substantial
devaluation of the land in the inner city takes place (Davis, 1965; Edel and Sclar, 1975).
The valley identified in the land value curve exists in places between the core and the
outer areas of the city, with the large concentration of deteriorating housing and lower-
income population. The physical deterioration in the inner-city area experiences different
stages. First, the selling prices of houses decline after one cycle of use. Second, the old
27 Land value refers to the price of undeveloped plots and the expected income from their use. Property
value is the price when a building is sold, including the value of the land (Hoyt, 1933).
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houses are converted to rental rather than be repaired by landlords, and property values
constantly fall down because of under-maintenance. Third, the decline in property values
is intensified by the operation of real estate agencies who buy houses cheaply and sell
them at inflated prices. Fourth, the local housing market is hindered as large institutions
cease to supply mortgage to these areas. Finally, substantial abandonment occurs since
landlords are not able to claim enough rent to cover the necessary costs. The decline of
the built environment leads to the ground rent capitalised under its current use being
substantially lower than that could potentially capitalised (Smith, 1979a, pp. 543-45).
However, the under-development of land lays the foundation for new investment. As
land rent continually drops, a 'rent gap' - the disparity between the land rent from the
present land use and the potential rent from the higher use, is formed. It opens new
room for reinvestment. There has been a growing evidence suggesting that a 'back to the
city movement' emerged in numerous cities in North America and Europe during the
1960s and the l97Os. This movement contained a rising flow of property investment
and affluent residents returning from the suburban area back to the city - generally to
some areas located within two or three miles commuting distance from the core, or some
areas with historical and aesthetic significance. 3° This has caused an upgrading process of
environment involving different degrees and types of physical changes: the construction
of new buildings on previously developed land, the rehabilitation of existing housing
stock, or the conversion of industrial and commercial land into residential use.
However, it is clear that spatial development does not take place everywhere at the
same speed or in the same direction. Where the capital will flow into depends on the
spatial patterns and the ground rent structure created by the foregoing development. The
profit appreciation from the disparity of land rent provides new investment opportunities
as capital flows into those areas where the rent gap is wide enough. The 'rent gap' is
Capitalized ground rent is the rent the owner claims from the user for offering the use of the land.
Potential ground rent is the higher rent can be claimed by offering the land for its best and highest use.
See Smith, 1979a.
See Hamnett, 1973, 1976; Williams, 1976; Hamnett and Williams, 1979, 1980; Laska and Spain,
1980a; Smith, 1979b; Zukin, 1982; Ley, 1981.
° In Black's (1975) survey of one hundred and forty-three cities in America, almost half of these cities
experienced some degree of housing renovation in older areas during the period 1968-75. Housing
rehabilitation was particularly occurring in small enclaves located close to the CBD. Almost two-thirds
of them were historic districts and renovated through government's conservation designation and
subsidy for housing improvement or rehabilitation. For a general discussion see Zukin, 1987; Kasinitz,
1988; Maher et al, 1985; Levy and Cybriwsky, 1980; Tournier, 1980; Ferris, 1972; Lees, 1994.
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considered as the key factor determining the timing of re-investment in the inner-city
area. Yet the timing of each turning point: from building depreciation, the decline in
capitalised ground rent, rent-gap expansion, and finally to rehabilitation or redevelop-
ment, has still been largely depending on the real circumstances of the property market
(Clark, 1988; Badcock, 1989).
2.5.2 The Role of the State in Capitalist Space Economy
The role of the state in capitalist society, as assumed in social democratic theory, is to
sustain the condition of production for the national interest in the growth of national
wealth, and to counter the imbalance of the market system through its distribution
policies. The state is seen as an institution separated from the economic system, and so
has the 'neutrality' as a political institution. The state is a means of regulating and facili-
tating the operation of the private market, since the market itself worked imperfectly for
new development. To maintain the market's efficiency, the state uses urban planning as a
device to renovate the spatial organisation of the city for new uses, to ensure allocative
efficiency, also to free up land for more profitable investment. The state also operates to
ensure distributive justice. It acts as a supplier of public goods and services, with the
aims of countering social-economic imbalances caused by the imperfect market mecha-
nism. The allocation and distribution of resources are seen in the general interest of
society.3'
This view has been criticised by scholars whose work is based on the Marxist
tradition. The state is seen as shaped fundamentally by an underlying logic of capital
accumulation. The state operates to counter the tendency of the decline of profit rate and
to resolve the crisis of capital accumulation. Hence, the neutrality of state intervention is
limited. The main function of the state in capitalist society, in broader terms, is to create
favourable conditions for the capitalist economy, such as maintaining capital accumula-
tion, eliminating cyclical influence and defusing social discontent. By doing so, the state
takes on many of the functions of the capitalist, in an attempt to avert an economic crisis
' For a review of the debate on the role of the capitalist state see Bonedeld, 1987; Jessop, 1988; Clark,
1988.
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and to stabilise the class struggle. From this view, the state acts as an instrument of
capitalist interest (Miliband, 1969, 1973).
To assist capital accumulation, the state takes actions to stabilise and rationalise
capital investment in the primary circuit. 32 If the over-accumulation crisis occurs in the
primary circuit, the state assists the circulation of capital between circuits by its policy
measures. As noted earlier, investment in the secondary circuit, in particular, needs
money supply and long-term commitment. If there is no certainty that investment in the
secondary circuit can be productive, excessive capital tends to over-accumulate in the
primary circuit instead of moving into the secondary circuit (Harvey, 1978a, p.107).
Hence, the flow of capital from the primary circuit to the secondary circuit can not be
accomplished without certain institutional factors surrounding regulation, subsidisation
and taxation. There also should exist a functioning capital market and a state that is
willing to finance and guarantee long-term, large-scale construction projects. The state-
controlled financial institution often acts as a cdllective 'nerve centre', governing and
mediating the flow of capital. The state also plays a substantial part in creating a
favourable environment for investment. It provides extensive funds for infrastructure
development, transportation system, urban renewal and new town programmes. Tax
concession and special credit arrangement are also given to home-owners and the
construction industry. Sometimes the state even applies relative weak planning regulation
to reduce the costs of property development (Feagin, 1987, pp. 173-89).
However, while social democratic theory overestimates the autonomy of the state,
orthodox Marxist theory under-estimates the possibility of that autonomy. There are
many different capitalist interests involved in the production process. The state has to
unify the divergent factions of the capitalist class by assisting capital accumulation in the
long-run, even against the immediate demand of different factions pursuing their own
short-term interests. The state also has to satisfy popular aspirations which necessarily
conflict with the interest of capital. From this view, the state is not autonomous but
reflects the balance of power among classes. It acts as a regulator of class interests but
its decisions work in the long-term interest of monopoly capital (Poulantzas, 1969).
An alternative approach, although inspired both by social democratic and Marxist
theories, has firmly rejected to interpret the state from purely capital logic. The state
32 See Harvey and Chatterjee, 1974; Preteceille, 1973; Scott and Roweiss, 1978.
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takes actions to secure the condition for capital accumulation, but at the same time it
avoids compromising legitimacy by identifying itself with any particular interest. This is
because the state cannot guarantee the condition for capital accumulation without
securing social consensus and social integration among citizens. The state has to ensure
acceptance of law and order and thereby create a stable environment for capital invest-
ment. It also need to secure the basic welfare of the people, especially those who are
vulnerable and who therefore are most likely to attack the capitalist system. The
integrative function of the state, as a means of reconciling conflicting interests and
reproducing the cohesion of society as a whole, should be redressed (Offe, 1972;
Habermas, 1973; Gold, Lo and Wright, 1975).
The state has dual functions: legitmation and accumulation. It attempts to fulfil two
distinct and contradictory functions through its public expenditure (O'Conner, 1973, pp.
103-57). The state uses 'social capital expenditure' to assist investment in both capital
production and labour force. This category is consisted of social investment, social
consumption and social expense. Through social investment, the state helps to increase
productivity and reduce the cost of fixed capital. thereby stabiising the fall of profit rate
in the primary circuit. Through social consumption, the state reduces the necessary costs
for the reproduction of labour power which should be borne by industrial capital, thus
prevents the rise of organic composition of capital. Through social expenses, which are
mainly military and welfare expenditures, the state plays down the struggle of the
working-class and maintains social harmony (Gough, 1975a, 1979).
The dual function of the state reflects on its provision of goods and services for
'collective consumption' (Castells, 1977). Through organising and subsidising public
goods and services, such as housing, transport, health service, education, training and
research facilities, the state helps to counter the falling rate of profit in the private sector,
to combat under-consumption, and to stimulate the demand in the economy. The
provision of collective goods and services is also necessary to regulate the process by
which labour power is reproduced. It transfers the costs for the reproduction of labour
power to society as a whole through the mechanism of public fmance. The social wage is
used to supplement real wages in the productive sector, and helps to reduce the social
cost for reproduction. Most importantly, through providing basic welfare and encourag-
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ing home ownership, the state wins popular support and effectively deflects political
pressures (Gamble and Walton, 1976; Ball, 1978).
From this point of view, the state has become an organic element for both economic
and social reproduction. However, the selection of a particular type of accumulation
strategy is decided politically, according to the need to secure social-bases of support for
that strategy. The realisation of an accumulation strategy is always based on a compatible
political-ideological 'hegemonic structure' or 'hegemonic project' (Hirsch, 1983; Jessop,
1983). The 'hegemonic project' is exercised through specific political, intellectual and
moral practice, aiming to mobilise support for state actions and to provide the motives
and opportunities for popular participation in the pursuit of development goals. It can be
concerned with non-economic objectives, including military success, social reform,
political stability or moral regulation, or broader issues grounded in the field of civil
society and the state (Jessop, 1990, pp. 207-9). The policies pursued by the state to
sustain accumulation are always the contingent results of the political process of the
state, determined by its own political priorities.
The state, as a bureaucratic form of domination, can be explained not only by the
interest it serves, or the economic function it performs, but in terms of its function as a
political institution which is designed to maintained the stability of the whole social
system. The state can act in the interest of capital, but in certain circumstances it can
pursue its own interest, which is, a framework to hold the state and society together. The
autonomy of the state, however, seems to be inherent in the structural relationship
between the state and society.
2.6 The State, Society and the Political Process of Policy-Making
The policy-making process of the state, according to traditional liberal democratic
theory, is based on a political division of labour. The decision is made by elected repre-
sentatives rather than through the widespread participation of the mass. The state is seen
as an institution outside civil society - neutral in its function and independent of any
particular interest. The neutrality of the state is guaranteed by its absolute control of
organisational and political resources, also by the electoral process which provides the
mass necessary means to decide who should be position of power. However, when one
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uses the concept of 'the state', it is not 'a state' that acts but rather the institutions and
individuals who comprise it. The state has heavily relied on a bureaucratic system of
administration to take on its responsibilities. 33
 The tendency towards concentration of
power on officials, who derive their power from a hierarchically organised bureaucracy,
has been evident. The exercise of power by the officials is seen as legitimate and accept-
able by the mass since theoretically, they will make the decisions which are responsive to
the changing needs of the majority.
It is also argued that the state elite do not necessarily coincide with effective power.
There are groups behind the scenes who exercise their influence on politicians and
bureaucrats, making them to accept or to reject certain actions. From this point of view,
the analysis of policy-making should distinguish those who hold formal positions of
power from those who might be in a position to exercise power or control local decision-
making by virtue of their social or economic position in the community. The earliest
debate on the community decision-making involves competing elitist and pluralist
approaches. The elitist interpretation explores the influence on the decision-making
process from the outside of the state apparatus. It is argued that the decision-making
process is basically elitist, not only subject to the control of politicians and bureaucrats,
but to a group of socio-economic elite (capitalist and land-owning class) or a series of
elite with different resource bases (Hunter, 1953; Mills, 1956). The pluralist interpre-
tation, on the contrary, suggests that different interests are active in different issues.
Although power is often concentrated in the hands of a limited number of people, it will
be very difficult for any of them to maintain and to endure control over all resources.
Thus, the actual exercise of power is dispersed amongst them over time and over
different issues (Dahi, 1969). The issue that this debate raises, has encouraged three
different theoretical assertions of the policy-making process: the neo-plurist, the Marxist
and the corporatist models of policy-making.
It is argued that the concentration of power in the elected politicians and bureaucrats
has caused the alienation of groups and individuals from the decision-making process.
The government has taken care of dominant interests related to the local economy, land
It is argued that in order to deal with the increasing complexity of modern society, the state has to be
rationalised. The increasing demands of 'expertise' to run the government and society resulted in the
development of a bureaucratic authority in which full-time and salaried officials are employed to help
the elected representatives. See Weber, 1978.
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use and property development, but has neglected those related to welfare issues. As a
reaction to these circumstances, pressure groups and neighbourhood organisations
representing particular interests or areas, have become more organised and articulated.
They have actively engaged in local politics, forced the local government to adopt
policies that are in their interests. In many places, they have succeed in deflecting the
authority from its intended course or shifting the direction of policy. The competition
between diverse interest-groups has occurred not only at national level but within the
local community. The state must maintain a balance between competing interests, in
order to achieve a base of support also to avoid future conflicts. The decision-making
thus has been characterised by a continuous process of discussion, negotiation, co-
operation and agreement among different groups in society, with no group be able to
dominate others.35
The analysis of the influence of pressure groups on the policy-making has heavily
drawn on the basic assumption of pluralist theory. This interpretation has many
weaknesses. First, the 'political inactivity' of ordinary people seems to be norm rather
then exception in many liberal democratic societies (Miller, 1986; Boaden, 1982). The
government has a tendency not to respond to the demands made by the less powerful
groups. Although sometimes they may be pushed to establish committees or to issue
inquiries for diffusing tension, the issues can be suffocated before they reach the political
agenda, so that 'the decision is not even taken'. As a result, the less powerful groups find
it very difficult to see that their access to local decision-making is ensured and their
interests are protected. They gradually lose interests and withdraw from any forms of
political events or activities. This 'non decision-making' process explains how these
groups can be effectively prevented from engaging in political action (Bachrach and
Baratz, 1970, p.30). Second, although competing interest groups or factions are crucial
to democracy since they can divide up power and reduce the exclusive influence of any
group or class, there are certain pre-conditions for their existence. There must be several
See Clavel, 1986; Molotch and Logan, 1990; Molotch, 1990; Castells, 1983.
See Dennis, 1972; Hague and McCourt, 1974; Simmie, 1971; Fagence, 1979.
Pluralist theory is based on an interpretation of the political system of modern societies which
emphasizes the competitive nature of group interests. Pluralist theory assumes first, people have equal
bargain power; second, competition and participation occur between organised groups not individuals;
and third, no single elite can dominate decision-making in every substantive area. See Olson, 1968 and
Kariel, 1961.
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political groups competing for power; opportunities for organised groups to access to
the political system; active individuals who are willing to participate in organised
activities; election as an available instrument of mass participation in political decisions
(Presthus, 1970, pp. 109-10). Thus, it would be misleading to assume that a pluralist
model of decision-making can emerge without a consent of democracy in society. Third,
the interest groups referred to by pluralist theory, are not equivalent in their power. The
control of resource itself is a capacity for political action. Those who control the critical
material sources are those who enjoy the most efficient contact with the government and
those who can obtain access to useful information (Saunders, 1983, p.23). These groups
retain decisive advantages in their ability to bring influence to politicians through public
participation. The less-advantaged section of the community may lack of the privileged
access to information and are less able or willing to respond.
The upsurge in the neo-Marxist literature has laid down a considerable challenge to
those who wish to interpret the policy-making process in liberal democratic terms. From
the orthodox Marxist perspective, the state is run by a class-conscious political elite
acting on behalf of monopoly capitalist interest. It is not a neutral agent but rather an
instrument by which capitalists can achieve and reproduce their domination. This argu-
ment has been rejected by Marxists who are particularly concerned with the question of
the 'relative autonomy' of the state. That is, to what extent the state can act indepen-
dently of or against dominant capitalist interests (Poulantzas, 1973). As the capitalist
class is to some extent divided, the state is seen as an instrument of mediation and
negotiation between the different factions of capitalists and between the various demands
necessary to their collective interest. Its decisions and policies work in the long-term
interest of monopoly capital but sometimes are relatively autonomous of immediate
capitalist needs. Although state intervention is designed to secure the general interest of
capital, the state will sometimes be obliged to respond to the interest of other classes,
even against the interest of monopoly capital. It may also impose certain policies on
capital when it anticipates trouble from the working class, or may act in the interest of
the working class as a result of successful mobilisation in protest or election. The state
serves to play down the working-class struggle through short-term comprises and
reforms (Lojkin, 1976, 1977a).
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Although the Marxist perspective provides an assumption of how the state operates
in capitalist society, it can not furnish a satisfactory explanation of the complexity of
state activities. The state is a framework for the exercise of power. It has a selective
mechanism through which to filter the demands of society in accordance with its own
political priorities. Drawing on elements of both pluralist writing and Marxist ideas, the
'corporatist' or 'contract' model of decision-making has provided an alternative explana-
tion. It is suggested that the need to secure the conditions for accumulation and legitma-
tion has forced the state to intervene more directly and to bargain with organised
interests (Winkler, 1976). The state establishes a corporatist decision-making framework
in order to mediate various interests and to co-ordinate their activities. This framework
enables conflicts over competing interests and demands being resolved without threaten-
ing the stability of the entire political system. This framework is also highly selective, as
certain organised interests are granted privileged access to the policy-making process and
are made co-responsible for the implementation of decisions. Such licensing is granted on
the basis of adherence to certain norms defined by the state, even if this would shadow
the immediate advantage of organised interests (Williams, 1985, pp. 68-9).
The corporatist model of decision-making enables certain interest groups and state
agencies entering into a closed process of bargaining over public policies. Public policies
thus are the outcome of managed bargaining between representatives from different
authorities and civil organisations. The access to and the distribution of key resources
have been controlled by those 'gatekeepers' or 'urban managers', who act as mediators
between the central state, the private sector and the demands of the local population
(Pahi, 1975, p.l2l ). The selective process of corporatist decision-making has given the
'growth coalition' a privileged position. In an urban setting, the growth coalition is
formed by influential actors such as financial capital (bank and trust companies), real-
estate interests (developers, construction companies and landlords), local media and
utility companies. This so-called 'urban growth machine' gains more from intensive use
of land and property and will seek growth at any cost (Logan and Molotch, 1987,
See Schmitter, 1974; Wolf, 1977; Grant 1985a; Saunders, 1986; Cawson, 1982; Harrison, 1984
These gatekeepers are a rang of individuals in the public and private sectors, including local authority
bureaucrats, technical experts, social workers, building society managers, etc. See Ford, 1975; Elliott
and McCrone, 1975; Danies, 1972; Young and Kramer, 1978.
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p.52). As the politicians are driven to made decisions which favour the interest of the
'urban growth machine' in their community, the 'anti-growth coalition', generally formed
by pressure groups and neighbourhood organisations, can at best gain short-term
victories. The corporatist policy-making is seen as another way to formalise the 'informal
privileged access' of certain interest groups, and to legitiniise their political influence on
policy-making (Stoker, 1988).
However, recent studies of urban politics have suggested that the function of the
state should be distinguished from the form of the state. It seem that different levels of
the state have different political process and interest being involved. The main function of
the central state is to maintain capital accumulation. Hence, policy measures have been
more concerned with economic expansion on a national or international scale, with its
decision-making process largely controlled by the ruling class or capital interest. From
this point of view, the policy-making process of the central state has been closer to a
corporatist model. The major function of the local state is to enhance the legitimacy of
the capitalist system, i.e. to secure social consensus and social integration. The local state
thus has to take account of the balance among all relevant interests. Its policy measures
have been more concerned with consumption and welfare services, which are directly
associated with working- and middle-class interests. Local politicians represent different
constituency interests have sought to gain benefit from the territories that return them to
power. The decision-making process of the local state has been more pluralistic and
subject to effective challenges from popular demands (Saunders, 1986).
2.7 Conclusion
The above discussion suggests that as a form of state intervention, the planning policy
for the transformation of historical urban centres can be read from two different aspects.
One is the invention and interpretation of 'historical and spatial icons'. The other is the
intervention in 'the production of the built environment'. The motives and consequences
of this planning policy can be the outcomes of the interplay of different mechanisms.
There are a number of empirical studies in the USA (Elkin, 1987; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Stone,
1980, 1989) and in the UK (Dannis, 1972; Dunleavy, 1981; 1990; Goldsmith, 1980; 1990; Blower,
1984; Davies, 1972; Wates, 1976; Harding, 1990).
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This planning process, as an attempt to preserve the historical built environment, can
be related to three different theoretical assertions. First, this planning process can be an
integrative part of the ideological construction of the nation-state. The nation state, as
mentioned previously, tends to use a mixture of two instruments - civil-territorial and
cultural-symbolic - to perform the key integrative function of society. The latter involves
the construction of identity on the basis of common history, shared culture or ethnic ties.
Hence, at a particular time in history, the nation-state may use historical and spatial icons
extensively in order to engender a sense of national pride, remind people of their
common heritage, and anchor national myth in shaping national identity. Second, this
planning process can be seen as one part of a hegemonic project of the capitalist state.
The early remarks suggest that the official interpretation of history always answers to the
present needs and aspirations of the state. The attitudes and values, which were asso-
ciated with the legacies of the past, can be fashioned and mobilised as cultural sources,
enabling and constraining individuals and institutions to operate in certain ways. They
constitute the base for moral exercises or regulations, thereby enabling the state to
enhance the unity and coherence of society or to mobilise support for new accumulation
strategies. The invention of historical and spatial icons can be closely associated with the
creation or reproduction of legitimacy for the capitalist economy. Third, this planning
process can be seen as an outcome of power negotiation between the ruling class and
those who refuse to be dominated. Historical and spatial icons can be used to legitimate
the statue and power of certain groups or interests in society. Yet they can also provide
important sources of collective identity and political action for those who have been
marginalised in political and cultural spheres. Hence, the questions of what to preserve
and who decide have always reflected the nature of political authority and power
structure within the state and society.
This planning process, as a form of state intervention in the production of the built
environment, has its unique features. The policy itself indicates the re-valuation and re-
use of the physical environment with peculiar visual image and aesthetic value, without
increasing floor space and the density of activities on land. This strongly implies a
rejection of the intensive use of land, and a preference of controlled growth. However, as
a form of state intervention in capitalist space economy, this planning process can be
related to two theoretical assertions. First, this planning process can be an integrated part
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of a new accumulation strategy, aiming to counter the crisis in capitalist production. The
logic of building investment in the capitalist economy, as discussed previously, has been
closely associated with the cycle of capitalist production. As a source of capital forma-
tion, building investment can contribute to the continue need for capital accumulation,
serve as an instrumental device to offset the decline of profit in the primary circuit of
production, or work in its own logic which can be contradictory to capital accumulation.
The state intervention can play a part in stabilising and rationalising capital invested
within the circuits or capital circulated between circuits, or in countering the effects of
market failure. Second, the intervention in the production of the built environment can
also be an element of a 'hegemonic project' of the capitalist state. The state intervention
also has ideological function. To remove obstacles to political stability and economic
development, the state needs to secure social consensus and to facilitate social inte-
gration. The peculiar 'anti- growth' or 'controlled growth' ideology embodied in this
planning process can play down political pressure and diffuse social discontent, thereby
the process of accumulation can proceed again on a new social basis.
This planning process is also a political and bureaucratic process involving the
exercise of power and the competition among interests. The process by which national
identity become constructed and reproduced through historic and spatial icons is
complexly negotiated, involving the effort of the nation-state, and the struggle of groups
whose autonomy is limited and who have alternative version of national identity. Like the
interpretation of historical and spatial icons, building investment also involves different
factions of interests, including financial institutions, property developers, real estate
agencies, landlords and individual investors. Hence, this planning process is not only an
action of the state, but an outcome of the interaction of a wide range of social actors,
who are divided by their political belief, socio-economic class and cultural identities. The
way this policy is formulated and implemented provides a way to understand the
domination of political powers and the exercise of citizenship rights, thus giving strong
indication of the structural relationship between the state and society.
The discussion also provides a way of understanding the structural interconnections
between economic interest, political power and national identity in the Asian NICs'
peculiar context. The nation-building process of Singapore and Taiwan is operated
through three sets of key mechanisms. As post-colonial states, they have combined civil-
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territorial and cultural-symbolic instruments in their own way in order to create political
and cultural communities out of their local societies. As capitalist developmental states,
they have developed strong apparatus with bureaucratic autonomy to defme national
strategies in pursuing capitalist development. As authoritarian states, they have obtained
sovereignty without depending on existing social forces or popular movement, and have
relied on repression and ideological control to secure political legitimacy. These three
sets of mechanisms, however, can be related to each other on both theoretical and
empirical levels.
Many post-colonial states were born in a highly complicated geo-political context.
The boundary of the nation and the sovereignty of the state are mostly artificial creations,
having little relevance to the existing social forces and group identities of local societies.
As nation-states, they have experienced great difficulty in creating one single identity
from among the many diverse elements of the plural societies. Hence, the civil-territorial
and cultural-symbolic instruments of nation-building are constantly insecure, having a
positive effect of national integration, but also a potential risk of territorial disintegration.
For these countries to survive as independent political entities, the states need to
demonstrate the ability to resist external threats from neighbouring-states, and also to
keep the whole society together. Many states have established themselves as strong
apparatuses with centralised bureaucracies and military capacities. For the ruling elite,
the main strategy to achieves internal integration is through buiLding the state as a
supreme power and as a proud icon of national identity. The state-building process thus
became the foundation of nation-building process.
Many post-colonial states have attempted to demonstrate an achievement of some
kind, such as breaking away from dependence and under-development. The ideology of
development has dominated the policy agenda and played an integrative function for the
nation, since the nationalist discourse is insecure in its nature. Some countries have taken
advantage of colonial heritage, foreign aid and the dynamism of global capitalism, in
order to enter a rapid industrialisation process. The lack of connection between the state
and society in turn gives the state relative autonomy to define development strategies
without entering into the power-negotiation process with social forces. The strongly
developed administrative apparatus is able to organise labour and to prevent the surface
of political powers. The effectiveness of state intervention in both economic and social
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spheres has increased the chance to succeed in the competition under global capitalism.
Although the authoritarian regime has been justified by the 'crisis mentality' embodied in
the state and society, it has inevitably repressed the practice of civil and political rights
of citizens to a great extent. This can in turn threaten the very foundation of a political
community, as assumed by the civil-territorial model of nation-formation. However,
through the success in maintaining political stability and economy development, the state
has satisfied citizens' rights to economic welfare and personal security. The restriction on
the practice of civil and political rights has been compensated by the highly-developed
social rights, which has engendered a sense of unity on the basis of common interest.
However, these mechanisms of nation-building are highly dynamic. They can be
coherent at particular time in history, also contradictory to each other at another time.
There is also a room for dissociation or inconsistency among them in specific conjunc-
ture. First, the existence of these mechanisms is also externally conditioned, heavily
depending on the dynamism of global capitalism and the geo-political politics of the
region. The constant changes in both spheres, for instance, the directions of foreign
investment or the balance of political and military powers, can support or destroy the
grounds of economic development and authoritarian control. Second, the fundamental
conflicts presented in the initiate stage of the nation-building process may be temporarily
repressed but not eliminated. They can surface again due to the change of historical
conjuncture, or stay as a hidden mechanism, countering the attempts made by the state to
enhance internal integration. There are also new forms of conflicts emerging, since new
socio-economic divisions have been created by the logic of the capitalist economy. All
these could combine to create new challenges to an authoritarian regime and further, the
social and ideological bases of a developmentalist regime. Third, the capitalist economy
is a cyclical process, having boom and recession periods. During the downturn of the
economy, the developmentalist promise of further material rewards will lose its credence.
Although the ideology of development has effectively mobiised the population into a
collective process of pursuing growth, it along is not sufficient to sustain an unified
identity over a long period.
Here we begin to understand the nature of crisis in the Asian NICs' context. As
nation-states, they need both civil-territorial or cultural-symbolic instruments to bind
people together. The states may still emphasise on the development of social rights
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through wealth creation. Yet in the long run, they might have to adjust themselves and to
seek integrative elements from other grounds. They might encourage social and political
participation by permitting citizens more civil and political rights; use national myths and
symbols to enable the people to participate the worship of the nation; or create a
collective discourse by recovering pre-existing ethnie or inventing national history and
tradition.
This planning process is conditioned in the interplay of economic interest, political
power and cultural identity on both structural and institutional levels. To describe the
structural interconnections of these mechanisms in specific time-space settings, we first
need contextualised knowledge of the development strategies of the state, the relation-
ship between the state and society, and the ideological construction of nation statehood.
We then will have to describe the influence that these mechanisms produce on the
institutional setting, namely, on the logic of urban policy, planning regime, property
market and cultural practice, in particular time and space. The internal dynamics and
conflicts of these institutional factors will also create the very conditions shaping the
planning process. As a form of state intervention, this planning process is composed of
three separate stages: the process of policy decision-making, the formulation of planning
strategies, and the implementation of these strategies. Hence, they can be influenced
respectively by structural and institutional mechanisms, and can perform different kinds
of regulative functions. Finally, all these observations will have to be brought back
together to a number of contingent related factors, such as individual decisions, which
can be discovered through the empirical studies. We also have to bear in mind that there
could be no one to one correspondence between a structural mechanism and an
observable outcome. Through comparison, we might be able to identify empirical regula-
tions and uniqueness, which are necessary for overcoming the difficulties of concep-
tualisation.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE AND THE
NATIONAL BUILDING PROCESS
3.1 Introduction
In an inquiry into sets of circumstances under which urban policies are formulated and
implemented, this chapter takes the first step in analysing the nature of the nation-
building process in Singapore and Taiwan in two main sections. In each section, I start
with an analysis of the development strategies formulated by the state in order to make
the economy successful in the trend of global capitalism. I then focus on the means by
which the state organised society in order to get their development strategies accom-
plished. This inquiiy brings to the fore an analysis of the power negotiating process and
the relative position of each of the social forces vis-à-vis others. I then study the ways
national identity was constructed during the nation-building process. A major theme of
this section is to discuss the political and economic purposes lying behind the ideological
construction of the state, and the reason that a particular kind of official ideology was
needed in certain historical circumstances. All these are necessary for the contextual
analysis to be developed later. The narrative in this chapter starts with a discussion of the
events that occurred after the Second World War. Particular attention is paid to some
major changes in the historical process. I do not pretend to offer an exhaustive descrip-
tion. Several issues raised here may be not directly relevant to the basic arguments
advanced; but they will be eventually be brought together in the following chapters.
Singapore
3.2 The Developmental State in the Global Economy: Singapore's
Openness to International Capital
Singapore is an island with limited natural resources and a small internal market. The
negative side of such a small domestic market was the insufficient demand and the
attendant difficulties of achieving cale economics and cost-competitiveness. Since
Singapore was cut off from Malaysian markets and raw materials in 1965, an import
substitution strategy was rendered completely unworkable. The only option left at this
stage was to take the advantage of its location and to create a local environment which
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could inspire foreign investment, since it could provide the means to attain rapid
economic growth. Singapore's out-looking strategy soon found itself a growth niche in
the post-war era, during which many industries in the industrialised countries were
enthusiastically in favour of investing abroad and reaping the profit from advantageous
local conditions. Singapore leaped at the chance to develop its national economy on the
basis of the expansion of export-oriented manufacturing industries and related business
services for the world market)
The state apparatus, influenced by the British bureaucracy, was fairly sophisticated
and efficient. Through monopolising major financial devices and implementing a tight
monetary policy, the state was able to control real wages, the inflation rate and the
foreign exchange market, thus creating a stable fiscal policy and an institutional environ-
ment for investment. Several public agencies, such as the Economic Development Board
(EDB), the Jurong Town Co-operation (JUC), the Development Bank of Singapore
(DBS) and the Institute of Standards and Industrial Research (ISIR), were established
under the state (Low et al, 1993).2 Major economic plans and policy measures were
formulated and implemented by these public agencies. They altogether executed a
difficult task aiming to make the industrial environment as conducive as possible for
investment activities.
As a major port, Singapore had certain locational advantages for some industries
such as shipbuilding and repairing, along with steel mills linked to its position in the
waterway. These heavy industries had been developed during the colonial period. The
EDB intended to transfer Singapore from a refining and shipment location for the main
oil operations to a major manufacturing base for oil rigs and electronic goods. According
to its long-term strategic plan, the emphasis within the manufacturing sector shifted from
the traditional shipbuilding, repairing and steel industries to the petroleum, machinery
and electronic industries. The petroleum industry in particular, was considered as the
main driving force for the industrialisation of Singapore (Koon, L., 1980).
1 Discussion on Singapore's export-led economy see Chen, S. 1983; Haggard and Cheng, 1987; Lim, L.,
1983; Krause, Koh and Lee, 1987; Mirza, 1986.
2 These development agencies also own several subsidiaries outright and hold large shares in a number
of companies. In the early 1980s, there were eight organisations and 450 commercial enterprises being
under state management.
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To create a favourable environment for foreign investment, the EDB also produced
plans for the liberalisation of the economy and to provide investment incentives to
foreign firms. Several policy measures had far-reaching influences, for instance, to invest
in physical infrastructure such as industrial and business estates, port and air transpor-
tation facilities, telecommunication and auxiliary services; to initiate an institutional
reform whereby foreign capital could have one hundred per cent ownership, full repa-
triation of profits as well as enjoying other benefit, such as the maintenance of a free
port, free convertibility, no exchange control in the entrepot, tax exemptions and export
incentives; to create a non-inflationary public finance regime on the basis of the budget
surpluses, a tight monetary policy and state intervention in the foreign exchange market;
to improve social infrastructure by investing in education, health, social service and
housing, and by intensifying the internal control of ethnic groups and labour (Chen, S.,
1983, pp. 3-3 6).
Foreign investment played a key role in developing Singapore's export-oriented
manufacturing industries. About two-third of foreign firms were from the United States,
Europe and Japan. They had developed a network of subsidiaries and joint ventures in
Southeast Asia, and wanted to use Singapore as a base for material or services needed by
their industrial plants in this region. Foreign investment was directed into the industrial
sector, in particular the petroleum, electronics, mechanical engineering, chemicals, trans-
portation equipment and food industries. Foreign investment accounted for 86 per cent
of total investment in the early 1970s, and 40-50 per cent of it was in the petroleum
industry (Haggard and Chen, 1987, p.106). Petroleum industry exports accounted for
38.4 per cent of total manufacturing output, 18.4 per cent of value-added, and 30 per
cent of total exports at the end of the 1970s (Wilson, 1972; Amjad, 1981; Garnaut,
1980). The derived energy products served labour-intensive industries, in particular the
machinery and appliances industry. This industry, with its core in electronics, represented
25 per cent of manufacturing output, 32.3 per cent of value-added and 45 per cent of
total exports (Mirza, 1988, pp. 89-96). At the end of the 1980s, foreign firms repre-
sented 25 per cent of the total manufacturing establishments and generated 58 per cent of
employment, 68 per cent of value-added, and 87 per cent of direct exports (Deyo, 1989,
p.23)
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The industrialisation strategy, which was in favour of export-oriented investments,
began to create serious structural obstacles for local firms (Deyo, 1981). Local firms,
referred to by the government as the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) sector, mainly
concentrated on the tertiary sector, such as trading, finance, real estate and transpor-
tation. Throughout the 1970s, these local businesses did not receive more than 20 per
cent of government incentives. Although businesses in the SME sector were traditionally
strong, they found themselves in great difficulty in competing with foreign firms,
especially in the key sectors of the economy. The SME sector however, accounted for 46
per cent of employment, 31 per cent of total value added and 20 per cent of direct
exports at the end of the 1970s. But, their share of total output in the manufacturing
sector fell from 61 per cent in 1963 to 21 per cent in 1983 (ARC, 1985).
Despite the oil crisis and the world-wide recession, Singapore's GDP growth re-
mained very high - about 16.4 per cent in average - throughout the 1970s. The labour
force participation rate reached 63.8 per cent. The inflation rate was kept consistently
under 6 per cent except for a short period in 1973-74 (Appendix 1.1). However, it seems
that export-led growth, which heavily depended on the large reserve of labour to keep
wages below market level, was not without constraints. After the late 1970s, Singapore
began to experience an increase in real wages. As labour costs continued to rise and
labour became increasingly scarce, a number of foreign firms directed their investment to
neighbouring countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia (Pang, E. and Tan, C., 1983;
Pang, E.,1985). The take-off of manufacturing industries in some Asian developing
countries threw a dark shadow on the key sectors of the Singapore economy, such as oil-
refining, textiles and the processing of primary products. The shipbuilding industry was
also faced with strong competition from Japan and South Korea. GDP growth in the late
l970s, which was far below 10 per cent each year, demonstrated the slowdown of the
economy. The share of gross domestic capital formation in GDP fell to 33.3 per cent in
1977 - 10 per cent less than that in 1971 (Appendix 1.1).
A state-led economic restructuring took place in the late 1970s in view of the fact
that labour-intensive industries began to experience increasing difficulties in competing
with the second wave NICs in the world market. The state acted with determination in
1979 to diversify and upgrade the existing economic system. The main aims were to
transform production structure from traditional manufacturing industries and business
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services to advanced services and high-technology industries, thereby taking Singapore
out of competition with other lower-wage countries and reducing the reliance on labour-
intensive industries for economic growth.3
To dislocate labour-intensive industries, incentives previously given to assembly
operations, such as components production in electronics, were gradually withdrawn by
the government (Pang and Lim, 1977). The government also introduced a new wage
policy, recommending an average 20 per cent increase in real wages. The purpose was to
force manufacturing firms to create skilled positions and to accommodate more capital-
intensive processes for raising productivity (Lim, 1984). Public investment concentrated
particularly on creating educational and technological infrastructures in furtherance of
advanced production. Special incentives were introduced to encourage the establishment
of research and development facilities, including plans for a science and technology park
(Haggard and Cheng, 1987). Construction investment was increased and acted as a
counter-cyclical device in the early 1980s to secure GDP growth, to control inflation
caused by the new wage policy, and to absorb labour force displaced by the restructuring
of the manufacturing industry. Domestic fixed capital formation, which was about S$ 6
billion, or 34 per cent of GDP in 1978, increased to S$ t8 billion, or 46 per cent of GDP,
in 1984. During the same period, the percentage share of construction in domestic fixed
capital formation increased from 41.3 per cent to 65 per cent (Appendix 1.1). The state
also increased direct investment in social infrastructure, such as education and health
services, for the improvement of human capital.
This restructuring strategy was challenged by the economic recession that followed.
Manufacturing industries which were high on the government's list of priorities, such as
electronics, and the ones which had the highest value-added, such as petroleum refining,
shipbuilding and repairing, oil-rig construction, were still seriously affected by the decline
in demand in export markets and the intense competition from neighbouring countries
(Rodan, 1992, p.107). The radical wage policy introduced by the government actually
discouraged further foreign investment in labour-intensive industries, in particular tex-
tiles, clothing and footwear. More companies moved their production plants near to their
Discussions of the restructuring strategy see Kuo and Chen, 1985; Lim, C., 1987; Haggard and Cheng,
1987; Chen, S., 1983.
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final markets. The inflow of foreign investment was thus impeded (Asian Business,
1981).
Accordingly, serious stagnation occurred in domestic capital formation and the
growth rate of GDP dropped sharply. Singapore experienced a recession in 1985 for the
first time since its independence: GDP growth declined from 8.2 per cent in 1984 to -2.8
per cent in 1985. Industrial output declined by 8 per cent and gross domestic capital
formation slipped by 6 per cent. There were a total of 96,000 jobs lost in a few months,
with 46,000 of them were in the construction industry and 35,000 were in the manufac-
turing industry. The unemployment rate reached 6.5 per cent (Economic Committee,
1986). The spectacular bankruptcies of businesses (400 cases) caused the closure of the
stock market for several days and seriously threatened the stability of the fmancial
regime. All these made new measures, in particular wage increase and construction
investment, become questionable.
The reasons that caused the recession were investigated by an economic committee
formed in 1985. From the official point of view, the economic recession was caused by a
combination of external and internal reasons. The key sectors which had been the driving
force for the economy, such as petroleum and petrochemical industries, shipbuilding and
repair, were all in the course of decline due to the changes in global demand. The high-
wage policy reduced Singapore's attraction to foreign investment and weakened its cost
competitiveness in the international market. The weakness of domestic demand was
caused not only by the slump in construction investment, but also by an excess of
national savings which could not be diverted into productive investments (Economy
Committee, 1986).
The state immediately executed new plans to gain recovery. A number of cost-
cutting measures were introduced to stabilise the economy, including to cut off the
employers' contribution to the Central Provident Fund (a social security programme), to
freeze real wages for two years, and to reform the tax system. The 1986 budget plan
introduced a first series of tax incentives by which company taxation was reduced from
40 to 33 per cent and the employers' contribution to the CPF was reduced from 25 to 10
per cent of employees' gross pay. Land sale and property development initiated by the
public sector were cancelled or postponed. The construction of public housing slowed
down and the total value of building investment dropped sharply.
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The state also determined to improve Singapore's competitive advantage in the more
integrated regional economy, which was by then largely influenced by the participation of
China and other ASEAN countries. 4
 To do so, the existing economic system needed to
be not only upgraded but also diversified. One of the major aims of the national
economic plan was to build up a strong base for service-sector growth, namely, to
reinforce Singapore's role as a regional centre providing services and techniques to the
producers of energy, raw materials and manufactured goods in neighbouring countries.
The existing function of the city as a financial and command centre for international co-
operations would be enhanced in order to compete in the globalization process. Also, it
seems to have been necessary to constitute a favourable environment for domestic
enterprises to grow, so that the economy would rely less on foreign investment. The
expansion of local small- and medium-sized enterprises and the development of local
entrepreneurship now assumed more importance in the official agenda (Rodan, 1989, pp.
190-98).
This policy was accompanied by various supporting measures. The state took the
first step of disengagement from control of production. Many public-owned enterprises
would be privatised to encourage the participation of domestic capital. The government
offered substantial assistance to local firms by giving funding and incentives, helping the
further education and training of the labour force, and facilitating technology transfer for
the improvement of productivity. Local firms were encouraged to adapt to the demands
of the most advanced sectors of international capital. In doing so, sub-contracting ties
between foreign-owned service industries and local firms were also arranged (Chen, K.,
1979; Lim, C., 1980; Pang, E., 1982). This orientation, however, appears to have given
some balance to the national economy which had been directed by an out-looking policy
for decades.
In sum, Singapore's economic growth can be ascribed to a high rate of investment
over a sustained period of time. Gross domestic capital formation was about 40 per cent
of GDP during 1970-89. This investment came from two major sources: an exceptional
growth of gross national savings, which reached 41.3 per cent of GDP in the 1980s; and
Alliance of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN) was formulated in 1967 to diffuse political conflicts
among its member states, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore and
Brunei.
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a net capital flow from direct foreign investment, which represented 15 per cent of GDP
during the same period. Gross national saving in particular, was the major driver of
domestic investment. The amount of gross national savings were equal to 65.4 per cent
of gross domestic capital formation in the 1970s, and this percentage increased further to
97.9 per cent in the 1980s. Most domestic savings were generated by the public sector.
The public sector accounted for 55 per cent of gross national savings in the 1980s. The
CPF along accounted for 24.4 per cent of national savings and was almost equal to 70
per cent of the total amount of private savings in 1985 (Appendix 1.1, 1.5). This large
volume of public savings enabled the state to use strategic development expenditure as a
major device to guide the direction of the economy (Lim, C., 1991, p.201).5
The developmental state plays a key role in Singapore's economic success. Economic
development has been achieved by the strong commitment of the state elite, and by their
comprehensive plans which can make the progress conform to changes in the global
market. Drawing on these, one might start to ask what are the essential pre-conditions
which enable the state to enjoy relative political autonomy and give it the freedom to
rebuild a planned society. In what follows, I provide a historical analysis of how the
ruling elite acts against possible challenges from social forces. It reveals some basic
features of the political regime and local society and changes in their mutual relationship.
Thus it may prove helpful for a proper understanding of the reasons why national interest
and the demands of the state elite can always be satisfied.
3.3 State-Society Relations: From Paternalistic Authoritarianism
to Political Corporatism
Under the banner of 'struggle for survival', Singapore has experienced uninterrupted
one-party dominance for over thirty-seven years. The ruling party - the People's Action
Party (PAP) - is not only characterised by its faith in economic development, but also by
its maintenance of political stability, control over political dissidents and strict definition
of social relations. The government has made every attempt to prevent social groups
from acquiring autonomy from the state. This reflects itself in the varied means used to
detailed discussion see Krause, 1987; Lim, C., et al., 1990; Lee and Low, 1990, Low, L., 1991.
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manage its relationship with political dissidents, the local power elite, ethnic groups, the
trade unions and other social forces in local society.
The power consolidation at the earlier stage of the nation-building process involved
harsh repression on the political opposition. The Internal Security Act (ISA) was intro-
duced by the state in 1963. The ISA allowed the government to arrest citizens for
unspecified charges and hold them for two years without trial. Shortly after the release of
the ISA, one hundred and eleven people, including twenty-four executives from the
Barisan Socialist Party (BSP), fifty executives from thirteen pro-BSP trade unions within
the Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU), five left-wing journalists, and
eleven students from Nanyang University, were arrested (FEER, 1963). The harsh prac-
tice of the ISA resulted in the elimination of the BSP and a significant decrease in pro-
communist activities. From that time onwards, the government used repressive mecha-
nisms, directly or indirectly, to prevent the development of any form of political opposi-
tion. Every sign of opposition was systematically accused of 'risking the very basis of the
prosperity and stability of the country', and was eradicated on the authority of the law.
How to build up a relationship with the local power elite which are long-established
in local society, is a crucial issue for many political regimes. In many developing
countries, the local power elite, such as landlords and merchants, have had considerable
autonomy from the state and a capacity to exercise influence against it if there is any
danger from the state policies to their interests. The state could only put them down by
the exercise of great violence. The situation in Singapore is different. Landlords appear
to have been less dominant because Singapore, since its beginning, has been a peculiar
city-state where there have not been many farm-holding areas. For the rural sector has
been almost negligible, and so there has not been an opportunity for a strong landlord-
class to emerge and exercise its power. However, in the initial stages of the nation-
building process, two groups of the local power elite, the Chinese-dominated business
and banking community, and the leaders of the Chinese associations, were influential in
local society (Chen, S. 1975, pp. 17-24). The former was a direct result of traditional
trade activities, and the latter developed on the interests and needs of different dialect
groups (Tan, 1983, pp. 76-112).
The political influence of the traditional business class on society seems to have been
limited in the post-war development. First, the relative importance of local enterprises
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vis-à-vis foreign firms in the state's economic development plan was decreasing. The
state administration, which was in favour of serving the demand of foreign firms, became
more independent from the business interests of local merchants. Industrial development
and the changing nature of external trade also created barriers for many local businesses
which had involved in the traditional trade since the nineteenth century. Without the
government's support, many of these businesses found it difficult to adopt the change in
the national economy, especially under the competition of foreign firms. As a result, the
number of local businesses sharply declined and their domination in both political and
economic spheres became eligible.
Secondly, the leadership of the PAP, Lee Kuan Yew, and other core members of the
party, have mainly come from an English-educated middle-class background and have
attained their power without relying on the support of the local power elite, particularly
the commercial and banking community. After the PAP taking over the government,
there were not too many chances for the traditional business class to participate in the
political arena. Also, in order to emphasis the 'cleanness, reliability and effectiveness' of
the state bureaucracy, the PAP has always been very concerned about corruption and has
made every attempt to prevent it (Quah, l984b, pp. 295-98). The opportunities for
corruption have been minimised through the exercise of the Prevention of Corruption
Act and the Corrupt Practice Investigation Bureau, also through improvement in salaries
and working condition of civil servants.
The Chinese associations, which developed along the lines of dialect groups, were
spatially specific, as members from different dialect groups tended to live together and
build up their mutual support in a form of community. Public housing development and
slum clearance initiated by the government in the 1960s re-allocated the population to
the newly-built public estates, thus breaking down the social and spatial organisations of
the Chinese communities. The Chinese associations therefore became less influential
since their services were no more needed. Also, the government actively promoted new
forms of civil organisations since the 1960s to counter the influence of the Chinese
associations. It is estimated that some 175 Community Centres and about 300 Citizens
Consultative Committees were firmly established in the public estates (Wong and Chen,
1977, pp. 17-24). These committees, with their permanent members nominated by the
PAP, were brought under the control of a statutory body - the People's Association -
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whose staff reported to the Prime Minister's office regularly. They organised civic and
social activities, and played the role in mobilising grassroots support for the PAP. As a
consequence, the number of traditional associations declined and the traditional leader-
ship based on these associations was gradually displaced.
In short, during the first decade of Singapore's independence, the power challenge to
the political leadership, mainly from left-wing opposition groups, was completed
eradicated through the harsh practice of the Internal Security Act. The influence of the
traditional business class and the Chinese associations also became very limited by all
kinds of circumstances. All these freed the state elite from having to deal with political
opposition groups or the local power elite, and thus gave them more autonomy to
change the organisation of society to an ideal form which could sustain political stability
and economic development. From that time onwards, the management of ethnic rela-
tions, which was the foremost objective linked to internal security, and the control of the
trade unions, which was the very foundation of industrial development, came to the
PAP's agenda.
Singapore is a highly heterogeneous society consisting of three major ethnic groups -
Chinese, Malays and Indians. 6 The Chinese can be divided into twelve dialect groups.
Five out of them have more or the same population as the Malays and the Indians. The
Malays and the Indians are also composed of many sub-groups on the basis of language,
religion and customs. Apart from the above ethnic groups, there are also some small
communities such as Jews, Nepalese and Filipinos. The complicated nature of ethnic
composition is a legacy of Singapore's historical position as an entrepot on the cross-
road of sea trade.
The conflicts among ethnic groups, particularly between the Chinese and the Malays,
had been long rooted in the Malay region on grounds of economic interest. In much the
same way, ethnic groups in Singapore had nothing in their culture, role and experience
that could have enabled them to develop any emotional ties with each other. As conflicts
and violence among different ethnic groups on this island developed since the nineteenth
century, to create a harmonic relationship amongst these ethnic groups was a difficult
task (cf. Clutterbuck, 1984; Lee, P., 1978). During the colonial period, racial harmonisa-
6 In 1970. ethnic composition in Singapore was as follows: Chinese 76.2 per cent, Malays 15 per cent,
Indians 7 per cent and others 1.8 per cent (Census of Population, 1970, Singapore).
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tion could be best maintained by segregation. The colonial government defined separated
ethnic areas in the city, which were known as Chinatown, Little India and Kampong
Glam, and then located different ethnic groups to different areas. Social contact amongst
ethnic groups was minimised against the possibility of violence and conflicts (cf. Wee,
V., 1988; Nevile, 1966; Cheng, L., 1985). However, racial segregation could only
prevent the conflicts from emerging to the surface but did not provide any real solution.
During a short period when the Japanese occupied Malaya and Singapore, the Japanese
used the Malay police against the Chinese and the Indians. This added to the latent
confrontation amongst ethnic groups on this island. A serious racial riot broke out in
Singapore soon after the Japanese surrender in 1945, in which the Chinese and the
Indians stood together against the Malays. The tension was not defused before the
returning British were able to control the critical situation.
The PAP realised that any form of repression of the Malay minority in Singapore
would not be tolerated by its two neighbouring countries - Malaysia and Indonesia,
which had been faithful in protecting the Malay population and culture in the Peninsula.
Also, maintaining balanced ethnic relations was the most efficient and least expensive
way of diminishing racial conflicts, and hopefully, over a period of time, could create a
cohesive community amongst all ethnic groups (Straits Times, 18, Jan., 1970). The
concept of a nijilti-cultural society was at the centre of the blueprint for the management
of ethnic relations and for the construction of a nation. /
After the independence, the government moved quickly to ensure all ethnic groups
that their interests and rights would be equally and safely guarded. The constitutional and
legislative frameworks were reformed to give political recognition to the equal place of
every race, and to enable all ethnic groups be protected by law with respect to their
opportunities for education and work. Thus, 'social opportunities would be open to all
citizens according to their intellectual skill and capacity for hard work rather than their
ethnic, cultural or religious background' (Straits Times, 13, Apr., 1970). The principle of
cultural pluralism, together with the ideology of meritocracy, were widely applied to
education and labour policies. Altogether, they helped to enhance social harmony among
ethnic groups and to stimulate their motivation to upward social mobility - which was
considered to be an essential element of national development (Clammer, 1985, pp. 107-
17).
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The control of the trade unions was another crucial task. Before the independence,
the federation of trade unions - the Singapore Trade Union Congress (STUC) - was
divided into two factions on the ground of different prospects of industrial relations. The
right-wing unions decided to form another body, the National Trade Union Congress
(NTUC), and to corporate with the PAP. The dissidents who called themselves 'left-
wing trade unionists' formed another federation - the Singapore Association of Trade
Unions (SATU) and explicitly supported the BSP. Although the SATU gained a subs-
tantial support from workers, their influence was weakened following the defunct of the
BSP and left-wing organisations. The PAP believed that 'political leaders must triumph
over the trade unions', and this could be achieved by 'changing the ground rules to
thwart the challenge from the trade unions, by using legislative and administrative
powers, and when necessary, backed by the mandate of the electorate' (Quoted from
Wong, S., 1983, p.265). Through the arrangement of the PAP, the NTUC replaced the
STUC as the only legal representative of the trade unions. The top official of the NTUC,
its secretary-general, was the second deputy prime minister of Singapore. Nine of twelve
union officials were the PAP members in the parliament (NTUC, 1990, p.7). The NTUC
became from the time onwards a mere sub-organisation for the PAP as the party was in
power.
The government, with the support of the NTUC, passed the Industrial Relations
(Amendment) Act and the Employment Act in 1968. It prohibited the trade unions from
collective bargaining beyond the minimum standards set by laws. Additionally, collective
bargaining was not allowed during the first five years of operation of pioneer industries
in order to stabilise the labour cost in the new ventures. The purposes of these legislation
were to restrict the scope of collective bargaining and the chances of labour strikes. The
National Wage Council (NWC), consisted of representatives from the government, firms
and the trade unions, functioned as a mediator to ensure that any dispute related to
wages and working hours could be peacefully resolved. The NWC monitored the stan-
dards of wages every year, also provided the guidelines for annual wage increase. This
aimed to convinced members of the trade unions that their interest and benefit were
under the government's concern.
However, restrictions placed on the activities of the trade unions seems to have been
accepted by the majority of the working population. The government was able to keep
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low inflation and unemployment, negotiated wages and working hours with employers,
and provided welfare services such as public housing, public health and education to the
working population. Its collaborator, the NTUC, also engaged in developing services,
such as co-operatives, transport, insurance and child care, for workers (NTUC, 1976,
1982). All these helped to enhance workers' sense of involvement both at symbolic and
material levels. They came to posses a feeling of belonging to society and nation as their
interests and needs had been safeguarded by the government (Nair, 1976, pp. 102-3).
The industrial community became more like a moral community in which the paternalistic
government provided for workers material needs and affirmed the dignity of their labour
(Deyo, 1981, p.107). Under these circumstances, workers were poorly motivated to take
any strong actions against their employers by themselves. Instead, they preferred to leave
the decision to the discretion of the government and the NTUC. All these made legal
strikes virtually impossible without the tacit consent of the government (Wilkinson and
Leggett, 1985, p.12).
The influences of left-wing dissidents and the local power elite were eliminated. The
trade unions and ethnic relations were well managed. Since then, there was no sign that a
strong political opposition could be built on another ground. Although the state adopted
a constitutional system very similar to the British system, public participation in politics
was restricted. Singaporeans were told by the top leadership that 'if the government had
got their priority wrong', which meant 'had placed emphasis on democratic forms instead
of economic substance', their country 'would not have reached its present stage of
development' (Straits Times, 17, Aug., 1984). The government made it very clear to the
people that the cost of political participation outside the PAP was too high. The one-
party regime along with paternalistic authoritarianism hardly gave room for democracy.
Under these circumstances, policies were formulated in a relatively isolated environ-
ment in which the government had considerable scope to decide what it believes to be
most appropriate (Crouch, 1984, p.22). The state was a technocratic apparatus com-
prised of civil bureaucrats, including permanent secretaries, chairman and directors of
statutory boards and other top civil servants, all of whom were carefully selected for
their education and competence. The top technocrats were given absolute power in the
decision-making process. For them, policy-making was in the domain of the government,
not 'a playground for those who have no talent, no responsibility to the people, and who
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are not answerable for the livelihood or survival of Singaporeans' (FEER, 12, Oct.,
1989). Individuals or civil organisations also did not have the chance to participate in the
decision-making process, even if their interests were affected.
Furthermore, in order to mobilise support for official policies and to influence public
opinion, numerous measures were implemented by the political Igime to control the
mass media. The government exerted direct control over the press by using its legal right
to inspect the financial management of newspapers and to nominate their shareholders.
On the authority of the Newspaper and Printing Press Act, which was passed in 1974,
the government was entitled to withdraw permissions given to newspaper and publishing
companies without notice. As a result, most of the newspapers were forced to collabo-
rate with the government and act as its propaganda voice.
Singaporeans were also told by the leader of the PAP that 'every society depends for
its survival on the talents of a mere 5 per cent of the population', namely, the state elite.
In his words, the PAP - a party composed of a group of cohesive and homogeneous elite,
including senior civil bureaucrats, professionals and politicians - 'has the most talented
people in the government'. Singapore was organised around a group of state elite, so, 'if
you kifi the 200 at the top and the 1 ,000 at the base with a single blow, you will have
destroyed Singapore' (quoted from Josey, 1968, p.38 1). This elitist version represented
not only the leader's self indulgence but very much a realistic reflection of the relation-
ship between the state and society in Singapore. It appeared that the remarkable growth
of the economy during the 1970s and the role of the state in providing the infrastructure
needed for economic and social development, actually convinced the majority of
Singaporeans that without a powerful state and a stabiised political environment,
Singapore would not have been able to achieve its success. Thus, society as a whole,
gave priority to internal cohesion and political stability in the interest of economic
development at all costs. The 'genius' of the political leadership and his elitist assump-
tion were beyond any doubt (Vasil, 1984, pp. 114-53).
Nevertheless, after one decade of economic development, a fundamental change in
employment began to take shape. The growth of the manufacturing and service sectors
generated more knowledge or skill-based employment. The expansion of government
activities into physical and social development, especially in education, public housing,
medical care and social services, entailed a need for more institutions and civil servants.
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Consequently, more professionals and technocrats were recruited into the public sector
(Chen, S., 1975, pp. 21-25). All these had direct impact on the occupational structure. It
is estimated that administrators, executives, managers, professionals, technicians and
clerical workers - which collectively represented 23.2 per cent of the workforce in 1970 -
increased to nearly 30 per cent in 1980. Accountants, economists, legislative officials,
system analysists, general managers, production and sales managers, which altogether
represented 53.8 per cent of the total number of the manager/professional category in
1970, reached 93 per cent in 1980 (Census of Population, 1980). It is generally believed
that Singapore became an affluent society with a sizeable middle-class which had much
greater exposure to the lifestyle and political culture outside the city-state (Rodan,
1993). These changes opened up the avenues of choice and individual preference, and
made an interventionist ideology harder to work.
During the Anson by-election in 1981, the PAP lost two seats to the Workers' Party
(WP) for the first time in history. Anson was an electorate where the local population
was well-educated. It revealed that middle-class citizens had subscribed to the liberal
notion of an opposition as an important element to keep a government accountable.
Although the election result hardly presented any practical problems for the government
in a 79-member assembly, and certainly did not in itself constitute political instability, the
PAP was frustrated by this unexpected defeat. The WP members were faced with a
hostile and dismissive attitude by other PAP members in the parliament. The top leader
of the PAP publicly claimed that opposition groups would 'make no difference to a good
government' and 'raise false hopes of easy give-aways from the imaginary pie' (Straits
Times, 15, Dec., 1981). The message spelt out was very clear: 'Singapore has no place
for a political opposition'.
The PAP made a number of significant moves to tighten political control - both over
the party itself and over the wider structure of society. The government took the
initiative in changing the structure and ownership of some of the local press which were
considered to be the collaborators of the opposition candidates in the by-election. To
prevent the opposition from winning more votes in the coming general election, the PAP
The Singapore Civil Service consisted of fifteen ministries and more than eighty public agencies,
employing 187,000 civil servants. They accounted for 14.9 of the working population, or 7.1 per cent of
the total (Ministry of Culture, 1984).
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launched a campaign of social mobilisation in 1984, which, under the slogan of 'Total
Defence', against the latent crises (Straits Times, 6, Mar; 23, Feb.; 1, May, 1984). The
Total Defence Campaign involved several social mobilisation programmes. Among,
these, the Social Defence Programme aimed to 'unify the population around the values
which most citizens were able to identify'. The Psychological Defence Programme
sought to 'protect the young generation from the potential danger of certain Western
values, or from over-dependence on material comfort and welfare' (Ibid., 18, Jan.,
1984). For the government, 'history has always been full of threats', so the most
important thing for them was to 'take precautions long before the threats become
unmanageable' (Ibid., 20, Nov., 1984). These campaigns seem to have been characteris-
tics of the 'crisis management' that reflected what a PAP member called the 'crisis
mentality' of his own government (Ow, C., 1984, p.3T7).
The nature of the political regime remained largely unchanged. The government
introduced a population policy in the early 1980s, intending to encourage unmarried
graduate women to marry, and those who were married to have more children. The less
educated women were inveigled to stop at one or two children in lieu with a cash grant
in their social security fund. From the leader's point of view, 'a thinning of the talented
gene pool is likely to happen if the non-talented genes continue to expand'. This trend
will bring 'a disaster to this island nation whose only resource is human intelligence'
(Straits Times, 15, Aug., 1983). Many educated women were furious at this policy even
if they actually constituted the privileged segment of the population. The government
was condemned for its 'genetic determination' and 'intrusion of the private domain'
(Straits Times, 2, Mar., 1985). A liberal politics was in demand and a pressure for a
credible opposition party in the parliament to examine the government's overly interven-
tionist stance began to build up.
The result of the general election in 1984 did not only see the return of the Workers'
Party (WP) but the entry of the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) to the parliament.
The opposition vote increased to 37 per cent for the third consecutive time - a clear 13
per cent swing against the PAP. The popular demand for a political opposition to 'keep
an eye on the ruling party', became evident (Straits Times, 10, Apr., 1985). More
interestingly, according to a post-election survey, the anti-PAP vote did not only come
from electorates where the residents were more well-educated or were in managenal/
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professional occupations, but also from areas where there was a large concentration of
traditional trade business, blue-collar workers and non-supervisory white-collar workers
(Rodan, 1992a). As mentioned before, Singapore's industrial development was dualistic,
with local manufacturers supplying the domestic market but more government attention
and incentives were directed towards foreign firms competing in the global market. This
industrialisation strategy carved a niche for Singapore in the international economy but
created structural obstacles for the national bourgeoisie. Their discontent seems to have
also come to the surface.
The loss of seats in the general election came as a shock to a party which had so
accustomed to a total dominance of the parliament. Worse than that, in the following
year, Singapore witnessed a negative growth rate first time in its history. The govern-
ment's ability of keeping up economic growth was also for the first time in dispute. For
the PAP, this was far more serious than losing some seats in the parliament because
economic viability was the very foundation of its political legitimacy. A new wave of
political consolidation was sought during the current delicate period of transition.
The PAP made an attempt to stem the tide of serious opposition on the one hand,
and to project an image of political tolerance on the other. On the eve of the 1984
election, the PAP was keenly aware of the situation and modified the electoral code to
create an artificial parliamentary opposition - the NCMPs. The existence of a few oppo-
nents in the parliament, for the PAP, 'might help to sharpen up the skill of the PAP's
emergent new generation of leaders' - the so-called 'New Guards' (Straits Times, 20,
Dec., 1984). Three PAP elected candidates were forced to withdraw in favour of the
opposition candidates who had obtained the best results (Ibid., 25, Dec., 1984). These
opposition candidates became non-constituent members of the parliament. They did not
have voting right but could speak on any issues.
To tackle the problems presented in the general election, a solution was also sought
within a new policy-making formula. The government attempted to channel dissent
through its own institutions and away from opposition political parties or civil
organisations. During the period of 1986-88, there were a range of initiatives from the
PAP to provide alternative avenues for public involvement in policy debate. The
Feedback Unit was established under the government to receive opinions and to respond
the requests of the public. The Town Councils came into existence to look after the
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welfare of the people living in the public estates. The Government Parliamentary
Committees was also Set up to dealt with racial issues. The SME sector was given
greater importance on the official agenda. The Small Enterprise Bureau (SEB) was
established and gave some chance to the SME sector to take part in the decision-making
process. 8
 Regular meetings and consultation were arranged by the SEB to open the
communication between local entrepreneurs and the government administration (Ong,
K., 1987, pp. 55-66).
To gain economy recovery quickly, the state also saw a need to enhance its control
over labour. It first stepped up the placement of party personnel in key positions of the
NTUC in order to enhance the institutional structure of the trade unions. Also the PAP
called for a collectivist approach to industrial relations. It identified the Japanese system
of industrial relations, characterised by a close co-operative spirits between employers
and employees, as a suitable model for Singapore. 9 Three objectives were to unfold: to
promote the establishment of a greater number of house unions, to apply a Japanese-style
management, and to adopt some form of company welfarism. The government issued a
series of national campaigns to inspire workers with ideas such as 'team work', 'group
interest' and 'firm as a family'. These ideas, which aimed to build up a closer relationship
between employers and employees, had their roots in the paternalist tradition in the Asian
community. Hence, the use of traditionalism at this stage can be seen as a fundamental
attempt made by the state, at ideological level, to reshape the attitude of workers and to
promote a devotion to corporate objectives.
However, for a collective sentiment to emerge, a soul-searching process began. The
government intended to promote a national ideology, what came to be officially referred
to as a set of 'shared values', in order to pursue a strong sense of 'collective survival and
group interest' (Speeches, 1989, p.82). Not coincidentally, a strong advocate of the
preservation of traditional cultural and values came on to the agenda at the same time.
Traditions and histories were re-invented to suit the ambition of the state elite to advance
their development programmes. All these suggest that the ideological system was
8 The Association of the SME was established in 1986 as an organisation to represent small enterprises.
The fundamental objective has been to win a degree of state support for Singapore-based firms and to
prevent private local capital from being squeezed out by foreign co-operations.
Japanese firm structure has been described as a family unit. Some basic benefits such as housing,
recreational facilities, job training, health care, saving and insurance, etc., are offered to employees.
These are important factors to stimulate employees' concern with or loyalty to the firm (Ballon, 1966).
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strongly linked with the political and economic systems (cf. Clammer, 1985; Benjamin,
1976; Chiew, S., 1990). This will be further examined in the coming section.
A political consolidation process, for re-gaining internal stability and economic
recovery, was initiated by the state since the mid-1980s. The various modifications to the
political system were principally designed to channel dissent through the PAP controlled
institutions. The political agenda was still decided by the government. Strict limits
continued to be placed on civil and political life. For instance, on the authority of the
Internal Security Act, the government imprisoned 22 members of a Catholic organisation
in 1987, without any trial. The Christian Conference of Asia was dissolved with five
Christian missionaries were expelled. They were accused of being involved in a 'Marxist
conspiracy' and using religious activities as 'a cover for political agitation' (FEER, 4,
June, 1987; 14, Jan., 1988). On the authority of the Newspaper and Printing Press Act,
some foreign newspapers and periodicals were accused of interfering in Singapore's
domestic politics. Accordingly, their circulation was suspended.
The political leader has re-asserted his convictions on the limit to democracy by
arguing that the people should 'leave the government to decide what is right'. For him,
Singapore will not make further economic progress, if the state does not intervene in
very personal matters - 'who your neighbour is, how you live, the noise you make, how
you spit or what language you use' (Lee Kuan Yew, 1989, Speech in National Day
Rally). Hence, politics in Singapore has always been practised within a framework of
centralised decision-making (Speeches, 1989, p.82). Although the consultative decision-
making has become the hallmark of the new administration, it seems to be no more than
a change in style masking the PAP's determination to maintain a monopoly on power.
The state is still to a large extent freed itself from the need to respond to political
pressures from social forces (Rodan, 1992, pp. 3-17).
3.4 The Construction of Nation-Statehood: Cultural Pluralism
and Shared Values
Singapore is a place where the Chinese are the dominant majority in terms of population.
Many in the Chinese community have viewed Singapore as 'their place' and have
intended to organise the polity and society in terms of their own aspirations, interests and
priorities. The appearance of Chinese nationalism in the Chinese community in the first
Chapter Three
	 83
place was closely linked with the eight-year Sino-Japanese War in China. The Chinese
associations in Singapore were actively involved in anti-Japanese activities while this
island was occupied by the Japanese army during the period 1942-45. Many Chinese who
were mainly taught in community-run Chinese schools, also took part in the radical
student movement and the anti-colonial struggle, by which they developed a very strong
sense of Chinese nationality and urged to construct Singapore as a Chinese nation. This
strong sentiment even turned a boycott of the British-institute national service in 1954,
mainly initiated by Chinese middle-high school students, into a bloody riot (Nair, 1976,
pp. 26-39). Under these circumstances, one might argue that the PAP could easily seize
the advantage and build a national identity on the basis of Chinese nationalism. Yet the
PAP seems to have been more hesitant to move on.
For Singapore, the costs of encouraging Chinese nationalism seems to be too high.
Singapore is an island nation with an overwhelming Chinese majority, but is surrounded
by countries where anti-Chinese sentiments have been long established. After the Second
World War, these countries were sceptical about Communist China's further military
invasion. Singapore government thus tried to avoid being perceived as 'the third China'
by playing down Chinese nationalism on this island. Also, the Chinese community in
Singapore itself was not homogeneous and was formed by many dialect groups. They
were also divided between those who were schooled in different language streams - the
Chinese-educated and the English-educated - since the colonial period. The English-
educated Chinese were in a superior position in the educational and occupational
structure because English had been the dominant working language in the colonial
administration (Kwok, K., 1991, p.1 1). In addition, while China turned communist in
1945, Chinese nationalists in Singapore were divided into two strands - the left was
influence by the Communist Party of Malaya in Malaysia and the right was organised by
the Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan. Two strands competed vigorously for the allegiance
of the trade unions and university students. Hence, on ground of different education,
occupation and political belief, there was no common consent to Chinese nationalism
amongst the Chinese community.
After the independence, the state rejected any forms of racial and cultural chauvinism
starting from its foundation. The history of Singapore has been read, officially, as an
evolutionary progress which began with the arrival of Stamford Raffles in 1819. The
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denial of pre-colonial history has helped to balance different ethnic culture in society and
enabled the state to claim its independent statehood (Preston, 1989, PP. 13-4). Instead of
building a national identity on the basis of one particular culture, the state has ensured
each culture a equal place through the reform of the constitutional framework. To create
a sense of unity, the state has decided to break down communal barriers through cultural,
education and language policies. The result is, and will continue to be, an ideology that
embodies cultural pluralism and multi-lingualism as the central cultural element.
Following the principle of multi-racialism, Singapore has had four official languages:
Malay, Mandarin, English and Tamil. Malay has been used in the public setting and
served as a ceremonial language of the national anthem and military commands. The
government has used a national system of education as a key institution in creating an
integrated multi-racial society. At the suggestion of the 'All-Party Report on Chinese
Education' - a report published by a commission set up in 1955 to exam the student riot -
the government decided to introduce compulsory bilingualism into its education system
(Singapore Legislative Assembly, 1956). This bilingual language policy had three main
functions: to facilitate communication among ethnic groups, to reduce the inequalities in
occupational opportunities between the English-educated and the vernacular (i.e., the
Mandarin-, Malay- and Tamil-educated) in monolingual schools, and to raise the
standard of the labour force for international co-operation which was essential to
economic development. The bilingual education in both primary and secondary schools
became compulsory in 1966. English was taught as the second language in the Chinese-
stream schools, while Mandarin, Malay, Tamil were made the second languages in the
English-stream schools. Interestingly, all schools taught mathematics and science in
English, and social and humanist subjects in the 'mother-tongue' language (Waidhauser,
1969, p.65). For the government, the use of languages such as Chinese, Malay or Tamil
in these subjects was needed to enhance the moral value of young citizens, enabling them
to obtain a sense of discipline and positive attitude towards work and civic respon-
sibilities (Straits Times, 5, June, 1973).
However, English has always been the most popular language in society, due to its
comparative economic advantage. Not surprisingly, enrolment in the Chinese-streams
schools continually declined, and dropped to only ten per cent in 1975. The only Chinese
-stream university - Nanyang University - was finally incorporated into National Univer-
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sity of Singapore in 1980, which, 'effectively played down a distinct achievement of the
Chinese-educated in anti-colonial struggle and destroyed a powerful symbol of Chinese
opposition power' (Gopinathan, 1994, p. 88). A sense of helplessness and pessimism
emerged amongst the Chinese-educated population, particularly in the older generation.
They began to push the government for the resuscitation of Chinese education and the
preservation of Chinese heritage (Kwok, K., 1994, p.18).
Also, after decades of economic growth, the state elite were alarmed by the change in
family relations, the increasing number of abortion, divorce and the rise of crime and
drug abuse. In tracing the causes of the perceived 'moral crisis', the public discourse
took a view that the Western values which attach to English had eroded the foundations
of society. The PAP leadership sensed that the population was increasingly exposed to
what the politicians perceived as potentially 'negative' foreign cultural influences. For the
PAP, a combination of individualism, hedonism, self-centred and anti-social behaviour -
regarded as 'Western values' - had undermined the traditional work ethic and group
solidarity, thereby threatening the social fabric of society (Koh, T., 1981, p.294.).
It was against these backgrounds that some soul-searching began to take place
behind closed doors. The government intervened at the national level to move language
policies into a new direction, making efforts to diffuse discontent amongst the Chinese-
educated population. A Speak Mandarin Campaign was launched in 1977 to encourage
the use of Mandarin as a common language among the dialect groups of the Chinese
community. This campaign was actually a balancing move to reassure the Chinese
community that their cultural heritage remained a primary concern of the government. A
comprehensive review of education policies was conduced, leading to the release of the
New Education Report, followed by the agenda on Moral Education, both in 1979.
Three years later, the government launched another national campaign to place
Confucian ethics and religious knowledge in the national curriculum, as cultural ballast
against the influx of Western decadent values (Kuo, C., 1992, p.5; Chua, B., 1995, p.5).
In fact, traditionalism was promoted with a very clear political purpose. Confucian
values of strong government leadership, harmony and trust were stressed in public
discourses, particularly when the PAP was fighting against election failure and economic
recession in the mid-1980s. For the leadership, Confucian values such as the notion that
the government should be led by honourable men (junzi), who have a duty to do right for
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the people and who have the trust and respect of the population, 'fit better than the
Western idea that a government should be given as limited power as possible, and should
always be treated with suspicion unless proven otherwise' (President Office of Singa-
pore, 1991, p.1). This official interpretation illustrates how ideas from tradition were
used for contemporary political legitimisation. Many other Confucian ideas such as
giving importance to human relationships, placing society above self, and, respecting for
authority and leadership, were all perfectly compatible with a political condition
preferred by the state elite.
However, Confucianism itself could not be justified as the base for a national
ideology because the multi-racial nation had to receive legitimisation on the basis of an
overarching ideology shared by all groups. For a collective identity to emerge, the White
Paper on 'Shared Values', was released in the late 1980s. The government called for
appreciation and respect for the traditional social values of different races. It identified
five essential Asian values: placing society above self; upholding the family as the basic
building block of society; stressing racial and religious harmony and tolerance; providing
community care and support for individual (Chua, B., 1995, p.1.5). Whether these
selected values are exclusively Asian values is highly dubious (Straits Times, 25, Aug.,
1984). What is beyond doubt, however, is that the government were keen to establish a
basic duality - Asian culture versus Western culture - in the construction of a national
identity, without too much reference to their internal diversity (Clamzner, 1985, pp. 23-
9). This has been useful to the government in two main respects. One is to justify the
state's intervention in what is considered to be either helpful or harmful to political-
economic interests. The other is to provide the base for social integration and form the
base to build the spirit of a nation.
Taiwan
3.5 The Developmental State in the Global Economy: The Triple
Alliance amongst the State, Local Entrepreneurs and
International Capital
Taiwan's particular geo-political situation made economic development a necessary
means for the KMT regime to maintain its domination of national politics and to compete
with the Chinese communists as a government of the whole of China. At the initial stage,
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the government's major concern of economy was to control the inflation rate and to
establish basic self-efficiency. To restore the financial stability, a new monetary policy
was formulated to allow the state to monopolise the banking system and to control
foreign exchange. The problem of inflation seems to have been solved after a huge inflow
of the aid from the United States (Jacoby, 1966). Throughout the 1950s, United States
aid accounted for 40-50 per cent of gross national savings and financed nearly 80 per
cent of Taiwan's trade deficit. The inflation rate was thus reduced from 800 per cent in
1950 to 23 per cent in 1955 (Shen, 1970, p.40).
According to the Council for United States Aid (CUSA) - a central economic
planning group formed by the United States advisors and the KMT technocrats in 1949 -
the restoration of the agricultural sector, which had been damaged during the war,
should be given top priority. They established the Sino-American Joint Commission for
Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), a co-operative body between the United States aid agency
and the KMT personnel - to carry out land reform and agricultural innovation. Several
land reform measures were introduced (Tsai, H., 1989, p.17 1). Farm rents were fixed at
a maximum of 37.5 per cent of the total annual yield of the main crop. This impeded
landlords' interest in making profits from renting out their land. Then, over the next three
years, public-owned fann land was leased or sold to tenant farmers. Privately-owned
farm land which was in excess of the retention limit was compulsorily purchased by the
government for resale to its incumbent cultivators. Land owners were paid 70 per cent of
the purchase price in government bonds, and another 30 per cent in shares in four state
enterprises shortly to be transferred to the private sector. They could also use the capital
they received from the government to re-invest in new industries. These measures led to
a decrease in the number of tenant farmers and an increase in small landowners. Owner-
cultivators increased from 57.12 per cent of all farming families in 1948 to 80.76 per cent
in 1959 (Koo, Y., 1968, p.39).
The government also distributed tools and chemical fertiliser and provided credit and
loans to farmers, in return for cereal outputs. Much of US aid was used to repair war-
torn rural infrastructure, mainly for irrigation and flood control (Amsden, 1985, p.85).
As a consequence, agricultural productivity was largely improved. Between 1951 and
1955, 25 per cent of the total gross fixed capital formation took place in the agriculture
sector (Ho, S., 1978, p.233). Also, the agricultural surplus, instead of going to the
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landlords, was now directly controlled by the state. The agricultural sector provided jobs
for 54 per cent of the work force in the mid-1950s. Net
 real capital flow from agriculture
rose an average of 10 per cent (Amsden, 1979, p.353). However, land reform and
agricultural innovation helped first to control the land and the productivity of the
agricultural sector, then to transfer both capital and labour force into the growth of the
industrial sector.
The central planning body - the Economic Stability Board (ESB) - formulated its first
'Four-Year Economic Development Plan' in 1952. This plan revealed the government's
intention to obtain self-sufficiency, i.e. gradually to change the national economy from
reliance on financial aid to the development of a domestic-sector industrial base. This,
generally referred as an import substitution strategy, first targeted some industries which
had been developed by the Japanese, such as heavy industries in both rural and industrial
sectors; also those supporting infrastructures such as transportation facilities and banking
institutions. Many of them were nationalised and placed under the direct control of the
central government. In 1955, total industrial production by state enterprises represented
51.1 per cent of all industrial production (Duan, 1992, pp. 173-89).
The textile and food industries were also targeted as strategic sectors. Many factories
in both sectors had developed since the colonial period. The textile industry in particular,
had expanded after the immigration of textile firms from China at the end of the war. The
government initiated an 'Entrustment Scheme' whereby it supplied aid-financed imported
cotton and wheat to the textile and flour-milling industries. The domestic market was
also protected through control of bank loans and import licenses. For instance, import
licenses were only granted to products on the condition that comparable goods were not
produced domestically. Within a very short period, domestic industries, especially in the
food and textile sectors, gained full viability. Industrial products were manufactured
mostly for domestic demand.
The small domestic market was nearly saturated by import-substituting industries in
the mid-1950s, especially textiles, wood products and rubber goods. The government
was persuaded by the CUSA to direct the economy towards export markets, limit further
expansion of state enterprise, and give greater support to the private sector. Thus, a
economic reform initiated by the state during 1958-62 aimed to liberalise controls on
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trade, stimulate exports and design a strategy to attract foreign investment, thus setting
Taiwan on the course of export-led growth (Cheng and Haggard, 1992, p.8).
The government issued its second Four-Year Economic Plan in 1958. In this plan,
certain key sectors, particularly the textile and electronic industries, were targeted as
major export sectors. This judgement was subject to the existing industrial structure and
the criterion of international competitiveness. The government helped these selected
industries by providing relatively stable market conditions. It simplified the multiple
exchange rate system, relaxed some import restrictions, and rationalised the allocation
system for imports (Haggard and Cheng, 1987, p.1 15; Wade, 1988, Pp. 57-8). The
Nineteen Point Programme (NPP), implemented by the government in 1960, gave the
industrial sector a leap forward into an era of export-led development. It offered a host
of market incentives, such as bank loans and tax exemption, to selected industries. The
Statute for the Encouragement of Investment (SEI) formulated in the same year
extended a series of benefits to foreign and local finns. Foreign finns were allowed to
have one hundred per cent ownership and freedom to remit profit. To promote further
exports and foreign investment, the Kaohsiung Export Processing Zone went into
operation in 1966.
The export-led development strategy changed the industrial sector from production
for domestic demand to production for export markets. With the export-orientation in
the economy, the industrial sector expanded by leaps and bounds. From 1960 to 1969,
the share of agriculture in GDP declined from 28.5 to 15.9 per cent and the share of
manufacturing increased from 19.1 per cent to 29.1 per cent (Appendix 1.4). Within the
manufacturing sector, the electronic, textile and clothing industries became the largest
industrial export sectors. The annual growth rate of GDP was 9.2 per cent on average in
this period (Appendix 1.2).
The division of labour between foreign finns and local firms in the industrial structure
was also determined by government economic policies. The government stimulated local
firms into exporting, first in the area of domestic dominance - the textile, clothing and
food processing industries. Fiscal incentives were given to local firms, which streng-
thened their capabilities until they could spearhead the export drive. Foreign investment
was channelled into priority sectors such as the electronics and chemical industries, but
away from those sectors which were mainly controlled by domestic capital (Gold, 1986,
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pp. 82-7). Hence, unlike Singapore, the entry of foreign firms in Taiwan was not without
constraints. The Investment Commission retained wide discretion in its decisions. It
tightened control in order to limit foreign equity participation in certain industries under
protection. Import control and local supply were used to force foreign firms to build
linkages with domestic firms. It aimed at protecting domestic producers from foreign
competition in the local market (Haggard and Cheng, 1990, p.116). As a consequence,
foreign firms operated by a flexible combination of a decentralised network of Taiwanese
firms acting as subcontractors. The large-scale assembly and manufacturing firms set up
by the United States and Japanese investors spawned a plethora of small-scale local
suppliers and assembly operations, to whose products the foreign investors would be
committed by the terms of their investment licence.
As a consequence, Taiwan's economy began to be characterised by a proliferation of
small- and medium-sized export-oriented manufacturing enterprises. These domestic-
owned small factories were largely engaged in production and export. Foreign invest-
ment played an important but not dominant role. At the end of the 1960s, 87 per cent of
factories were locally owned but 57 per cent of large factories (with assets in excess of
NT$ 60 million or employ more than 300 workers) were wholly or partly foreign owned.
Foreign firms made up 20 per cent of total exports every year and generated 18 per cent
of total employment. Exports by foreign firms accounted for 82.9 per cent in the
electronic industry and 93.9 per cent in the chemical industry. Small- and medium-sized
enterprises, mainly locally owned, accounted for 34 per cent of total investment and
generated 81.8 per cent of employment (Duan, 1992, p.261).
Taiwan's export industrialisation faced a bottleneck after a decade of rapid growth.
First, industrial development relied heavily on the existing infrastructure left by the
Japanese but these facilities were no longer able to accommodate the demands of the
economy. Second, there was a growing dependence on the import of intermediate goods
and an enlarged domestic demand from export sectors. All these inherent structural
problems in Taiwan's internal economic organisation came to a head with the first oil
price shock in 1973-74. The oil crisis increased the inflation pressure and reduced the
competitiveness of export sectors. The growth rate of GDP dropped from 12.8 per cent
in 1973 to 1.4 per cent in 1974 (Appendix 1.2).
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To remove the development hurdles, the government recognised the need to upgrade
infrastructure and to enhance the supply for export sectors. The Nine Major Projects
were announced in 1973 (increased to ten in 1974), including plans for establishing the
upstream and defence-related industries of steel, petrochemicals and shipbuilding, also
for constructing of superhighways, seaports and electrified railroads. From this time
onwards, the government began to be more directly involved in heavy industries, parti-
cularly the upstream petrochemicals, steel, shipbuilding and heavy machinery industries
(Amsden, 1979, p.36'7; Gold, 1981, pp. 233-34, 269) . b 0 The main aims were to keep
upstream activities under the control of the state, to encourage joint ventures with
foreign firms in intermediate products, and to draw local private capital into downstream
activities. Taiwan's economy passed through the shock of the oil crisis and managed to
get back into its development again in 1976. The annual growth rate soon returned to
13.7 per cent and remained stable throughout the late 1970s (Appendix 1.2). Industrial
output already made up 44 per cent of GDP, while agricultural output declined to only 7
per cent. The electronic industry had replaced the textile industry to become the largest
export sector. Information and machinery industries also began to experience substantial
growth.
However, the government recognised that an issue for economic development would
be the transformation of current industrial structure into one that was more capital
intensive. A Ten-year Economic Development Plan issued in 1979 emphasised the need
to upgrade existing industrial structure and to move into specialised high value-added
sectors (Chu, Y., 1989). Information and machinery were designated as strategic sectors.
The government tried to establish linkages between local research institutes, local firms
and foreign firms in the development of high-technology industries, particularly in the
Hsinchu Science Based Industrial Park. Twelve Key Infrastructure Projects were imple-
mented with the aim of improving communications and transport systems. A range of
measures were in force to channel foreign investment into strategic sectors. To enhance
the capability of local finns in these advanced sectors, alliances with foreign firms
10 The Ministry of Economics established 12 wholly-owned enterprises and 26 joint ventures. Up to the
mid-i 980s, these state-owned enterprises represented 57 per cent of total investment and generated 10
per cent of employment each year. State-owned steel and petrochemicals industries, in particular,
accounted for 84.2 per cent and 40 per cent of the total investment in both sectors. They effectively
controlled the supply of the mechanical, automobile, construction and textile sectors. See Duan, 1992,
pp. 87-8.
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through joint ventures were encouraged with several policy incentives were given to
support joint ventures in strategic industries."
Economic development was halted again in the mid-1980s because of new conditions
such as the increasing pressure of the US protectionism, high labour costs and the lack of
advanced technology. The export market was threatened as the formation of regional
trade blocs in Europe and North America prompted Taiwan to take a provocative
response, redirecting its trade flows and reducing its overall trade dependency on the
United State. Due to the rise in labour costs, labour-intensive manufacturing industries
which relied on cheap labour and assembly processes of relatively simple products,
gradually lost their competitiveness.' 2
 Many of them moved to neighbouring countries
such as China, Vietnam and the Philippines to seek cheap labour. Capital-intensive
industries were also faced with the difficulty of technological innovation. The flow of
new technology from Japan virtually dried up because Japanese finns were reluctant to
provide key advanced technologies and inputs to potential competitors. The tougher
enforcement of intellectual property rights in the United States also increased the
difficulty in copying foreign technology. Ongoing stagnation occurred in domestic capital
formation in the mid-1980s. The annual growth rate of export declined from its peak
53.8 per cent in 1976 to 16.5 per cent in 1981, and dropped to 1.5 per cent in 1985. The
average profit rate of the manufacturing industry was above 8 per cent in the 1970s. It
fell to 3.7 per cent and 4.6 per cent in 1980 and 1985 respectively. The annual growth
rate of GDP dropped to 3.6 per cent in 1982 and 4.9 per cent in 1985 (Appendix 1.2).
Besides these issues, another problem related to the imbalance between national
savings and domestic investment also came to the surface. After two decades of export-
led growth, Taiwan ran the second largest trade surplus against the United States and
accumulated the second largest volume of foreign reserves after Japan.' 3 Gross national
savings, which accounted for 24.9 per cent of GDP in 1980, increased to 37.4 per cent in
1986. A high saving rate and foreign reserves were countered by the relative low rate of
"These industries were: communications, information, consumer electronics, semiconductors, precision
machinery, aerospace, high-grade special materials, special chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and medical
equipment.
12 During the 1960s and the 1970s, real wages only increased 5.4 per cent every year on average. Real
wages increased 15 per cent in 1980 and 18 per cent in 1985. See Chu, Y., 1994, p.37.
' Foreign exchange reserves reached USS 30 billion in 1980 and increased ten times to US$ 300 billion
in 1986. See Duan, 1992, p.164.
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gross domestic capital formation in the mid-1980s. Gross domestic capital formation,
which accounted for 33.8 per cent of GDP in 1980, dropped to 17.5 per Cent in 1986.
Gross national savings thus became as high as 224 per cent of gross domestic capital
formation in that year. As domestic investment continued to decline, national savings and
foreign reserve loomed in the government and the private sector (Appendix 1.2).
Unlike Singapore, Taiwan's national savings were generated mostly by the private
sector. During the period 1980-1985, the private sector made up 67.5 per cent of
national savings, while the government and the state-owned enterprises collectively
represented 32.5 per cent (Appendix 1.6). The accumulation of a trade surplus and
domestic savings in the private sector built up a tremendous demand for property and
financial assets. According to a survey conducted in 1989 on twenty-two illegal invest-
ment companies which announced bankruptcy in that year, the total financial capital of
these companies was as much as US$ 9.2 billion (Chi-Li Morning News, 23, June,
1989). The excessive demand started to wreak havoc on the real estate and stock
markets. All these combined to create a huge inflation pressure and thereby threatening
the viability of the long-standing national financial regime. It is clear that the imbalance
between savings and investment became a serious issue.
Compelled by all these forces of circumstance, the government decided to take an
initiative in economic liberalisation (Kodama, 1992). It first loosened its control over the
import of goods and the flow of capital. A drastic tariff cut on industrial goods in 1988
reduced tax on 4,619 items by an average of 50 per cent. The domestic banking market,
insurance sectors and stock market were also opened to foreign investors. The indirect
investment in former socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and even
Taiwan's respective political rivals - North Korea and mainland China - was legalised by
the government. From this time onwards, Taiwan's investment capital flowed rapidly
into the Fujian and the Guangdong Provinces in China through a third country, usually
Hong Kong or Singapore.'4
An open-door policy to foreign investment came onto the agenda. The government
became more aggressive in attracting a new wave of foreign-based capital to Taiwan. In
the early l990s, the government moved to slash all sectional restrictions on foreign
' Detail discussion of Taiwan's investment in the mainland see Chin, C., and Chung, C., 1992;
Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1994; Mainland Affairs Council, 1994.
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investment, launched a new pitch for foreign investors, and unveiled an all-encompassing
plan to develop Taiwan into a regional operational centre for international co-operation
(Economic Construction Committee, 1994). This plan identified six areas for future
development, including a production centre for video and audio programmes, an air
passenger and fright transhipment hub in greater China, a regional distribution and
service centre, a financial centre, a telecommunication, data-processing and software
development centre, and a research and development centre. In conformity with this
plan, the government increased public investment in social and physical infrastructures to
create a favourable environment for foreign-based capital.
To tackle the problem of increasing difficulty in obtaining advanced technology, the
government encouraged joint ventures between Taiwanese companies and international
co-operation. Large amounts of government funds were channelled into state research
laboratories, universities, and state-sponsored R&D consortia, or were used to subsidise
R&D activities undertaken by private firms. The share of the total R&D expenditure in
GNP increased from 0.95 per cent in 1984 to 1.7 per cent in 1992. In strategic industries,
the government subsidised private R&D projects up to 60 per cent of the total cost (Chu,
Y., 1994, p.227). The state research labs and research organisations were also respon-
sible for supporting private industries with prototype technologies. To encourage a shift
from labour-intensive to capital-intensive industries, the government concentrated on
assisting a few selected industrial sectors and excluded unproductive ones by applying a
minimal-wage legislation.
Economic development is essential in Taiwan's nation-building process. The state has
played a leading role in guiding the national economy through development strategies.
Taiwan's economic strategy in the past made economic resources diffuse into a private
sector largely controlled by Taiwanese family businesses. Since Taiwan's national politics
was almost reserved for mainlanders, economic advancement and social mobility were
made available for indigenous Taiwanese. It is believed that this arrangement was the
result of the division of labour between the mainlander-dominated public sector and the
Taiwanese-controlled private sector (Cheng and Haggard, 1992, p.10). This, however,
must be carefully examined in the following section.
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3.6 State-Society Relations: From Military Authoritarianism to
Political Pluralism
Taiwan was a typical agrarian society embedded in kinship ties in extended family
systems before rapid indusirialisation began. The social bonds exerted their influence on
the ioyal relations between landlords and peasants. Thus, long-established landlord
families became the natural leaders in the rural areas. Intellectuals and professionals
represented another influential faction of local society. Many of them engaged in the anti-
colonial struggle, and acted as mediators between the state elite in China and the native
Taiwanese (Pang, 1983, p.25). Hence, before the nationalist government moved to
Taiwan in 1949, local politics was controlled by a group of the local power elite: the
native Taiwanese who owned land and knowledge. Landlords acquired importance in
both county and provincial parliaments. Intellectuals also had the largest share among the
state-level representatives (Lee, S., 1986, pp. 110-24; Pang, 1983, pp. 25-6).
The massacre in 1947 caused a great loss of the local power elite in society since
many intellectuals involved were either killed or arrested by the nationalist army. After
the KMT takeover, military force appeared to be the major repressive mechanism for the
regime to exercise its political control. The first ten years after 1949 were described by
the leadership of the KMT as a period for a 'life and death struggle'. To safeguard
Taiwan and to recover the mainland, individuals were required to 'put national interest
above everything, give full support to the government, and co-ordinate with the armed
force' (Chiang Kai-Shek, 10, Oct., 1951). An 'Emergency Decree' was promulgated on
Taiwan in 1949, by which martial law was effectively imposed.' 5 Taiwan was legally put
under the rule of the Taiwan Garrison Command Headquarters (TGCH). The TGCH had
the right to determine when to restrict or prohibit the exercise of constitutional rights.
For reasons of social order and public security, it was authorised to control every
citizen's entry into or departure from the country, the publication of books and
periodicals, meetings and rallies, On the authority of martial law, criminal offences by
15 Through controlling the constitutional bodies, the KMT enacted the 'Temporary Provision Effective
during the Period of Communist Rebellion'. It suspended some constitutional provisions, justified the
application of martial law, and thus allowed nearly complete power concentration in the hands of
President Chiang Kai-Shek.
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civilians were handled by military tribunals. This provided the TGCH with a convenient
method to manipulate judicial procedures for political purposes.
The leader of the KMT ascribed the party's traumatic defeat by the Communist party
on the mainland to the party's inability to separate itself from landlords' interests.
Although most of the KMT elite did not have any intertwined interests with the landlord
class in Taiwan, they were well aware of the political and economic influence of this class
as a dominant social force. A land reform was initiated in the early 1950s by the govern-
ment, which successfully eliminated the power of the landlord class in the rural areas and
thus gained support from small peasant proprietors. All these combined to have a direct
result: the KMT elite were independent from the traditional power elite and had the
freedom to engage in political control and economic transformation (cf. Fewsmith,
1985).
The leader also saw the KMT's failure in China as a result of 'the organisational
collapse, loose discipline and low spirits of the troops and the party members' (Chiang
Kai-Shek, 22, Jul., 1950). A supervision system was established in the National Army in
1950 as part of the KMT's readjustment to its failure on the mainland. From this time
onwards, the intelligence system expanded to a great extent (You, Y., 1991, pp. 89-91).
Seven intelligence bodies were established subsequently in the state apparatus.' 6 Only
two of them were organisationally independent of the military. In other words, the
intelligence system has been an incarnation of the armed forces. The principal function of
this security apparatus, not surprisingly, was to preclude Communist infiltration and
subversion, and to quell political dissidents and the opposition movement. This security
arrangement also assured the political loyalty of the military to the party. Thus the
triangular nexus among the supreme leader, the party, and the military constituted the
solid backbone of KMT authoritarian regime (Kerr, 1965, p.481).
The KMT also determined to control civil organisations such as trade unions,
farmers' associations, irrigation associations, commercial and industrial associations and
other major social interest groups. In the leadership's opinion, 'party members must be
organised to form the basic units of society' (Chiang Kai-Shek, 4, Jun., 1950). The party
16 They were: the National Security Bureau, the Taiwan Garrison Command Headquarters, the
Investigation Bureau, the General Bureau of Police Administration, the General Political Warfar
Department, the Military Intelligence Bureau, and the Headquarters of Military Police.
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maintained organic ties with many of these associations. For instance, each trade union
had its own cadre committee, consisting of the union's general manager and officials who
were also party members and periodically received training from the KMT's central
cadre school. Party membership in these civil organisations was not compulsory yet was
certainly encouraged (Tien, 1989, p.60). The party also operated hundreds of service
centres, providing vocational training, job placement, free medical care and technical help
to farmers and business organisations. These service centres seem to have manipulated
large numbers of people who were easily mobiised to support the KMT candidates in
elections.
The implementation of martial law since 1949 prevented the growth of the political
opposition. Under the banner of national survival, 'those who dedicate themselves to that
principle and march forward to the goal are the comrades; those who do otherwise are
the enemies and undesirable elements of the nation' (Chiang, Kai-Shek, 1, Jan., 1951).
The government immediately suppressed two opposition groups which emerged in the
early 1960s.' 7 Many political dissidents were arrested and charged with 'associating with
communist agents'. They were sent to military court and imprisoned for ten years. The
harsh practice of martial law left the KMT's oqponents intimidated that they abandoned
their scheme (Mendel, 1970, pp. 114-21). An appalling atmosphere of totalitarian rule
alienated ordinary people from politics, thus weakening the possible resistance from local
society.
Taiwan's international status was weakened when the General Assembly of the
United Nations decided to accept the PRC (lPeople's Republic of China) as the only
representative of China in 1971. Accordingly, Taiwan was denied membership in all UN
affiliated organisations. On the one hand, the concrete threat to national survival made
the sense of crisis a common mentality of society, thereby legitimated the extraordinary
power given to the state. On the other hand, the lack of international recognition gave
rise to a call for national identity among the native Taiwanese. After the aborted effort to
form a union of opposition, a group of intellectuals turned to express their dissent
through publishing journals. They were initially patriotic but soon turned their attention
The intellectuals from the mainland, epitomised by Lei Chen - the editor of the journal Free China,
advocated political reform and constitutional democracy. They endeavoured to join fcices with some
Taiwanese opponents of the KMT by proposing to form the Chinese Democratic Party (CDP).
Chapter Three
	 98
to domestic society and politics. Since the early I 970s, they challenged the KMT and the
way society was developing under their guidance, especially over the issue on the
legitimacy of the parliament which never faced re-election for more than twenty years.78
Not unexpectedly, these opposition journals were banned by the government and several
liberal dissidents were arrested and imprisoned (Huang, 1976).
During this critical period, Chiang Kai-Shek's son Chiang Ching-Kuo, who was the
premier of the Executive Yuan and who was expected to succeed the presidency from his
father, took the first lead in political reform (Moody, 1992, p.77). This reform started
with the party itself. The KMT was an exclusionary authoritarian party under main-
landers' domination.' 9
 Virtually all of the key posts in both the party and the government
were held by mainlanders. Chiang Ching-Kuo intended to change the imbalance by
recruiting more native Taiwanese into the KMT regime. At his discretion, three native
Taiwanese were appointed to the Central Standing Committee (CSC) of the party.
Political dissidents, however, decided to form a political group at the time when the
law still prohibited the formation of opposition party. A political organisation - 'Tang-
Wai' (outside the party) was established in 1976 on the basis of a distinct Taiwanese
identity. Tang-Wai published a journal entitled 'Mei-Li-Tao' (beautiful island) and used
its offices as local headquarters for their members. The local election in 1977 saw a
crowd of ten thousand gathered in Chungli Municipality to object the abuse of ballot
papers by the KMT. It ended as a riot ensuring that was the largest public disturbance
since the takeover. As a result, Tang-Wai candidates won many local and provincial
offices, including twenty-two seats in the seventy-seven member Taiwan Provincial
Assembly, and four out of twelve major or country magistrate posts. Tan-Wai activities'
victory in local elections during the coming years marked the emergence of the
opposition as a genuine political force (cf. Moody, 1988).
The succession in leadership after the death of Chiang Kai-Shek in 1975 brought a
significant change into the KMT. Chiang Ching-Kuo was nominated by the KMT for the
18 The KMT preserved three bodies that were created by the 1946 constitution - the National Assembly,
the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan. Mainlanders who were elected in 1946 to these three bodies
would remain in office. The purpose was to reinforce the idea that the KMT would recapture the
mainland. When hopes of recovery began to dissipate, the KMT maintained those members' position as
a way to ensure its own grip on power over Taiwan (You, Y., 1991, pp. 69-73).
The term 'Taiwanese' generally refers to those Han Chinese who had immigrated to Taiwan before
1949 and the offspring of those people. The term 'mainlander' refers to Chinese who either came from
the mainland after 1949 or are the Taiwan-born offspring of those people.
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presidency and formally elected by the National Assembly in 1978. Some Taiwanese
party members were promoted to the upper-middle ranks. Taiwanese representation on
the CSC increased to 33 per cent and Taiwanese membership in the KMT also rose to 60
per cent (Wang, 1988, p.1 1; Cheng and Haggard, 1992, p. 41). Similar reforms also took
place in major government appointments, military corps and three parliamentary bodies.
His reform, generally described as 'Taiwanization', had two clear implications. One is
that the role of the native Taiwanese in the political arena was to be enhanced. The other
is that the legitimacy of the KMT regime was to be modified to depend increasingly on
its governance of Taiwan, rather then the fictitious claim of sovereignty over mainland
China. The political reform initiated by Chiang in the late 1970s helped the party and
himself to pass the power transition period without suffering too many threats, but did
not lose any political control nor give room to democracy. Namely, the reform served to
consolidate, rather than to transform the KMT rule.
During the campaign for the general election in 1979, Tang-Wai activists held a
series of speeches and rallies across the island. The rally in Kaohsiung degenerated into a
riot in which thousands of civilians and 183 policemen were seriously injured. The
general election was suspended by the state, and fourteen opposition leaders and more
than one hundred of Mei-Li-Tao supporters were arrested and imprisoned. Some of the
prominent members were charged with sedition and given sentences ranging from twelve
years to life (Lee, H., 1987, pp. 140-58). The Kaohsiung Incident did not destroy
Taiwanese' desire for political reform. The attorneys and relatives of the Kaohsiung
Incident defendants were all elected to offices when the general election was reinstated in
1980. As an illegal political group, Tang-Wai witnessed an increasing support from the
public - especially from the native Taiwanese - throughout the 1980s.
The KMT leader recognised that the party was faced with an enormous crisis and
that the only solution was to continue political reform. This realisation did not emerge
suddenly but in the wake of the diplomatic setbacks in the international community, the
loss of control over anti-government riots, and the failure of the party to win over-
whelming victories in elections at all levels (You, Y., p.1 60). In other words, Chiang was
forced by the domestic and external pressure to advance political reform (Meaney, 1992,
pp. 95-120; John, 1988, p.61 1). The process of liberation proceeded rapidly after the
elections for the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly in 1986, during which
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Tang-Wai candidates gained 33 per cent and 13 per cent of the votes. President Chiang
Ching-Kuo established a task force to formulate a plan for the party's transition in the
same year. A Six-Point Proposal was drafted, recommending supplementary elections for
three ageing constituency bodies, direct population election of the mayors of Taipei and
Kaohsiung, and general liberalisation of the control of civil associations. When the
Democratic Progress Party (DPP) was formed by the original Tang-Wai activists at the
end of 1986, the KMT Central Standing Committee decided to take a leap forward into
democracy instead of suppression. The Emergency Decree that had effectively suspended
constitutional rights since 1948 was abolished. The National Security Act (NSA), with
effect from 1987, replaced martial law to regulate political marches and assemblies yet
the ban on political parties was eradicated
Within the KMT itself, 'Taiwanization' by then was clearly an irreversible trend. As
mentioned above, the internal structure of the party was in transition under Chiang
Ching-Kuo's leadership. More Taiwanese members were incorporated into the decision-
making bodies. Taiwanese representation on the CSC already increased to 52 per cent in
1988. Approximately 70 per cent of the KMT membership (2.4 million) was Taiwanese
(Wang, 1988, p.11; Cheng and Haggard, 1992, p. 41). Moreover, Chiang selected Lee
Teng-Hui - a Taiwanese member of the party - as his vice-president, in view of the fact
that Lee's background allowed him to speak to the native Taiwanese. Lee won strong
support from young bureaucrats, civil servants and business representatives, who were
collectively referred to as the 'mainstream faction' of the party. At this juncture, main-
lander members of the party, who represented the 'hard-liner' faction, revealed their
serious doubt about Lee's cultural identity. These two factions were often to view each
other with suspicion. The power transformation after the death of President Chiang
Ching-Kuo in 1988 was not smooth. Lee was elected after a vicious battle with the
conservative KMT hard-liners. After Lee taking over the office, both sections continued
their battle for dominance over the party. The KMT thus fell into an internal conflict.
The political conflict within the party was not solely a question about the leadership
or power sharing, but was broadly combined with economic interests (Baum, 1993, p.'7).
Unlike Singapore, Taiwan's development strategy was in favour of local entrepreneurs
and their role in wealth creation. After two decades of comprehensive state-planning in
the national economy, the accumulation of Taiwan's private capital had been fostered.
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The financial power of industrialists and local businessmen who benefited from export-
led industrial development was increasing. From the mid-1980s, leaders of local business
groupings began to challenge the state's independence of decision-making through their
collaboration with Taiwanese members within the KMT or through direct participation in
elections (Evans and Pang, 1989, p.17). Representatives of local business groupings
became the dominant faction of representatives in the Legislative Yuan and in all levels
of parliament. They tried to use their political influence to minimise state intervention
(Chen, S., 1988, p.'76; Huang, L., 1990, pp. 141-2). Collectively, they campaigned to
change the textile export regulations in 1985, the banking/insurance legislation and the
automobile import tax in 1988, as well as the stock exchange legislation in 1989 (Ding,
Z., 1985, p.1 13; Shun, F., 1988, pp. 158-83). It became undeniably clear that the
representatives of business groupings emerged as the new local power elite in society
(Peng, H., 1985, p.146).
Two factions of the KMT reacted differently to the defeat of the state bureaucracy by
business groupings. There were some evidence suggesting an over-representation of
native Taiwanese in the private sector and mainlanders in the civil service. Taiwanese on
average enjoyed a higher income than mainlanders (Tung, M., 1978, p.12). Mainlander
members of the KMT, who steeped in the statist tradition of the KMT, believed that the
reduction of the role of the government in the economy, such as selling off the largest
state-owned enterprises, might erase the gains in equity in exchange for more rapid
growth. Taiwanese members of the party, largely comprising representatives of the
business community, were more committed to a free market ideology and more clear
about their priorities, i.e. equality is less important than growth. They suspected that
mainlanders were interested in developing state economic monopolies from which only
party favourites benefited. The disparity between two antagonistic factions within the
party was enlarged. Mainlanders members felt they could no longer depend on the KMT,
which was by then more heavily influenced by native Taiwanese, to protect their interest.
Hence, in 1993, immediately preceding the KMT Fourteenth Party Congress, a group of
mainlanders who belonged to the hard-liner faction, left the KMT and formed the
Chinese New Party (CNP).
Apart from the evolution of party politics, civil society was also in upsurge after the
lifting of martial law. Political demonstrations occurred with higher frequency. In 1986
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alone, there were about twenty rallies protesting against government policies. These
kinds of activity increased in the coming years and protest issues became substantially
broader in their variety. Independent trade unions, mainly among the workers of large
corporations and state enterprises, were organised in various industrial regions on the
island and refused to affiliate with trade union federation under the KMT control. The
formation of the Labour Party and the Workers' Party also boosted the trade union
movement. The number of civil organisations grew substantially. By the end of 1992,
there were 6,828 professional associations, 8,190 civil groups and 72 political parties
(Lin, T, 1994, p.67). Many of them engaged in demonstration or protests relating to
social and political issues. Although their goals and agendas were different, they had one
thing in common; namely, they demonstrated a massive need for some efficient way to
get collective goods in the face that the government was not delivering, also challenged
the place in liberal values that property rights and market decision-making had long held
(Hsiao, H., 1990, pp. 163-79).
The public opinions generated in social movements gave a clear sign that the general
public was discontented with the wealth distribution in general and business groups'
over-influence in politics in particular (Krong, K., 1994, pp. 58-73). For instance, the top
five out of the ten most critical issues raised during the 1983 and 1986 election
campaigns were all about the well-being of the people and administrative corruption.
More specifically, in both elections, 32. per cent and 25.3 per cent of the attentive
public concerned with the reduction in the gap between the haves and have-nots as well
as improvement in the life of the lower income class, 32.6 per cent and 35 per cent of the
public were concerned with cleaning up administrative bureaucracy and eliminating
comiption (You, 1991, p.167, 172).
The CNP leaped at the opportunities and soon became the third largest party in
Taiwan. After being defeated by business groupings and native Taiwanese in the internal
power struggle of the KMT, not surprisingly, mainlanders who formed the embiyonic
CNP, claimed their goals were anti-con'uption, anti-monopolies, anti-independence and
reunification with China. Mainlanders who voted for the KMT for centuries now turned
their faith to the CNP. Apart from its controversial pro-unification ideology, the CNP's
clean and fresh image was welcomed by the middle and lower strata of society. They
gained almost 30 per cent of the vote in the successive elections for the Legislative Yuan
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and the National Assembly in 1994, while the KMT and the DPP shared 30-40 per cent
of the vote respectively. The KIvfF is still the ruling party but the political arena of
Taiwan is becoming shared by three largest parties. None of them can be sure to win an
overwhelming majority of the vote.
After four decades of authoritarian rule, it is clear that the one-party politics in
Taiwan has finally come to an end. Taiwan has entered a new era of competitive party
politics since the late 1980s. Civil society as a whole has learned how to make wider
claims on the state. In a newly awakened civil society, the state has to respond to
political pressures that could no longer be ignored. All these suggest that a new form of
relationship between the state and society has come into existence.
3.7 The Construction of Nation-Statehood: Chinese Nationalism
versus Taiwanese Separatism
Taiwan is an island separated from the coast of Southeast China by a 150-mile-wide
Strait. The aboriginal population, divided into nine linguistic groups, is of Malay and
South Sea origin. Although there existed a small number of Chinese settlers, this island
did not have to much connection with China until the late seventeenth century. At the
end of the Second World War, the Chinese nationalist government claimed their sover-
eignty of Taiwan on ground that 'the people of Taiwan are Chinese, so there is no doubt
that the sovereignty of Taiwan belongs to the Republic of China, racially, historically,
culturally and legally'. Thus, 'it can in no way separate the spiritual solidarity and the
racial relationship between the people on the mainland and those on Taiwan.' (Chiang,
Kai-Shek, 25, Oct., 1950).
Despite these statements, Taiwan was actually viewed by the nationalist government
as a 'peripheral frontier province dangerously exposed to the Japanese colonial influence
and populated by what was perceived as a dissident intelligentsia' (Premier office of
Taiwan Province, 1989, pp. 391-2). The state elite suspected that many Taiwanese had
collaborated with Japan during the eight-year Sino-Japan War, as this island had been
ruled by Japan for decades. They also worried that Taiwanese had been infiltrated by
Communist provocateurs in the post-war period. Not only were the state elite apt to
mistreat Taiwanese; the nationalist troops, formed mainly by mainlanders who lacked
knowledge and connection with local society, were also ill-disciplined. Numerous con-
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frontations occurred between solders and local residents. It was against this background
that a sense of distrust and hostility between the mainlanders and the Taiwanese began to
build up. The 1947 massacre, which deprived thousands of lives of native Taiwanese,
transferred the hostility between two groups of Chinese into deeply-rooted conflicts.
The KMT claimed itself as the sole legitimate government of the entire China and
insisted on preserving all political symbols and cultural orthodoxy used in China before
1949. The national flag of the Republic 'is the symbol of the Nationalist Revolution'; the
name of the Republic 'is the binding force of the people's patriotic sentiments'; and the
anthem of the Chinese Republic 'tells the purpose of our national reconstruction based
on the Three Principles of People's Livelihood'. For the KMT, all of these 'form an epic
written with the blood and tears of revolutionary fathers, soldiers and people', and
'represent national consciousness and the love of the fatherland' (Chiang, Kai-Shek, 10,
Oct., 1949). 'Three Principles of People's Livelihood', a philosophy created by Sun Yat-
Sen and was written into the Constitution as the founding principle of the Republic of
China, was employed as a national ideology. 20 This official ideology was used to justify
state policies or goals such as anti-communism, worship of the supreme leader, crisis
consciousness and patriotism, and thus became a source of legitimacy (cf. Gregor et al
198 1).
For the KMT, ideological control was essential to their dominance on this island
(Hsiao, A. 1991, p.78; Li, 1989, pp. 74-5). The party itself directly intervened in the
formulation of cultural and education policies to ensure that its political interest was well
protected. The Department of Cultural Affairs (DCA) was established in 1960 as one of
the seven largest bodies in the Central Committee of the KMT. It was responsible for
making propaganda policy and to monitor the diffusion of ideas through the mass media
and other forms of cultural production in Taiwan (Tien, H., 1989b, p.76). The party itself
also had the ownership and controlled the operation of the mass media including news
agencies, newspapers, broadcasting, television and film companies. 2' Through controlling
the Government Information Office, the party forced censorship on other non-party news
20	 doctrine which comprised of three themes: nationalism, self-autonomy and people's livelihood, is
a blueprint of nation-building, state-building and welfare society.
21 Among Taiwan's three TV stations, one has been linked with the DCA, one with the military, and one
with the Taiwan Provincial Government. The KMT has directly owned two daily newspapers. The
branch of the party in the media, such as television and newspapers, has been the implementation unit
for their control.
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agencies. If these news agencies turned against the official policy, the government could
cancel their publishing permission or close down their offices.
In view of the fact that many Taiwanese might have changed their historic and
cultural sentiments to their homeland and no longer abide by the notion of a unified
China (Wachman, 1994, pp. 93-8), the major task at the earlier stage of the nation-
building process was to eliminate the Japanese colonial influence on Taiwanese society,
to pro-mote Chinese culture, and to create a sense of unity through assimilating
Taiwanese into Chinese (cf. Chang, M., 1990b; Chen, Y., 1992; Wachman, 1992). The
circulation of Japanese-written materials was completely banned and the use of Japanese
language was entirely forbidden (Premier Office of Taiwan Province, 1989, pp. 390-
415). To counter the 'Cultural Revolution Movement' in Communist China, the KMT
made urgent efforts to promote what is generally known as the 'Chinese Cultural
Renaissance Movement' in Taiwan. A quasi-public authority was established in the mid-
1960s to affirm and restore those traditional values in Chinese culture, especially
Confucian virtues (Warren, 1970, pp. 6 1-9). Compulsory course on 'Three Principles of
People's Livelihood' was given at schools and universities and in the training of the
armed forces (Chen, Y., 1992, pp. 40-50).
In order to keep with Chinese patrilineal tradition, one's ethnic identity was defined
in terms of one's father's ancestral origin. This information was recorded on the identity
card carried out by all people older than fifteen years of age (Chiu, H., 1979, p.16). The
state enforced a strict language policy which entailed using only Mandarin on radio,
television, in schools and on official occasions. The use of Mimnan and Hakka dialects
was restricted. This was accompanied by a national campaign that emphasised the value
of Mandarin and the comparative vulgarity of Taiwanese language. Taiwanese students
were taught the old names of mainland China places, railways and administrative divi-
sions which had been used before 1949, ignoring the fact that these names had been
changed by the PRC. Taiwan's own history and geography were neglected in the
textbooks because any expression of Taiwanese culture was considered harmful to social
harmony (Lin, Y., 1987; Wilson, 1970). Over three decades, Taiwan was a peculiar self-
proclaimed country where the identity of the Taiwanese was denied in their own land.
The ideological construction of the state had different effects on the Taiwanese and
the mainlanders. For the Taiwanese, a hierarchy - at the bottom, the indigenous culture
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of Taiwan and above it, the elite culture that the KMT portrayed as Chinese national
culture - was formed as a result of government policies. The Taiwanese felt they had lost
their dignity and respect under the authoritarian regime which imposed on them. For the
mainlanders, despite the official claim, the crucial fact that they would never return to the
mainland became clear. This turned to be a shattering disappointment. Most of these
mainlanders left their whole family in China as they did not expect to stay in Taiwan very
long. They suffered tremendous guilt as they realised that they would possibly never
return home for the rest of their lives. A deep frustration emerged among the population
of Taiwan, both Taiwanese and mainlanders. This frustration reinforced their own sense
of identities. The older generation in particular, who remembered the dislocation that
came from immigration, or who experienced the transition from the Japanese to the
Chinese rule, became highly sensitive to the origins of others with whom they interacted
(Hsiao, H., 1991, pp. 42-3).
However, the political liberalisation which has proceeded in Taiwan since the late
1970s has weakened the KMT's capacity to enforce a single view of Taiwan's political
status or cultural and political identities. The KMT' s sovereignty over the whole of
China and Taiwan's historical association with the mainland have been in dispute. For the
KMT, a common Chinese identity and a banner of reunification are still needed to justify
its claim to rule Taiwan as part of China (Chen, Y., 1992, pp. 17-25). From their view, 'a
world long divided must unite and when long united must divide', thus, 'China is now
divided as Germany was, and will be unified one day' (Central Daily News, 8, Jun.,
1990). Taiwan, in their view, has always been part of China thus it should not be
considered an independent nation.
The DPP, an opposition party emerged in the political movement and fed by a revival
Taiwanese identity, has wanted to force the independence issue so that it can destroy the
legitimacy of the KMT and replace it as the ruling force on the island. For the DPP,
succeeding waves of invaders had tried to sever the island from the rest of China from
the earliest times, and had broken what were seen as tenuous bonds to the regime on the
mainland. Hence for the past three hundred years, Taiwan had been rarely under the
effective control of the Chinese and therefore should not relinquish its independence.
Furthermore, it is difficult to determine what is meant by China since China's boundaries
A famous sentence addressed in the opening passage of one of Chinese epic novels.
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have expanded and receded over time. There is no reason that Taiwan must be part of
the Chinese state for China to be complete. Thus, they emphasised that Taiwan is a
sovereign nation already and should keep its self-determination. The issue on national
identity remained the major focus of the subsequent political movement. This division of
views, a division largely based on national identity, has led to an intensification of
political conflicts between the KMT and the DPP, with reunification on the one hand and
independence on the other.
In the late 1980s, the national identity issue was also in line with the power struggle
between two factions within the KMT. The KMT's tolerance of the provocation for an
independent Taiwan, basically backed by the mainstream faction of the party, was
opposed by the hard-liner faction of the party, which composed largely of mainlanders
who came over with Chiang in 1949. These old guards were in permanent alliance with
the members in the military-intelligence establishments, who were even more resistant to
reform. In their opinion, the party had made too many concessions to the DPP in terms
of the independence issue. The former minister of National Defence, also the core
member of the hard-liner faction, insisted that the government would never give up its
sovereignty over mainland China. For the old guards, the tolerance of independence was
a matter of some consequences, because 'the national army's responsibility is to protect
the Republic of China', and if any political party is not loyal to the Republic of China,
'the army would not sit and watch' (Central Daily News, 2, Feb., 1987). Since the hard-
liners of the KMT were also those who had control over the national army, their reaction
to the identity issue caused speculation and anxiety.
Several extreme right-wing organisations, reminiscent of the Chinese secret societies
and probably fmanced by the hard-liner faction of the KMT, suddenly appeared in 1987.
Violence broke out in June while a protest arranged by the DPP was met with a counter-
rally organised by these right-wing organisations. In the fear that the pro-independence
movement and the counter force would bring Taiwan into a civil war, the KMT decided
to tighten its control over any the provocation on Taiwan independence. Some rather
harsh provisions regarding sedition were re-employed. As a result, two pro-independence
DPP activities were sentenced to ten and eleven-year prisons term on sedition charges in
1988.
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Taiwanese who preferred an independent state to an ambiguous status vis-à-vis the
mainland, wanted a open call for Taiwan independence. After the arrests, the remaining
pro-independent activitists were unified in their demand and sought to compete for
political power. To protest at the KMT's policy of harsh repression on the provocation
of Taiwan independence, two loyal members of the DPP, including one journal editor,
committed suicide in 1989, a short time before the elections for the Legislative Yuan and
the Taiwan's Provincial Assembly. Taiwan independence gained its appeal for many
native Taiwanese and the pro-independence DPP candidates won about 30 per cent of
the vote in those elections.
By the end of the 1980s, Taiwanese society was still officially divided by three main
categories: mainlanders (12.2 per cent), Taiwanese (86.8 per cent) and aborigines (1.1
per cent) (Census of Population, 1990, p.12). It is argued that the main distinction
between mainlander and Taiwanese is the time and the occasion of their arrival. This
distinction should not even exist among the young generation since all of them were born
and grew up in Taiwan. Unfortunately, the term 'Taiwanese' or 'mainlander', means a
lot more than just two categories. For years it has not really been possible for people to
identify one culture or one place without identifying the political entity. Namely, if one
identifies itself with the mainland, one will be labelled as a unionist. If, on the other hand,
one identifies itself with Taiwan, one will be labelled as a separatist.
Taiwan's politics has evolved around the conflicting cultural and political identities
for decades. The government decided to take the initiative in campaigns for national
consolidation in the early 1990s. An official commission was set up to investigate the
1947 massacre with an official report released to the public. The government offered a
formal apology for its abuse of military force in this incident, announcing plans to
construct shrines in memory of the victims, and providing reparation to the families of
the victims. A 'New Taiwanese' campaign was launched in 1993 in which the govern-
ment made a plea to all residents of Taiwan, including mainlanders and Taiwanese, to
create a new form of Taiwanese culture, and to rectify the problems stemming from the
abuse of national identity.
Although the government has begun with an attempt to create a collective sentiment
among the population, this is far from an easy task. This is because all forms of identity
have been conflated and mixed up. Even among the younger generation, who were all
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born in Taiwan, there has been an absence of consensus. Some might find themselves
culturally as Chinese but consider Taiwan as an independent nation-state. Others might
identify themselves as Taiwanese yet consider Taiwanese as an ethnic sub-group within
the larger Chinese nation. Taiwan's ambiguous international status also makes it more
difficult to know whether the island is a nation itself or only part of a larger nation.
Although people may have clear opinions about whether they are Chinese or Taiwanese,
there is considerable uncertainty about the future of the country in which they live.
3.8 Conclusion
The economies of Singapore and Taiwan have developed through the expansion of
export-oriented manufacturing industries associated with the world market. The states
have played leading roles in guiding the national economy through their development
strategies. The states have monopolised major fmancial devices, controlled real wages,
the inflation rate, and the foreign exchange market, thereby creating a stable institutional
environment for investment. Through their development expenditure, the states have
directly invested in physical and social infrastructures for industrial production and for
the reproduction of human capital. The state-guided economic restructuring has taken
place in both countries since the late 1970s when labour-intensive industries had
increasing difficulties in competing in the global market. The common aim has been to
upgrade productive sectors from labour-intensive to capital-intensive industries, such as
high-technology industries and advanced services. In doing so, the states have introduced
new development strategies to exclude those labour-intensive industries which were no
longer productive, and to concentrate on assisting some targeted industries through
public incentives and direct investment. However, in the beginning, these new
development strategies did not bring immediate effects as expected. Capital formation
was relative low and there was an excess of national savings which could not be directed
into productive investment. The states thus have modified development strategies since
the mid-1980s, trying to facilitate industrial transformation yet at the same time
emphasising the balance and the diversity of the national economy.
The state-guided economies in both countries also differ in many aspects. The
industrial structure of Singapore has been controlled by the state-owned enterprises and
foreign-based multinational co-operations. Local enterprises have thrived in sectors
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linked with traditional trade, real estate and transportation. Within the manufacturing
sector, the petroleum, machinery and electronic industries have assumed most impor-
tance. Financial and business service associated with command centre of international co-
operations, has been another key sector in the economy. Singapore's domestic savings
have been generated mostly by the public sector through its social security scheme. A
large volume of public savings has become one of the major source of capital formation
through the government's strategic expenditure. The state has used construction invest-
ment as a counter-cyclical device to balance the market economy. Although construction
investment led by the public sector has been a main source of capital formation, the over-
expansion of construction investment has also contributed to the economic crisis in the
mid-1980s. The recent restructuring strategy has decided to increase the competitive
ability of local firms through public incentives. The expansion of small- and medium-
sized enterprises and the development of local entrepreneurship have become major
concerns on official agenda. Locally-owned financial and business services in particular,
will also perform a key role in further development.
The industrial structure of Taiwan has been controlled by the state-owned enterprises
and a proliferation of small- and medium-sized family firms linked with foreign-based
capital through sub-contracting arrangements. The manufacturing sector has specialised
in the textile, electronic, information and machinery industries. Foreign capital has only
been allowed to participate in some selected sectors. Hence, while mainlanders have
dominated state bureaucracy and public enterprises, economic resources have diffused
into a private sector largely controlled by Taiwanese family businesses, This arrangement
has helped to cement a tacit alliance between the state and the domestic bourgeoisie.
Taiwan's domestic savings have been mainly generated by the private sector. The im-
balance between private savings and capital investment has constantly increased the
inflation pressure and the demand for property and fmancial assets. The recent restruc-
turing strategy has decided to lift the regulation on the flow of capital and goods, giving
foreign capital more access to the domestic market. Under the out-looking policy, direct
investment in social and physical infrastructure to create a favourable environment for
foreign-based firms has become to assume greater importance
Singapore and Taiwan have both given priority to internal cohesion and political
stability in the interest of economic development at all cost. The conflicting nature of
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nation-building in both countries created a sense of crisis, thereby legitimated the extra-
ordinary power given to the states. The massive social dislocation in the beginning
weakened existing patterns of social control and gave the states relative autonomy from
social forces. The states have been highly power-centralised and have been constituted as
a political-military apparatus. They have both used a series of repressive mechanisms to
ensure political legitimacy, social integration and labour control. The one-party regimes
along with paternalistic authoritarianism have hardly given room to political dissidents.
Local societies have been organised around a group of elite including civil bureaucrats,
professionals and politicians, who have played a crucial role in the decision-making
process.
However, the one-party states in both countries have been under political pressure
since the late 1 970s. The states have reacted differently to the public outcry about autho-
ritarian control and as a result, different forms of state-society relationship have emerged
in the 1980s. The demand for political liberation in Singapore originated in the increasing
discontent of middle-class citizens and the local bourgeoisie, and intensified after the
economic crisis in the mid-1980s. The state has developed several measures to integrate
the domestic bourgeoisie and middle-class citizens into a consultative politics, aiming to
channel dissent through its own institutions and away from opposition parties and civil
organisations. To promote a devotion to corporate objectives, a soul-searching process
involving strong provocation of national survival and group interests has taken place.
The call for political liberation has pushed the regime to adjust its means of social
control, but has not brought any fundamental changes. The state seems to be moving
more hesitantly down the road of democratisation and liberation, such is its apparent fear
of losing control. Strict limits have been continuously placed on civil and political life.
Taiwan obviously has had more serious internal conflicts. The 1947 massacre turned
the hostility between Taiwanese and mainlanders into a deeply-rooted conflict. The
political conflict first came to surface in the late 1970s when the mainlander-controlled
one-party state was seriously challenged by well-organised political opposition groups
with distinct Taiwanese identity. The ruling party used organised violence to overwhelm
waves of anti-government riots provoked by political dissidents, also attempted to
integrate more Taiwanese members into its own organisations. Yet opposition groups
have won popular support and become more influential through elections. The party was
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left without much choice but to reform itself and to loosen its control over society. After
the removal of martial law, political parties and civil groups were in upsurge. Taiwan has
entered a new era of competitive party politics. The state is no more free from the
constraints of social forces. Taiwanese members, particularly financial capitalists and
representatives of business groupings, have come to dominate the ruling party and the
parliament. Their influence has increased and challenged the state's independence of
policy decision-making. Many civil groups and neighbourhood organisations also have
formed coalitions to counter the business influence on politics. It seems that pluralist
politics has taken shape in a newly-awakening civil society.
Singapore and Taiwan have very different nationalist agendas. Singapore wants to
emphasise itself as standing at the starting point of a new era. The national history is read
as a process beginning with colonialism, without referring to a 'homeland' or a 'common
ancestry'. The denial of pre-colonial history has enabled the state to claim an independent
statehood without over-emphasising any individual culture in society. Singapore has
rejected the creation of a national identity on the basis of one particular culture, and has
adopted 'multi-racialism' as its official ideology. The concept of nation adopted by the
ruling elite was basically civil-territorial, aiming to bring together ethnic population into a
political community. It guarantees ethnic group equal citizenship rights, seeking to create
a supra-ethnic political culture for the new political community. The bilingual language
policy, in particular, has played a large part in facilitating inter-ethnic communication.
This policy has produced some undesirable consequences and has stimulated the demand
for moral regulation since the late 1970s. The state has used traditionalism as a cultural
ballast against moral crisis deemed to be caused by foreign cultural influence. This is not
an easy task because as a multi-racial nation, the state has received legitimisation on the
basis of an overarching ideology shared by all groups. During the political and economic
crisis in the mid-1980s, the state recognised that economic development alone was
insufficient for the formation of a 'nation'. It must find unifying symbols to develop a
sense of solitary for national consolidation. The concept of 'Asian values', as a repre-
sentation of traditional social values of different races, or more straightforwardly, as the
opposite side of foreign influence, has been on the agenda.
Taiwan's nation-building process has been very peculiar. The state emphasised the
continuity of linguistic and cultural roots for its construction and existence, because the
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legitimacy of the regime depended on a fictitious claim of sovereignty over China. It
acted as a 'memory nation', using common ancestry and genealogical myth to bond
together those who deemed to have common ethnic origin. It adopted a dominant-ethnic
model in which national identity is built on the basis of history and culture of the core
ethnic community. The consolidation of a dominant ethnic core - the Han Chinese,
ignoring the cultural differences between the mainland Chinese and the Taiwanese, and
other ethnic and cultural minorities. The exclusion of Taiwanese's history and culture
deepened the conflict between mainlanders and Taiwanese. However, the appearance of
the political opposition in the late 1970s weakened a single view of Taiwan's political
status and cultural identity. Taiwanization first surfaced as a cultural revival movement
and was incorporated into political agenda by both the ruling party and the opposition
party. The state has began to look for criteria of 'belonging' in history and geography of
the territory it currently governs. For decades, the issue on national identity has been
closely associated with the power struggle between political parties. There is still a lack
of consent within the state and in local society.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING: URBAN
PLANNING AND THE PROPERTY MARKET
4.1 Introduction
The very conditions that shape the planning process are directly associated with the
nature of urban policy, the planning regime and the property market in their historical
context. The analysis developed above already reveals an intertwined process during
which political, economic, social and cultural forces induce each other and act together
to constitute the historical context. My objective here is to analyse institutional factors
which contribute to the planning process. I begin with an analysis of the role of building
investment and urban policy in national development from economic, political and social
perspectives. It sheds the light on the way that the alliance of state intervention and
economic growth negotiates through urban policy and spatial development. I then move
to a detailed account of the evolution of the planning regime in Singapore and Taipei,
aiming to provide a proper understanding of the internal dynamics and conflicts of the
planning regime in both cities. In the third section I focus on the contextual elements of
urban policy and the property market in a particular era of historical development - the
1980s. The objective is to unfold the underlying logic of spatial development and the
ways it contributes to the appearance of a conservation-based redevelopment policy. At
the end of this chapter, I address a number of characteristics in the institutional setting
which can make the planning process in Singapore and Taipei different from each other.
They also set the stage for the analysis to be developed in the later chapters
Singapore
4.2 The Role of Urban Policy in National Development
Recalling the brief statement given in the previous chapter, Singapore's economic
growth stemmed from a high rate of capital investment for a sustained period of time. It
was reflected in the share of gross domestic capital formation in GDP, which represented
39.6 per cent in the 1970s and 41.3 per cent in the 1980s. A large proportion of this
capital investment (about 80 percent) went to fixed assets. The share of domestic fixed
capital formation in GDP represented 31.2 per cent in the 1970s and 37.4 per cent in the
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1980s (Appendix 1.7). It seems that domestic fixed capital formation was the major
impetus of capital investment in Singapore. The relative importance of construction
investment in total capital formation, and further, its contribution to GD? growth, need
to be carefully examined.
The rhythms of GDP growth and domestic fixed capital formation in relation to GD?
are presented in Figure 4.2.1. Interestingly, domestic fixed capital formation and GD?
growth appear to have exhibited an opposite movement. As can be seen, Singapore's
economy was at a standstill in the years after the independence. The economy sharply
took off during 1972-74 when the growth of GD? even reached 30 per cent. The first
downturn came between 1975-78 during which GDP growth dropped to less than 10 per
cent. The economy gained its recovery in 1979-83 while GD? growth ever returned to
22 per cent. It was again followed by a serious recession during the period 1984-87.
GDP growth fell to -2.8 per cent: the lowest point in Singapore's recent history. GD?
growth returned back to 20 per cent between 1988 and 1991 when the economy wit-
nessed a small recovery. The rhythm of domestic fixed capital formation in relation to
GDP was almost a reverse process. It continually increased throughout the late 1960s,
remained stable in 1971-73, peaked upwards in 1974-77, and began to slow down in
1978-82. A sharp upward movement could be seen during the period 1983-86 and this
was followed by the downturn during 1987-9 1.
Gross fixed capital formation is a measure of the additions to the stock of capital in a
country, i.e. new investment in fixed assets consisting of buildings, plants and machinery,
as well as depreciation, repairs and maintenance expenditures. In Singapore, construction
investment seems to have represented a large proportion of gross fixed capital formation.
The percentage share was 42.6 per cent in average in the 1970s and jumped to 51.4 per
cent in the 1980s (Appendix 1.7 ). As almost one-half of domestic fixed capital formation
went to construction, the change in construction investment was probable the major
force that affected the performance of gross domestic fixed capital formation.
There were two construction booms, in the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, while
GDP growth in both periods seems to have been halted. As indicated by Figure 4.2.2 and
4.2.3, the first construction boom started in 1975 and ended in 1978. During this period,
the value added by the construction industry registered for 7-8 per cent of GD?. The
total value of construction investment increased to S$ 1,205 million in 1976 and then
Chapter Four	 116
Figure 4.2.1 Percentage Change of GDP and Gross Fixed Capital
Formation in Relation to GDP, Singapore
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remained constant until 1978. It was equal to 13 per cent of GDP. Housing investment
constituted half of the total construction investment, with a total investment value of S$
1,180 million in 1976. The floor area built each year rose to 5,035,000 sq.m. in 1975 and
reached a peak at 5,732,000 sq.m. in 1978 (Appendix 1.9, 1.10). The second construc-
tion boom happened between 1983 and 1986. The value added by the construction
industry in GDP jumped to 8-12 per cent. The total value of construction reached S$
8,106 million in 1983 and grew to S$ 11,780 million in 1985, when it was equivalent to
26 per cent of GDP. More than half of the investment concentrated in property develop-
ment. The percentage change of floor area built each year was 56 per cent in 1983 and
73 per cent in 1984. As a result, the floor area built each year increased to 8,598,000
sq.m. in 1983, and reached a peak of 14,890,000 sq.m. in 1984 (Appendix 1.9,1.10).
The above information reveals that construction investment has been the major driver
of gross fixed capital formation. Construction investment could take place in various
forms, including residential and non-residential buildings, and other construction works
such as roads, bridges and land reclamation. Figure 4.2.3-4 indicate the changes in floor
area built each year by different uses and sectors over time. The floor area built for
residential use and built by the public sector both increased substantially during 1974-79
and 1983-86. The floor area built by the private sector was more prominent in the later
period. This suggests that property booms were in line with construction booms and the
public sector had a large part to play. The nature of public investment thus offer an
example to understand the logic behind construction investment, and the reasons that
help it to develop in a particular relationship with GDP growth.
Public housing construction and land sale scheme both seem to have strong influence
on property booms. More than two-thirds of residential space in Singapore was gene-
rated by the public sector as a direct result of its housing policy (Appendix 1.10). A
public-housing finance scheme was introduced by the Housing Development Board
(HDB) as early as in 1968 as part of its Home Ownership for the People scheme. It
allowed citizens to withdraw a portion of their Central Provident Fund - the compulsory
social security savings contributed by individual employees and kept in trust by govern-
ment - to pay for their HDB flats. A commercialisation strategy was also applied in the
later stage to open a larger market for public housing. It allowed residents in the public
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Figure 4.2.4 Floor Area Built Every Year by Sectors, Singapore
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Figure 4.2.3 Floor Area Built Every Year by Uses, Singapore
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estates to re-sell their flats in the market. This policy helped to create a significant de-
mand for public housing.
Large-scale slum clearance was put into force by the authorities with public housing
provided in the city or in the immediate periphery for resettlement. Numerous incentives,
such as the increase in compensation payments, were introduced to assist land clearance
and resettlement. To accelerate public housing construction, several new towns con-
taining a large distribution of HDB flats were proposed by the Concept Plan in 1973.
From this time onwards, public housing was constructed at a massive speed. During the
period 1960-89, six five-year building programmes were completed by the HDB. The
total number of HDB flats constructed by the end of the l980s was 680,130 units (Lim
et al, 1986, p.5; Wong and Yeh., 1985, p.231).
To accelerate housing development, a vast amount of land, freed from restrictions,
has to be made available in the first instance. Singapore benefited heavily from a legal
system inherited from the colonial government with regard to property right. After the
transfer of control to the Colonial Office in 1867, the British Crown began to alienate
land under the royal prerogative. The other forms of tenure prevalent were leases for a
variety of terms ranging from 30 to 999 years. The public sector therefore monopolised
land ownership; and the private sector participating in the development of land was based
on a leasehold basis. Later on, the Land Acquisition Act and the Urban Redevelopment
Act, which together constituted a legal framework to manage land acquisition, compen-
sation and resettlement, also gave the authorities strong powers to purchase land and
properties for development purposes. Accordingly, state ownership represented 60 per
cent of all land in 1970, and even increased to 76.2 per cent in 1985 (Motha and Yeoh,
1989, pp. 7-8).
Land policy, which shaped the nature of the landholding system and land ownership,
was not only critical for the success of public housing development but also played a key
role in building the public-private partnership for property development. As residential
space was mostly created by the public sector, approximately two-thirds of office and
commercial space was generated by the private sector (Appendix 1.10). The floor area
built by the private sector became more significant during the period 1983-86. This could
also be ascribed to the Sale of Site Programme - a land sale scheme started since 1967 by
the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) in combination with a package of incentives
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including property tax concessions, exemption from development charges and easy
repayment of the land price'. On the authority of the Land Acquisition Act and the Urban
Redevelopment Act, the URA assembled land parcels from small lots mainly through
compulsory acquisition. After clearance, land parcels with vacant possession were sold
to private developers mostly on 99-year leases, through a competitive tender system
(URA, 1983, p.9).2
 To ensure that development took place within a specific time frame,
one of the conditions attached to the URA tender sale was a preferred schedule of com-
pletion of the projects in a time span of between forty-two and fifty-eight months.
Between 1967 and 1982, a total of 166 sites were sold to the private sector for property
development, about 2,116,458 sq.m. floor area were created, including 719,025 sq.m. of
office space, 830,345 sq.m. of shop space and 3,549 residential units (URA, 1983).
Through public-housing development and the land sale scheme, the government
could effectively start building investment at the critical time. For the government, one of
the major aims of building construction was to act as a reflection of 'positive growth
despite economic recession' (Singapore Bulletin 4, 1976). As can be seen in Figure
4.2.5, the number of public housing units constructed by the Housing Development
Board (HDB) increased shortly after the oil crisis 1974-75 and 1982-1983. More than
30,000 flats were built each year during 1976-78, and the number even doubled in 1984,
during which more than 70,000 flats were competed (Appendix 1.11). The share of
housing investment in gross fixed capital formation increased to 22.9 per cent in 1976
per cent and to 36.2 per cent in the 1985 (Appendix 1.8). The land sale scheme was also
applied in accordance with the principle of 'growth through investment' (Wallace, 1971,
pp. 447-55). Figure 4.2.6 suggests that land released from the land sale scheme recorded
a substantial increase between 1978 and 1980. The sufficient supply of cheap land was
the main contributing factor for the growth of private investment. The total investment
value increased to S$ 1,436 million in 1978 and S$ 2,531 million in 1980 (Appendix
1.12). The property boom in the 1982-85 period was overwhelmingly a response to the
land sale scheme.
These incentives were: 1) easy terms for land payments which was 20 per cent down payment, 2)
interest-free loans over 10 years, and 3) property tax concession at one-third of the normal rate of 36 per
cent for 20 years. For a detailed discussion of this taxation scheme see Barker, 1974; John, 1976.
2 For information and critics about the Sale of Site programme see Choo, S., 1978.
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Figure 4.2.5 Public-Housing Development in Singapore
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The major financial source for public-housing construction was the Central Provident
Fund. It constituted the basis of public-housing finance scheme and created a property-
based banking system. The expansion of housing investment helped to transfer a large
amount of accumulated national savings into capital formation for the whole economy.
Also, by controlling the funds for public housing development, the government could
regulate financial institutions and the circulation of money. Hence, whenever the inflation
rate increased beyond the standard level, the government adjusted the price mechanism
of public housing to reduce the inflationary pressure. For instance, when a radical wage
policy was introduced by the government in the late 1970s to phase out labour-intensive
industries, it caused a large real wage increase between 1979 and 1981. The percentage
change was 19 per cent in 1979, 20 per cent in 1980 and 14-18 per cent in 1981. The
inflation rate coincided with real wage increase, jumping from 4 per cent in 1978 to 8.2
per cent in 1980. As a response to the inflation rate, the selling prices of public housing,
which were fixed before 1978, were raised 15 per cent in 1979, 20 per cent in 1980 and
38 percent in 1981 by the government. This helped to decrease the inflationary pressures
in other consumption goods. The inflation rate thus fell back to 3.9 per cent in 1982 and
1.2 per cent in 1983. After the pressure of inflation was removed, the adjustment of price
for public housing in the following years returned to a relatively moderate level: about 5
per cent in 1982, 5 per cent in 1983 and 2.5 per cent in 1984 (Economic and Social
Statistics, 1984).
Construction investment also stimulated the growth of the construction industry. The
value added by this industry in GDP was only 4.5 per cent in the 1960s, but rose to 7.5
per cent in the 1970s and to 8.5 per cent in the 1980s (Appendix 1.7). The construction
industry did not only make a contribution to GDP, but also served as an agent to regulate
the labour market by generating employment. For instance, the labour market was
slashed when the British troops withdrew in 1971, also during the global oil crisis in
1974-1975 and in 1982-1983. The restructuring process after the late 1970s also caused
a substantial loss of jobs in manufacturing industries. In these circumstances, the govern-
ment always started major labour-intensive projects, such as highway construction, land
reclamation, public housing development, etc. Through the massive increase in public-
sector expenditure, the construction industry expanded quickly and effectively generated
thousands of jobs.
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Construction investment also supported the rapid growth of industrial and commer-
cial activities by providing available land and the entire network of infrastructure.
Through the land sale scheme, land was acquired by the government and sold to property
developers mainly for commercial or industrial development. 3
 Generally, in every year
since 1980, more than 2,000 sq.m. floor area for commercial or industrial uses was
released to the market. The number even doubled and increased to 3,700 sq.m. floor area
in 1984. It is estimated that from 1960 to 1989, a total of 38,755 sq.m. floor area for
industrial and commercial uses was released to the market (Appendix 1.10). Massive
industrial estates in particular, were constructed in consequence of the development
plans formulated by the Jourong Town Corporation (JTC). These development plans
comprised the reclamation and development of the Southern Islands as an international
petrol-chemical manufacturing and distribution centre; the development of Loyang as a
centre for aviation industries and as an engineering base to support offshore oil and
mineral exploration; the development of Seletar Air Base for aeronautical industries; and
the construction of the Singapore Science Park for high-technology industhes. The JTC
managed 19 industrial estates in 1986 and another 17 estates were under development. A
total of 2,700 companies with around 210,000 workers - almost 60 per cent of the total
manufacturing employment - were accommodated in these industrial estates (JTC Annual
Report, 1986).
Housing development also supported the improvement of human capital by providing
relatively high standard housing, social and educational services. All of them created a
substantial advantage for industrial development by lowering the investment costs of
social reproduction. The HDB constructed between 50,000 and 160,000 housing units in
each five-year period. By the end of the 1980s, the percentage of population living in
public housing had increased to 87 per cent (Appendix 1.11). Moreover, the construction
of new towns also helped to locate industrial facilities to places with sufficient supply of
labour. The HDB made 20 per cent of the land area in new towns available for light
industries. Most of these industries were in need of unskilled and semi-skilled labour, and
thus produced employment opportunities for the female population, especially married
women living in the new towns. The journey to work was shortened, making it easier for
Land area used for industrial estate increased from 1,101 hectares in 1967 to 3,867 hectares in 1982-
more than 6 per cent of the total land area of Singapore (JUC Annual Report, 1982).
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women to combine their paid-jobs and domestic duties. This policy encouraged more
women to engage in production. The female participation rate rose from 21.6 per cent in
1967 to 45.8 per cent in 1984 (Economic and Social Statistics, 1984).
Drawing on these factors, it can be asserted that building investment in Singapore is
not only a matter involving the supply of floor space. As a major element of construction
investment, building investment has been an integrated part of government development
strategies. Through public-housing development and the land sale scheme, the govern-
ment has played a key role in building investment and has used it as a means to regulate
the cycle of the economy. Building investment has acted as a driving force for domestic
capital formation, and as a counter-cyclical device to manage economic fluctuations. The
economic function of building investment has become undeniably clear. Urban policies,
which determined building investment within a framework of economic planning also has
other critical aspects. Housing policy, in particular, contributed greatly to social integra-
tion among ethnic groups and assisted the political and social controls over the majority
population living in the public estates.4
As mentioned in the previous chapter, to resolve confrontations and violence bet-
ween different ethnic groups, the colonial government had placed different groups in
separate zones within the Central Area. As a result, the spatial concentration of ethnic
groups was phenomenal. The post-war urban development, in particular urban renewal
and new town construction, resulted in the relocation of the population from the Central
Area to the suburbs. As the population of the Central Area dropped from 411,600 in
1960 to 60,895 in 1980 (Census of Population, 1990), the significance of spatial concen-
tration of ethnic groups was reduced. The policy on housing allocation aimed to mix
ethnic groups in the public estates and new towns. In doing so, great attention was also
paid to environmental quality and urban design in furtherance of communication.
Although there was still some discernible ethnic spatial concentration existing in some
areas, it is believed that social integration of ethnic groups living in the public estates and
new towns began to take shape.
Additionally, as a great majority of the population lived under rules and conditions
governed by the housing authority, social and other policies could be co-ordinated and
implemented through housing policies to ensure better social and political control. For
a detailed discussion see Goh, L., 1987; Ha, S., 1987; Lau, S., 1988; Quah, S., 1990.
Chapter Four
	 125
instance, when traditional values were promoted by the state as a cultural ballast against
foreign influence after the late 1970s, housing policy was also formulated in accordance
to this official agenda. The housing authority introduced several programmes including
the Joint Balloting Scheme and the Reside Near Parent/Married Children Scheme in
1978, the Mutual Exchange of Flat Scheme in 1981, and the Multi-Tier Family Housing
Scheme in 1982. All these aimed to inveigle parents and their married children to live
together as a traditional extended family. Public incentives and design guidelines were
also in practice through these schemes to promote desirable traditional values. Further-
more, in another attempt to replace the role that traditional associations played in the
ethnic communities and to enhance control of residents in the public estates, many
government-sponsored community organisations were established. This network of com-
munity organisations and supporting public facilities were directly controlled by the PAP.
They fulfilled an important political function - as the avenue for individuals to express
their opinions and as a means for the government to promote official policies and views.
To all intents and purposes, the PAP effectively controlled most of the electorates where
there were a large number of public estates.
4.3 The Evolution of Urban Planning and Urban Renewal
4.3.1 The Origin of Modern Planning in Singapore (1955-1959)
The earliest plan in Singapore, generally known as the Town Plan, was formulated under
the auspices of Raffles's Town Committee in 1823, and then adopted by the colonial
government in 1828. This plan covered an area 5 miles along the seafront and up to 3.5
miles inland, which is the core of the Central Area at present. It proposed a settlement
pattern on the basis of strict functional and racial segregation. 5 As a result, the Europeans
lived adjacent to the government area along the Singapore River; the Arabs and the
Bugis settled close to the Malay Sultan's compound and the Mosque; the Malays lived
along the northern fringes of the Rocher River; the Chinese and the Indians separately
resided next to the mercantile and commercial district at the southern bank of the
Detailed Discussion on early planning practice of Raffles see Fraser, 1952; McGee, 1967; Buchanan,
1972.
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Singapore River. The earlier morphology of the city was thus very much characterised by
its functional specialisation, which created several ethnic enclaves such as Chinatown,
Little India and Kampong Glam, referred to as the Historical Districts by the current
authority (Map 4.3.1).
The population of the city increased drastically in the late nineteenth century as a
result of the flourishing entrepot trade and successive waves of immigrants. Owing to the
substantial expansion of new settlements, the ethnic segregation defined by the original
Town Plan became gradually obscured (Choo, 1988, p. 260). Housing shortages and
overcrowding problems began to threaten these ethnic enclaves by leading them into
acute social and environment decay. A colonial authority for urban planning and housing
development - the Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT) was established in 1927. Physical
development of the city was controlled by the SIT through the application of the General
Improvement Plan (GIP). The SIT, however, was unable to solve housing crisis in many
occasions because of the lack of consistent support and intervention from the colonial
government (Quah, 1985, pp. 84-5). Hence, the GIP became no more than an official
record of public proposals for the development of land, and only dealt with particular
areas or with special need.
As urban growth continued, the resulting crisis fmally went far beyond the Town
Plan's control. A housing survey conducted in 1947 suggested that about 250,000
people lived in slums and 300,000 people lived in squatter settlements. The gross
population density in Chinatown reached 160 persons per acre. The net density of indivi-
dual blocks was as high as 800 persons per acre in some cases (Singapore Annual
Report, 1960, p. 72). The resultant environmental and social problems in those ethnic
enclaves forced the colonial administration to introduce a range of palliatives to arrest
the worsening housing stress in the city (Goh, 1958; Kaye, 1960; Ommanney, 1960). A
Housing Committee was established in 1947 as a higher level authority over the SIT. It
set a twenty-year target for a 'definite programme of slum clearance'. To control urban
development in the long run, a statutory Master Plan was also drawn by a British planner
Patrick Abercrombie in 1955 and approved by the colonial regime in 1958. According to
the 1955 Master Plan, the problems of congestion and overcrowding were expected to
be alleviated by a proposed green belt to stop the continued expansion of the
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central area, and by the development of new towns outside the existing urban area.
Urban renewal and housing development were closely articulated. Housing stress could
be sorted by resettling population into new towns. As most of the population moved out
from the central area, there would be a chance for redevelopment.6
The Master Plan also prepared a detailed programme concerning the redevelopment
of the city. The Central Area (CA), a land area of 1,160 acres (or 469 hectares) covering
almost the old city of Singapore, was designated by the government (Map 4.3.2-3). The
CA was further divided into precincts for staged redevelopment. Several principles
related to the practice of urban renewal were also addressed. For instance, to retain the
existing ambience of the historical core of the city, conservation and rehabilitation were
considered to be more adequate than the wholesale demolition of Street blocks. Historic
monuments, sites and buildings of architectural interest were listed and shown on the CA
map by a distinctive notation (Master Plan: Written Statement, 1955). This appears to
have been the earliest official statement of urban conservation in Singapore. Another
important principle was that urban renewal should be undertaken by an active public
authority in a framework of public-private partnership (Master Plan: Written Statement,
1955). This later became a long-term strategy for the implementation of urban renewal in
Singapore.
The Control of Rent Ordinance (1947) and the Land Acquisition Ordinance (1955)
constituted the legal basis of the Master Plan. The former fixed land rent with a minimal
allowable increase and prohibited the repossession of tenanted properties by owners even
for demolition and rebuilding (Section 7, Section 15, Control of Rent Ordinance). It
aimed at preventing landlords from charging exorbitant rents and evicting tenants in the
face of the housing shortage. The latter was an important legal precedent provided for
compulsory acquisition of land for development purposes. It allowed the authority to
purchase land at a fixed value equal to the value at 22 April, 1955. Both regulations had
perpetuated influence on the later urban renewal process. The Planning Ordinance also
came into force in 1959 to give effect to the Master Plan. This act was also the legal base
6 The Master Plan objectives and proposals were reviewed by Choo, S., 1978; Jensen, 1976; Field, 1989.
7 For a review of the earlier legislative framework see Yeung, 1973, pp. 27-41 and Lai, S. 1991, pp. 79-
91.
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Map 4.3.2. The Location of the Central Area, Singapore p-
Map 4.3.3. The Central Area, Singapore
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base for the implementation of development control. 8
 On the basis of this Act, proposals
for the revision, addition or alteration to the Master Plan were required to be publicly
exhibited for those affected to submit their objections. The overall planning function was
vested in the Planning Department of the Ministiy of National Development. The chief
planner was the sole competent authority in charge of the review of planning proposals.
A Master Planning Committee and a Development Control Committee were appointed
by the Minister to assist the review of public and private proposals respectively. Appeals
from Chief Planner went to the Minister whose decision was final.
4.3.2 Squatter Clearance and Public Housing Development (1959-1965)
The planning regime established by the colonial government contained several inspiring
concepts but did not provide any effective measures to resolve the problem of housing
shortage. From 1927 to 1959, only 23,000 housing units were completed (Field, 1989,
p4; Wan, T., 1975, pp. 4-5). A difficult task was thus left to the self-government of
Singapore which was elected in 1959. The new government took quick action to seek
immediate solutions. The Housing and Development Board (HDB) replaced the SIT in
1960 and became responsible for public housing and urban development. At this stage,
housing development on the fringe area was strongly pursued by the authority (Map
4.3•4).9 Most of the public estates were located within a five-mile radius of the city
centre, involving high-density infilling of vacant sites within the existing urban areas
(HDB Annual Report, 1960, p.8).
During the period of 1960-65, the HDB constructed over 65,000 flats in several
isolated estates in the urban fringe area such as in Bukit Ho Swee, St. Michael's Estate,
MacPherson Estate, Tanjong Rhu Road and Kallang Estate, and in two new towns -
Queenstown and Toa Payoh. These public flats were mainly built for the resettlement of
squatters and farmers, as most of them were displaced by slum clearance and compulsory
According to this act, all kinds of development require planning approval. 'Development' is given the
widest possible interpretation. It means to carry out any building, engineering, mining or other operation
on, or under land or making any material change in the use of any building or land (Section 10.1,
Planning Act)
Considering that the majority of these people entirely depended on the activities in the traditional
central area for their livelihood, their income level was relatively low and they could not afford the high
costs of transportation.
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land acquisition. Hence, after the completion of the first five-year housing programme, a
total number of 12,455 people who were displaced by slum clearance or compulsory
acquisition obtained new flats in the public estates near their original neighbourhood. The
substantial fringe development by the HDB compensated those who need to be resettled
by offering them alternative housing (Report on Land Clearance and Development,
1956).
The government considered that the original Master Plan (1955), with its emphasis
on development control, was insufficient to deal with the demand for rapid change. It
decided to take the lead in searching a new planning regime suitable for its own needs.
The government embarked on two research projects with the aid of the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP). The first project was conducted by Lorange in 1962;
the second was carried out by a group of consultants led by Koenigsberger, Abrams and
Kobe in 1963. One of the main concepts of their proposals was to establish a two-tier
planning system, with a long range land-use plan, commonly known as the Concept Plan
or the Ring Plan, to serve as a guiding principle for development; and a series of Action
Programmes, or Action Plans, to serve as public initiatives for synchronised investment.
More intriguingly, both projects strongly proposed retaining the general features of the
original city core and rejected the idea of wholesale demolition of large quarters of the
historical centre. Urban renewal for the Central Area was to be implemented by 'a
phased rehabilitation rather than entire rebuilding of the old city' (Lorange, 1962).
Their emphasis on rehabilitation and conservation was entirely different from the
government's aspiration. For the government, although the city centre embraced the
early settlement and development pattern of the original city, many of the buildings and
the nature of the Street layout were not considered to be appropriate as the basis for a
major business and financial centre. Moreover, rehabilitation would not bring major
economic benefits from higher land value, since the property taxation system in this
country was based on improvement value, i.e., rental or capital value of properties,
rather than site value (Choo, S.,1988, pp. 275-76). Comprehensive redevelopment was
more politically astute as well as fiscally sound and administratively convenient (Gamer,
1972, pp. 142-43).
The idea of urban conservation, which made its appearance in the early Master Plan
and again in the UN reports, was completely rejected by the government. Comprehensive
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redevelopment rather than rehabilitation was regarded by the government as a rational
way to transform Singapore into a modem city. However, at this stage, the practice of
urban renewal in the Central Area was faced with several difficulties (Field, 1989, p.8;
Jenson, 1976, p.122). The main problem was that most of the properties were under a
rigid rent-control. A stifling property-tax system and a pattern of fragmented land owner-
ship also acted against private redevelopment. Therefore, if the Central Area was to be
redeveloped on a comprehensive and long-term base, public initiatives appeared to be
necessary.
4.3.3 The Establishment of New Planning Regime (1966-1979)
After gaining independence in 1965, the government set up an organisation, known as
the State and City Planning (SCP) under the Ministry of National Development. A four-
year research project, generally referred to as the SCP Project, was issued in the same
year. The direct result of this research project was a three-tier planning system of
Concept Plan, Master Plan and Action Plan. A new Concept Plan (or Ring Plan) was
formulated and accepted by the government in 1973 (Map 4.3.4). It served as a non-
statutory physical plan to guide long-term development.' 0
 The existing Master Plan was
retained as a short-term statutory plan to control land use, private development, land
values and the levy of development charges. It was to be revised in every five-years.
Several Action Plans (or Development Guide Plans) were drafted in the following years
on the basis of special needs in specific areas. The Action Plan for the redevelopment of
the Central Area became the blueprint of the Master Plan for Urban Renewal (MPUR),
which was formulated by the URA in 1973."
The project had three major objectives: First, and primarily, to prepare a long-range, comprehensive
land use and transportation plan to guide the future physical development of the city, to prepare a
programme for the implementation of this plan and to establish machinery for its continuous review and
updating. Second, to prepare policies and programmes for urban renewal in the old areas of the city.
Third, to make recommendations to the government concerning the type of mass transit system
appropriate for the island (Wardlaw, 1971; Olszewski and Skeates, 1971). For a detailed discussion on
SCP see Western, 1966 and Tan, J. 1966.
"It provided for a doubling of population and employment within the current CA: population was to
increase from 248,000 to 300,000, employment from 155,000 to 300,000. To accommodate this growth,
it proposed a large-scale residential redevelopment within the CA by the HDB. Public transportation,
including the construction of a Mass Rapid Transit System was also recommended. It also revised
several guidelines for zoning and plot ratio control (Olszewski and Skeates, 1971, p.61-72).
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To provide an institutional basis for the plans, the reform of the administrative and
legislative frameworks also came onto the official agenda. The government established
the Housing Resettlement Department under the HDB in 1964, with a main task to
rehouse residents from the key renewal areas to the public estates. This was a realisation
of an original principle laid down by the original Master Plan (1955) which emphasised
that the process of slum clearance, resettlement, public housing and urban renewal
should be intimately connected. The Urban Renewal Department (URD) was also set up
within the HDB in 1966. It was in charge with a wide range of responsibilities, including
drawing and co-ordinating plans for the Central Areas, designing public housing and
commercial estates, controlling private investment, preserving or rehabilitating historical
buildings, and co-ordinating development projects. Also, to make urban renewal more
efficient, a central authority - the Urban Renewal Steering Committee (URSC) - was
established in 1971 under the chairmanship of the Permanent Secretary for National
Development. It was responsible for co-ordinating the URD with other public bodies.
Two years later, the URD separated from the HDB and became an individual statutory
authority, generally known as the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA).
The government revised several earlier legislation relating to the implementation of
urban renewal. 12 It first replaced the existing Land Acquisition Ordinance with the Land
Acquisition Act in 1966. On the authority of this Act, the state could compulsorily
acquire land and buildings 'when the land was needed by any person, corporation or
statutory board, for any work or an undertaking which, in the opinion of the Minister,
was of public interest, or for any residential, commercial, industrial purpose' (Section 5,
Land Acquisition Act, 1966). Any increase in land value by reason of the development
within seven years preceding the date of acquisition would not be taken into account.
The amendment in 1973 went further: the relevant date for counting land value was fixed
at 30 November, 1973. Property owners thus had to accept two scales of values
depending whether their properties were acquired by the government under compulsory
purchase procedures or were sold in the market (Section 10, Land Acquisition Act,
1966).
12 Detailed discussion of the legislative framework see Lai, A., 1990, pp.79-91.
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Map 4.3.4. Generalised Urban Structure of the Concept Plan, Singapore
Map 4.3.5. Location of Public Estates. Singapore
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The Controlled Premises Act (Special Provision) was revised in 1 969) It enabled the
Minister to declare any part of Singapore as a 'Development Area'; also allowed owners
of rent-controlled properties to repossess and redevelop their properties within certain
designated development areas. Private owners who failed to undertake their proposed
development within six months after repossessing properties or were unable to complete
the entire redevelopment within three to ten years, would be subject to compulsory
acquisition (Section 3-7, Controlled Premises Act, 1969). The Urban Redevelopment
Act also came into force in 1973. It set out the functions, duties and powers of the Urban
Redevelopment Authority, and contained the provision for the declaration of an 'Urban
Redevelopment Area'. The authority could from time to time, with the approval of the
Minister, declare a place as an urban redevelopment area for renewal activities. Land and
properties in this area would be acquired by the authority within three years from the
date of notification in the Gazette or within such extended period as the Minister might
think fit (Section 15-27, Urban Redevelopment Act, 1973).
Among these new regulations, the Land Acquisition Act was particularly important.
It challenged the conventional concept of 'property right' in most capitalist societies
since it gave the planning authority absolute power to intervene in the private sphere
without individuals' concessions. According to this act, the authority has the right to
declare any areas with private properties as the sites for development purposes. The
authority was not required to either disclose or establish its intentions for the sites in
question at the time of a declaration. On condition that the properties could not be
obtained by agreement, the authority could exercise compulsory acquisition powers
given by the law to achieve its objective. This practice gave no chance to property
owners to appeal to juridical court or administrative tribunals if they disagreed with the
propriety of the public purpose or demanded evidence that alternative sites had been
considered and reasons why they had been rejected. Only the objection to the measure-
Historically, rent control was firstly introduced between 1914 and 1923 as a short-term expedient to
deal with the housing shortage and rising rent during the First World War. After this short interlude,
rent control was brought into operation again during the Second World War. All these culminated in the
Control of Rent Ordinance in 1947. The legislation applied to both to residential as well as business
premises which built or completed on and before 1947. To provide tenants the security of tenure, the
legislation forbade the recovery by the landlord from the tenant of any lump sum payment premium as a
condition of grant, renewal, transfer or continuance of a tenancy.
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ment of the affected areas or the claims for compensation could be regarded by the
authority.'4
At this stage, the government emphasised more comprehensive planning for housing
estates in the form of new towns. Throughout the 1970s, eight new towns were built by
the HDB in accordance with the prototype new town model - a relatively self-contained
population centre with high-density, high-rise public housing built at net densities of
between 110 and 220 units per hectare) 5
 The location of new towns was to a large
extent determined by the Concept Plan which suggested housing development taking
place along the southern coastal belt and further in a ring around the central reserve cum-
water catchment area (Map 4.3.5). A total number of 265,600 flats, mostly three and
four-room units, were built on a land area totalling 5,680 hectares. Apart from these new
towns, the HDB also started to build public estates in Marine Parade, Farier Road and
Tampines and continued to carry out the development of Queenstown, Toa Payoh,
Kallang Basin, Balestier Road and Upper Changi Road. The annual expenditure of the
11DB was even more than a third of the total government annual capital budget (HDB
Annual Report, 1985).
Following the success of housing development, the government reckoned that the
essential pre-conditions for urban redevelopment had been achieved. According to the
principle of staged redevelopment laid down by the Master Plan for Urban Renewal, the
URA divided the Central Area into several sub-areas, including two central business
districts, one civic centre and nineteen precincts (Map 4.3.6).6 They were numbered in
accordance with their priority for redevelopment.' 7 The official proposal was to start
urban renewal in one precinct in the extreme north and another in the extreme south,
then moving gradually towards the most central precinct until the whole area was entirely
redeveloped (Choe, A., 1975, p.102). Also, in the designated area, rent-control would be
' For a detailed discussion see Kon and Lim, 1969, pp. 332-34; Grebler, 1964, p.76-88; Lim, S.,1975,
pp. 45-55.
' They were: Woodlands New Town (1971), Telok Blangah (1972), Bedok and Ang Mo Kio (1973),
Clementi (1974), Yishun (1976), Houngan, Jurong East and Jurong West (1979)
16 The Civic Center, the North CBD, and eleven precincts were located to the North of the Singapore
River with the remaining to the South of the river.
'' The priority was based on 1) the availability of land (in this stance based on areas where most of the
land is state land), 2) the possibility of clearance, 3) the stage of deterioration which poses the urgency
for redevelopment, and 4) the need of the land for development or for road and other public utility and
amenity improvement proposals and its fitting in with the plan for comprehensive renewal. Detailed
discussion of the precinctal division see Choe, A., 1975, pp. 102-14; Jenson, 1967, pp. 126-27.
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lifted to allow land-owners repossess their land properties for redevelopment. Given that
some fragmented properties were unlikely to be developed privately, the authority moved
in to acquire land and properties from their owners. The assembled parcels were then
sold to private developers through the land sale scheme (URA, 1989, p.58).
Comprehensive development of the Central Area came to take place along two major
axes. One of them paralleled the sea coast between Singapore Port and Kallang Basin
Industrial Estate. The other extended westward from the historical core on the seafront
north of the Singapore River, along Orchard Road and eastward onto planned reclaimed
land (Olszewski and Skeates, 1971, p.66). Throughout the 1970s, the Central Area was
transformed by many large-scale, comprehensive redevelopment projects assisted by the
successful land sale scheme. The best illustration was an eighty-acre land area covering
the vicinity of Shenton Way. After being declared as a 'Development Area' in 1970,
rent-control was lifted, land parcels were sold to private developers and the pace of
redevelopment was given an unexpected boost in the early 1970s. After comprehensive
redevelopment, this area functioned as a financial centre for the city and gained itself a
name as 'Golden Shoe' as for its shape and land value (Map 4.3.7). ' Apart from this
area, office and commercial development also took place in Orchard Road corridor, and
in the vicinity of the City Hall and the North bank of the river. The Central Area alone
provided more than 75 per cent of the total office space in the early 1 980s.
Interestingly, for the government, the residential land in the Central Area would be
reserved exclusively for housing in the future. Following the completion of the first and
the second five-years HDB programmes, the proportion of population living in tradi-
tional shophouses declined from 90 per cent in 1957 to 56 per cent in 1970. The Central
Area as a whole experienced a considerable decline in population and density. The HDB
was thus expected to construct more than 10,000 flats on the residential land along the
banks of the Singapore River and the Rochore Canal which was sold at subsidised prices.
Also, a 106 acres land area in the Marina Centre reclamation was earmarked for
constructing private condominium housing with specially priced sites offered to reduce
land costs for development. This policy, apparently a reaction to the rapid decline of
18 The average 'and value in the Golden Shoe Area increased 80 per cent from 1971 to 1972, and over
100 per cent from 1972 to 1973. See Choo, S., 1978, pp. 90, 93-94.
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population, aimed to give a balance to the decentralisation process which had been
promoted in the Master Plan.'9
Generally speaking, the Master Plan for Urban Redevelopment introduced a more
intensive type of development into the Central Area. High-rise official and commercial
buildings were erected at the core of the CA. Land around the city core was filly
occupied by high-rise, high-density public housing estates. Most of the new development
projects in this area displayed a trend in the direction of multi-use structures or mega
structures, packaged with the jargon 'city-within-a city'. Many pre-war shophouses
gave way to these commercial and residential complexes. The urban space was drasti-
cally transformed in the 1970s - an era which was seen as the 'most spectacular decade in
Singapore's history' - by its political leadership (Lee, K., 1975).
4.3.4 Urban Redevelopment for the Making of a Global City (1980-)
The early 1 980s witnessed a massive injection of public expenditure and private invest-
ment in the redevelopment of the Central Area in line with the 'global city' agenda. The
Central Area Planning Team (CAPT), chaired by the General Manager of the URA and
including chief members of key development agencies such as URA, HDB and PWD,
was formed under the Urban Renewal Steering Committee. The main tasks were to co-
ordinate different public bodies in a framework that can help to formulate land-use plans
and urban design concepts for the global city in the coming years. The CAPT issued
several studies combining a series of estimates and projections, including population,
employment, floor space requirement. An Interim Report and a Urban Growth Image
Plan were produced as a result of these preceding analyses (URA, Annual Report, 1979/
80, p.12).
According to the CAPT. the major objectives for developing the Central Area at this
stage were: to establish and promote the Central Area as the trade, financial and culture
'9 The emphasis on more housing in the Central Area was widely publicized through important speeches
by both the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Development, such as 'Time to Get More
People to Live in the CBD' (Strait Times, 1, Nov., 1975); 'More People to Live in the City' (Singapore
Bulletin 4, 1975); 'Advantages of Living in the City Center' (Mirror, 28, Jun. 1976); 'Checking Drift
from the City Center' (Singapore Bulletin 6, 1977).
Two mixed-use development projects in Marina Bay and Raffles City were considered to be the largest
urban renewal schemes of their kind in Southeast Asia (Field, 1989, p.18).
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centre of the republic; to improve environmental conditions and investment opportunities
in the Central Area through Continuous clearance of slums and the redevelopment of the
run-down areas; to stimulate residential development by providing more residential units
with an emphasis on achieving greater variety of housing to accommodate a cross-
section of the population; to preserve and revitalise specific areas and buildings with
cultural and historical significance; and to provide opportunities for a wide range of
social and cultural activities of national and city-wide significance (URA, 1980, p.32-4).
The CAPT revised the Master Plan and extended the Central Area to a total of 2,545
hectares, more than three times the size of the old URA Central Area (Map 4.3.2). For
planning purposes, the CAPT divided the existing use patterns of the Central Area into
two categories - the hard area and the soft area - in terms of their opportunities for
redevelopment from both economic and general aspects. 2' In view of the fact that half of
the rent-controlled properties were located on residential land and there would not be
sufficient incentive for any forms of redevelopment, the CAPT also suggested to convert
these rent-controlled properties, in particular pre-war shophouses, to state ownership
through compulsozy acquisition.
A significant change in policy was that the CAPT planned to restrict public housing
development within the URA Central Area (Straits Times, 24, Sept., 1981). From the
official point of view, the HDB redevelopment projects, which built public estates in the
Central Area in order to resettle low-income residents in the run-down areas to the
nearby neighbourhood, were no longer to be tolerated (URA, 1980, pp. 57-58). The
motive behind this decision was to avoid a situation in which the commercial centre in
the Central Area would be surrounded by a wide band of public estates that 'stand in
contrast with modem skyscrapers - both in volumes, quality of materials, and visual
images' (Ibid., 1980, p.58). Accordingly, high-density public housing would be confined
to those areas which were already in course of construction and several areas which had
been acquired by the 11DB would be developed for other uses. Added to this, new
21 A land area of 543 hectares in the Central Area with recently completed buildings was classified as
the hard area; a land area of 1200 hectares was classified as the soft area in terms of their redevelopment
opportunities. Approximately 60 per cent of the previous URA Central Area or a land of 484 hectares
was considered to be the hard area (URA, 1980, p.15-16, p.43).
These HDB land parcels were mainly located in Ann Siang Hill, Telok Ayer Street and Duxton Plains
(Ibid., 1980, p.58).
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housing developments initiated by the private sector or by the URA were only allowed to
take place outside the boundary of the URA Central Area. Residential use within this
area must be mixed with commercial and office uses. As a result of the exclusion of
residential use, the Central Area was expected to lose 10 per cent of its population and a
reduction of the residential density by 18 per cent within five years after 1980 (Ibid.,
1980, p.50). Land previously acquired for public housing development had to be given a
new use, thus a large pool of state land became available.
Moreover, the government became more concerned about the visual image that the
Central Area represented. For the CAPT. there was an urgent need to 'enhance the
visual contrast, richness and historical perspective of the city' through the guidance of an
overall urban design that can 'preserve the visual and psychological values of diversity,
meaning, comfort and tradition' (Ibid., 1980, p.34). On the basis of the Urban Growth
Image Plan, the Urban Design Envelope Control Plan was formulated by the URA in the
early 1980s and served to control the visual image and built form of the Central Area
(URA, Annual Report, 1983/84). Several measures concerning the preservation and
rehabilitation of historic buildings also appeared on the official agenda. All these seem to
have been part of a comprehensive package of aesthetic improvement calculated to
overturn the image of Singapore as a dehumanising and unfathomable concrete jungle.
However, it is also noted that before the mid-1980s, pro-development criteria still by and
large overrode equity and aesthetic considerations. Preservation and rehabilitation were
still not generally practical propositions. A detailed analysis is needed before quickly
jumping into a conclusion. In the next section I focus on several trends taking place in
urban planning and the property market which were closely associated with these
changes.
4.4 Urban Planning and Property Market in the post-1980 Era
4.4.1 Over-Supply of Floor Space and Downturn of the Property Market
One major trend, which appeared on the eve of the second construction boom, was that
the property market was halted because floor space was in excess of the needs of the
market. Figure 4.4.1 -3 illustrate the changes in supply, demand, and occupancy rate in
the office, commercial and residential sectors. It seems that an observable excess of floor
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space became evident in all these sectors after 1984. The over-supply of office space
reached a peak in 1987 when office space provided was 3,074,000 sq.m., an excess of
678,000 sq.m. The commercial sector exhibited a similar trend; in 1987, the supply of
commercial space was 1,480,000 sq.m., an excess of 277,000 sq.m. The excess supply of
private residential units also reached to a high at 8,470 units. The over-supply situation
remained consistent in the following years (Appendix 1.13).
The over-supply of floor space threw a dark shadow on the occupancy rate and on
property prices. The occupancy rates of office, commercial and residential space were on
average above 90 per cent before 1983. They began to decline after 1984, reaching the
bottom in 1987. During that year, only 78 per cent of office space, 81.3 per cent of
commercial space and 80.3 per cent of private residential units were taken. The office
sector seems to have been more affected by the over-supply of floor space in comparison
with the commercial or residential sectors (Appendix 1.13). The decline in property
prices was in line with the trend in the occupancy rate. As indicated in Table 4.4.1,
property prices sharply escalated between 1981 and 1983. Property prices in general rose
by 65 per cent in 1980 and 83 per cent in 1981. Among the four sectors, office and
industrial properties recorded the biggest increases. Property prices of both sectors rose
180 per cent and 108.8 per cent respectively in 1983. Property prices began to fall when
the construction boom started. The average price, for instance, slipped by 7.7 per cent in
1984, 16.7 per cent in 1985 and 13.0 per cent in 1986. Among the four sectors, office
and commercial properties were mostly affected, experiencing a reduction of 25.4 per
cent in 1985. A small recovery emerged in the period 1988-89 during which the average
prices increased 18.4 per cent and 6.8 per cent. However, it was not until the mid-1990s
that property prices rose again. Hence, it seems very clear that the buoyant market in the
early 1980s ended on the eve of the construction boom. The overall price slipped to the
bottom in the mid-1980s and failed to make a full recovery until the mid-1990s (Figure
4.4.4).
Various reasons which caused the downturn of the property market were given by
the government in several surveys (Economic Committee, 1986; Quah, S, 1986; Tay, C.
1987). In short, the peaking of property prices in the early 1980s obviously motivated
property developers to build additional units and sell them just for short-term capital
gain. This speculation was compounded in part by the release of land through the land
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Figure 4.4.1 Supply, Demand and Occupancy Rate of Office
Space, Singapore
	
1000	 75
500'
	
0	 I	 ,	 .	 ,	 70
- CM (	 '	 It)	 F..	 0)	 - CM
0) 0) 0) 0)
0) 0) 0) 0) 0) a) a) 0) 0) 0) 0) a) 0) 0)
year
Supply --------- - Demand	 Occupancy Rate
Source: Appendix 1.13
Figure 4.4.2 Supply, Demand and Occupancy Rate of Commercial
Space, Singapore
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Table 4.4.1 Percentage Change in Property Prices, Singapore, 1979-1994
All Properties	 Residential	 Office	 Commercial	 Industrial
1979	 16.2	 21.9	 16.2	 21.4	 3.4
1980	 65.1	 66.7	 86.0	 35.3	 51.7
1981	 83.1	 70.8	 180.0	 71.3	 108.8
1982	 -3.8	 0.9	 -13.8	
-15.7	 -11.1
1983	 4.0	 12.5	 -10.4	 -10.2	 -16.6
1984	 -7.7	 -5.6	 -22.5	 -10.1	 -11.3
1985	 -16.7	 -16.0	 -25.4	 -25.4	 -20.0
1986	 -13.0	 -12.0	 -16.0	 -4.0	 -25.0
1987	 18.4	 17.0	 16.7	 18.8	 5.3
1988	 6.8	 6.8	 19.4	 8.8	 8.9
1989	 0.5	 0.7	 -6.8	 -8.1	 9.3
1990	 0.3	 0.6	 -4.6	 -5.3	 8.5
1991	 0.5	 1.0	 -6.6	 -6.5	 8.8
1992	 10.4	 13.1	 -3.7	 -7.4	 9.0
1993	 24.3	 28.0	 -1.1	 -3.0	 6.6
1994	 40.6	 43.6	 25.4	 17.3	 16.3
1995	 15.8	 14.1	 35.3	 15.6	 28.7
Source: Appendix 1.14
sale scheme in which excessive plot ratios were given for development. At the same time,
public housing construction was accelerated by the housing authority in the new towns.
Therefore the supply-side of floor space was greatly expanded. The slowdown of the
national economy after the early 1980s had no doubt a very strong impact on the effec-
tive demand for office and commercial space. The demand for housing also gradually
approached its limit since the majority of the population already lived in the public
estates. All these factors caused the supply to increase at a faster rate than the demand,
culminating in a glut of floor space. The over-supply situation was therefore reflected in
a low occupancy rate of floor space and the decline in property prices.
Interestingly, the fall of the occupancy rates of office and commercial space exhibited
a geographical variation. In Table 4.4.2 the data are divided into three categories -
Central Area, Orchard Road and Rest of Island - for closer inspection. It is seen that
during the period 1983-86, the occupancy rate of office space in the Central Area
declined from 92 to 80.6 per cent. The occupancy rate of commercial space decreased
from 92.7 to 83.6 per cent. The occupancy rate of office space built by the public sector
in particular, even dropped below 79 per cent in 1986, as did that of commercial space
built by the private sector. The occupancy rates of office and commercial space in other
two areas - Orchard Road and the Rest of Island - also decreased over the same period
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Figure 4.4.3 Supply, Demand and Occupancy Rate of Residential
Space, Singapore
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Figure 4.4.4 Property Price Index by Sector(1985100), Singapore
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Table 4.4.2 Geographical Variation of Occupancy Rate, Singapore, 1979-1995
1979	 1983	 1986	 1989	 1995
................................... ......................q92ce
Central Area
Total	 89.3	 92.0	 80.6	 86.5	 93.5
Public Sector
	 94.7	 90.7	 86.7	 75.6	 97.1
Private Sector
	 87.6	 96.0	 79.0	 89.2	 93.1
Orchard Road
Total	 86.7	 92.0	 85.4
Public Sector
	 65.3	 91.0	 84.4
Private Sector	 93.9	 94.8	 85.6
Rest of island
	
93.5	 94.4
	
93.5	 91.3
	
93.5	 94.8
Total	 87.8	 91.0	 85.5	 90.1	 91.7
Public Sector	 83.4	 83.4	 84.2	 89.4	 93.9
Private Sector	 95.1	 95.2	 87.9	 92.1	 89.5
cLpace................................................
Central Area
Total	 91.9	 92.7	 83.6	 89.5	 81.6
Public Sector	 94.5	 90.4	 79.4	 87.0	 100
Private Sector	 90.3	 95.9	 89.4	 93.8	 78.0
Orchard Road
Total	 90.3	 87.8	 86.1	 95.7	 92.9
Public Sector	 65.2	 87.5	 86.0	 95.6	 100
Private Sector	 91.2	 95.5	 89.0	 97.7	 92.0
Rest of island
Total	 84.9	 87.3	 85.1	 84.1	 86.9
Public Sector	 82.1	 86.9	 77.3	 84.6	 98.0
Private Sector	 89.0	 87.6	 89.6	 83.9	 84.0
Source: Stock and Occupancy, URA, 19934995, Singapore
but the percentage change was less significant than that in the Central Area (Table 4.4.2).
Thus, compared with Orchard Road and the Rest of Island, office and commercial space
built in the Central Area was most seriously affected by the over-supply situation. This
had direct impact on the office decentralisation process later pursued by the government.
4.4.2 Decentralisation of Office Development Led by the Public Sector
Before entering the discussion of the change in office development in Singapore, the first
point to be considered is the trend of demand among business sectors during this period.
According to a survey of business sectors conducted in the mid-1980s, firms in
Singapore had specific requirements when they chose particular 1ocations. It was found
that the prestige of the office sites and the need to be located in a good position were of
For the details of this survey, see Tie, S., 1985, pp. 2-3.
Chapter Four
	 147
paramount importance to banking and financial institutions. These institutions tended to
be close to related businesses and were willing to pay the higher rent associated with
superior locations, especially in the core of the Central Area (i.e. the Raffles Place-
Shenton Way axis). As indicated in Table 4.4.3, the inner core of the Central Area was
dominated by firms in the financial and producer-service sectors. Altogether banking and
professional services took over 60 per cent of the office space in the inner core of the
CA. These firms were normally in need of direct contact with their customers, suppliers
and supporting activities. A central location enabled agglomeration economies to be
reaped. Also, more than 90 per cent of firms in the banking and insurance sectors were
located in buildings within the inner core of the CA. Professional services and trading
companies tended to choose office Sites closer to these sectors. Hence, over 64 per cent
of these firms concentrated in the inner core of the CA while another 35 per cent of these
firms were located outside the inner core but within the Central Area (i.e. the Maxwell
Road, Orchard Road) (Appendix 1.15). It is clear that Professional services accounted
for 47 per cent of the office space in the outer core of the CA. It seems that in a rising
rental market, these firms might move further outward to cheaper site in the Fringe of the
CA. This tendency can partly explain the emergence of new office sub-markets in the
Fringe area of the CA, particularly along the New Bridge Road and Beach Road axes.
Table 4.4.3 Share of Office Space by Sectors, Singapore, 1985
Central Area	 Outside Central Area
inner	 Outer Decentralized Fringe of Periphery
Core	 Core	 Zones	 CA	 Area
Business Sector
	
Percentage
Banking	 53.4	 0.0	 0.0	 25.0	 0.0
Professional Service/Consultants	 13.0	 46.6	 28.0	 0.0	 2.6
Trading	 6.5	 8.7	 39.4	 6.7	 0.0
OH/Petroleum	 2.1	 0.0	 0.0	 12.0	 48.2
Engineering/Construction	 3.6	 19.1	 29.3	 0.0	 0.0
Insurance	 7.0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0
Computer Service	 3.0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 23.3
Finance Brokerage 	 4.0	 11.2	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0
Shipping/Freight	 1.6	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 6.5
Others (public service)	 5.5	 14.4	 3.2	 56.0	 19.2
Total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
Source: Appendix 1.15
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Table 4.4.3 also suggests that other sectors, such as oil and petroleum-related firms,
computer services, engineering and construction companies, and public services were
more price/rent sensitive and less enthusiastic about the central location. Public service
occupied 56 per cent of the total office space provided in the Fringe of the Central Area.
Office space generated in the Periphery Area was dominated by oil and petroleum related
companies. About 53 per cent of engineering and construction firms rented office outside
the inner core of the CA. More than 70 per cent of oil and petroleum companies, 47 per
cent of computer services and 32 per cent of public services were located outside the CA
(Appendix 1.15).
However, whether there would be a more significant shift of demand away from the
core of the Central Area to the peripheral area depends on the structural changes in the
economy and the decisions of individual finns. For the government, it was believed that
the economy needed a greater variety of supply sources to serve firms with different
locational interests and affordability. The decentralisation process of office development
was initiated by the public sector.
Table 4.4.4 shows the change in the distribution of office space in three different
geographical areas between 1979 and 1995. In 1979, about 67.2 per cent of the total
office space was generated in the Central Area, while 15.9 per cent was in Orchard Road
and another 16.9 per cent was in the Rest of Island. The percentage shares of the Central
Area and Orchard Road in office space exhibited substantial decline throughout the
1980s. During the period 1979-84, the Central Area lost about 7.2 per cent share of
office space, while that of the Orchard Road gained 6.6 per cent increase. Between 1984
and 1989, the Central Area and Orchard Road lost about 0.9 per cent and 12.5 per cent
share of office space respectively, while that of the Rest of Island gained a substantial
growth, 12.5 per cent. Thus the percentage share of the Central Area dropped to 42.3
per cent in 1994 and that of Orchard Road fell to 8.1 per cent. The Rest of Island, by
contrast, gained a large increase in office space, the percentage share jumping to 49.6 per
cent in 1994. It is therefore seen that office development experienced an observable
decentralisation: office development moved out from the Central Area to Orchard Road
and then to the Rest of Island.
As the data are further divided by sectors, more interesting results could be obtained.
The increase in percentage share of office space in the Rest of Island during the 1980s
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Table 4.4.4 Geographical Distribution of Office Development, Singapore, 1979-1995
1979	 1984	 1989	 1995	 1979-	 1984-	 1989-
1984	 1989	 1995
Both Sector
Central Area	 67.2	 60.0	 59.1	 42.3	 -7.2	 -0.9	 -16.8
Orchard Road	 15.9	 22.5	 10.3	 8.1	 6.6	 -12.2	 -2.2
The Rest of Island	 16.9	 17.5	 30.0	 49.6	 0.6	 12.5	 19.9
Public Sector
Central Area	 52.0	 40.0	 34.0	 26.7	 -12.0	 -6.0	 -7.3
Orchard Road	 13.0	 8.0	 5.0	 4.2	 -5.0	 -3.0	 -0.8
The Rest of Island	 35.0	 52.5	 61.0	 69.1	 17.5	 8.5	 8.1
Private Sector
Central Area	 74.0	 70.0	 73.4	 50.5	 -4.0	 3.4	 -22.9
Orchard Road	 17.0	 14.8	 13.1	 9.3	 -2.2	 -1.7	 -3.8
The Rest of Island	 9.1	 15.2	 13.5	 40.2	 6.1	 -1.7	 26.7
Source: Real Estate Statistics Quarterly, 1989-1995, URA, Singapore
came about almost solely as a result of public sector activities. Table 4.4.4 shows that
between 1979 and 1989, office space generated by the public sector in the Central Area
and Orchard Road slipped by 18 per cent, yet the proportion for the Rest of Island
almost doubled. At the end of the 1980s, 70 per cent of public-led office development
was outside the Central Area and Orchard Road. The share of the Central Area in office
space generated by the private sector dropped slightly from 74 per cent in 1979 to 70
per cent in 1984, but increased to 74 per cent in 1989. The corresponding share for the
Rest of Island increased from 9.1 per cent to 15.2 per cent before dropping slightly to
13.5 per cent. This tendency changed between 1989 and 1995 when the share of the
Central Area in total office space generated by the private sector dropped by 23 per cent
and that for the Rest of Island increased 26.7 per cent. However, about 50 per cent of
private-led office development was still taking place in the Central Area. This suggests
that central locations were basically favoured by private office developers.
The decentralisation of office development began in the early 1980s, led by the public
sector. There were a number of factors contributing to the shift of emphasis in office
development. First, government agencies and statutory boards started to develop offices
both for their own use and as investment projects. Several suburban centres such as
Jurong, Bukit, Merak, Alexandra Road and Thomson, became their favourable sites of
office development. For instance, the HDB's office developments at Jalan Bukit Merah
and Pasir Panjang Road created 135,000 sq.m. office space. About 57,000 sq.m. of the
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Map 4.4.1. The Mass Rapid Transit System, Singapore
Map 4.4.2. The Growth Pattern of the City, Singapore
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generated office space was used to shift administration from the headquarters of the
Ministry of National Development to the above areas. This was the earliest experiment of
office decentralisation by the public sector (Straits Times, 13, Jul., 1980).
Second, the relocation of residential population from the central city to the periphery
through housing development, created a new demand for offices. Hence, the HDB
decided to provide 60 sq.m. office space for every 450 dwelling units in the new towns.
Most of these office developments took place in the town centres (Wong and Yeh, 1985,
p.103). Third, the construction of the Mass Rapid Transit System since 1983 also
increased the potential for office development in the vicinity of the MRT stations (Map
4.4. 1--2). Several office buildings, such as Treasury Building, URA Building, Malayan
Credit Building and MAS building, were developed by the public sector in areas within
walking distance of the MRT stations. Many sites close to the stations were reserved by
the URA for sale. These reserved parcels were to be sold to the private sector for
massive projects comprising commercial and office development, yet the private sector
was encouraged to develop offices up-market and precluded from moderate states ones.
As previously argued, office space built by the public sector in the Central Area was
mostly affected by the over-supply situation in the mid-1980s. According to a proposal
announced by the URA, which declared that the public sector would take the lead in
office development outside the Central Area, it seemed likely that office decentralisation
would be reinforced from that time onwards. Thus those firms which could not afford
high rents or did not consider a central location to be necessary for their operations
would move to the alternative sites outside. However, with regard to the continuing
demand for offices in central location, in particular from firms in the banking, fmancial
and advanced-service sectors, the URA embarked on a long-term development of Marina
South into an extension of the current Central Area (Map 4.3.3). Land would be offered
to the private sector for office and commercial development through the land sale
scheme. This area was expected to make available sites with enormous potential to
satisfy the demand (URA, Annual Report, 1984/85, pp. 8-9).
4.4.3 Economic Recession and Policy Adjustment
Singapore's industrial bottleneck emerged as early as in the late 1970s, yet the problems
were masked by exceptionally strong growth in construction investment, as a result of
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the accelerated public housing construction and private property development. The
property boom in the early 1980s sustained gross domestic capital formation, but the
remarkable downturn of the property market in the mid-1980s also contributed to the
cataclysmic economic crash in 1985 and furthermore, to the long-term damage to the
base of the economy. It shows the limit of using building investment as a counter cyclical
device to balance the economy.
The over-emphasis on building investment caused the capital to flow into property
development, thereby obstructing capital investment in productive sectors. It is estimated
that more than 60 per cent of domestic fixed capital formation in the mid-1980s took
place in construction, This means that only 40 per cent of fixed capital investment flowed
into non-construction sectors, such as plant, equipment and machinery. Comparing the
percentage shares with those in the precedent period, it became clear that more than 20
per cent of capital investment had shifted from productive sectors into construction
(Appendix 1.7). The construction boom in the mid-1980s, was unsustainable because the
excess supply of properties would take time to be absorbed by the market. Since cons-
truction investment played a large part in transforming national savings into capital
investment, the fall in construction investment caused an imbalance between a high
national savings rate and a lower domestic investment rate, with multiplier effects on
GDP growth.
Many development plans were slowed down or shelved, the further expansion of the
construction industry came to a halt. Construction companies and local contractors, who
tended to dominate the lower cost, public sector construction market, were most
affected by this slowdown. Many trimmed their operations and cut costs. Accordingly,
the job market created by the construction boom was at a stake. Following the contrac-
tion of the construction industry, employment in this sector began to experience a net
reduction and many local workers laid off. The total reduction of employment from the
construction sector accounted for 51 per cent of the total job loss in 1985, during which
the unemployment rate rose to 5 per cent, the highest level for fifteen years (Economic
Committee, 1986, p.199). Moreover, when property prices hit the bottom, property
loans by banks and loans secured by using property as collateral were also at stake. The
collapse of prices seriously affected those banks with a large property exposure, thereby
threatening the integrity of the entire financial system.
Chapter Four
	 153
For the government, the rationalisation of land supply and land use was among the
most critical issues in the late 1980s. The supply of floor space would be regulated by
changes in the planning legislation and the planning process. The reform of the planning
machineiy was perhaps the most significant event affecting future land use and property
development. The URA merged with the Planning Department and the Research and
Statistics Units under the Ministry of National Development so planning and develop-
ment now came under one single authority and the relationship between economic
development and urban planning could be closely monitored. Several policy adjustments
were introduced to achieve a better management of land and Tesource.
The government tackled the over-supply situation in the current property market.
The construction of public housing was slowed down after 1985. Many development
plans were postponed, and land parcels already acquired by the housing authority were
shifted to other uses. The land sale scheme was completely suspended by the URA. This
step aimed to limit the land offered to the private sector, so that the pace of private
development could be effectively controlled. The URA also avoided letting out its vacant
properties at rock bottom prices, which would have aggravated the situation in the
property market. The URA decided to transform Marina South - a newly reclaimed land
of 243 hectares adjacent to the Telok Ayer Basin - into a major public recreational area
instead of the original plan for immediate development of office space (URA, Annual
Report, 1988/89). Accordingly, the number of the HDB flats built every year declined
from 50,348 units in 1985 to 11,979 units in 1989 (Appendix 1.1 1). During the same
period, the total value of construction investment decreased from S$ 11,780 million to
S$ 6,447 million and the floor area built each year fell from 11,329,000 sq. m. to
4,039,000 sq.m. (Appendix 1.10).
The government was also pushed to find a growth niche for the construction
industry. For the Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB) - a new authority
formed under the Ministry of National Development - the large number of buildings and
infrastructure facilities completed in the previous two decades constitute a potential
market for building maintenance and renovation, since more ageing buildings needed
upgrading to meet the changing demand. To encourage the development of the mainte-
nance and retrofitting sector, the CIBD announced a long-tern programme in 1989 to
upgrade the existing public estates, particularly the HDB flats built in the early years
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(Singapore Annual Report, 1991) The total investment on maintenance and renovation
increased from S$ 484 million in 1984 to S$ 800 million in 1990 (Construction Industry
Development Board, 1990).
However, it seems that in the mid-1980s, the 'growth-through-investment' strategy
was unable to cope with a problem - an increasing pressure to absorb the excessive
supply of floor space, veiy little or no demand for further property development. The
daunting task for the planning authority by then was to monitor closely the supply,
demand and occupancy rate of floor space and try to maintain a balanced market by
ensuring that the supply of floor space adequately reflected the demand. The supply of
land through planning would be asserted with greater efficiency in terms of information
and administration, and would be more quality-conscious.
Taipei
4.5 The Role of Urban Policy in National Development
Capital investment in Taiwan did not assumed as much importance as in Singapore. The
share of gross domestic capital formation in GDP was 23.0 per cent in the 1960s, 29.6
per cent in the 1970s and 23.8 per cent in the 1980s. Domestic fixed capital formation
was the major impetus of capital investment, since more than 90 per cent of capital
investment went into in fixed assets. However, because the share of gross domestic
capital investment in GDP was relatively small, domestic fixed capital formation only
represented 16.8 per cent of GDP in the 1960s, 26.1 per cent in the 1970s and 22.7 per
cent in the 198Qs (Appendix 1.2 ). The influence of domestic fixed capital formation on
economic growth seems to have been less significant than that in Singapore.
Figure 4.5.1 illustrates the movement of GDP growth and domestic fixed capital
formation in relation to GDP over three decades. Interestingly, as in Singapore, domestic
fixed formation and GDP growth moved reversely to each other. The economy took off
during 197 1-73 when the growth of GDP was about 13 per cent. GDP growth sharply
dropped to 1.4 per cent in 1974, returning to 13 per cent in 1976-1978. The economic
slowed down in 1979-1983, during which GDP growth swung in a range between 6-8
per cent and even dropped to 3.6 per cent in 1982. The period 1983-87 witnessed a
strong recovery, GDP growth returning to above 10 per cent. Another downturn of the
economy came during the period 1988-93. The trend of domestic fixed capital formation
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exhibited an opposite movement to GDP growth; it continuously increased in the late
1960s and remained stable during the period 1971-73. It rose in 1974-75, slightly slowed
down for a brief period in 1976-79 and returned to the high rates in 1980-82. A serious
downturn came after 1983, lasting until 1989, when the percentage slightly rose again.
Construction investment accounted for one-third of domestic fixed capital formation.
The percentage was 28.7 per cent in average in the 1960s, 30 per cent in the 1970s and
32.6 per Cent in the 1980s. The value added by the construction industry was only 3.4
per cent of GDP in the 1960s, rising to 5.0 per cent in the 1970s but declined to 4.7 per
cent in the 1980s. In comparison with Singapore, where construction investment
represented one-half of domestic fixed capital formation and the value added by the
construction industry constituted 7-8 per cent of GDP, construction investment in
Taiwan was less influential in leading the dynamics of capital formation and assumed a
smaller importance in the national economy.
Nevertheless, construction investment developed in a similar trend with the move-
ment of gross domestic fixed capital formation. There were three boom periods: in the
late 1960s, between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s, and in the early 1990s. Figure
4.5.2 suggests that the first construction boom started in 1967 and ended in 1969. The
value added by the construction industry represented 4.3 per cent of GDP in 1968 while
the total value of construction investment increased to NT$ 14,683 million, equivalent to
7.5 per cent of GDP. The floor area built each year rose to 5,724,000 sq.m. More than
one-third of construction investment went to residential housing (Appendix 1.8, 1.16,
1.17). Another major construction boom began in 1974 and ended in 1982. The peak
point was first in 1975, when the value added by the construction industry increased to
5.7 per cent of GDP and the total value of construction investment jumped to NT$
56,158 million, about 9.0 per cent of GDP. The floor area built each year also increased
to 13,388,000 sq. m. The growth remained consistent for the next five years and reached
to another peak in 1981, when the floor area built every year grew to 39,758,000 sq.m.
and the total investment value to NT$ 150,879 million. Both were almost three times
higher than those in 1975. The third construction boom started after 1990. The value
added by the construction industry returned to 5-6 per cent of GDP in 1993 and the total
value of construction investment increased to NT$ 1,370,771 million, or 9.4 per cent of
GDP. The floor area built every year was estimated at 47,798,000 sq.m.
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Figure 4.5.1 Percentage Change of GDP and Gross Fixed
Capital Formation in Relation to GIDP, Taiwan
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Figure 4.5.2 Construction Industry and Construction Investment in
Relation to GDP, Taiwan
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The change in building investment was in line with the general trend of construction
investment. The trends in total floor area built every year in Taiwan in general and Taipei
in particular, exhibited large increases in construction booms (Figure 4.5.3, 4.5.4). On a
closer inspection, building investment in Taiwan after the I 960s was mainly initiated by
the private sector (Figure, 4.5.3). The share of the private sector in the total floor area
built every year grew to 69 per cent in 1967 and rampaged to 98.3 per cent in 1969.
From that time onwards, the private sector constructed more than 90 per cent of the
total floor area (Appendix 1.17). The change in floor area built every year can be
ascribed to the change in the annual supply of residential housing. As can be seen in
Figure 4.5.4, in Taipei, residential floor space represented 70 per cent of the total floor
area in 1970s and 60 per cent in the 1980s (also see Appendix 1.18, 1.20). The reasons
why private housing investment should develop in this particular way need careful
examination.
Unlike Singapore, public housing development in Taiwan was a secondary issue for
the government? The government tended to reduce public spending on housing cons-
truction to a minimum level. This limited amount of housing funds would usually be cut
off while the government channelled funds into productive sectors and education (Chang,
L., 1986; Ju, P., 1976). At the earlier stage of national development, the government
practically allowed squatting on public land to solve the serious housing shotage in the
urban areas. A limited number of public housing units were built but, were mainly
allocated to the state elite or to those who were victims of disasters. This policy was
later modified to produce a state-.subsidised mortgage program for self-build housing
projects required by individual or social groups (such as farmers' or workers' associa-
tions) in the late 1950s. For the purpose of slum clearance and squatter control, the
government started to engage in the construction of resettlement housing after the early
1 960s. A total number of 59,751 residential units were constructed by this housing
For a detailed discussion see Chin, P., 1988; Mi, F., 1988; Tsai, H., 1979; Tzen, S., 1993.
The mortgage programme was funded by US loans and by a portion of land capital gain tax revenue.
The resource itself was not stable. The fund also would be reduced when higher priority projects
emerged on the agenda, such as it had been halved for the new compulsory education programme in
1967 (Chin, P., 1988).
Approximately 79 per cent of squatters lived in the five largest cities in Taiwan. and 44 per cent of
them lived in Taipei. About 71.3 per cent of squatter houses in Taipei were built on public land. These
squatter houses mainly accommodated refugees from the mainland and immigrant from the rural areas
(Council for International Economic Co-operation and Development, 1970).
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Figure 4.5.3 Floor Area Built Every Year by Sectors, Taiwan
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Figure 4.5.4 Floor Area Built Every Year by Uses, Taipei
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programme, including 18,531 units in 1960, 13,736 units in 1964, 14,865 units in 1966
and 12,614 units in 1967. The displaced squatters, low-income people and victims of
disasters were resettled in the public estates. The government also launched its six-year
public housing programme in 1975, under it, a total number of 53,146 residential units
were released to the moderate-income population during the period 1976-8 1. Another
four-year public housing programme was implemented following the announcement of
the Twelve Major Projects in 1981, by which 18,672 units and 13,606 units were built in
1982 and 1984 respectively (Appendix 1.19). However, for a country with a population
of 20 million, the number of public housing provided was very small and cot Id not meet
the massive demand stemming from the shortage of housing. Under these circumstances,
the government encouraged the private sector to construct affordable housing for the
market and assisted private development through slum clearance and mortgage supply.V
This paved the way for developing a private-sector dominated mass housing market after
the late 1960s (Mi, F., 1988; Tsai, H., 1979).
Many small- and medium-sized property development companies, which originated
from local construction companies or artisan-contractors, started to produce small-scale
housing projects in partnership with individual landlords. Some enterprise groups, who
grew up in the import-substitution industrialisation in the l960s, also began to take part
in large-scale housing production. Many of them even gradually changed their organisa-
tion for property development. From this time onwards, the private sector provided more
than 90 per cent of the housing stock, producing a large quantity of affordable housing
which helped to solve the housing shortage and to lower household expenditure on
housing (Mi, F., 1988).
The remarkable growth of the national economy in the 1970s resulted in large
amount of abundant capital accumulated in the form of savings. Most of the national
savings were generated by the private sector. The share of the private sector in national
saving was about 65 per cent on average in the 1960s and the 1970s, and increased to 68
per cent in the 1980s (Appendix 1.6). Large amounts of abundant capital were in line
with inflation. During the high inflation period, higher-income groups and large enter-
prises were particularly in favour of housing investment, thereby stimulating the
27 The term of mortgage was extended from ten to fifteen years and the amount was increased from 50
per cent to 80 per cent of building cost. See Lin, Y., 1982.
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demand. Property prices were forced up. In Taipei, the first price escalation occurred in
1975, when the price of a newly built flat grew from 20,900 per pin (3.3 sq.m.) in 1973
to 33,600 per pin in 1975, an increase of almost 61 per cent. As a response to the oil
price increase and the high inflation rate in the second half of 1979, housing prices took
off again. The increase in housing price was more substantial than that in the mid-1970s:
from NT$ 39,300 per pin in 1978 to NT$ 90,000 per pin in 1980, more than 125 per
cent (Appendix 1.22). Price increases encouraged property developers to built more
units for sale for a short-term profit, and in turn stimulated the speculate demand.
As mentioned previously, many labour-intensive industries suffered increasing pres-
sure of competition after the late 1970s. The textile and clothing industries particularly,
were faced with substantial decline in profit rates (Appendix 1.25). Owing to the
speculative demand in the property market, a high profit return from property investment
was almost guaranteed. Producers thus found property development an alternative form
of high profit, and preferred to invest in property development instead of manufacturing
production. This tendency seems to have become more significant in the late 1980s. The
share of land and building in the total fixed capital of the private sector increased from
12.2 per cent in 1980 to 18 per cent in 1989. The share of machinery and equipment, in
contrast, fell from 20.8 per cent to 15 per cent (Appendix 1.24). Housing prices were
forced up again in the late 1980s. The price of a newly built flat in Taipei grew to
117,600 per pin (3.3 sq.m.) in 1987 and 357,500 per pin in 1989, an increase of almost
200 per cent, gain. The increase in housing prices was much more substantial than any in
the previous period.
The market-led urban development did not produce satisfactory results; thus some
degree of state intervention became necessary, both for political and economic reasons.
Property investment could widen income distribution among social groups by extra
profits (Kuo, L., 1991, pp. 107-4). Owing to its experience of the corruption disaster in
China, the KMT regime was aware of the political consequence of social inequality. The
official ideology - Three Principles of People's Livelihood - strongly advocated state
About 50-60 per cent of home-buyers in Taipei actually bought residential properties for investment
rather than for residence. See Chin, P., 1988, p.42.
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planning for economic development and wealth distribution. The relative income equality
was always in the centre of KMT political propaganda. This ideology forced the state to
take actions against developers' interests. Also, from the official point of view, the conti-
nuous outflow of capital from the productive sectors into property development would
also lead to a stagnation in the productive sectors, thereby damaging the foundation of
the economy. The high inflation rate always fed the speculative demand of the property
market and vice-versa. Hence, considering long-run economic development priority, the
state would repress property speculation to certain extent. Property price became a
major target when the state wanted to decrease the inflation rate and attain financial
stability (Deng, T., 1991; Kuo, L., 1991; Tanzer, 1981a).
Two key mechanisms were used by the state to correct instances of market failure.
One was through the state-monopolised financial system; the other was through planning
control of housing development. Both tackled the supply side of the property market.
The state took action during 1973-76 while the inflation rate and housing price both rose
owing to the oil crises and the diplomatic setbacks. The government announced two
price stabilisation measures concerning property development. It aborted permissions for
the construction of any building above four stories and placed limits on developers'
access to bank credits. Housing prices and the inflation rate returned to the moderate
Level (Chin, P., 1988, p.39). As a response to the oil price increase, the inflation rate and
housing prices took off again in the second half of 1979. The government this time
responded by raising the empty-lot tax rate and enforcing construction on vacant sites.
These measures aimed at releasing land from private holders, increasing the supply of
floor space, and then playing down property prices. The government also tackled the
speculative demand through investigating the source of finds of high-price and excess
property buyers. As a result, housing prices were suppressed by the decreasing demand
and the over-supply of floor space. The inflation rate dropped from 19 per cent in 1980
to only 3 per cent in 1982 (Appendix 1.2).
The state intervention in property development, however, was not consistent. In
most of the occasions, it merely responded to the undesirable aspects of the free market.
On the basis of the Land Right Equalization Act, the government decided to buy up vacant lots at the
low official-assessed prices if they were not built by the holders before July, 1981.
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Figure 4.5.5 Inflation Rate and Housing Price, Taiwan
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Figure 4.5.6 Public Housing Development in Taiwan
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The remarkable fluctuation of public housing construction, as can be seen in Figure
4.5.5-6, offered the best illustration of the fact that the state involvement was a reaction
to the pressure to control the inflation rate and housing prices. The floor area built eveiy
year by the public sector sharply increased when housing prices soared in line with the
increase in the inflation rate. Once the pressure of inflation was removed, the government
shifted financial resource from construction to other sectors, so that the floor area built
every year by the public sector drastically declined. The percentage share of the public
sector in the total floor space generated was also very small. Hence, the impact of public
housing construction was very limited.
From the early days of its foundation, the state decided to concentrate its resources
on infrastructure developments which were directly associated with national defence and
the industrialisation process. 3° The provision of housing and public services were not
given much importance. This state intervention was basically motivated by the demand
for internal cohesion and fiscal stability. However, the political and ideological aspects of
urban policy seem to have been revealing. Housing construction led by the public sector
was a showcase of the welfare policy and a political project to assist social control. This
could be well illustrated by the distribution of public housing among the populace.
After the KMT takeover, one of the major concerns of the government was how to
settle mainlander refugees. Due to the lack of resources and social contact, apparently
66.8 per cent of immigrant mainlanders flocked to a few large cities and squatted on
public land. These mainlanders constituted 49.7 per cent of all squatting households in
the urban areas in 1950 (Council for International Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, 1970). The government thus decided to build large public estates, generally known
as the 'military dependent villages', on public land for mainlanders who were still in the
military service. These projects were regularly financed by the government's national
defence expenditure, providing a total number of 133,110 rental housing during 1956-93.
If these were added to the stock of general public housing, one can see that approxi-
mately 31.5 per cent of total public-built housing units were provided to mainlanders
over the years (Appendix 1.19).
° The well-known 'Ten National Development Projects' started in the early 1970s, providing most
important infrastructure such as airport, highway, port, processing zone, etc.
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Moreover, in the urban areas, these public estates were built on certain locations
separated from the Taiwanese communities. Thus they contributed to the distribution of
the mainlander population in the city. In Taipei, one hundred and seventy-eight military
dependent villages had been built on a land area totalling 187.1 hectares by the end of the
1980s. These estates consisted of 22,535 units of rental housing - about 48 per cent of
the total public housing stock in Taipei. Mainlanders were concentrated in six districts in
Taipei and constituted more than 80 per cent of the total population in three particular
districts - Chengchung, Kuting and Taan. 3' The pattern of segregation was reinforced
when many Taiwanese moved to the suburbs following the expansion of the private
housing market (Gates, 1981).
The spatial separation between mainlanders and Taiwanese reduced the chances of
contact and communication and thus enhanced existing cultural and ideological barriers
between the two groups. For mainlanders, the less contact they had with local society,
the fewer resources they could obtain. Accordingly, mainlanders who lived in these
public estates became highly dependent on the KMT, both materially and
psychologically. This enabled political control over them to be easily achieved. For
instance, social and political activities in these estates were organised by their resident
committees. These committees, with their permanent members appointed by the militaiy
branch of the KMT, were under the central control of the party. They were highly
organised and effective, especially in mobilising residents during the elections.
Mainlanders living in these military dependent villages were faithful supporters of the
KMT. Their loyalty towards the political regime even gained for themselves the
collective name - the voting troops.
Nevertheless, owing to the demand for national consolidation, the state began to
make efforts to encourage social integration between mainlanders and Taiwanese after
the late 1980s. More than one-third of the military dependent villages were rebuilt into
high-rise public housing estates, through redevelopment. All rental stock was transferred
into home ownership. One-half of the new flats were sold to the public as ordinary public
housing with another half distributed back to the original residents for minimal payments.
31 Mainlanders were mainly concentrated in Chengchung, Kuting, Mucha, Chungshan, Sungshan and
Taan Districts. They made up 81.61 per cent of the population in Chengchung, 80 per cent in Kuting
and Taan, 60.13 per cent in Chungshen and 29.43 per cent in Chienchung (Gates, 1981; Selya, 1995).
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On the surface, spatial segregation between mainlanders and Taiwanese seems to have
fast disappeared, for the reason that more Taiwanese moved into public housing built on
these village areas (Hsu and Pannell, 1982). Social integration between the two groups,
however, still remains to be seen (Luo, Y., 1992).
The provision of low-income housing is one part of the state's welfare policy. The
first project began in the mid-1960s and was conducted directly from the top leadership
of the KMT, who wanted to demonstrate the party's determination to offer an alternative
welfare nation to Communist China. Because of the lack of constant financial support,
this project was short-lived and only managed to complete 27 per cent of its target. The
second project started in the early 1970s, when the state began to face major diplomatic
crises and when the power transition took place in the ruling party. This project stopped
in the late 1970s when the political pressure was removed, with only 24 per cent of its
target completed. By the end of the 1980s, low-income housing represented about 2.7
per cent of the total public-build housing stock and accommodated less than 15 per cent
of the population living on the welfare (Taipei Municipal Government, 1991, p.12). This
policy turned out to be a party propaganda, offering little assistance to the low-income
households.
4.6 The Evolution of Urban Planning and Urban Renewal
4.6.1 The Origin of Modern Planning in Taiwan (1905-1946)
The earliest city plan in Taiwan, known as the City Area Modification Plan (CAMP), was
basically a product of the Japanese planning system in the early twentieth century. The
CAMP was implemented firstly in Taipei in 1905, and then in other major cities such as
Tainan, Taichung and Keelung. The CAMP for Taipei, which proposed to accommodate
a population of 150,000 on a land area totalling 1,000 hectares, covered three original
settlements, Moungar, Dadowchang and Chengnei, and their surrounding areas (Map
4.6.1). Because the colonial regime did not want to give local government sufficient
power to control urban development, the CAMP was a merely physical plan for the
improvement of the built environment. The main objectives were to improve railways and
road systems, to solve the sanitary problem, to distinguish the function of different areas,
and to develop separate residential areas for the Japanese population in the city.
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As a result of the modernisation of the urban planning system in Japan,32
 the CAMP
for Taipei was abolished in 1932 and replaced by a Master Plan - the Great Taipei City
Plan (GTCP). This Master Plan laid down several principles for the physical development
of the city. For instance, Taipei was designed as a circular city with a radius about 6 km
from the centre of Chungnei. The planning area was bounded by the Tamsui River in the
West, the Hsitein Stream in the South, and the Shung Hill in the North. It covered a land
area totalling 6,667 hectares and planned for a population of 0.6 million up to 1955. A
transport network consisting of fifty-seven arterial roads was also to be developed. Main
traffic roads radiating from Chungnei to the outskirts would be built and would function
as throughroutes connecting the city and the countryside. These roads would be linked
by several circular roads with radius at different distances from the centre. Furthermore,
lower-level vehicle streets were designed hierarchically and routed in a strict grid-
pattern. Seventeen large parks and many green spaces would be located in different areas
of the city. A 70m-wide parkway running from the North to the South would link these
large parks and constitute a network of green space. Three 'land re-plotting areas'
covering a land area of 294.22 hectares were designated to combine small-sized and
irregular lots and to generate a proper area for property development. Land-use zoning
would also be applied after the release of a detailed land-use plan in 1937.
For the implementation of the Master Plan, new planning legislation, including the
Urban Planning Act (UPA), the Ordinance for the Implementation of the UPA, the
Urban Planning Committee Ordinance and the Ordinance for Land-Use Registration,
were formulated by the colonial government in 1936. These legislation, together with
32 Owing to the industrialisation process, rapid urbanisation had occurred in major cities of Japan since
the First World War. This development was not effectively controlled by the existing planning system
and aroused a great anxiety among the ruling elite of Japan (Detailed discussion see Japanese
Architecture Association, 1982, p.989.). In the late 1920s, the Japanese government decided to reform
its urban planning system. It established planning bureaucracy, revised planning legislation and adopted
several devices which were used in the Western countries, such as plot ratio, zoning control and land re-
plotting etc. This planning system was not only used in Japan but also its colonies, thereby becoming the
origin of modern planning in these countries. Detailed discussion on Taiwan's planning regime under
the Japanese colonisation see Huan, J,. 1960; Huan, S,. 1992
It defined the core areas - Dadowchang, Moungar and Chungnei as major commercial zones of the
city. Industrial zones were allocated alongside the main railway. All street blocks fronting the main
traffic roads were classified as linear commercial zones; and the blocks sitting behind were major
residential zones. Different zones were given different level of plot ratio, population density and building
height (Huan, S., 1992, p.155).
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the earlier Land Requirement Ordinance (1901) and the Guidelines for Residential
Housing (1901), formed a basic framework for a modern planning system to develop in
Taiwan. Two separate planning authorities, the urban planning authority and the urban
planning committee were established under the central government. The former was
responsible for land survey and plan formulation; the latter was in charge of assessment,
review and consultation. The urban planning committee was in position to monitor and
supervise the planning activities undertaken by the planning authority. The local planning
authority was responsible for acquiring or re-plotting land for planning purposes. It also
controlled land use, plot ratio and building type through zoning and construction
guidelines laid down by the city plans. However, the central government played a
determinant role in the policy decision-making process. Local government, by contrast,
only paid attention to the implementation of plans.
The GTCP had far-reaching influence on the physical development of Taipei. First,
the development of the city was limited on the west side by the Tamsui River. Since the
river gradually lost its transport function, its role was reduced to a geographical bound-
ary separating the city and the county. Second, Chungnei continued to be the major and
the only centre for commercial and administrative activities to take place. Third, the
GTCP allocated most of the land re-plotting areas, traffic roads, open spaces, and public
facilities in the eastern part of the city, even though there was still sufficient land in the
northern and the southern areas. The development of the city was thus directed from the
centre towards the eastern area and an imbalance in physical structure began to take
shape. Also, the physical environment was the main subject matter of urban planning.
Non-physical factors such as social or cultural issues were considered to be irrelevant.
4.6.2 Urban Land Reform and the Development of Infrastructure for Defence and
Evacuation (1947-1963)
The planning bureaucracy and legislative framework established during the Japanese
colonisation continued to function up to 1949M During the 1950s, Taiwan was under the
shadow of military attacks because both governments in China and Taiwan were actively
' Since Taiwan was re-united with China after the second World War, most of the Japanese legacy was
destroyed, apart from the planning system. It was because in comparison with urban planning in other
Chinese cities, this system was considered to be technologically advanced and worth preserving for
practical purposes. See Tsen, S., 1994, p.46-7.
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involved in military actions against each other. To secure the civilians from the frequent
air-force attacks, constructing defensive infrastructure in high-density areas for pro-
tection and evacuation was the top priority for the KMT. Urban development was thus
subject to the need for national defence. The Ministry of National Defence urged regulat-
ing urban development and constructing infrastructure for defence and evacuation in
major cities. The Urban Construction Guideline for Defence (UCGD) was released in
1954 and was quickly transferred into a formal legislation - the Building Control Proce-
dure for Defence and Evacuation (BCPDE) in the next year. The BCPDE suppressed the
existing planning regulations and enabled the government to start the construction of
roads and bridges in major cities in Taiwan (Annual Report of Taipei Municipal Govern-
ment, 1956, p.68).
As mentioned before, the critical issue facing the government was that a total of 9
million refugees had fled from China to Taiwan in a short period prior to 1949. The
sudden increase in population and serious housing shortage forced the government to
allow immigrants to squat on open spaces, riversides or streets (Lee, D., 1969, p.'7).
These squatter settlements presented the major problem for evacuation. The govern-
ment thus released another new legislation - the Procedure for Illegal Building Manage-
ment (PIBM) - in 1956, containing several detailed principles for squatter clearance.
According to this legislation, the government had to build on-site resettlement housing
for refugees before demolishing their squatter houses. 35 In doing so, the Public Housing
Construction Committee was established under the provincial government and the Public
Housing Construction Mortgage Act was in force in the next year. Most of these housing
programmes landed in the vicinity of the targeted slums. To accelerate squatter clear-
ance, a high-level authority, headed by the commander of the Taiwan Garrison and the
commissioner of the provincial government, was established in 1962. This authority was
given power to use police or military forces to evict residents in squatter houses.
Urban development in Taipei at this stage was also subject to these regulations. After
Japan's surrender, the local government of Taipei had proceeded with the old planning
system and set up an Urban Construction Committee to draft a new Master Plan for the
Squatters were granted the choice between monetary compensation or government resettlement, and
were given high priority when they applied for resettlement housing.
Chapter Four
	 170
city. Their efforts failed because of the sudden change in political context. Owing to the
influx of refugees, the population of Taipei had already reached 0.7 million in 1955 - 0.2
million more than the target population defined by the earlier Master Plan (Map 4.6.2).
The developed area, which constituted only 26 per cent of the total land area of the city,
accommodated 80 per cent of the population. Taipei was the focus of national defence
throughout the 1950s because most of the government offices and military establishment
were located here. The physical development was completely governed by the BCPDE
and the PIBM, rather than the existing planning regulations. The government spent one
part of US aid on infrastructure construction, by which large shelters were built under
the surface, four bridges crossing the Tanishui River and eight through routes linking the
city and the county were all widened. For a short period in 1958, the local government
was even decreed to stop granting permissions for the construction of new buildings
(Annual Report of Taipei Municipal Government, 1951, pp. 219-20).
The physical development of the city was decided by central government bodies; and
the role of the local planning authority at this stage was no more than a public adminis-
tration. The local government drafted a new Master Plan in 1957. This plan, generally
known as the Taipei City Plan (TCP), was simply a reproduction of the early GTCP and
did not provide any new aspects. Twenty-one detailed plans were formulated between
1959 and 1966; but they were simply the revision of old maps showing the new
development (Lee, H., 1959, p.9). The main task of the local government was to carry
out squatter clearance for infrastructure construction. Since confrontations frequently
occurred between the residents and the local planning authority, the intervention of
police or military forces was not exceptional (Taipei Archives Committee, 1985, p.138;
Wu, F., 1991, p.149). The tension gradually decreased only after the central government
began to implement resettlement housing programmes. The local government thus was
able to indulge in the earliest urban renewal in Chunhua Road - the core of the Chun-
chung District (Chungnei) in 1959.
This master plan prepared to accommodate 0.5 million population in 1955. The periphery of the city
was designated as agricultural zone and conservation zone to limit urban expansion. Infrastructure
construction and land re-plotting were also initiated by the planning authorities (Annual Report of
Taipei Municipal Government, 1949, p.176).
Chunhua Shopping Complex was built on public land to replace 2,000 squatter houses. The original
residents (mainly political immigrants from mainland China) were resettled in 1,600 shophouse units
(including both living and working places) in the complex (Annual Report of Taipei Municipal
Government, 1961, p.6)
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Map 4.6.2. The Growth Pattern of the City, Taipei
Chapter Four	 172
Another important policy in effect at this stage was land reform. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, the land reform programme in the rural areas started after 1949 and
turned out to be remarkably successful. The government thus became more confident
about its effort to extend this reform to the urban areas. The Land Act was revised in
1954 and a special statute - the Status for Equalisation of Urban Land Ownership
(SEULO) - was added as a by-law. The SEULO dealt with land acquisition, land re-
plotting, and taxation. This land policy was derived from 'Three Principles of People's
Livelihood' developed and advocated by Sun Yat-Sen, aiming to eliminate social inequa-
lities based on unequal land ownership. The urban land reform programme constituted of
four measures. The first one was to determine land value based on landowners' self-
declaration. Landowners were required to file a declaration indicating the values of their
land. The government would adjust these values according to the values of land of
similar class, location and use, and would announce two standard values for each block
in each street, representing its average rental value and market price. The former was
called the 'officially announced land value' (OLV) and the later was referred to as the
'officially announced market value' (OMV). The second measure was to impose a land
tax based on these standard values. The third one was that government was given the
authority to purchase private land at the OMV whenever it was in need of land for public
purposes. Lastly, when the land was sold to a new owner at a market price, an increment
tax was levied against the difference between the OMV and the OLV. Afterwards, the
revenue generated from this land value increment tax was used for health and welfare
services, or to finance public housing and facilities (Section 33, SEULO, 1954).38
The application of SEULO in the first instance was opposed by the provincial and
city councils. Hence, before the end of the 1 950s, this legislation was only applied to 59
urban areas (including Taipei), covering a land area of 18,192 hectares. Only 32 per cent
of the total land area was located within urban planning areas. This meant that most of
the major growth areas were not covered by the land reform programme. Therefore,
unlike land reform in the rural areas, urban land reform did not bring an instant impact on
cities as expected. Since the majority of urban land was still under private ownership and
This concept, usually referred to as 'land value increment to the community', aims to tax value
increment of land for the benefit of society as a whole. (cf. Fung, H., 1988, p.90).
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the landowners hold the exclusive property right, market forces were allowed free play.
The impact of this type of landholding system and land ownership on urban development
gradually came to the surface in the coming years.
4.6.3 The Establishment of New Planning Regime (1964-1981)
The military tension between Communist China and Taiwan gradually defused after the
early 1960s. Taiwan's import-substitute industrialisation strategy also began to take
shape. An Urban Planning Commission was established by the Ministry of Home Affairs
and the provincial government in 1961 to examine several issues regarding the supply of
industrial land which had been addressed by the Investment Incentive Ordinance. 39 After
completing an island-wide land survey, the Commission proposed to formulate a new
planning regime on the grounds there was a serious shortage of industrial land and a lack
of overall planning to regulate industhal establishments (Ministry of Home Affairs, 1963,
pp. 25-30). Hence, with the aid of the United Nations Development Plan, the govern-
ment set up a central planning agency - the Urban and Housing Development Committee
(UHDC) under the International Co-operation and Development Committee of the
Executive Yuan. The Urban Planning Committee (UPC) was also formed under the
Ministry of Home Affairs as another central planning authority outside the UHDC. While
the UHDC was mainly responsible for drafting regional plans, the URC was in charge of
review and approval.
The Urban Planning Act was revised in 1964. The amendment appears to have been a
combination of the 1936 Planning Act and new regulations. It clarified the function of
city plans, defined the duties of planning authorities, and outlined the procedures for
drafting plans (Section 1-9, Urban Planning Act). The City Plan was basically a two-tier
plan consisting of a Master plan and a series of Detailed Plans (Section 5, Ibid.). The
Master Plan laid down the overall concepts of urban development; and the Detailed Plan
covered parts or the city, focused on commercial, administrative, or residential districts,
The Investment Incentive Ordinance which began to enact in 1961, was one of the most powerful
devices for industrial development. According to the act, the government should select proper locations
and increase the supply of land for industrial establishment. To achieve the aims, the government can
revise the present land-use plan and convert some of the public land or agricultural land in the urban
areas into industrial use (Section 25-29, Investment Incentive Ordinance).
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public facilities and special projects. Land use, population densities and plot ratios for the
planning areas laid down in the Detailed Plans would be reviewed every five years.
According to this act, the local government would have its own planning authority
and planning committee. City plans produced by the local planning authority were to be
submitted to the UPC for final review and approval. Once a draft plan was made by the
planning authority, public hearings for citizens were to be held. The draft plan would be
reviewed and possibly revised before formally submitting to the central planning
authority (Section 10, Ibid.). The local planning authority was also responsible for land
acquisition and land re-plotting. To construct traffic roads and infrastructure for public
use, some private land parcels in the city were designated as the 'Reserved Land for
Public Facilities' in the Detailed Plan. Land use of the 'reserved land' was restrained
once the Detailed Plan was approved. The local planning authority was obligated to
acquire the 'reserved land' five years after the designation. 4° Under certain circum-
stances, the acquisition period could be extended to ten years. Compensation to land-
lords was paid in accordance to the officially announced market value (Section 48, 49,
Ibid.). The local planning authority was also the main agent to initiate urban renewal.
Once the area had been selected, the local planning authority was responsible for drafting
renewal plans and for introducing incentives to encourage the private sector to take part
in urban redevelopment (Section 27, Ibid.).4
The UHDC conducted a five-year project during 1966-71 and produced several
strategic plans. The Taiwan Area Physical Plan was released in 1971 and was officially
approved in 1979. It functioned as a policy guideline for the physical development of
Taiwan.42 Three Regional Plans for the northern, middle and southern regions of Taiwan
and several Sketch Plans for major cities such as Taipei, Taichung and Tainan were also
released subsequently. Following the completion of these regional plans, several large-
40 According to the SEULO, owners of the 'reserved land' would be compensated with a price equal to
officially announced market value (OMV). The OMV is generally lower than the market price.
' Urban renewal area was selected by the following principle: a run-down area suffering from public
health and safety problems due to a concentration of dilapidated or squatter houses and a lack of back-
lanes, public facilities and sanitary systems.
42 This plan divided Taiwan into four regions: northern, central, southern and eastern. It also proposed
five major development programmes for each regions, including transportation development, industrial
estate development, social capital improvement, rural re-development, and metropolis development
(UHDC, 1971).
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scale infrastructure development projects were started in the metropolitan areas by the
UHDC. In Taipei, a eight-year Public Work Construction Plan (1968-1975) and a six-
year Civic Construction Plan (1976-198 1) were put into effect. The traffic-road system
of Taipei, which was defined by the earliest Master Plan, was almost completed by the
early 1 980s. Accordingly, the road area of Taipei increased from 701 hectares in 1967 to
1,675 hectares in 1981. These new traffic roads were constructed in the eastern part of
the city, including Shungshan (21 per cent), Taan (20 per cent) and Chungshan (13 per
cent) Districts. They helped to open sites for property development in the coming years
(Tsen, S., 1994, pp. 76-7). Squatter clearance and resettlement housing seems to have
remained a top priority for the central government in the mid-1970s. The UHDC granted
a special fund to the planning authority of Taipei to start urban renewal. 43
 The Public
Housing Construction Committee also launched a four-year Resettlement Housing Pro-
gramme which built resettlement housing on public land near the large squatter areas
where urban renewal projects were about to take place (UHDC, 1971, p.46)
Compared with the UHDC, the local government in Taipei seems to have had a very
small part to play. For political reasons, the central government could not decide whether
to designate Taipei as a national capital or just to keep it as a provincial capital. It was
only in 1967 that Taipei was formally granted as the 'Special Municipality of the
Republic of China' (Map 4.6.3-4). The city area was expanded to 27,414 hectares. Six
towns were added to the original 10 districts, making 16 districts in total. The boundary
of the county was also redefined to incorporate 6 satellite cities, 5 towns and 12 districts
(Taipei Municipal Government, Annual Report, 1968). The local government established
its own planning authority - the Urban Planning Board (UPB) in the late 1960s under the
Department of Public Works (DPW). The Urban Planning Committee was formed by
the Mayor and his planning advisors.
n Huajang Bridge Area Improvement Plan and Wanda Plan were completed by the planning authority
(Urban Development Department, 1990, p.1 -10). The first project took place during 1969-73. It cleared
1,900 squatter houses which occupied a land area of 5.7 hectares fronting the Tamsui River. All of the
original residents were resettled in 1,860 resettlement housing built in the same area. The second project
was initiated during 1972-74. It targeted another 4,880 river-side squatter houses in Lungshan and
Taton Districts. The squatter houses were replaced by 4,036 resettlement housing. For a detailed
discussion see Pei, L., 1986
The UPB was at a very low hierarchy of the municipal administration. It was until the early 1990s that
the UPB was separated from the DPW and became an independent planning authority -the Urban
Development Department.
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Although a new Master Plan for Taipei - the Taipei City Sketch Plan (TCSP) - was
already completed by the UN consultants in the late 1960s, it was abandoned by the local
government for political reasons (Hsu, A., 1989). The local government simply wanted
to revise the land-use plan of the TCP instead of adopting this new Master Plan. The
amendment of the land-use plan, with effect from 1967, kept one concept laid down by
the early TCP: the Tamsui River remained as the western boundary of the city, and
further development was to be directed to the eastern areas. Apart from this, various
original ideas for the physical development of Taipei were entirely abandoned. Zoning
control, which remained highly controversial at that stage, was not applied.
As described above, urban renewal seemed have been important during the early
period as a response to the central government's defence policy. Later, if there was no
urgent need, urban renewal was entirely ignored by the central government. The Urban
Planning Act released in 1964 did not provide an effective device for the local planning
authority to put urban renewal into practice. Therefore, without financial support and
proper legislation which were still lacking, the local planning authority was unlikely to
take any move. Before the Urban Renewal Division (URD) was fmally established under
the UPB in 1976, there was no single authority in charge of urban renewal in Taipei. The
planning authority launched 14 urban renewal projects between the mid-1970s and the
early 1980s. Five of them were completed while another one was in progress at the end
of this period, and the rest were suspended or completely abandoned (Appendix 1.24).
The five completed projects were in places where most of the land was publicly-owned,
showing that land ownership was particular critical in urban renewal. This will be
discussed in greater detail later. However, since most of the urban renewal projects
initiated by the local government failed, urban renewal appears to have had a small part
to play in the overall urban development.
4.6.4 Urban Redevelopment for the Transformation of National Capital (1982-)
The state's economic strategy from 1980 onwards had a clear aim: to change Taiwan
from a country relying on labour-intensive industries for export to a nerve-centre of high-
technology and advanced services. To accelerate this restructuring process, restrictions
on foreign investment in the fmancial sector and the stock market were removed.
Foreign-based firms were given more freedom to perform in the national economy. There
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was also a large increase in public investment on industrial infrastructure, telecommuni-
cation and transportation. The government also decided to transform Taipei from a
capital restricting itself to the national function, to a global city for headquarters offices
of international corporations, banking, financial institutions and advanced services. To
perform these global functions, the infrastructure and services of the city had to be
upgraded; and the old image of Taipei - a polluted and overcrowded city - needed to be
improved. All these required an active planning rather than a reactive prevention of the
undesirable, as in the past.
The local government of Taipei issued nine Detailed Plans in the 1980s. 45
 The major
objectives were, in brief: to establish a sub-centre in the eastern part of the city as an
high-rank office and commercial centre; to redevelop land in the central area, especially
in the vicinity of the old CI3D; and to encourage suburban development. Among all these
detailed plans, the creation of a sub-centre in the eastern part of the city had most far-
reaching influence. An ambitious redevelopment plan drafted as early as in 1976 - the
Hsinyi Sub-Centre Special Zoning (HSSZ) - was put in effect in 1984. The HSSZ was
located at the centre of Shunshan District, covering a land area of 153.21 hectares.
About 30 per cent of the land area was to be used for high-density office and commercial
development. The regulation for controlling building-height, which was laid down by the
Airway Security Authority previously, was removed in order to allow skyscrapers to
emerge. New buildings were subject to strict zoning and urban design guidelines to
ensure the development could create a catching idiosyncratic image for this area.
The local government also encouraged residential development in the suburban area
in order to remove the population from the congested central area to the periphery and
to release more residential land for commercial use. To initiate the decentralisation
process, the local government was funded by the Ministry of Transport to develop a
Mass Rapid Transit system for the city (Map 4.6.5). An underground and a above-
These detailed plans include: 1) redevelopment of the old city areas - the old CBD redevelopment.
Wanhwa (Moungar) Railway Station redevelopment, Dadowchang Special Zoning; 2) development of
newly-generated land in an area where the over-surface railway was transformed into an underground
train- Taipei Railway Station Special Zoning and Chunghua Road Pedestrian Mall, 3) development of
the new CBD - Hsinyi Sub-Centre Special Zoning; 4) development of newly-claimed land - Shedz
Peninsula development; 5) development of agricultural land in the peripheral area - Kuantu Plain
development; 6) suburban development - Shihlin community development and urban design; 7) land
reclamation - Keelung River shortening programme, Keelung River reclamation project; 8) urban
renewal and 9) urban survey.
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Map 4.6.5. The Mass Rapid Transit System, Taipei
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ground light railway were built after 1987 as pilot projects for the MRT. Property de-
velopment in places near the new traffic corridor and in the suburban area began to take
shape.
Moreover, the surface railway which ran through the core of the central area was
transformed into an underground line after 1983, allowing more land to be released for
new development. A comprehensive redevelopment plan - the Taipei Railway Station
Special Zoning - was implemented in an area adjacent to the original railway station,
aiming at high-density office and commercial development. Urban renewal in the run-
down places in the old central area was mostly required to provide sufficient land for
further commercial development and to improve the existing image of the city. The local
government thus issued a series of surveys during 1985-88 to assess the condition of the
deteriorated areas and to provide the grounds for the formulation of redevelopment
strategies. The direct result was an ambitious Urban Renewal Long-Term Plan (URLP),
which listed twenty-six run-down areas for redevelopment, including seven areas which
could not be regenerated by previous urban renewal plans.
Adequate legislation for urban renewal was finally introduced. The Procedure for the
Implementation of Urban Renewal (PIUR) was in effect in 1983 as a by-law of the Urban
Planning Act. According to the PIUR, the local planning authority would issue an urban
renewal survey every five years (Section 3, Procedure for the Implementation of Urban
Renewal). Urban renewal areas were selected according to the following priorities: for
the purpose of enhancing the function of the city; to support major physical development
projects; to encourage the full development of land with low utility; to improve the
image of particular areas containing important tourist sites; to upgrade the physical
environment for public health and safety reasons; to preserve areas which had historical
and cultural values; and to clear squatter houses which obstructed major traffic routes
(Section 6, Ibid.).
The local planning authority could acquire land and properties from their private
owners to accelerate the pace of renewal on condition that 'an agreement, including land
title and deed, could not be reached by the original owners' (Section 12-15, Ibid.). In this
case, the authority could re-sell the land back to the original owners or other individuals
(Section 22, Ibid.). Under the sale scheme, the original owners were generally given first
priority to buy their land or properties back. There were still some strict rules. For
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instance, owners could not buy more land than the sizes of their original lots. If the sizes
of their original lots were smaller than the minimal size of building site required by
planning law, they were not allowed to develop except in partnership with other owners
(Section 23, Ibid.).
More importantly, special incentives would be given to landlords or developers who
engaged in the redevelopment of large-sized land parcels or the renovation of historical
preservation sites within urban renewal areas. In the above cases, property developers
could obtain loans from the government-owned banks or receive special funds from the
government. If they redeveloped these sites following the official guidelines, their land
parcels would be granted excess plot ratio, thereby enabling them to gain additional floor
space equal to the floor space reserved for public facilities, open space or historical
preservation (Section 26-33, Ibid.).
The URLP aimed to bring more private investment back into these run-down areas,
then to redevelop the land for higher-rank activities. In line with the whole package for a
comprehensive redevelopment of the run-down areas in the central city, the government
also noticed that historical buildings would be a most valuable environmental asset, since
only the image rooted in historical and cultural heritage could really make a city different
from its competitors. However, all these policy moves merely represented a small step
made by the government to assure a more active role in urban development. There were
still many deeply-seated problems in the existing planning regime. These problems fmally
rose to the surface in the late 1980s and some of them even had serious political
consequence.
4.7 Urban Planning and the Property Market in the Post-1980
Era
4.7.1 The Disruption of the Price mechanism in Taipei's Housing Market
The late 1980s appear to have been a turning point for the housing market. The second
construction boom ended in 1982 and was followed by a remarkable downturn which
lasted up to the end of the 1980s (Figure 4.5.2). During this recession period, the value
added by the construction industry dropped to 3.9 per cent of GDP in 1986. Construc-
tion investment accounted for 6.3 per cent of GDP. The floor area built annually
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decreased 26 per cent in 1982 and 10 per cent in 1983. The total floor area built every
year even fell to 26,527,000 sq.m. in 1986 - less than two-thirds of that in the boom
period (Appendix 1.8, 1.16, 1.17.). The floor area built every year in Taipei also sharply
declined, and this extent was much more significant than that in Taiwan as a whole
(Figure 4.5.3, 4.5.4). The floor area built annually decreased 15 per cent on average
during the period 1982-86. The total floor area built every year declined to 3,517,000
sq.m. in 1986 - only one-fifth of that in 1981. During the period 1987-91, the annual
floor area built increased 3.8 per cent in average. It was not until 1993, when another
construction boom began to take shape, that the annual floor area built returned to a
moderate level of 5,877,000 sq.m. (Appendix 1.20).
During the downturn of building investment, the supply of residential floor space in
Taipei was limited. The supply of residential space drastically declined during 1982-86.
In 1986, floor area built every year decreased to 2,180,000 sq.m. - less than one-third of
that in 1981. During the period 1987-91, it stood in a range between 1,786,000 sq.m.
and 2,253,000 sq.m. (Appendix 1.20). The shortage of floor supply had a serious impact
on the housing market in Taipei. The price mechanism of the housing market broke
down in the late 1980s. During 1987-89, the average price for a newly-built flat rose
40.3 per cent, 88.6 per cent and 61 per cent annually. The average housing price
increased from 83,800 per pin (3.3 sq.m.) in 1986 to 357,200 per pin in 1989 - the
highest point over three decades (Appendix 1.22).
The price escalation during the late 1980s had many undesirable consequences. As
can be seen in Table 4.7.1, the increase in annual household income in Taipei was far
below the growth in housing prices. During the period of 1975-80, annual household
income increased 120.6 per cent while the average price for a 30-pin new residential unit
gained 152.7 per cent. Housing price equalled 8.6-year household income. The situation
was slightly improved in the mid-1980s since housing price decline by 11.5 per cent, and
real wages rose 56.4 per cent. From 1985 to 1990, housing price increased 366.7 per
cent, while the annual household income only gained 53.4 per cent growth. This meant
that by 1989, a new residential unit would cost a household 16.7 years income (Kuo, L.,
1991, pp. 107-14). It is believed that housing inequalities among different income groups
gradually emerged, and even the middle stratum of society were
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Table 4.7.1 Housing Prices and Annual Household Income, Taipei, 1973-1993
Annual Household Income	 Housing Price for a 30-pin
	 i-lousing Price!
New Unit	 Annual Income
$1,000 dollars	 Change	 $1,000 dollars	 Change
1973	 90.1	 -	 627	 -	 7.0
1974	 119.8	 32.9	 831	 32.5	 6.9
1975	 133.6	 11.5	 1,008	 21.3	 7.5
	
1973-1975	 -	 48.2	 -	 60.8	 -
1976	 156.9	 17.5	 1,005	 -0.3	 6.4
1977	 167.5	 6.8	 1,047	 4.2	 6.3
1978	 189.7	 13.3	 1,179	 12.6	 6.2
1979	 244.9	 29.1	 1,671	 41.7	 6.8
1980	 294.7	 20.3	 2,547	 52.4	 8.6
	
1975-1980	 -	 120.6	 -	 152.7	 -
1981	 360.0	 22.2	 2,700	 6.0	 7.5
1982	 404.4	 12.3	 2,463	 -8.8	 6.1
1983	 438	 8.3	 2,400	 -2.6	 5.5
1984	 441.6	 0.8	 2,286	 -4.8	 5.2
1985	 460.8	 4.3	 2,253	 -1.4	 4.9
	
1980-1985	 -	 56.4	 -	 -11.5	 -
1986	 454.8	 -1.3	 2,514	 11.6	 5.5
1987	 511.2	 12.4	 3,528	 40.3	 6.9
1988	 556.8	 8.9	 6,657	 88.7	 12.0
1989	 643.2	 15.5	 10,716	 61.0	 16.7
1990	 706.8	 9.9	 10,515	 -1.9	 14.9
	
1985-1990	 -	 53.4	 -	 366.7	 -
1991	 777.48	 10.0	 9,939	 -5.5	 12.8
1992	 948	 21.9	 9,900	 -0.4	 10.4
1993	 1042.8	 10.0	 10,314	 4.2	 9.9
	
1990-1993	 -	 47.5	 -	 -1.91	 -
Source: Survey of Family Income and Expenditure, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1993; Weekly Report of Housing,
Tailien Real Estate, 1994
also affected by the price escalation. The crisis fmally emerged on to the surface in the
late 1980s.
The late 1980s witnessed the end of one-party domination, and the political regime
was in conformity with competitive party politics. Many grassroots organisations and
civil groups emerging in this period were concerned about urban issues such as environ-
mental quality, housing prices, public services and historical preservation. The Houseless
People Movement - a series of campaigns initiated by a group of primary school teachers
in 1989 to protest against worsening housing problems and skyrocketing housing prices -
involved twenty thousand citizens (Haggard and Cheng, 1992, p.7 1). They demanded a
tough action from the government to combat land speculation, to regulate the over-
heated property market and to improve the quality of public services. This began to show
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that more and more citizens became interested in the planning decision-making process
and were willing to take actions. The government was thus kept under political pressure
and its policies had to respond to public concerns.
4.7.2 Giant Enterprise Groups and Property Speculation
It is widely accepted that enterprise groups which engaged in land speculation were also
responsible for the disruption of the price mechanism in the housing market. As
mentioned before, large enterprise groups emerging from industrial production began to
engage in property development in the mid-1960s. Cathay Enterprise for instance, set up
Taiwan's first and largest property development company in 1964. Three years later, the
second largest development company was established by Pacific Enterprise. During the
first property boom, other giant enterprise groups such as Hsingung Enterprise and Asia
Enterprise also formed their own development branches. Although the number of small-
and medium-sized development companies also increased during this period, they offered
no threat to enterprise groups which had much more financial capital.47
As earlier mentioned, mortgages from the state-controlled banking system formed the
main financial source for property development. The government managed price inflation
through imposing restrictions on mortgage credit to property developers. To avoid the
state's mortgage regulations and to self-finance property investment, giant enterprise
groups such as Cathy Enterprise and Hsingung Enterprise, established their own life-
insurance, trust and investment companies. These companies gained their capital from
individual depositors and provided financial capital to property development companies
while they were banned from access to bank loans. Their investment strategies were soon
followed by other individual life-insurance companies, such as Taiwan Life Insurance and
Nanshan Life Insurance.
According to an opinion poll conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation (POF) in 1990, 42.2 per
cent of respondents thought that enterprise groups which engaged in land speculation were responsible
for the disruption of the price mechanism in the housing market; 31 per cent of respondents thought the
soaring prices were caused by quick property transactions encouraged by enterprise-owned property
management agencies (POF, 1990, p.6). Another questionnaire survey issued by the KMT's Social Work
Committee had a very similar conclusion (Bai, J., 1988, p.12).
annual income of Cathy Enterprise was about 4 per cent of GNP, those of Usingun Enterprise and
Pacific Enterprise were 1.04 per cent and 0.64 per cent respectively (Tsen, S., 1988, p.80)
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These enterprise-owned companies and individual life-insurance companies often bid
for land at a price several times higher than that advertised for sale by the government.
They helped to raise the bidding prices for several land parcels in Taipei between 1978
and 1980. Subsequently, the market prices of land parcels in the surrounding area were
forced up (Lin, Y., 1982, p.19). After the early 1980s, these companies used their
financial capital to invest in land, thus becoming the main landholders in major cities.
Altogether they held 330 vacant lots totalling 133,094 hectares in Taipei - approximately
30 per cent the size of the city. Cathy Enterprise became the biggest private landholders
in Taipei since their construction, life-insurance, trust and investment branches altogether
owned 80 vacant lots. Asia Enterprise (10 lots) and Pacific Enterprise (7 lots) were also
big landholders (Land Department, Taipei Municipal Government, 1981). The possession
of financial capital and land enabled these companies to manipulate the market price
mechanism for making short-term profit.
As an annual growth rate at 26.7 per cent in average, the total capital of all life-
insurance companies increased from NT$ 385 billion in 1970 to NT$ 70,140 billion in
1993 (Ministry of Finance, 1994). Their investment in land and properties grew on
average 28.6 per cent each year, increasing the total investment value from NT$ 82.5
billion in 1970 to NT$ 1,094 biffion in 1980 and approaching NT$ 14,460 billion in 1993
(Table 4.7.2). As the overall building construction was halted after the mid-1980s,
building investment by these companies became more decisive. Their share in total
building investment increased to 8.3 per cent in 1986 and 12.5 per cent in 1990. In the
late 1980s, it was estimated that almost 30 per cent of total circulating assets in the
housing market were produced by life-insurance companies (Economic Daily News, 8,
Feb., 1990). Cathy Enterprise played an active role by spending more than 50 per cent of
its total capital in land and property investment. It invested NT$ 7,017 billion on
property development in 1990, constituting more than one-half of the total investment
made by all enterprise groups and about 7.4 per cent of total building investment value in
Taiwan (Table 4.7.2). These enterprise-owned companies gained massive profits by
In 1987, Cathy Life Insurance paid NT$ 2,970,000 p.sq.m. for bidding a vacant lot totalling 5,846
sq.m. in Saungshan District. The bottom price advertised for sale was NT$ 825,000 p.sq.m. In the same
year, Hsingun Life Insurance bought a larger vacant tot in the Sub-Centre totalling 8,754 sq.m. The
price paid for bidding was NT$ 3,300,000 p.sq.m., much higher than the bottom price NT$ 1,900,000
p.sq.m. The official announced market value for land in the surrounding area of these two lots was only
NT$ 60,000 p.sq.m. and NT$ 42,000 p.sq.m. respectively (Ministry of Finance, 1987).
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investing in land and properties. The average gross profits made from property develop-
ment were estimated at NT$ 7 billion in 1988 and NT$ 13.6 billion in 1989 (United
News, 7, May, 1990).
The government was concerned about the widespread speculation headed by giant
enterprise groups and the undesirable consequences. In the early 1980s, political leader
Cbiang Ching-Kuo launched a nation-wide campaign in the name of 'Anti- Speculation
and Monopolisation' to combat land speculation. The government raised the tax rate on
vacant lots and to check the income taxation of individual investors. Landholders of
vacant lots were compelled to build before the deadlines, leading to artificial over-supply
and depressed real estate prices. Once it was implemented, this policy seems to have
affected small- and middle-sized development companies. The empty-lot taxation, in par-
Table 4.7.2 Building Investment by Insurance Companies and Enterprise Groups, 1970-1992
Building Investment by Insurance	 Building Investment by Cathy Enterprise
Companies	 Group
Investment	 %	 %Share of Total Investment	 %Share of
	 %Share of
Value	 Change	 Building	 Value	 Change Total Capital Total Building
(million)	 Investment	 (million)	 Investment
1970	 825	 1.7	 249	 31.0	 0.5
1971	 1,245	 51.0	 2.0	 566	 126.0	 45.0	 0.9
1972	 1,580	 27.0	 2.1	 676	 19.0	 43.0	 0.9
1973	 2,346	 49.0	 2.3	 1,207	 78.0	 52.0	 1.2
1974	 3,297	 41.0	 2.1	 1,720	 42.0	 52.0	 1.1
1975	 3,363	 2.0	 1.8	 1,515	 -12.0	 45.0	 0.8
1976	 3,799	 13.0	 1.9	 1,797	 18.0	 47.0	 0.9
1977	 4,908	 30.0	 2.3	 2,661	 48.0	 54.0	 1.3
1978	 6,765	 38.0	 2.6	 3,642	 36.0	 53.0	 1.4
1979	 9,026	 33.0	 2.7	 5,096	 40.0	 56.0	 1.5
1980	 10,941	 21.0	 2.4	 6,206	 22.0	 57.0	 1.4
1981	 13,467	 23.0	 2.7	 7,666	 24.0	 57.0	 1.6
1982	 17,426	 29.0	 3.5	 9,853	 28.0	 57.0	 2.0
1983	 23,345	 34.0	 4.9	 13,594	 38.0	 58.0	 2.8
1984	 29,116	 25.0	 5.9	 18,742	 38.0	 640	 3.8
1985	 36,610	 26.0	 7.9	 21,965	 17.0	 60.0	 4.7
1986	 43,002	 17.0	 8.3	 23,631	 7.0	 54.0	 4.6
1987	 59,029	 37.0	 9.5	 35,811	 51.0	 60.0	 5.8
1988	 77,261	 31.0	 10.7	 49,013	 37.0	 64.0	 6.8
1989	 95,091	 23.0	 11.1	 55,436	 13.0	 58.0	 6.5
1990	 118,362	 24.0	 12.5	 70,169	 26.0	 59.0	 7.4
1991	 125,490	 6.0	 12.0	 70,891	 1.0	 56.0	 6.8
1992	 130,348	 4.0	 10.8	 69,688	 -1.0	 53.0	 5.8
1993	 144,600	 10.9	 10.5	 73,400	 5.3	 52.0	 5.4
Source: Ministry of Finance, Annual Report of Insurance, 1975, 1994
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ticular, brought many of these companies into bankruptcy in the mid-1980s (Chow, Y.,
1981, p.24). Interestingly, while some leading trust companies began to experience
financial troubles, the government supported them with public funds (Industrial and
Commercial Times, 1984, p.3 1; 1985, p.39) .49 Although the government defended its
intervention as 'a difficult decision' made to 'protect thousands of individual depositors
of these trust companies' and to 'secure the stability of the financial system', it was
widely believed that these actions were all part of a conspiracy to protect some high-level
state elite who were in tacit alliance with giant enterprise groups (Han, Y, 1985, p.24).
However, these enterprise-owned companies survived thanks to the state funding.
Public opinion towards the surge in property prices and the intervention by the state
was extremely divided. On the one hand, profit gains from land and property investment
constantly sustained a speculative demand. Strong resistance emerged among enterprise
groups and individual landlords against state intervention, and this was strengthened
following the political reform and the break down of the KMT domination in the late
1980s. On the other hand, the moderate- and low-income population, who suffered most
from the rise of housing prices, were strongly against property speculation (Legislative
Yuan Bulletin, 1989,1990,1994). The divided property interest seems to have combined
with the existing conflict between Taiwanese and mainlanders, therefore the whole issue
became closely associated with the power struggle in the political arena. As mentioned
previously, mainlanders had a large presence in the public sector and represented the
middle-income population. Many of them lived in rental housing provided by the state
and did not buy land or properties for themselves. The trend of property speculation
made them feel relatively poor in comparison with native Taiwanese who owned land
and houses (Central Daily News, 12, June, 1980). As the power struggle within the KMT
became intensified, the hard-liner faction of the party, mainly consisting of mainlanders,
turned to oppose a laissez-faire policy regarding land and property investment. They
were furious about the government's concessions to profit-seeking development, and
used this issue as a means to challenge the leadership of the party. At the same time, the
opposition parties (the DPP and the CNP) issued a series of public inquiries in the
" The government granted NT$ 160 billion to the Tenth Trust (owned by Cathy Enterprise) in 1980,
NT$ 44 billion to the Asia Trust in 1982 and NT$ 8 billion to the Overseas Chinese Trust in 1984
(Industrial and Commercial Times, 1985, p.39)
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Legislative Yuan and made combating property speculation the top issue during their
election campaigns.
The government, which was still controlled by the KMT, was faced with the situa-
tion that the critical issues of land speculation and housing prices were gradually turning
the middle-class population and mainlanders against the party. Compelled by all forces of
the circumstances, the government decided to tackle property speculation in the late
1980s through introducing more financial measures. The Ministry of Finance proposed to
reduce the percentage of capital resources that life-insurance and trust companies could
use to invest in land or properties from 33.3 per cent to 20 per cent (Chili Morning
News, Aug., 17, 1989).° This policy, not unexpectedly, was strongly opposed by the
representatives of enterprise groups and life-insurance companies in the parliament. At
this juncture, the state had gradually lost its autonomy to the financial capitalists who
were supported by landlords and the local bourgeoisie. The financial capitalists who took
over the parliament through the general elections, began to exercise their political
influence and direct the policy toward their interests. Through the co-operation of their
allies in the Finance Committee of the Ministry of Finance and the Legislative Yuan, they
successfully changed the policy and reduced the target to only 30 per cent. Hence,
although to tackle land and property speculation was by then a subject of common
consent among the state elite, the state found itself effectively unable to interfere in the
property market.
4.7.3 The Spatial Distribution of Newly-Generated Floor Space and Property Price
After three-decades of building investment led by the private sector, an uneven pattern of
urban development had already come into existence in Taipei. The spatial distribution of
newly-generated floor space can offered a good illustration. 5' For analytical purposes,
statistical data at district level are recorded and summed by every five years (1976-1980,
50 cc 	 to the 1974 insurance law, life-insurance companies could invest in the housing market not
excess 33.3 per cent of the total capital collected from the depositors.
SI This data was made between 1974-1991. The 1991-1995 data were omitted here due to the inconsis-
tency of real estate statistics. It was caused by the change of the boundary of Taipei's sixteen districts at
the end of 1990 which reduced the number of districts from sixteen to twelve. Since the newly published
real estate statistics do not deal with the problem of data transformation, it is impossible to separate the
data of o)d districts from new format used in the post-1990 statistics.
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1981-1985 and 1986-1990). Sixteen districts within Taipei are aggregated into five
groups: 1) the central area (two districts containing the old CBD and the sub-centre); 2)
the central area fringe (two districts between the old BD and the sub-centre); 3) the old
central area (three districts constituting the original settlements of the city); 4) the outer
urban area (five districts surrounding the above areas); and 5) the suburban area (five
districts on the periphery of the city). The results are presented in Table 4.7.3.
From 1976 to 1990, the central area (19.4 per cent), the central area fringe (25.4 per
cent) and the suburban area (37.4 per cent), altogether accounted for 82.3 per cent of
newly-generated floor space. The central area had substantial increase in floor space, but
it is clear that most of the growth concentrated in Shungshan (the sub-centre) rather than
in Chengchung (the old CBD). As mentioned previously, the development of the eastern
part of the city has long been emphasised in the Master Plan. The implementation of the
Hsinyi Sub-Centre Special Zoning could be seen as a realisation of this concept. It
brought a new wave of property development into this area. Property development in
Shungshan District accounted for 16.8 per cent and 15.6 per cent of newly-generated
floor space in 1976-80 and 1981-85 respectively. It reached a climax in 1986-90 when
the district's share of floor space rose to 23.5 per cent - the highest among all sixteen
districts. The old CBD - Chengchung by contrast, received only 2.5 per cent, 1.3 per
cent and 1.8 per cent during three time periods.
The central area fringe witnessed large increases in floor space. Property develop-
ment in the sub-centre apparently created a great impact on its fringe area. Taan District
in particular, received 12.4 per cent of floor space in 1976-80, 16.5 per cent in 198 1-85,
and 9.0 per cent in 1986-90. The fringe area of the old CBD was seen as an alternative
location for property development as land in the old CBD became difficult to obtain:
Chungshan District received 16.8 per cent, 15.6 per cent and 21.6 per cent of newly-
generated floor space during these three time periods. Property development in the
suburban area also had already started in the late 1970s; five districts in this area together
received 37.6 per cent of newly-generated floor space during 1976-80. As mentioned in
the previous section, the road system of the city was almost completed before the early
1980s; transport between the city and the county was largely improved, which assisted
property development in the suburban area. This trend continued and the percentage
share of the suburban area even increased to 40.3 per cent in 'the late 1980s. Neihu and
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Shihlin appear to have been the two most popular suburban districts for property
development over this time.
Property development in the old central area seems to have been hindered during
these fifteen years. This area consisted of three original settlements of the city: Lungshan
(Moungar), Yenping (Dadowchang) and Chiencheng (part of Chengnei). Every district in
this area gained less than 3 per cent of newly-generated floor space over this time. The
floor area generated in Yenping District only represented 0.9 per cent of the total - the
second lowest among the sixteen districts of Taipei. The outer urban area was in the
same situation. Two districts in the area, Shuangyuan and Tatong, were also considered
to be the old districts of Taipei since they were the extension of the original settlements.
Each of them received only 2 per cent of newly-generated floor space over the period.
Table 4.7.3 Floor Area Built by Districts, Taipei, 1975-1990
Floor Area (1,000sq.m.)	 Percentage Share
1976-	 1981-	 1986-	 Total	 1976-1980 1981-
	 1986-	 Total
1980	 1985	 1990	 1985	 1990
Central Area (the old CBD and the Sub-Centre)
Chengchung	 982	 450	 417	 1,849	 2.5	 1.3	 1.8	 1.9
Shungshan	 4,083	 3,400	 3,078	 10,561	 16.8	 15.6	 21.6	 17.5
Sub-tota..5065
	
	
. 45- ...................................193 	 .69	 .2.3A................9.:4
Central Area Frinpe
Taan	 3,006	 3,610	 1,285	 7,901	 12.4	 16.5	 9.0	 13.1
Chungshan	 2,862	 3,300	 1,313	 7,475	 11.8	 15.1	 9.2	 12.4
Sub-tota..,868	 .910	 .2,598	 ..5,37624.2
.LP.............................. 5
Old Central Area
Lungshan	 602	 215	 291	 1,108	 2.5	 1.0	 2.0	 1.8
Yenping	 295	 150	 82	 527	 1.2	 0.7	 0.6	 0.9
Chiencheng	 176	 85	 49	 310	 0.7	 0.4	 0.3	 0.5
	
.................40	 .2,945.............44 	 .. . 2.9	 .3.2
Outer Urban Area
Tatong	 380	 470	 327	 1,177	 1.6	 2.2	 2.3	 2.0
Kuting	 1,455	 1,010	 870	 3,335	 6.0	 4.6	 6.1	 5.5
Shungyuan	 589	 505	 127	 1,221	 2.4	 2.3	 0.9	 2.0
Chingmei	 1,222	 425	 655	 2,302	 5.0	 1.9	 4.6	 3.8
	
b-t0a1.........................364.6 	.MiS!	 .........972	 .............8,035 	 .150	 ...0J9	 ..3
Suburban Area
Mucha	 896	 550	 983	 2,429	 3.7	 2.5	 6.9	 4.0
Neihu	 1,970	 3,250	 2,003	 7,223	 8.1	 14.9	 14.1	 12.0
Nankang	 707	 560	 356	 1,623	 2.9	 2.6	 2.5	 2.7
Shihlin	 2,604	 2,440	 1,422	 6,466	 10.7	 11.2	 10.0	 10.7
Peitou	 2,420	 1,400	 971	 4,791	 10.0	 6.4	 6.8	 7.9
	
8597
...... 8. 2P0	 ..........355	 . LP	 ......74
Total	 24,249	 21,820	 14,229	 60,298	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
Data Source: Department of Public Works, Taipei Municipal Government
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The spatial distribution of newly-generated floor space demonstrates the pattern of
property development in Taipei: building investment mainly took place in the sub-centre,
the central area fringe and certain districts in the suburban area. Six districts in the above
areas received exceptionally large amounts of floor space: Shungshan (17.5 per cent),
Taan (13.1 per cent), Chungshan (12.4 per cent), Neihu (12 per cent), Shihlin (10.7 per
cent) and Peitou (7.9 per cent). These six districts made up 73.6 per cent of newly-
generated floor space. They became the major growth zones of the city. Residential and
commercial activities gradually moved from the old core to the eastern side and the
periphery of the city. The redevelopment of old districts did not display significant
progress, and building investment in those areas was very limited (Figure 4.7.1).
The uneven pattern of building investment also reflected itself in increasing disparity
of housing prices in different areas of Taipei. Figure 4.7.2 suggests that in the 1970s,
except for the suburban area where housing prices were still low, the disparity of housing
prices in the city area was not so obvious. Following the escalation of housing prices in
the late 1980s, the gap was clearly enlarged. Housing prices in five areas could be
divided into two groups, with the central area and the central area fringe in top rank, and
the old central area, the outer urban area and the suburban area at the bottom. The
disparity between these two groups became even more substantial in the early 1990s:
housing prices in the top group approached NT$ 420,000 per pin in 1993, while these in
the bottom group were about NT$ 285,000 per pin (Appendix 1.22).
The decline in housing prices in the old central area became phenomenal in the late
1980s. The average housing price in this area was the highest one among all five areas in
the 1970s. Although surpassed by the average housing price in the central area in the
mid-1980s, it nonetheless still stood in the second place among five areas. But, during
the late 1980s, the average housing price in the old central area was also surpassed by
the central area fringe. Further, they continually fell to become the lowest among all five
areas in the early 1990s. Among three districts in the old central area, the average
housing price in Yenping District (Dadowchang) was NT$ 240,000 per pin in 1993, even
lower than the average prices in some districts in the suburban area.
The direct result of an uneven pattern of building investment was that in some areas
of Taipei, the quality of infrastructure and services was largely improved and housing
prices rose remarkably. Yet in some other parts of the city, housing prices dropped in
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Figure 4.7.1 Newly-generated Floor Space by District, Taipei
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Fifure 4.7.2 Housing Prices of Newly-constructed Flat, Taipei
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line with the decay in the physical environment. Although the importance of urban
renewal was addressed by the local government after the early 1980s, property develop-
ment in the old core of the city, including the old CBD, still progressed at a relatively
slow pace. This trend would continue since market forces were allowed free play and the
existing planning regime was unable to take the lead in physical development.
4.7.4 The Deficiency of Planning Devices In Urban Renewal
The local government of Taipei stepped in to assert a more vigorous role in guiding
urban development in the early 1980s. Urban renewal was considered an important com-
ponent of urban planning. Yet all kinds of problems emerged to prevent public or private
plans getting off the ground. One of the major problems was the excessive fragmentation
of land ownership. Generally, a property developer who wished to develop a multitude
of parcels simultaneously would, in order to assemble the land, have to make arrange-
ment with each landlord, thereby in most cases making development almost impossible.
In Taiwan's context, what planning could do at this level was to convert small lots into
parcels of regular size and shape and distribute them among the owners, or to improve
the physical environment through investment in infrastructure and services. But this was
unlikely to happen, owing to the failure of two important planning devices - land re-
plotting and compulsory acquisition.
According to the earliest Master Plan (GTCP), the purposes of land re-plotting were
to combine small and irregular land lots for development, to bring together publicly-
owned lots thus to generate large-sized lots for the development of public housing and
facilities, and to transform agricultural land into residential land. Land re-plotting was
most needed in the redevelopment of the old city areas where land was multiply-divided
because of the nature of ownership. Unfortunately, the importance of land re-plotting
was underestimated by the government during the establishment of the new planning
regime. Land re-plotting legislation was excluded from the Urban Planning Act in 1964
and was not in effect until added into the Statue for the Equalisation of Urban Land
Ownership (Amendment) in 1977.
However, going by the statement of the SEULO, the local government was
authorised to re-plot land on condition that they intended to change the nature of land
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use or land ownership, or when more than half of the landowners requested to do so
(Section 4, SEULO, 1977). From 1977 to 1990, twenty-eight areas in Taipei covering
614 hectares land area (2.5 per cent of the total land area) were designated as the 'Land
Re-plotting Areas'. The average size of these areas was only 25 hectares - much smaller
in comparison with those designated during the colonial period (98 hectares in average)
(Land Department, Taipei Municipal Government, 1993). Fourteen areas out of twenty
eight had a land area less then 5 hectares. These 'land re-plotting areas' were located
exclusively in the eastern districts such as Shungshan, Taan and Chungshan or in the
suburban districts such as Neihu, Mucha and Peito, aiming to convert agricultural land in
these areas to residential land. None of these 'land re-plotting areas' were in the old
central area - where this device was most needed to solve the problem of land ownership.
The effect of compulsory acquisition was also in serious doubt. According to the
Urban Planning Act (1964), the local government was given the authority to purchase
land from original owners in order to start infrastructure construction or other projects
for public purposes. This 'reserved land for public facilities' should be purchased within a
five-ten year period after the date of designation. Landlords would be paid a compen-
sation price on the basis of a standard land value (OMV). Past experiences indicated that
the standard values were always 30-50 per cent lower than the actual market prices. As a
consequence, landlords were unwilling to sell their land to the government and used all
means in trying to delay compulsory acquisition. 52 In 1973, only 21 per cent of the
'reserved land' designated in 1964 had been successfully acquired. In other words, most
of them would be exempted from the regulation.
This crisis forced the central government to revise the Urban Planing Act in 1973 and
the Statute for Equalisation of Urban Land Ownership in 1977. New regulations enabled
the local government to extend the original acquisition period to fifteen years. Several
incentives, relating to land use and taxation on this 'reserved land', were introduced. The
compensation price (OMV) was also adjusted in accordance with the inflation of market
value. Nevertheless, the main hurdle seems not to have been removed. Because of the
remarkable increase in property prices, the local government was now required to pay a
52 Landlords of the 'reserved land' often appealed to the parliament to change the designation. They
also took radical actions, such as hunger strikes, trying to make the authority overturn its decision. The
involvement of armed police in solving the confrontation between landlords and the local planning
authority was not unheard (Chang, L., 1987, pp. 16-24).
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price 21.6 times higher than the 1973 price to acquire a land parcel. It was almost
impossible to do so without financial support from the central government which was
still lacking. Thus, while the deadline of acquisition again arrived at the end of 1987, only
45 per cent of the 'reserved land' had been acquired (Chang, J., 1991, p.17!).
The central government, instead of providing funds for the purchase of land, decided
to revise the Urban Planning Act and postpone the deadline again. This decision was
strongly criticised by the public for its implicit attempt to 'duck the issue and smooth
things over'. The government's failure of purchasing the 'reserved land' was viewed as
'the biggest scandal in planning history' and 'a sign of the entire collapse of the planning
system' (Legislative Yuan Bulletin, 1987, pp. 2-3). This problem evolved into a political
crisis in 1988. However, the 'reserved land' remained an issue unsolved for more than
twenty years. Many development projects proposed by the Detailed Plans were post-
poned because of the lack of land. The local government could hardly take any initiative
in urban renewal especially in the old central area where most land parcels involved a
great number of landlords. Landlords whose land had been designated as the 'reserved
land' and the public who had already suffered from the lack of public facilities, both
completely lost their trust in government.
It can be argued that the lack of autonomy and adequate fmancial support were the
main reasons which paralysed the local planning authority. Taiwan's political system was
formed by three levels of governments: central government, provincial government and
local government. Although the Procedure of Local Government Autonomy enacted in
1950 declared that the local government and the local assembly were to be elected by the
public, it did not give power to the local government to decide financial budgets, public
spending or even administrative organisation. The central government controlled the
main sources of finance and played a decisive role in the policy-making process. Taipei,
as the capital of Taiwan, was effectively placed under the direct administrative and
supervision of the central government. The publicly-elected local government appeared
to have very small part to play, as can be seen by their budget and spending powers.
The budget of Taipei was estimated at NT$ 61.5 billion in 1990. These funds were
derived from 13 different kinds of sources. 53 Tax revenues, especially business tax and
They included tax revenues (71.14 per cent), government bonds (8.67 per cent) and surplus (6.6 per
cent), etc. (Information Department, Taipei Municipal Government, 1988, p,1 1).
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land/property tax, appear to have been the most important ones . M
 They made up 35 per
cent and 26 per cent respectively of the total funds of the local government (Information
Department, Taipei Municipal Government, 1988, p.22). The tax revenues generated by
business tax and land/property tax, however, were very limited. 55
 This was because first,
tax exemption was used as an incentive to encourage the development of businesses.
Firms covered by the Investment Incentive Ordinance (1961) were to enjoy a three-year
freedom from business tax and certain other fiscal concessions. As a consequence, from
1961 to 1987, the local government had lost NT$ 3,648 billion or 10 per cent of total tax
revenue generated from the business sector (Annual Report, Ministry of Finance, 1987).
Second, as mentioned in the previous section, land tax was levied against the
standard values promulgated by the local government. These standard values derived
mainly from landlords' self-declaration. Tax evasion through false reporting turned out
to be a secret that everybody knew. Furthermore, these standard values were supposed
to be reviewed and approved by the local appraisal councils which had members repre-
senting the local assemblies. They tended to reduce the tax-rate by repressing the stand-
ard values. Also, these standard values could only be updated three years after the
previous review and only if there was been a more than 50 per cent change in values.
Hence, the standard values were far from realistic, especially when land prices were
going up rapidly. Lastly, the 'officially announced market value' (OMV), was not only
applied for tax purposes but also used to purchase land. For its short-term interests, the
local government itself wanted to keep the compensation price at a lower level. The land
increment tax thus could not really be based on the grounds of the profit that landlords
gained from transactions. The effective taxation rate was lower than 25 per cent (Chang,
J., 1991, p. 126).
The central government, as mentioned before, considered urban development as a
secondary issue. The SEULO indicated that land value increment tax should be used for
4 The share of tax revenues was a result of an agreement between the central and the local governments.
Although the share changed over time, generally the central government controlled the major tax
revenues, such as income tax. The local government were empowered to levy several kinds of taxes such
as business tax, land/property tax etc. The tax revenues levied by the local government of Taipei
included business tax (53.1 per cent), land value increment tax (24.3 per cent), land tax (6.9 per cent)
and housing tax (6.7 per cent) (Information Department, Taipei Municipal Government, 1988, p,1 1).
In average, business tax accounted for 18 per cent of the total tax revenue. Land tax revenue and land
value increment tax revenues only represented 5 per cent and 7 percent respectively (Chang, J., 1991, pp
125, 137).
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social and public purposes, but there was no guarantee that city plans would be placed in
the top priority. The Urban Planning Act declared that major financial sources of urban
planning were funds provided by the central government, private investment, and the
revenue generated from the transformation of public land. It did not require the local
government to allocate their public spending to urban planning (Section 23-28, Urban
Planning Act). Hence, if the central government tightened its purse-strings, the local
governments could hardly finance development projects by themselves. Accordingly, the
local planning authorities became poorly-motivated administrations and in most of the
cases, they were unwilling to take the lead.
4.8. Conclusion
The state intervention in the production of space has played different kinds of economic
function in the two countries. Construction investment in Singapore has been integrated
into the state's development strategies and has acted as a productive force for the
national economy. The state-managed building investment has been a driving force for
domestic capital investment and a counter-cyclical device to control economic deviation.
The state has effectively initiated building investment at the critical time through public
housing construction and the land-sale scheme. Through building investment, a large
amount of public savings has been transferred into capital formation for the whole
economy. The expansion of the construction industry has not only contributed to
productivity but also has helped to regulate the labour market by generating employment.
Through providing necessary infrastructure for industrial, office and commercial
activities and supplying high standard housing, social and educational services for human
capital, the state has helped to reduce producers' costs of production and social
reproduction. The state also has been able to maintain the inflation rate and the price
mechanism of the housing market through controlling the money circulation in the
property-based banking system.
Construction investment in Taiwan, on the contrary, has been lesser influential in
leading the dynamics of capital investment and has assumed a lesser importance in the
state's development strategies. Building investment has been mainly initiated by the
private sector and assisted by the state's mortgage programme and squatter control. The
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market-operated building investment has been an alternative way of making profit for
those local enterprises which originally engaged in manufacturing production. Through
the operation of enterprise-owned investment companies, a large amount of accumulated
private savings has been transferred into building investment. The speculative demand,
often triggered by latent inflation and the operation of property development companies,
has constantly threatened the price mechanism of the housing market. The state has
intervened in the property market when property prices rose and caused economic and
social deviations. The state regulation has tackled price inflation by imposing restrictions
on mortgage credit to developers. This policy was only effective in the early stage as
most development companies heavily relied on public subsidy and bank loans to finance
their projects. The state has had a long history of combating property speculation but its
policy measures have been inconsistent. Market forces, to a great extent, have been
allowed free play.
The political and ideological functions of state intervention have been evident in both
countries. In Singapore, public housing development and urban renewal have effectively
demolished the previous pattern of spatial concentration of ethnic groups. Several social
and cultural policies have been co-ordinated and implemented through public housing
policies and community development schemes. Together they have helped to accelerate
social integration among ethnic groups, and have assisted political and social control
over the population living in the public estates. In Taiwan, the construction of low-
income housing has been a showcase of the state's welfare policy, but has offered little
assistance to the low-income households in its practice. The state has built public estates
for state officials and military dependants by which social integration among mainlanders
has been enhanced. The spatial segregation between mainlanders and Taiwanese through
the spatial arrangement of these public estates has also made it possible for social and
political control over the mainlander population to be easily achieved. Yet the recent
demand for national consolidation has forced the state to break spatial segregation by
developing mixed public estates.
The different forms of state intervention in Singapore and Taiwan have produced
different urban planning regimes. Urban planning in Singapore has been a means for the
state to exercise control over construction investment. The administrative and legislative
framework established by the colonial government has enabled the planning authority to
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control land rent and to monopolise land ownership. The later reform carried out by the
Singapore government has reinforced the existing regulations and has created a more
centralised planning machineiy. The planning authority has been given absolute power to
compulsorily purchase land and properties for planning objectives. The authority has also
established a public-private partnership in urban redevelopment. While the public sector
is mainly responsible for housing and infrastructure development through direct invest-
ment, the private sector takes part in office and commercial development through the
land sale scheme. The absence of a landlord class at the very beginning, and the bias
against the domestic bourgeoisie in the state's economic planning, have given the state
stronger autonomy from internal social forces; thereby the formulation of urban plans has
been simply an effort by the planning authorities, conducted strictly within the confines
of the state. The planning regime thus has been characterised by rigid regulations,
powerful authority and efficient plans.
Urban planning in Taiwan seems to have been a reflection of the contingent nature of
state involvement in urban development. Urban planning in many cities was obstructed
for two decades by road construction and squatter clearance for national defence. The
reform of the planning regime was firstly provoked by the demand for land at the early
stage of industrial development. On the surface, the legislative and administrative frame-
work has entitled the local government to formulate plans and to acquire land for de-
velopment purposes. Because of the lack of autonomy and financial resources, several
important planning devices such as land re-plotting and compulsory acquisition, can not
be put into practice. The majority of urban land has been under private ownership with
the owners holding the exclusive property right. The local planning authority cannot
initiate plans easily because of the increasing difficulty of acquiring land from private
owners. The function of the local planning authority thus has been reduced to
administration, offering assistance to infrastructure projects and opening sites for private
development. Their plans have tended to reflect rather than promote change. The lack of
a long-term version of urban development seems to be the inevitable outcome of a
system that is reactive, incremental and limited by external constraints.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RECLAIMING HISTORIC AREAS: NEW POLICY
ORIENTATION TO URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
5.1 Introduction
The analysis developed in the previous chapters reveals that historically, the states of
Singapore and Taiwan have many similarities in terms of their role in the development of
the national economy and the ways they exercise their control over societies. Yet the
political, social and cultural contexts in both countries are very unique, and the nature of
building investment, urban policy and the planning regime also differ in many aspects.
Together they set up the stage for our understanding of how the developmental state,
market forces and internal politics can shape the planning process in different ways. This
exercise has prepared the grounds for me to explain, rather than taking for granted, the
very conditions that enable an alternative strategy for urban redevelopment to emerge.
In the forthcoming chapter, I analyse the new planning policy in the post-1980s era
with regard to the transformation of historical urban centres in Singapore and Taipei. I
first discuss the role of historic heritage in the nation-building process and the political,
social and cultural motivations which gave rise to the conservation movement in the late
1970s. The main aim is to understand the origin, the nature and the influence of this
movement, and the ways it was integrated into the policy for urban redevelopment in the
mid-1980s in the context of a number of intertwined process. Another major line of this
chapter is a detailed account of the formulation of a conservation-based redevelopment
policy, with particular attention paid to different interests in the policy-making process.
This is a necessary step to understand how and why the states of Singapore and Taiwan
responded in different ways to the pressure brought by conflicting interests in the
transformation of historic areas.
Singapore
5.2 Forgetting and Remembering: The Invention of National Past
The history of Singapore could be traced back to the emergence of the Malacca
Sultanate - a vast trading empire created in the fifteenth century on the Malaya Peninsula.
Following the development of trade activities by Arab and Chinese merchants, Singapore
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became one of the chief trading centres in this region (Wong, L., 1978, p.51). The
Malacca Sultanate collapsed at the end of the fifteenth century and most of its territory
was first divided by several agrarian kingdoms and then colonised by the great sea
powers - the Portuguese, the Spanish and the Dutch - who wanted to dominate the sea-
route cross this region. Singapore, however, was not subject their control because the
resigning Sultan of Malacca fled to the southern archipelago and established the Johore-
Riau Sultanate. The British developed trade with China, India and Southeast Asia after
the early nineteenth century. To build their trading posts on the long sea-route between
China and India, the British began to extend their influence in Malacca. The British
governor of Bencoolen, Stamford Raffles, negotiated an agreement with the Sultan of
Johore-Riau in 1819 to establish a free port on Singapore. Following the Anglo-Dutch
treaty signed in London in 1824 which exchanged the British possessions in Sumatra for
Malacca on the Malay Peninsula, the Sultan of Johore-Riau decided to cede Singapore
island to the British.
The ideological construction of the developmental state in Singapore has reflected
itself in the interpretation of national history. The history of Singapore has been read as
an evolutionary progress which began with the arrival of Stamford Raffles in 1819. As
mentioned before, the state has adopted multi-racialism as its official ideology and has
rejected the creation of a national identity on the basis of one particular culture.
Therefore, the state has launched great efforts to break with the pre-colonial past, which
could remind people of their 'homeland' or 'common ancestry'. For the government, to
push people's historical awareness beyond 1819, or to make any historical connection
with the Chinese or the Malay world, would plunge this island into 'the genocidal
madness of racial, communal and religious imperialism which have devastated so many
underdeveloped and even developed countries' (Speeches, Apr., 1984, p.5). Also, since
the developmentalist ideology has provided the legitimisation to mobilise the populace
effectively towards national goals, the government has been more than enthusiastic to
demonstrate its ability to govern and to modernise the country. The legislative and ad-
ministrative framework established by the colonial regime has been preserved to a great
extent to constitute the base for the new bureaucracy to develop. By showing itself as a
modernised and effective administration, the government has asserted its authority to
command and control people, thus, comprehensive state planning for economic develop-
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ment can probably be achieved more easily. Hence, for the government, to name
Stamford Raffles as the founder of Singapore, has been 'a proper use of history' (Ibid.,
Apr., 1984, p.7). The denial of pre-colonial history has helped the state to balance
different ethnic culture in society, and to create a modern image for the new bureaucracy.
To all intents and purposes, it has enabled the state to claim its independent statehood
(Preston, 1989, pp. 13-4).
During the survivalist mood throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, the government
had its plans subject to all kinds of development priorities. Progress and modernisation
were the major aspirations of society. The promotion of a historical awareness was only
a low priority amidst other more pressing demands (Lau, S.,1992, p.50). 'The practical
relevance of history was questioned', P.T. Ong, a former minister of the cabinet,
recalled: 'Our education policy emphasised mathematics, science and technical subjects,
which had direct benefit in terms of industrial needs. History was squeezed out of the
curriculum because it had no immediate practical use at that stage') 'The message was
very clear', Ong argued: 'One should examine the present, think of the future, and forget
the past' (Speeches, 3, Sept. 1981).
Historical preservation was not a matter which assumed a paramount importance (cf.
Lau, S., 1988; Lee, E., 1990). For the government:
Every building in Singapore is a historical building. The only difference is between one year old
and one hundred years old. They are all historical buildings. A good modern building is just as
precious as an old building. Why do we have to make those which are more than sixty or eighty
years old so different from those are one or two years old? Why should we apply different
standards? We have to get rid of this hang-up.
(Informant, S.1)
The statutory board of historic preservation - the Preservation of Monuments Board
(PMB) - was established by the government and began to function in 1972.2 Because the
government was apt to dismiss Singapore's pre-1819 past as of 'antiquarian interest
only' (Lau, S., 1992, p.55; Preston, 1989, pp. 13-4), the PMB limited its main interest in
History became non-examinable at the primary schools after 1968, and was dropped completely from
the leaving examinations of the secondary schools after 1972 (Lau, S., 1992, p.51)
2 The PMB was established in 1971 with four objectives: 1) to preserve for the benefit of the nation,
monuments of historic, traditional, archaeological or artistic interest; 2) to protect and augment the
amenities of those monuments; 3) to stimulate public interest and support in the preservation of those
monuments; and 4) to take appropriate measures to preserve all records, documents and data relating to
those monuments (Section 5, Preservation of Monuments Act, 1985).
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small number of single buildings, mainly religious buildings and government estates
which were built after the nineteenth century. It also did not concern itself with verna-
cular buildings in the old core of the city, for the reason that preservation might obstruct
the development interests of these valuable sites (cf. Lee, E., 1990; Samuel, 1991). Since
the PMB had such a narrow range of concerns, historic buildings were neglected, then
destroyed during the development process. In their place rose many modern skyscrapers
that contributed to Singapore's appearance as an international city and as a regional
centre for commerce and industry.
The second half of the l970s witnessed an increasing interest in historic and cultural
heritage in the public domain. The Oral History Unit was established by the government
in 1979, and then merged with the National Archives and Record Centre (established in
1968) to form a national authority - the Archives and Oral History Department. Writings
on Singapore's national past and cultural tradition were encouraged by the government
and numerous books were published subsequently. 3 The emphasis on history seems to
have taken place amid a mood of cultural despair. As discussed before, a bilingual lan-
guage policy had been introduced since the late 1960s to create a common language for
communication among citizens. The Chinese-educated intellectuals protested against this
policy which caused the disappearance of the Chinese heritage. The state elite also
viewed some Western values attached to English as the main causes of several perceived
'moral crises' in society. Hence, a soul-searching process, comprising education reforms
and national campaigns, was initiated by the government in order to diffuse the discon-
tent of the Chinese-educated population and to prevent the younger generation from
being over-exposed to the so-called 'negative foreign influence'. It was against this
background that historical and cultural heritage began to gain some importance.
The early 1980s was an era in which historic and cultural subjects entered into the
lexicon of political discourse in a vigorous and sustained manner (Woon, K., 1994, pp.
19-2 1). The reason was, according to the editor of the national newspaper: 'It is easy to
forget the past, amidst the affluence, the high standard of living and modernisation which
Singaporeans have had'. Therefore, 'more Singaporeans are feeling nostalgic' (Straits
Times, 2, May, 1984). It seems that not just nostalgia alone prompted the government's
See Moore, 1975; Turnbull, 1977; Barber, 1978; George, 1985.
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interest in the invention of national past. As mentioned previously, the ideology of
'struggle for survival' was addressed by the state during the earlier post-independence
decades and provided the legitimisation for the political leadership to mobilise the
population towards development objectives. The potency of this ideology seems to have
been diminished to a great extent following the subsequent changes in the economy and
politics. The pace and the scope of these changes became to worry the state elite. For
them, the traditional ideas of morality duty had given way to 'a more individualistic and
self-centred outlook on life'. The pursuit of individual liberty would 'damage economic
prosperity and political stability in the long run' (Goh, C, 1991, p.56). The loss of seats
in general elections in particular, came as a shock to a party which had enjoyed total
domination for decades. The government introduced several measures and launched a
series of national campaigns to grapple with the latent political crisis. The domestic bour-
geoisie and the middle class were integrated into consultative politics. Traditional values
of trust, strong leadership and social harmony were also addressed to meet the demand
for moral regulation.
The new basis of legitimisation seems to have been found in the sphere of culture and
history (Woon, K., 1994, p.25). For President Lee Kuan-Yew and other members of the
political elite, history by then turned to be a matter that could 'make people understand
the present and anticipate the future' (Speeches, 8, Feb., 1980). In Lee's words:
An awareness of the national past will provide Singaporeans the sense of belonging, enable
them to weather difficult times. It can help the young generation to understand how we get
here, so that when they face new problems, they will have some thinking of how our people
responded in the past. In any crisis, it is how people respond that decides whether they can
overcome their difficulties.
(Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 25, Mar., 1982, p.1203)
The speeches and writings of political leaders touched this issue sporadically throughout
the early 1980s. 'An understanding of the past is essential to understanding the present
process of nation building' (Speeches, 21, Jul., 1983); the Second Deputy Prime Minister
at that time, S. Rajaratnam, developed Lee's theme further:
A nation must have a memory to give it a sense of cohesion, continuity and identity. The longer
the past, the greater the awareness of a nation's identity.......A sense of a common history is
what provides the links to hold together a people who came from the four corners of the
earth......We must preserve the transplanted cultures which have taken root in Singapore. The
Singapore identity is now definitely taking shape. We require these transplanted cultures to
reinforce a Singapore identity which has come into being.
(Speeches, 28, Apr., 1984)
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The messages from the top leadership were sent across the country through the mass
media and official campaigns. The Archives and Oral History Department organised a
series of building and picture exhibitions, including one named 'The Development of
Singapore Community' in 1983, and another one named 'Singapore 1819 to 1980: Road
to Nationhood' in 1984. Numerous articles and letters about the preservation of histori-
cal and cultural heritage were published in the predominant national press - the Straits
Times. The National Television presented a series of programmes produced by the
Curriculum Development Institute in 1983 in the name of 'Making of a Nation'. These
TV programmes were documentaries of the historic development of the ethnic com-
munities in the central city such as Chinatown, Little India, and Kampong Glam. These
ethnic districts, with a large concentration of shophouses, were a legacy of the city's
original arrangement as a conglomeration of separate enclaves for its various ethnic
groups. For centuries, they served as the hubs for ethnic groups and provided them with
sources for their cultural identities (Wei, M. 1993, p.35). The need to conserve shop-
houses in the ethnic districts also began to be recognised by the state elite. One of the
chief officers in the URA recalled how he was beginning to be aware that 'Singapore
might be losing a large part of its heritage and this would be an unforgivable mistake for
the nation':
The future generation needs to learn things from the past. Historical heritage is another form of
evidence of the past. We always talk about our own identity. If a city does not have its own
identity and uniqueness, the people living in it will not gain a vicarious identity from it....The
time has come for Singapore to take hold of its destiny and secure its past. We need to conserve
those buildings that are essential to the history and culture of our city.
(Informant, S.1)
However, the government realised that history is not only about the past, it is about a
sense of unity. The emphasis on history was not only to make sure that Singaporeans
would have a sense of the past, but also to incorporate the relevant part of a varied
cultural heritage, and the attitudes and values which were associated with the legacies of
the past. The government's interest in inventing national past was basically motivated by
the enthusiasm for engendering a collective sentiment, by which the internal cohesion of
society could be enhanced. The emphasis on national past can be seen as an effort to re-
invent national myths and national identities, and hopefully, national loyalties (Informant,
S.6).
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5.3 Reclaiming the Historical Built Environment: The Hidden
Agenda of the Capitalist Developmental State
Historical preservation had been frequently mentioned by the government during its
traditionalist mood after the late 1 970s. Interestingly, instead of reinforcing or develop-
ing the existing function of the PMB, the task of conservation was taken over by the
URA, which was considered to be one of the most powerful public authorities in guiding
Singapore's urban development. The functional division of the two national authorities
suggests that the government made a clear distinction between preservation and con-
servation from the very beginning. For the government, preservation referred to the strict
retention of national monuments (mainly institutional and religious buildings) in their
originally architectural form. Namely, the original construction method, architectural
details and use of materials were protected by stringent regulations. Conservation, by
contrast, adopted a more flexible approach and was applied primariiy to vernacular
buildings such as bungalows and shophouses. This meant that selective alteration and
redevelopment, particularly of the interior of these buildings, as well as enhancement and
restoration works using new materials and contemporary construction, were permitted.
The main aim was to allow adaptive changes to these buildings to accommodate new
uses more relevant to present times (Liu, 1990, pp. 4-5).
The URA conducted several surveys on the prospect of shophouse renovation in
Chinatown in conjunction with the government's Speak Mandarin Campaign in the late
1970s. Two small-scale conservation projects involving 14 shophouses in Murray Street
and 17 shophouses in Cuppage Terrace were subsequently undertaken by the authority
(URA Annual Report, 1976/77; 1978/79). Although the URA began to speak of its
enthusiasm about the preservation of vernacular buildings, its concept was still vague and
its policy was no more than a statement. By the end of the 1970s, apart from the above
mentioned two conservation projects, the authority appears to have lacked motivation to
move forward. For the authority:
Conservation or rehabilitation can not be widely applied in our context because Singapore does
not possess as many architectural monuments of international importance as many European
countries. Therefore, only few buildings worthy of preservation. Also, land is very valuable in
Singapore. Our redevelopment policy means no less than the gradual demolition of virtually the
whole 1,500 acres land in the Central Area, replacing it with an integrated modem structure
which could fulfil Singapore's future role as the New York of Malaya.
(Informant S.l)
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For the time being, some architects and planning professionals grasped at this chance to
demonstrate their vision of urban environment. An architect, Paul Tsakok, submitted his
plan to renovate a shophouse in Emerald Hill - an area of 9.5 hectares consisting of 184
residential shophouses. As most of the shophouses would be eventually acquired by the
URA for redevelopment, it took the authority eighteen months to approve his plan.
Tsakok's plan was completed in 1978 and pioneered shophouse conservation in Singa-
pore. His effort encouraged many individuals who came from a similar background. A
group of architects and planners, led by William Urn and Tay Kheng Soon, spoke of
their frustrations and anxieties about urban development in Singapore, which was
pursued at the expense of a large part of the cultural and historical heritage. 'Most
Singaporeans were caught up in the race for material improvement, and had little time to
think of anything else. History stood completely outside of their context', Lim argued,
There is more to life than just material development. We have to ask ourselves: Who are we?
Where do we come from? What does it mean to be a Singaporean? Could we talk about
ourselves beyond the language of pragmatism and utilitarianism? How to make a deeper sense
of our changing physical environment and how do we relate to our precious natural and
historical heritage?
(Informant, S.7)
Lim and his colleagues began to circulate their ideas of urban conservation through
various working papers, workshops and seminars organised by the Singapore Institute of
Architects (SIA), the Singapore Institute of Planners (SIP) and the Singapore Planning
and Urban Research Group (SPUR).4
Their provocation forced the URA to deliberate upon the future of shophouses in
Emerald Hill. This area was designated as a conservation area by the URA in 1981. A
total number of 184 residential shophouses in this area were expected to be renovated by
their private owners. The authority invested in infrastructure in order to enhance the
quality of Emerhald Hill as a residential locality, including converting one section of the
Emerald Hill Road into a landscaped pedestrian mall with restricted vehicle access;
replacing the tarmac road with pre-cast concrete paving blocks; opening the back lanes
and installing furniture such as play equipment, seats, lighting and flower beds in the
street etc. Private owners who wanted to carry out external renovation would have to
In 1981, the SIP held a forum on 'Singapore Shophouses' dedicated to discussing issues on urban
conservation, Subsequently, an entire issue of the SIP journal entitled 'Conservation of the Building
Environment' was published
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comply with the guidelines laid down by the authority. Generally, the alterations to, or
refurbishment of, the original facades were strictly controlled. Public investment in
Emerald Hill triggered shophouse renovation by private owners and offered the earliest
example of area conservation in Singapore.
Urban conservation at this stage, however, seems to have remained as private efforts.
The Urban Redevelopment Authority did not seriously consider conservation as an
alternative for urban redevelopment. Practical methods of conservation were not fully
developed and the economic viability of conservation was still in dispute. The release of
the Emerald Hill plan provoked the anxiety of property developers and residents in
shophouse areas. The Singapore Association of Real Estate Developers first spoke of
their negative prospect of urban conservation. From their point of view, land scarcity in a
small city like Singapore made maximum utilisation of precious land even more crucial.
Therefore, having a modern high-rise office building was more profitable than a two-
floor shophouse. Local people who lived in the ethnic districts such as Chinatown, Little
India or Campong Glam also had serious doubts about the poor safety and hygiene
elements of the ageing shophouses and preferred a comprehensive redevelopment
(Informant, S.4).
Most importantly, at this stage, the government had other priorities. The previous
discussion shows that the government had adapted a growth-through-investment strategy
since the late 1970s, aiming to enhance the national economy. Property development was
initiated by the public sector through direct construction and the land sale scheme. To
support this policy, vast amounts of land had to be made available. Hence, whether to
release valuable land in the Central Area from high-density development and gave them
away to conservation was highly debatable:
Although it is time for us to talk about the preservation of historical shophouses, we have to
think very carefully when it comes to the actual practice.....We are not so sure about whether
our valuable land should be released to conservation rather than for development purposes.
Land in the Central Area should be made available for supporting office and commercial
development, which is crucial for our national economy......As a responsible government, we
prefer not to take any policy move unless we can be sure that shophouse restoration is a feasible
idea.
(Informant, S. I)
Meanwhile, architects and planning professionals who had already been involved in urban
conservation since the late 1970s, came up with further ideas. Lim and his fellow
architects completed a proposal in 1982 for the conservation of Boat Quay, a riverside
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area at the heart of the CED with eighty-five shophouses standing in front of the
Singapore River. To convince property owners that urban conservation could be prac-
tical, the economic viability of shophouse renovation was also seriously taken into
account in their plan. They formulated several conservation-based redevelopment strate-
gies which aimed to create a combination of architectural style, traditional activities and
modern facilities in the shophouse area. By doing so, the shophouse area would create an
immense attraction with genuine local flavour and 'conservation could be viable even
without any government subsidy' (Informant, S.7). Their concepts appealed to some
property developers who were more optimistic about conservation. In conjunction with
its 200th anniversary celebration in 1983, the giant real estate consultant company -
Jones Lang Wootton - organised an exhibition at the Raffles Hotel entitled 'Our Heritage
is Worth Preserving'. Booklets of the same title documenting historical buildings in
Singapore were subsequently published and circulated in the business community.
However, the URA decided to work in collaboration with these active individuals
instead of allowing them to mobilise more participants or develop more radical ideas.
The URA and the SIP together organised an international competition named 'Ideas for
Conservation' in 1983. The main purpose was to search for a consensus in resolving the
so-called 'conservation dilemma' or 'conservation-redevelopment conflict', namely, to
find out whether there could be a solution for the seemingly irreconcilable interests
between historical preservation and comprehensive redevelopment (Kong and Yeoh,
1994, p.248). Applying the modest concept of 'adaptive re-use', the URA directly
involved itself in a conservation project in 1984 which renovated several shophouses at
the junction of Emerald Hill Road and Orchard Road, known as Peranakan Place. The
facades of these shophouses were preserved but the internal space was reconstructed to
accommodate new commercial uses, such as cafes, showhouse and restaurants. The scale
of this project was very small. Hence, it seems that area conservation was still not on the
agenda.
The mid-1980s appears to have been a watershed for urban redevelopment policy in
Singapore. The indecent haste to obliterate historical buildings was realised by the top
leadership, and the reclaim of lost heritage 'assumed an urgency that was neurotic'
(Warren, 1986, p.326). A speech delivered by S. Rajaratnam - the Second Deputy Prime
Minister - at a seminar on 'Adaptive Re-use: Integrating Traditional Areas into the
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Modern Urban Fabric' in l985, spoke of his concern of the mindless demolition of old
buildings without any regard for preserving:
It is the mixture of Asian culture and European influence represented by historic buildings that
makes Singapore an interesting place to invest and to live...I hope our planners will not try to
falsify history by eliminating all reminders of our past... We want to save what is worthwhile
from the past. This should not only include prominent buildings that are of national historical
significance, but also smaller buildings of less importance that have a role to play on a different
scale.
(Speeches, 28, Apr., 1984)
There seem to have been some well-established economic motives behind the reclaim of
historical built environment. For the government, the economic recession in 1985 was a
cataclysmic crisis since it seriously tested the government's ability to maintain economic
growth. To diversify the economy, the out-looking development policy in the past was
reformulated, aiming to build a strong base for service-sector growth and to constitute a
favourable environment for domestic enterprises. The expansion of small- and medium-
sized local enterprises in the advanced-service sector and the development of local entre-
preneurship assumed greater importance on the official agenda. At the same time, a
corporatist framework, comprising company welfarism and a team-work model, was
introduced in the workplace to improve productivity and to enhance industrial relations.
The corporatist and patemalist relationship between employers and employees, and the
traditional work ethnic and group solidarity both had their roots in the operation of
traditional trade business:
Local businesses are the very foundation of our national development. Their importance in our
history should not be undermined. They will also play a greater role in the future, particularly
in our development of advanced-services for international co-operation........Shophouse is the
best evidence of local business spirit and working attitude - both are very critical for
Singapore's achievement......To overcome our current difficulties, we need innovation, hard
work and self-reliance. All these have their cultural roots in our traditional business. They need
to be re-addressed and enhanced.
(Informant S.9)
For the government, the role of the city as a financial and command centre for interna-
tional co-operation also needed to be enhanced. The 'global city' agenda indicated new
directions for the redevelopment of the Central Area. To perform global functions, the
infrastructure, services and images of the Central Area would be upgraded. The aesthetic
5Singapore Co-ordinating Committee together with the Aga-Khan Program for Islamic Architecture at
Harvard and MIT organised a seminar on 'Adaptive Re-use of Buildings' in 1984. Participants in this
seminar included both members from the URA as well as the private sector.
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aspect of the physical environment was receiving serious concern, and high rise, high-
density development was no longer seen as a sole solution for the redevelopment of the
Central Area (URA, Annual Report 1984/85, pp. 8-9). The URA, for the first time
condemned the modernist type of spatial development in the past, for its 'destroying
Singapore of a large part of its precious heritage' and 'making it impossible to tell the
difference between Singapore and Chicago, Toronto or New York'. For them:
An attractive image is essential for a city to acquire a global status. Marina Bay is recognised as
a key urban design asset of our city. The new city will evolve around this man-made basin. New
buildings will be arranged to take advantage of the view, while at the same time, to visually
define the bay area and create new skylines.....Historical areas that form the older fabric of the
city will be preserved and renovated to create a setting which is in stark contrast to the bay area.
What will emerge is an unique, distinct Asian city of the 21st century.
(Informant S.!)
Most importantly, for the time being, there was an urgent need to regulate property
development as a result of the over-accumulation crisis in building investment. The
earlier discussion suggests that the over-expansion of public housing development and
the land sale scheme in the early 1980s caused an excessive supply of floor space.
Building investment could no longer be sustained as the market needed more time to
absorb the accumulated floor space, The fall in building investment had a devastating
effect on the construction industry and the labour market. The property-based banking
system was at stake following the collapse of property prices. The over-accumulation in
the property sector contributed to the economic crisis in 1985. Therefore, construction
investment as a development strategy needed to be modified. Public housing develop-
ment and the land sale scheme were stopped in order to revive the property market. The
government began to find a new niche in building maintenance and renovation. A better
management system for the supply and the demand of land was also developed.
Singapore will not suffer the shortage of land for development purposes. For the time being, the
abundant floor space in the market need be absorbed. It could take a long period. We do not
have to build as much as before. So, there is no worry about land supply.... The Golden Shoe
Area will extend into Marina South for the two areas to jointly function as the new downtown
of our city. The reclaimed land would meet the needs of the economy for at least fifty years.
Therefore, it is time to think about preserving our historical heritage.
(Informant S.1)
There were also several pre-conditions in urban development and the property market
enabling a new redevelopment strategy to take shape. As discussed before, the earlier
success of slum clearance in the Central Area relied on the construction of public housing
in the fringe areas. The later new town development accelerated the out-movement of
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population from the Central Area to the periphery, so that redevelopment in the urban
core could take place. Hence, after two decades of housing development and urban
renewal led by the government, the Central Area already experienced a serious decline in
population. The demand for residential land had been effectively reduced. The over-
supply situation in the mid-1980s caused a fall in the occupancy rate and property prices.
Office and commercial space generated in the Central Area was mostly affected. The
decentralisation of office development began as a response to the different locational
interests and affordability of firms and to the declining market in the Central Area. The
development of new towns and the MRT system accelerated the decentralisation of
office development, led by the public sector. This policy effectively reduced the demand
of land for property development in the Central area. It is against all these backgrounds
that a conservation-based redevelopment strategy became a practical proposition. Hence,
in the mid-1980s, the issue of 'whether to conserve' progressed to the issue of 'how to
develop a conservation-based redevelopment policy' (URA Annual Report, 1984/85, pp.
3). Here began a new story of urban redevelopment in the city of Singapore.
5.4 The Formulation of a Conservation-Based Redevelopment
Policy in Singapore: Taking Control over Cultural Resource
5.4.1 A Technocrats-Led Policy Decision-Making Process
The URA unveiled a dual-track policy for the future city in its tenth anniversary theme
named 'Towards A Better City' in 1985. Urban redevelopment policy embraced both
new development and conservation aiming to ensure the city reflect a distinctive identity
and an international status. In the same year, the URA also revised the Structural Plan
for the Central Area to adopt this new policy orientation. The Singapore River Plan was
completed embracing an action plan to revitalise three distinctive zones along the
Singapore River, including Boat Quay, Clark Quay and Robertson Quay. Shophouses
and warehouses lining the river-sides in Boat Quay were firstly designated for conser-
vation. At the end of this year, the URA decided to draft a separate Master Plan for area
conservation. The Conservation Master Plan was released by the authority after an
official exhibition entitled 'Conserving Our Remarkable Past'. It targeted shophouses in
Chinatown, Kampong Glam, Little India, Singapore River, the Civil and Cultural District
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and Emerald Hill (Map 5.4.1-2).
Following on the release of the Conservation Master Plan, preliminary design studies
for the preservation of Chinatown, Little India and Kampong Glam also started. Three
hundred shophouses in Tanjong Pagar, a sub-area of Chinatown, were firstly designated
in 1986. The URA indulged itself in a pilot project involving the restoration of a block of
32 shophouses. After this practice, a seminar on the techniques of conservation was
jointly held by the URA and the SIP in 1988 to produce technical guidelines for private
owners and property developers who wanted to participate. Conservation manuals for
Chinatown, Little India, Kampung Glam and Boat Quay were released subsequently in an
official exhibition entitled 'Action Plans for Conservation' in the same year (URA Annual
Report, 1988/89, p.2).
The URA replaced the PMB as the major conservation authority according to the
Planning Act amended in 1989. Its main task included identif'ing buildings and areas of
historical interest for conservation; preparing a conservation master plan; and guiding the
implementation of conservation by the public and private sectors (Section 10, 13, 14, 15,
Plarming Act, 1990). Having obtained its legal status, the URA announced a revised
Conservation Master Plan entitled 'A Future with a Past', which provided more
comprehensive versions and technique for area conservation. Conservation areas were
extended from the ethnic districts in the Central Area to the rest of the island. The
Historical Districts was composed of Little India, Kampong Glam and Chinatown. A
total of 2,600 buildings, mainly two and three-floor shophouses, were included. The
Residential Neighbourhoods covered Emerald Hill, Cairnhill and Blair Plan with a total
of 360 terrace houses built with ornate and decorative facade were selected for conser-
vation. The Secondary Conservation Areas consisted of River Valley, Jalan Besar, Beach
Road, Geylang and J00 Chiat, with a total of 1,900 buildings selected for conservation.
A total of 340 shophouses in the Civil and Cultural District was not included for reason
that the conservation plan in this area was given further attention in the form of a
separate Master Plan (URA, 1989). Altogether there were a total of five thousand two
hundred buildings designated for conservation. Thirty-two of them were designated as
national monuments. The majority of these buildings were located in the central city. It
was estimated that more than 100 hectares or six per cent of the total land area in the
Central Area was used for conservation (URA, 1989).
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Chapter Five	 215
20
Chapter Five
	 216
According to the Conservation Master Plan, historic buildings would be designated
and renovated in five stages according to their priorities. 6
 Several strategies were formu-
lated for the conservation practice. For instance, the authority initiated pilot projects on
the state-owned land parcels in conservation areas and constructed infrastructure and
facilities for improving the environment quality. It also established an administrative
mechanism to help private owners to recover their rent-controlled properties and to
resettle the evicted tenants to the public estates. The authority provided several technical
guidelines to private owners who wanted to restore their buildings. Also, to facilitate the
restoration process, the authority purchased historic buildings from their owners through
the exercise of compulsory acquisition. These buildings were sold to property developers
through the Sale of Sites Programme. All these strategies were crucial for the success of
conservation and needed to be particularly addressed.
The URA largely invested in infrastructure to enhance the environmental quality and
to encourage the private owners to rehabilitate their properties. The most difficult part is
that the completion of infrastructure was also tied in with the completion of shophouse
restoration by private developers. The common completion date was critical to the co-
operative work involving several authorities and to the revitalisation of the area as a
whole. Thus, in most of the cases, the URA also fixed a deadline to ensure that all
developers would complete the restoration and their businesses would be operational at
about the same time. The URA also indulged itself in the restoration of some state-
owned properties in the conservation areas. The objectives were to demonstrate the
government's commitment in conservation, to build up the expertise of rehabilitation
within the public sector and to foster a sense of confidence amongst private owners,
developers and professionals. Three pilot projects were completed during 1987-95 in
Chinatown and Little India, with 95 shophouses restored at a total cost of S$ 13.3
million. The pilot project in Little India was carried out in co-operation with the national
housing authority. The focus was placed on the method and technique employed in
restoration, which can contribute to the development of the authority's expertise of
6 five stages were: Phase (1A) - Historic District and significant areas. Phase (1B) - Bungalows in
Good Class Bungalow Areas and their fringes. Phase (2A) - Additional Monuments for preservation in
the Central Area. Phase (2B) - Additional Monuments for preservation in the rest of the island. Phase
(3) - Secondary Development Areas. Phase (4) - Buildings of outstanding architectural and historical
value in pockets in the rest of the island. Phase (5) - State-owned properties worthy of conservation.
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housing rehabilitation. After restoration, the URA sold a total of 44 shophouses on a 99-
year lease and gained S$ 32.4 million in return. The rest of restored shophouses were
managed by its affiliate (URA, Annual Report, 1988/89; 1990/9 1)
Most shophouses were subjected to rent control which prohibited the repossession of
tenanted properties by owners for demolition or redevelopment (Section, 7, 12, Control
of Rent Ordinance). This was seen as the obstacle that stopped shophouse restoration
from taking place. On the basis of the Controlled Premises (Special Provision) Act,
which was released in 1969 to enable the owners in the so-called 'Development Area' to
recover their properties for redevelopment, the URA made a revision in 1985 and applied
it to the conservation areas (Khublall and Yuen, 1991, p.134). Owners who had concrete
restoration plans for their tenanted rent-controlled premises in the conservation areas
were first qualified. In 1987, a total of 38 tenanted shophouses in Tanjong Pagar were
firstly exempted from the provision of the Control of Rent Act. By the end of the 1980s,
a total of 1,800 tenanted shophouses in the conservation areas were exempted in phases.
After the removal of rent control, it was estimated that about 2,500 elderly tenants in the
conservation areas would be evicted without adequate alternative housing (Straits Times,
26, May, 1989). The URA thus unveiled its rules to resettle elderly citizens displaced
from the conservation areas. Private owners of such premises must submit lists of elderly
tenants to the Tenants Compensation Board, which was responsible for assessing the
amount of compensation payable by landlords to evicted tenants. Generally, four-year
rent, amounting to a fixed total sum of 2,400 dollars, should be paid in advance to each
displaced elderly-tenant and most of them could be offered HDB flats (Khublall and
Yeun, 1991, p.135).
Although the URA declared that conservation could be economically feasible, many
owners were still reluctant to restore their premises by themselves (Straits Times, 6,
Sept., 1991). Some still believed that selling their shophouses for redevelopment would
bring more financial return. Others disagreed that shophouses were worth preserving
because they were 'hovels in an indescribably decrepit state and entirely lacking in
aesthetic value' (Ibid., 4, 28, Apr., 1990). To facilitate the restoration process, the
authority used its most powerful planing device, compulsive acquisition, to buy up
shophouses from those private owners who could not meet the official deadline. 'It is do
or die time!', was the message sent from the authority to the owners of 177 shophouses
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in Boat Quay who were unable to submit their restoration plans before the deadline
(Straits Times, 28, May; 31, Aug., 1989).
We have been trying to encourage the original owners to start restoration. In Boat Quay, where
shophouses are still largely privately-owned, restoration has taken so many years and there is no
certainty how it is going to turn out. On the contrary, in Tanjong Pagar, where the URA have
acquired most of the shophouses then offered them for sale, restoration proceeds very quickly. It
appeais that with Boat Quay, we also have to acquire, otherwise the owners will not act.
(Informant, S.l)
After acquiring these shophouses, the URA sold them to private investors on a 99-year
lease through the Sale of Site Programme. Namely, vacant possessions were sold to the
highest bidder in a competitive tender system which was subject to certain conditions but
also offered appropriate concessions to achieve the desired planning objectives. To make
sure the restoration of shophouses was progressing satisfactorily, the URA started to
exercise its monitoring functions, including the regulation of project time and the control
on flow of development capital, until the project was entirely completed (URA, Annual
Report, 1988/89). During the period 1987-95, a total number of 559 shophouses were
sold to private investors, including 378 units in Tanjong Pagar, 40 units in Kreta Ayer,
14 units in Telok Ayer, 71 units in Little India and 56 shophouses in places outside these
ethnic districts such as Bencoolen Street, Seragoon Road. Amongst these shophouses,
41 units had been restored by the authority before being offered for sale (Skyline, 199 1-
1995). The Sale of Site programme was considered to be the most effective device
through which the URA could involve property developers in the conservation practice.
If it had been twenty years ago and we had a conservation project, I would be more worried.
The degree of sophistication of developers and their willingness to engage in restoration were
very different. Today we have seen a very different breed of developers. They have gained a lot
of experience through their investments abroad. They know what kind of project can make
money.
It is economic ability that determines the future of shophouse conservation. The success of
conservation is depending on the injection of public and private investment. If someone can pay
more, run the place better and make it more viable, is anything wrong with that? I see nothing
wrong, because it is done for everyone in Singapore.
(Informant, S. 1)
Shophouse restoration soon became a fast-growing sector in Singapore. According to
the survey conducted by the Construction Industry Development Board, the annual
growth rate of contracts awarded for restoration rose to 14 per cent in 1992. Approxi-
mately S$ 787 million, or 60 per cent of the total investment, was generated by the
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private sector in conservation areas. The experience gained in shophouse restoration also
contributed to the expertise of housing rehabilitation. The overall size of the restoration
industiy would further expand after being injected by public investment through the URA
conservation plans and the HDB upgrading programmes (Straits Times, 15, Jul., 1992)
5.4.2 Whose Heritage to Conserve? Grassroots Interpretation of Historical
Heritage
The URA was well equipped and had a large part to play in this transformation process.
This appears to have been a reflection of a long-established paradigm in Singapore's
planning regime. For the URA, the power to shape the city 'should be held in the hands
of the government'. Thus, 'the government should play a major role in determining the
success of conservation efforts' (Business Times, 29, 30, Aug., 1992).
The URA, as a state organisation which has taken the leading role in urban development,
should respond to the popular demand.....According to our conservation policy, the government
is the one who must pay for restoring historical shophouses. For all Singaporeans, conservation
is a completely new idea. No one would like to take the first move. Therefore, the government
should set up a good example for people to follow. If the government is not willing to invest,
how could you convince people that conservation is a right way to go?
(Informant, S.8)
The URA established a comprehensive procedure to identify and choose historical
buildings for conservation. Historical buildings were evaluated against a set of criteria to
decide whether they qualified for conservation. 7
 Conservation consultants from abroad
were invited to assess the URA's conservation practices in comparison with overseas
projects of this kind (Skylines, May/June, 1993, p.9). 'We have done our homework
before we start', the URA argued:
Before an area is proposed for conservation, an extensive and detailed study will be carried out.
History and design of the targeted buildings are thoroughly researched, examined and
documented. The existing building conditions are carefully assessed, with ownership
established and building usage studied. Thus, only the best and worthy buildings will be
selected for protection under our comprehensive way of identifying and evaluating process
(URA, 1994, pp. 6-7).
The official assessment covered historical, social and cultural relevance, architectural merits, building
conditions and contribution to the environment. In principle, buildings with significant architectural
qualities were recommended for conservation. Buildings with historic significance of national
importance or with exceptional architectural merits were recommended for preservation as national
monuments (Chiang, L., 1994, p.6)
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Once the decision has been made, the authority would organise a public exhibition in
which practical publications would be sold to private owners, property developers and
other interesting parties to 'keep people informed' and to 'increase their understanding
and appreciation of conservation' (Skylines, May/June, 1993, pp. 8-9).
However, there was a substantial agreement among the public that public input in the
decision-making process was insufficient. According to a survey conducted in three
conservation areas (Chinatown, Kampong Glam and Little India) in 19918, the majority
of respondents (73 per Cent) agreed that the public had not been sufficiently consulted
during the decision-making process. More than half of the respondents (57 per cent) felt
the decision-making process should be open to the general public, while a small majority
of the respondents (43.4 per cent) agreed that the state should be given power to decide
what to conserve and how to conserve. 9 However, some messages revealed by the
survey should not be ignored. Many respondents agreed that 'there were no effective
channels for public views to be voiced', and 'when there was feedback, the state paid no
heed'. They also felt that 'the URA was too draconian, taking over whatever properties
they wanted to conserve, setting all the rules to ensure any attempt to make the slightest
changes to one's own property had to be approved by the authority' (Kong and Yeoh,
1994, p.253).
Several articles appeared in newspapers and journals suggesting that public bodies
and private organisations were also excluded from the decision-making process.
Singapore Heritage Society, a civil organisation formed by architects and planning
professionals who had been involved in urban conservation since the late 1970s, argued
that their activities were always on low-profile because 'the URA simply did not want to
give civil organisations a part to play' (Roots, May 1992, p.8). Other organisations such
as the Singapore Tourist Promotion Board and the National Association of Travel
Agents, also complained that they were not consulted in the decision-making process and
did not know whether the conservation of historic areas should be associated with the
8 This survey was conducted in three conservation areas: Chinatown, Kampong Glam and Little India,
by independent researchers Kong and Yeoh in 1991. The result was published in 1994. See Kong and
Yeoh, 1994, pp. 247-65.
Within this group, about 12 per cent felt that interest groups and professional bodies, such as
Singapore Heritage Society or the Singapore Institute of Architects should exert greatest influence; and
8.0 per cent felt that property owners and residents of affected premises should have the right to
participate. In an area where most premises are privately-owned, 38.3 per cent of the respondents argued
that owners should have a free hand in deciding how conservation should be carried out.
Chapter Five	 221
development of Singapore's tourist industry. For these organisations, 'shophouse conser-
vation was purely an URA effort' (Straits Times, 2, Mar., 1986).
The important issues here appear to be which area should be preserved, who makes
these decisions, on what basis and in consultation with whom, and how would the
authority react when there is a conflicting interest between itself and the public, or
among different social groups. Two controversial cases - the demolition of Eu Court and
the commercialisation of the Convent of the Holy Infant Jesus probably offered the best
illustrations for the issue addressed. The former was related to people's attempts to
secure a heritage which was defined from their everyday place; the latter was an effort
made by citizens to save a heritage from a profit-orientated type of conservation.
Eu Court was built as a residential apartment block in the late 1920s and was located
at the junction of Hill Street and Stamford Road. The URA started to evict tenants and
acquire the building for redevelopment from 1984 for the reason that 'the owners could
not get rid of the tenants and the site continued to be a slum in the centre that was being
redeveloped (Ibid., 16, Mar., 1990). Due to the arrival of urban conservation, the rede-
velopment plan of Eu Court was abandoned. Eu Court was listed as a building needing
to be conserved in 1987 according to the Master Plan for the Cultural and Civil District,
and the whole building was expected to be rehabilitated.
At a time that the Conservation Master Plan just been released, the URA announced
a proposal to resolve traffic congestion in Hill Street - an important corridor linking the
city and the eastern part of Singapore. Following this proposal, Hill Street would be
widened and the demolition of Eu Court seems to have been inevitable. This official
decision was controversial because the need to preserve historic buildings in the city was
by then a common consent amongst society. Several articles appeared on newspapers
requested the URA not to just 'cry for conservation' and demanded 'more information
from government on why Eu Court must go' (Straits Times, 20, Mar.; 20, 30, Apr.; 7,
May, 1991). Tenants who lived in Eu Court spoke of their disappointment:
I must say the authority really bent over backwards to make life easier for car drivers. We
already have had a very good MRT system. Do we really need to widen Hill Street for car
drivers' .....Eu was built by our founding fathers. It reflects a time in our past-of ordinary people
striving and trying to survive. It is part of our heritage and once it's gone, there is no way to get
it back. I am willing to trade multi-lane highways for some beauty to our city.
(Ibid., 7, 20, May, 1991)
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To protest against the official decision, these tenants worked in conjunction with the
Singapore Heritage Society, and started a petition, gaining 10,000 signatures from
people living in the surrounding area. The URA ignored public opinion and passed this
problem to the higher-level authority. The Minister of National Development tried to
smooth things over:
Traffic congestion would adversely affect the efficiency and the cost of doing business in the
Central Area and would ultimately reduce its competitive edge. For this reason, although
considerable time and efforts have been spent in finding ways to conserve our historical
buildings, it is not possible to conserve for conservation's sake.
(Ibid., 7, May. 1991).
Despite the critical voice, the state still went ahead and proceeded with its original
decisions. Eu Court was finally pulled down and the widening of the Hill Street section
was completed in 1992 (Roots, May, 1992, p.8). It seems that the question of whether a
place should be conserved or demolished was very much a question of who held the
power to define spatial meanings. In this case, the state had the ability to shape landscape
in terms of its own needs. Ordinary people did not have the power to 'define' places in
the same way that the state did. This reflected, to a great extent, the nature of citizenship
shaped by the underlying relationship between the state and society
Another controversial case was an attempt made by the public to save the Convent of
the Holy Infant Jesus (CHIJ), as a historical site, from a profit-oriented type of conser-
vation. The CHIJ is a religious and educational institution in a complex of buildings
designed by a British architect between 1823 and 1841. These buildings had historical
importance as they were apparently the only remaining cloistered convent buildings on
this island. Among these buildings, Chapel and Caldweil House were designated as
national monuments by the PMB in 1990. According to the URA's proposal, the CHIJ
would be sold to property developers by tender and would be changed to commercial
use. Former CHIJ staff and students spoke of their concerns of this proposal which
would probably destroy the original character of the historical site. Instead, they put
forth the case that the site should be used as a cultural base for art activities with some
financial help from the government (Lee, H., 1991, pp. 3-4). Their appeal was supported
by the La Salle College of arts, which at that time was looking for a place to extend its
college facilities. The college tried to fmd sponsors to tender for the place on its behalf,
with the aim of turning this place into a conservator of music instead of commercial
development. As the PMB decided to preserve Chapel and Caldwell House as national
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monuments, both buildings would only be used for chamber and choral concerts. The
rest of the buildings on this site would be used as seminar rooms for academic activities.
Their approach to this historic site was appreciated by the Singapore Heritage Society on
the grounds that a musical conservatoire would provide a 'cultural and quiet type of
activity which is compatible with the ambience of the place' (Straits Times, 20, May,
1990).
It seems that public opinion in general preferred to keep the entire premises from
commercial purposes (Ibid. 23, 29, Mar.; 1, 7, 12, Apr., 1990). Their argument was
based on the premise that the profit motive should not always be a prime consideration in
the conservation of a historic site. The URA's stand, however, was that the profit motive
was compatible with the conservation of the heritage:
Who says there will be a conflict between economic and cultural interests? It is because some
people cannot stretch their imagination beyond the present use. This is why we need planners,
architects and developers who will stretch their imagination beyond 'ordinary people'. We have
done our homework and made all calculations. We have made the best decisions for the
country.
Historical buildings should be renovated through rehabilitation and adaptive re-use rather than
the conventional way of historical preservation which puts strong emphasis on the genuineness
of the object and would give almost no room for change. The ambience of the CHIJ would be
retained when re-adapting a conserved, beautiful building to new uses
(Skylines, Jul./Aug., 1991, p.7).
The URA decided to award the site to a property developer, the LKH Consortium,
which successfully bid for it at a price of S$ 26.8 million in 1991. At the authority's
discretion, the LKH introduced a mixture of commercial, recreational and cultural
activities into this site (Skylines, Mar.I Apr., 1991, p.15). As a result, the Chapel was
kept for art performances; the Orphanage was turned into a jeweilery centre; the
Caldwell House was restored as 'one of Singapore's finest restaurants'; the Dormitory
was used mainly for retailing purposes - with the ground floor accommodating two
additional restaurants, and the upper floors being used as a reception and for private
entertainment. For the authority, the fUll restoration of the CHIJ resulted in a revitalised
living heritage that 'strikes a balance between viability and profitability without losing
sensitivity for the fascinating history' (Ibid., Jan/Feb., 1993, pp. 4-5).
However, most of these efforts to inscribe grassroots interpretation of heritage failed
as the decision-making process of urban conservation worked to the exclusion of public
opinion. The state was given absolute power to decide whether to conserve and how to
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conserve. There was a resistance emerging in civil society against this form of decision-
making, but it was too weak to constitute a force of challenge. As a result, the state can
choose to ignore contradictory opinions and proceed with its original decision. It was
too much a reflection of every aspect of Singaporean life where the state was involved.
Taiwan
5.5 Rewriting the Narrative of National Past: History from
Below
At one time in the early seventeenth century, Taiwan was first claimed by the Spanish,
then by the Dutch. Although there existed a small number of Chinese settlers, this island
did not have much connection with China until the late seventeenth century, when the
Dutch were defeated by a local elite who considered himself a loyal subject of the Ming
Dynasty of China. Chinese settlements expanded as a result of the development of tea,
sugar and camphor trade. Taiwan was formally established as a prefecture to the Fujian
Province by the Chin Dynasty. After defeating China in war in 1895, Japan demanded
Taiwan as a colony. Taiwan remained under Japan's control until the end of the Second
World War. After the takeover, the KMT strongly emphasised the historic and ideologi-
cal construction of a Chinese nation in order to sustain its internal control. The state
claimed that China is an united, common entity and Taiwan is part of it. Taiwan's history
and culture were redefined in terms of its association with China. Heritage preservation
played an essential role in the initial stage of this nation-building process. But, it clearly
responded to the state's nationalist doctrine:
Heritage preservation is related to a very fundamental question: when did our national history
begin"....Historically, Taiwan has always been connected with China. Taiwanese are Chinese.
Hence, there is no doubt that China is at the centre of our national history. Therefore, heritage
preservation should not include historical buildings constructed by the Japanese. Historical
buildings associated with the anti-Japanese movement are exceptional.
(Archive Association of Taiwan, 1974, p.96)
Large-scale clearance of the Japanese heritage was led by the state in the 1970s as part
of its 'Anti-Imperialism Campaign'. The Ministry of Home Affairs released the guidelines
for 'the clearance of colonial heritage which symbolise the imperialists' superiority' in
1974. Taiwan's colonial past was denied as a 'national shame'. On the authority of this
legislation, monuments and shrines built by the Japanese government were completely
demolished. Japanese symbols appearing on nameboards, buildings or memorials were
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removed or destroyed. By contrast, historical buildings constructed before the colonial
period, such as Chi-Kan Castle ('Provintia', built in the Ming Dynasty), the Shrine of the
Duke of Yen-Ping (built in Ming Dynasty) and the Barbicans of Taipei Castle (built in
the Chin Dynasty), were designated as national monuments. Many of these historic
buildings had been restored or partly reconstructed by the Japanese. The government
therefore released a by-law to eradicate alterations of or additions to these buildings, and
restored them in accordance with the 'Chinese-Palace' building style (Shi, J., 1992, pp.
113-4).
Moreover, to construct an imaginary China on Taiwan, most of the names of places
and streets were changed by the government according to the Confucian virtues or the
names of cities or provinces in China:
The vast plaza on which the grandiose Chiang Kai-Shek memorial stands, is surrounded by
four roads: Chung-Shan South Road on the west, named for Sun Yat-Sen; Hang-Chow South
Road on the east, named for the Southern Sung Dynasty of China; Hsin-Yi Road on the north,
referred to the Confucian virtues; Ai-Kuo East Road on the south, referred to Patriotism....The
map of Taipei is a map of China. It is easy for mainlanders to go back to visit their homeland;
from Chung-King to Hei-Lung-Kiang in just twenty minutes, from Nan-King to Hsin-Kiang, or
from Can-Ton to Shang-Hai is two blocks.
(quoted from Wach man, 1994, p.1 11)
Historic heritage inscribed in the form of antiquity was of particular significance because
without this visual evidence, China remained an abstract notion and was difficult for the
populace to understand. The National Palace Museum, which has had the fmest Chinese
antiquity collections in the world, was established as a subordinate institution under the
Executive Yuan, and functioned as one of the largest cultural institutions in Taiwan.
Chinese antiquity was the representation of the ancient China, and was considered to be
the major source for the construction of a national history. 10
The only legislation concerning historic heritage was the Antiquity Preservation Act
formulated as early as 1920 by the nationalist government in China. This legislation was
originally applied to protect antiquity and treasures which had national importance. Its
legal effect was extended to embrace historical heritage in general after 1949. Apart from
this legislation, there was no specific legal source to protect monuments and historical
buildings. The direct result was that the principles of historic preservation appear to have
10 The National Palace Museum, which opened in 1965, was constructed for over fifteen years with a
huge exhibition hall backing onto a mountain and occupied a land area of 34.14 acres in Taipei. The
collections were originally preserved in the Beijing Palace Museum and were removed to Taiwan by the
KMT1n 1949.
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resembled the principles of antiquity preservation. Namely, what was worthy to conserve
depended on whether the object was original and to what extent it could represent the
so-called 'high culture' of ancient China. Historic buildings were only 'aesthetic objects'
preserved for 'display' or 'exhibition'. This official definition was embodied in the later
preservation policy.
In the mid-1970s, the diplomatic crisis provoked a search for new national identity.
This desire crystallised into political and cultural movements, aiming to terminate the
political and ideological domination of the state. The political opposition, which grew up
on the basis of a clear Taiwanese identity, challenged the ruling party in elections. The
ruling party was forced to change its internal structure and allow native Taiwanese to
share power with mainlanders. Corresponding with a wave of 'Taiwanisation' in the
political sphere, a literature movement, referred to as the 'Indigenous Literature Debate'
by the intelligentsia, came into existence. This movement was considered to be a reaction
against the influence of modernism and anti-communism in the cultural sphere. Instead, a
group of young writers proposed 'nativist' and 'realist' forms of literature. The narrative
of their work focused on Taiwan's colonial history, cultural identity and the life
experience of native Taiwanese, especially the daily life of the lower stratum of society,
such as farmers and workers (Lu, J. 1990b, pp. 34-41; Pan, J., 1991, pp. 93-153).
Although the government tried to suppress this kind of literature by accusing their
writers of 'spreading inadequate separationist and communist ideas to the public' (Lu J.,
1990b, pp. 41-2; Hsiao, S., 1991, p.114.), this literature movement produced a far-
reaching influence on people working in the cultural sphere. The message - Taiwan is our
homeland - was clearly spelt out through several journals and indigenous literature. Many
efforts were made by intellectuals and cultural professionals to 'return to the roots'.
Indigenous history, language, literature, art and music, that had been suppressed by the
government for three decades, now assumed a new significance. It seems that a new
'Taiwanese consciousness' became to take shape.
We were taught that Taiwan is to be a stepping stone to go back to China, It is a transition, like
a hotel. The ultimate goal is the recovery of the mainland. The government said Taiwan has no
language, no culture and no purpose in itself. We learned to despise Taiwanese culture. We fell
so humiliated and downgraded....Today, there is a turning point for a complete reform in
Taiwanese society. Taiwanese have had all kinds of new consciousness. They are bravely
pursuing freedom, emancipation, egalitarianism and self-respect.
(Chi-Li Morning News, 4, Mar., 1988).
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The efforts made by citizens to reclaim historical heritage, in particular vernacular
buildings which represent local history and culture, could be ascribed to the awakening
of historic consciousness. The owner of Lim An-Tai Estate - a group of farm houses in
Taipei well known as one of the best Mm-Nan Architecture - protested against the
redevelopment plan of the Hsin-Yi Sub-Centre announced by the local government in
1976 which would lead to the eradication of this estate. A group of historians and
intellectuals joined his protest and requested the government to designate this estate as
historic heritage. The government simply wanted to find a easy way out. Instead of
demolishing Lim An-Tai Estate, the government made a decision to take apart the
compound of houses, remove them and then rebuild them into a museum of folklore in
Pinchiang Park. This decision was opposed by preservationists:
Removing historical buildings from their original settings to other places for exhibition is not
the right way of conservation. If historical buildings are out of their original context, they are
absolutely dead. They become like other material relics, only restored for display.........The
government's strategy is to objectify heritage either in special places such as museum, or
broader showcase-type landscape. Thus, history is reduced to an aesthetic object and place is
invoked as a concrete showcase of history rather than an active process.
(China Times, 29, Dec. 1977).
Their claims were supported by many architects, planners, and cultural professionals.
Members of the Architects Association for instance, organised regular meetings to
debate preservation issues, and offered professional assistance to areas where preserva-
tionists were involved (Tsai, J., 1977, p.23-36). They also published several books and
numerous articles in newspapers and journals to reveal their concerns about historical
buildings." For them, the attempt was not just a struggle for the future of historic
buildings, but for 'the fundamental change in the official definition of national history and
national heritage' (Ma, Y., 1978, p.103).
The late 1970s witnessed the transition of political leadership in the ruling party, and
large-scale civil disturbances involving the political opposition and a great number of
their supporters. As discussed previously, the political opposition in Taiwan evolved
around a peculiar Taiwanese cultural identity in the first instance. Hence, cultural and
historical sentiments embodied in historic heritage were difficult to separate from
political conflicts. Preservationists' protest for saving LAm An-Tai Estate was charged of
" For relevant discussion See China Times 8, Mar; 12, 24, Oct.; 2, 29, Dec., 1977; Chi-Li Evening
News 21, Sept., 1977; 21 Apr., 1978; Architect 1976(11) (12); 1977 (7) (9); Housing Market 1977 (1)
(4) (5) (6); Ham-Shang 1980(5) (6); 1981 (8) (9) (10) (Il) (12).
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'a conspiracy to encourage anti-government sentiment'. Following on the Kaoshiung
Incident in 1979 - a riot ensured that was the largest public disturbance since the 1947
massacre, several books documenting Lim An-Tai and the preservation event were
banned)2
However, the damage done to political stability by this public disturbance began to
worry the state elite. They acknowledged that the mood of national survival had already
faded away and there was an urgent need to enhance ideological control. In 1977, while
'Cultural Construction' was announced as one of the twelve national projects, a speech
delivered by a Minister of the Executive Yuan clearly revealed his central concern:
We should not forget our first priority: law and order. Wealth has destroyed the authority and
order of our society. In the name of 'freedom', we begin to see a growing rebellion against the
government and an increase in violence and crime in society. People have forgotten what makes
us achieve today's success. The main aims of our cultural policy are to reinforce the moral value
of our citizens and to assure their commitment to our national goals.
(Cultural Construction Committee, 1980, pp. 4-5).
A cultural-development plan entitled 'Enhancing Cultural, Educational and Leisure
Activities' was proposed in the following year. This five-year programme cost thirty-four
billion dollars public expenditure and embraced several important plans, including the
establishment of a high-level authority and the construction of cultural centres, museums
and theatres in provincial cities. The Cultural Construction Committee was formed under
the Executive Yuan in 1981 with the purposes of 'assuring the value of Chinese culture
and enriching the spiritual life in a rapidly developing society that can also become
increasingly materialistic' (Chen, C, 1981, p.3).'3 It was responsible for the formulation
and implementation of cultural policy, as well as for co-ordinating many separate bodies
within the existing bureaucracy which were in charge of culture-related activities. One of
the three divisions in this committee was in charge of heritage preservation. It became
the main authority which was entitled to designate national heritage (Cultural Construc-
tion Committee, 1988, pp. 1-8).
However, the growing historical consciousness of native Taiwanese contributed to
the subsequent development of political movement. The political and ideological crisis
12 For instance, preservationist Y. K. Ma edited a book named 'Good-bye to Lim An Tai' on the basis of
her articles published in several newspapers and journals (Ma, Y. 1978). This book was banned after
publishing the first edition.
' This committee mainly consists of three divisions which are responsible for heritage preservation,
mass media and art performance respectively. It also includes six special committees for cultural
heritage, language, film, music, literature and art
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became intensified since the niid-1980s. The complexity of political and ideological
conflicts among competing powers and different factions within society threatened the
very foundation of nation-building. The state recognised that the existing nationalist
discourse was already bankrupted and a national ideology had to be built on other
grounds. Yet Taiwan's international status and internal conflicts made it difficult for the
state to shape a common identity on the basis of local history and culture. The state was
thus reluctant to use too often historical and cultural subjects for engendering a sense of
unity, as for the time being, any form of collective discourse can potentially cause social
disintegration. The policy regarding historical preservation was ambiguous and only
acted to diffuse the tensions.
5.6 Reclaiming the Historical Built Environment: The Battlefield
of Conflicting Interests
Although historical and cultural subjects were mentioned in the government's cultural
development policy, adequate legislation for historic preservation was still lacking. Under
these circumstances, historic buildings could not be protected effectively by law and the
idea was no more than an official propaganda. In 1981, the local government of Taipei
received a grant from the Cultural Construction Committee to rebuild Lim An-Tai in
Pinchiang Park. The authority soon discovered that most of the original materials stored
in the garage were damaged due to lack of adequate protection. Consequently, it was
only possible to reconstruct the main building of Lim An-Tai Estate. Worst than that,
after reconstruction, Lim An-Tai Estate was ruled out from the list of historical heritage
because its original character was completely lost (Chung, J, 1981, pp. 65-7). The
preservation of Hung Mao Castle offered another illustration. This castle was once a
symbol of imperialism according to the official definition, and was a target for demoli-
tion)4 Preservationists put pressure on the government and successfully secured this
building from eradication (China Times, 28, Jun. 1980). Hung Mao Castle was listed as a
national monument in 1982 and a rehabilitation plan was drafted by the Cultural
Construction Committee. Six months before the plan was completed, Hung Mao Castle
' Hung-Mao Castle was built by the Dutch in Tainan City in the sixteenth century and then ceded to the
Spanish and the British by the Chin regime of China. It was occupied by the British Embassy under the
Japanese colonisation, and was controlled by Australia and the United States before being returned to the
Taiwanese government in 1980.
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was already seriously damaged by a film company which gained permission from the
local government to shoot a movie inside the castle (United News, 1, Jul., 1982; China
Times, 28, Jun., 1982).
These incidents provoked serious criticism by the preservationists. The humiliation
forced the government to take further action. The Cultural Heritage Preservation Act
(CHPA) and several by-laws were announced in 1982 and 1984 respectively. According
to this legislative framework, historical heritage referred to 'ancient buildings, archaeo-
logical sites and other forms of cultural heritage'. The category 'ancient buildings',
embraced 'old baileys, fortifications, shrines, temples, palaces, tombs, bridges and
streets, etc. which still keep their original forms' (Section 3, Cultural Heritage Preser-
vation Act). The assessment of historical heritage was carried out by the Cultural Cons-
truction Committee. Historical heritage was divided into three grades according to its
national significance. Once a historic building was designated, any forms of alteration
was prohibited (Section 35, Ibid.). The emphasis on the original character of the objects
was obviously a legacy of the previous policy regarding national treasure or antiquity.
The CHPA was only applied to historic buildings which had existed for more than
one hundred years. This meant that all historic buildings built under Japanese colonisa-
tion were excluded. From this view, Taiwan's colonial past was still officially denied.
Many critics appeared in newspapers and journals, challenging the official version of
historic preservation. The government was accused of attempting to create an idealised
picture of the national past:
After decades of failing to eradicate Taiwanese culture, the government begins to accommodate
cultural localism, but still defines Taiwanese culture as just one local variant of a national
Chinese culture. ..The reconstruction of the past gives the state the chance to select what it
deems undesirable and to retain what it considers useful to enhance its own version of national
identity.
(Informant, T.9).
For them, through the interpretation of national history, the state again asserted its
dominant ideology and disposed of those values which were not affirmative to their
interest. Thus, historical heritage acted as a powerful ideological tool which masked the
artificial and ideological nature of its content. The past as a social construction, 'became
more readily accepted as natural and unquestionable' (Informant, T.9).
The meaning of ancient buildings defmed by the CHPA was strictly circumscribed to
include artefacts of 'high culture'. As a result, only majestic and monumental structures
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such as palaces, temples and national symbols, could qualify as heritage. Not much room
was given to vernacular buildings. Also, the CHPA did not provide any device to deal
with historic buildings which belonged to private owners. For preservationists, vernacu-
lar buildings should be included in the legislation as they embraced the live experiences of
a wider spectrum of the populace. A flexible way of preservation could help to preserve
vernacular buildings which were mostly privately-owned.
The legislation should cover towns, villages, districts, skylines, streetscape, buildings fragment
and objects, therefore enabling us to have different aspects of the past....To preserve vernacular
buildings is a difficult task since they are privately-owned. In our context, private owners prefer
to sell their properties for redevelopment. Hence, flexibility is necessary while preservation is
implemented in places such as historical towns, campus, or urban districts.
(Ham, 1983, pp. 15)
As a response to criticism, the Cultural Construction Committee worked in collaboration
the local government and proposed an area-based conservation plan in Lukong - an old
settlement in the Changhua County with a legacy of the late seventeenth century town-
scape. This plan aimed to transform Lukong's genuine townscape, including eight old
temples and a substantial group of shophouses which were largely unaffected by the
industrial development, into a 'village of folk art'. A special fund was also granted to
assist rehabilitation and to promote tourism. Thus, 'the cultural and historic significant of
Lukong as the second oldest settlement developed by the earlier immigrants from China
could be well preserved and displayed'. It would 'contribute to the revival of local
economy and our understanding of Taiwan's historic linkage with China' (Cultural
Construction Committee, 1986, p.4).
Lukong Conservation Area, as an earliest experiment of area conservation in Taiwan,
turned out to be successful. Yet the preservation of vernacular buildings was still not on
the public agenda. The reasons that privately-owned vernacular buildings were entirely
excluded by the legislation were more complicated than the 'high-culture' proposition.
As discussed previously, for decades, development objectives pursued by the state
suppressed other needs of society. All forms of changes which could serve economic
purposes had overwhelming privilege. As a result of the government's aspiration to
transform Taiwan into an industrialised country, modernist ideology came to dominate
the planning regime. Land and property development led by the private sector had been a
long-established paradigm. Unless there was a particular political or economic reason,
the state tended not to intervene. Hence, to protect landlords' and property developers'
Chapter Five	 232
interests, the government adopted a conservative stand with regard to the preservation of
vernacular buildings. Accordingly, privately-owned historic buildings, especially those in
the urban areas, were left to be demolished and reconstructed. It seems that only those
which were not threatened by development pressures, such as historic buildings in
Lukong, or those which possessed important symbolic value for the state, as explained
above, had more chance to resist the pressure for redevelopment.
The late 1980s is an era that witnessed major progress in the development of the
conservation movement. Area conservation was promoted by preservation activists in
places including aboriginal settlements such as Lanyu (1987) and Wutai (1991); fishing
villages such as Xiyu (1985), Makong (1989), Kongliao (1989); agricultural villages such
as Sanshia (1989), coal-mining towns such as Juifang (1988) and urban commercial
district such as Dadowchang (1988). This can be ascribed to the development of social
movements during this period, which awakened citizens' consciousness of environmental
and social issues. One important message spelt out from conservation supporters was
that citizens did not want to compromise with a profit-oriented development. Instead,
they were searching for an alternative way of living. It is against this background that
cultural and historical aspects of urban environment began to be brought to the fore.
Yet, the late 1980s, as mentioned previously, was also a critical era for Taiwan's
property development. The imbalance between domestic savings and capital formation as
a result of the slowdown of the national economy built up a tremendous demand for
property assets. Housing prices escalated to a historic peak because of the operation of
enterprise-owned investment companies. The escalation of property prices therefore
encouraged more landlords to sell land for redevelopment. Hence, not surprisingly, while
preservationists began to promote the preservation of vernacular buildings, a strong
resistance also emerged among property owners.
The practice of area conservation in Samhsia threw a dark shadow on the preserva-
tion of historic buildings which were privately owned. Min-Chung Street, a 200-metre-
long street at the centre of Samhsia with 104 privately-owned shophouses built in 1916,
was to be widened according to a traffic plan formulated by the local planning authority
in 1988. This traffic plan was abandoned in the following year after a series of protests
organised by preservationists, and the entire area was designated as the 'third-grade'
historical heritage by the Cultural Construction Committee (United, News, 22, Jun.; 25,
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Jun.; 8, Jul., 1989). But, historic preservation was strongly rejected by most of the
property owners. Many of them had been well schooled in accepting that they must give
way to economic progress, and were used to the sight of old buildings toppling before
the bulldozer. It is fully understandable that comprehensive redevelopment for them
appeared to have been more economically feasible than conservation. Private owners
went into a state of shock on hearing the official new pro-preservation line. They quickly
organised themselves and appealed to the parliament and the local assemblies for change
of the heritage designation. The confrontation amongst the government, politicians, pre-
servation groups and property owners became intensified.' 5
 This controversial issue
brought pressure to both the central and the local governments. After five years of
contention, land interests fmally won over cultural interests. Heritage designation was
abolished in 1994 (China Times, 30, Jun., 1994).
The Samhsia incident was only a tip of the iceberg. The KMT also planned to
redevelop its headquarters office in Taipei - a group of old buildings standing directly
opposite the presidential office of the central government in Taipei - into a fourteen-floor
high-rise building. This group of buildings was constructed by the Japanese and was used
as headquarters of the Military Department during the colonial period. For many local
historians, they were one of the most important remains of Taiwan's colonial history
(People, 1994, pp. 6-8). The KMT's plan was opposed by the 'Alliance for Rescuing
Historic Heritage' (ARHH), which was formed by eleven civil organisations. They cam-
paigned to preserve these buildings and to reduce the density of commercial development
in the central areas. Some members spoke of their deep anger and frustration:
The KMT came to Taiwan and took over everything. These buildings are state properties. We
have to ask how did the KMT get permission to use these buildings in the first place? These
buildings should be returned to the people. People have the right to decide how to use
them........The KMT only have their own interest in mind. We come here to teach them a
lesson. They can not do whatever they want.
This protest is not only about saving several buildings. This is a battle between local Taiwanese
and the mainlander regime.......These buildings are colonial heritage, so what? The central
government office and the president's official residency are colonial heritage too!... The motive
behind the KMT's plan is highly dubious. They just do not like to see us begin to value our
local historical and culture. They aim to destroy Taiwanese spirit.
(People, 1994, pp. 17-19)
See United News, 19, 25, Sept.; 22, Oct.; 11, Dec., 1990; China Times, 8, Nov.; 1991; 29, Jan.; 28,
Feb., 1992).
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The ARHH's request was entirely ignored. Worst than that, while the ARHH appealed
to the Cultural Construction Committee to designate this site as a historic zoning, the
KMT secretly gained building permission from the KMT-controlled local government.
This provoked the further action taken by the ARFIH. In order to stop the demolition,
their members occupied the main entrance of the site for months and tried to negotiate
with the K'fF and the municipal government. Despite their protests, the clearance of the
site was completed with the assistance of two-thousand armed police. This solution
turned a simple social mobilisation into an anti-government riot. Just one hour after
demolishing the KMT headquarters, more than three-hundred taxi drivers were informed
by a DPP-owned underground radio station to take revenge. They barricaded the streets,
attacked the police and damaged other KMT-owned offices in the central area (People,
1994, pp. 10-15).
This incident gave the justification to the property owners who opposed historic
preservation from the veiy beginning. The owner of Lim Garden, a 'first grade' national
heritage, appealed to the Cultural Construction Committee for abolishing the designation
(China Times, 20, Oct., 4, Nov., 1994). Some owners began to destroy their historic
buildings in order to avoid designation. Privately-owned historic buildings such as An-
Ping Agent House, First Commercial Bank, San-Yeh Hotel and Ken-Shen Hospital were
all quickly demolished by their owners once they learned their properties would be listed
for designation (Ibid., 11, Jun. 1994; 7, 9, Jan; 1995). Seven shophouses situated at the
First Street in Tainan, a street which had a 300-year history and had been incorporated
into historic-zoning by the local government, were also deliberately destroyed by their
owners before the public inquiry (Ibid., 26, Jan., 1995). For owners of these historic
buildings, 'citizens had the right to protect their legal private property from the state's
intervention' (Ibid., 28, Jan., 1995). Although the government condemned property
owners for 'being publicly against the government's authority' (Ibid., 31, Jan., 1995),
they had already lost their ground.
The divided interest in historical icons and property development was a critical issue
not only associated with the conflicts between preservationists and landlords or between
mainlanders and Taiwanese, but also linked with the power struggle within the political
regime. Therefore, the policy regarding historic preservation was not consistent and
there was still lack of common consent among all levels of the government. Under these
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circumstances, the designation of historical preservation itself became a disaster for
historic buildings. Historic buildings disappeared faster than expected. As historic preser-
vation was opposed by the majority of landowners, the Cultural Construction Committee
appeared to have been poorly motivated to initiate any plans. By the end of the I 980s,
only one hundred and forty-five historical buildings, mainly religious buildings and the
government-owned estates, were designated as historic heritage. Only twelve out of
these designated heritage were privately-owned properties. This could also be attributed
to the conflicting nature of property development and the deeply-rooted identity crisis in
Taiwan.
5.7 The Formulation of a Conservation-Based Redevelopment
Policy in Taipei: Untying the Gordian Knot
5.7.1 Conservation as an Anti-Speculation Doctrine
Historic preservation in Taipei was subject to the circumstances described in the above
section. By the end of the 1970s, the local government reported sixty-two buildings to
the Cultural Construction Committee; only twenty-one of them were designated as
historical heritage. Historic buildings rapidly disappeared in the eagerness to pursue
development interest. Dadowchang - the historical centre of Taipei - was the only place
which still had its original streetscape and a great number of shophouses (Map 5.7.1;
5.7.3). According to the detailed plan announced in 1978, Dihua Street in Dadowchang
would be widened from 7.8 metres to 20 metres to solve traffic congestion in this area.
Three hundred and twenty shophouses along this Street were supposed to be demolished.
The land area bounded by the old and new front lines of land parcels (about 6 meters
wide at each side) was defined as 'reserved land for public facilities', and would be
required by the UPB within five-years of 1978.
After learning the road-widening plan which would destroy not only many shop-
houses but the unique townscape of Dadowchang, preservationists acted quickly and
claimed to conserve this area as a whole. For them, Dadowchang was not only the old
core of Taipei but also the origin of the anti-Japanese movement in Taiwan's colonial
history, and a place that had given birth to many indigenous artists and novelists who had
national importance. The unique social and economic fabric has made this area 'a place
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which sits at the centre of local Taiwanese' common memory'. For them, the remaining
shophouses in Dadowchang should not be destroyed for the sake of comprehensive
redevelopment; and, protecting a place like this, is a 'historical responsibility' (Informant,
T.12).
Oddly enough, their request received a positive response from the local government.
The planning authority cancelled the road-widening plan of Dihua Street and replaced it
with the 'Dihua Street Special Zoning' (DSSZ) in 1983. It covered an area bounded by
Anshi Street, Liangchu Street, Hungha North Road and Nanking West Road (Map
5.7.2). Buildings in this area were subject to two sets of development control according
to the 'Guidelines for Building Construction before the Designation of DSSZ' (GBC)
formulated in 1985. Shophouses in the middle section of Dihua Street, where most shop-
houses remained in their original shape and where local businesses largely concentrated,
were to be entirely preserved as national heritage. The rest of the buildings in this area
were subjected to urban design guidelines. Namely, new buildings were only allowed to
be built if their height, volume, building material and architectural style met the official
requirement (UPB, 1985). Historical shophouses were expected to be rehabilitated by
the owners on the basis of public subsidy. The total rehabilitation cost was estimated at
seventy billion.
This decision seems to have been made without too much hesitation. The most
obvious reason was that the deadline to acquire the 'reserved land' in Dihua Street for
the original traffic plan was due to arrive in 1983. As analysed before, the local govern-
ment was unable to purchase this 'reserved land' for the time being because of the
increase in purchasing prices and the lack of fmancial resources. The traffic plan was
thus highly unlikely to get off the ground, making shophouse conservation an obvious
alternative. For the time being, Taiwan's openness to international capital also compelled
the local government to transform Taipei into a regional centre for foreign-based firms.
To acquire international status, there was a determined effort to upgrade the infrastruc-
ture and services of the city from the early 1980s. The redevelopment of the old central
area of the city was decided since it could release land for office and commercial devel-
opment and could transform the existing image of the city. The symbolic value of historic
buildings was emphasised and historic preservation was integrated into aesthetic planning
for urban redevelopment.
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If Taipei wants to have a chance to play the key role in the global economy in the 21st century,
its political, economic, cultural and intellectual environment should be able to rank alongside
the major cities of this kind in the Asian Pacific Region, i.e. Tokyo, Singapore and Hong Kong.
The uniqueness of the historical built environment can contribute to the cultural image of our
city. Dadowchang has the greatest potential to become a historical, economic and cultural
centre that is internationally famous.
(Informant, T.15).
The general trend in urban policy and the property market also provided the justification
for this decision. Land in the old central area was not as available as in other areas due to
the excessive fragmentation of landownership; thereby property development was hin-
dered for a long period. Although the renewal of old districts in Taipei was addressed,
the local planning authority had difficulty in reversing the trend of property development
led by the private sector, which created an uneven pattern of building investment and
housing prices and led these old districts into serious environmental decay. Since urban
renewal in the old central area proceeded at a relatively slow pace, a conservation-based
redevelopment strategy became a practical solution. Also, the speculative investment by
enterprise groups forced up the exchange values of land and broke the price mechanism
of the housing market in the early 1980s. The government launched a national campaign
to combat the widespread speculation. The ideology of 'controlled-growth' associated
with the preservation or rehabilitation of the built environment, had great appeal for the
public.
Historic buildings became important environmental elements in the whole package of
urban redevelopment. On the authority of a by-law of the Urban Planning Act released in
1983, local planning authority was given power to select urban renewal areas on the
ground of historic and cultural values. The GBC was born in this context and was
applied to Dadowchang in order to stop the destruction of shophouses undertaken by
individual landlords. However, the GBC was a short-term, interim device rather than a
long-term policy. It aimed to give the local government some time to formulate the
conservation plan, also seeking the support of the central government (Informant, T.15).
After the release of this legislation, the local government submitted a list of shophouses
in Dihua Street which were located between its junction with Junchan Street and Lianchu
Street to the Cultural Construction Committee for final approval. Once these shophouses
were designated as historical heritage, they were not allowed to be altered or demolished
by private owners.
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This is just the beginning of the story. After the road-widening plan was announced
in 1978, many landlords in Dihua Street already prepared to demolish their shophouses
and to build modern flats on their land in partnership with real estate companies
(Informant, T.3). While the road-widening plan was replaced by the conservation plan,
many landlords felt their chances of redeveloping the land were completely terminated.
Their reaction towards the conservation plan was a mixture of anger, frustration and
hopelessness:
When the traffic plan was announced in 1978, we decided to redevelop our land in partnership
with a real estate company. We already paid the bills for building design. The government
announced a conservation plan and ravished everything. I quitted cigarettes six years ago.
Because of this incident I started smoking again.....I was completely shattered and felt like
'being sentenced to death'
(Informant, T.2).
A petition for abolishing the DSSZ, signed by sixty landlords in Dihua Street, was sent to
the parliament. By arguing that residential population and businesses in Dihua street had
been threatened by local traffic, they requested a return to the original road-widening
plan.
Two weeks ago, when a shophouse caught fire, fire-engines could not even approach the
building because the street is too narrow. We just stood there and watched the fire taking four
people's lives. We have known this family for twenty years....Our life has been in such a
danger. The street is not allowed to be widened because of these shophouses. Are shophouses
more valuable than people's lives?
(Informant, T.2)
We are big wholesalers. Our customers are mainly small wholesalers, retailers and factories.
Dihua street was originally designed for rickshaw and bullock carts. It is too narrow for vans to
park and to load goods. Therefore, traffic congestion has occurred and affected businesses in the
street. We need better transportation and communication infrastructure in this area to make the
circulation of goods and information more efficient.
(Informant T.3).
In view of the fact that the majority of the landlords opposed conservation, the Cultural
Construction Committee decided not to designate those shophouses selected by the local
government as national heritage, unless the local government could resolve the conflict.
Therefore, while another piece of legislation - the 'Guidelines for Dihua Street Special
Zoning' (GDSSZ) came into force in 1988, a compromise was made by the municipal
government to defuse the tension. The conservation area contracted to only four blocks
between Dihua Street's junction with Kuasui Street and Junchan Street (Map 5.7.2). The
idea of entire preservation of shophouses in the middle section of Dihua Street was
abandoned.
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Shophouses inside the DSSZ were classified into three groups in accordance with
their historical value and physical condition (Section 6, GDSSZ). Shophouses in the first
group were to be entirely preserved. It meant that the original layout and elements of
these shophouses had to be restored. Shophouses in the second group would be partially
preserved. The first sections of these shophouses, ending eight metres away from the
front line, had to be entirely preserved. Alteration and redevelopment were allowed in
the rear portions. Shophouses in the third group were allowed to be altered or redevel-
oped, with the preservation of original facades and arcades. To enhance the existing
character of the middle section of Dihua Street, land use zoning was adjusted to allow
shophouses in this area to be used for both commercial and residential purposes (Section
3, GDSSZ). To maintain the consistence of building style of the street, new buildings
were only allowed to be erected at an eight-metre distance behind the front line of land
parcels. Facades and arcades, resembling the original style of shophouses, had to be
reinstalled. New construction, alteration, addition or rehabilitation of all buildings in the
DSSZ had to gain the approval from the Urban Design Committee of the local govern-
ment (Section 10, GDSSZ).
For preservationists, the result was disappointing (Unite News, 1-8, Aug., 1987; 13,
17, 21, 22, Aug., 1988). At this juncture, Taiwan witnessed a changing relationship
between the state and society: one-party domination was turned upside down and social
movements were in upsurge. Grassroots organisations and civil groups concerning envi-
ronmental issues retained a powerful voice in the policy-making process. Preservationists
became more organised and began to involve other civil organisations in conservation
issues. Among these groups, the Yaoshan Foundation of Education and Culture (YFCE)
in particular, has played a leading role in the subsequent development of the DSSZ. They
made clear their central bundle of concerns:
The contribution of the local community to this area and to our national history should not be
ignored. But it does not mean that other people have no right to say a word. They need to
understand that history is created by everyone. History is not personal belongings but common
cultural resource shared by all. Therefore, the future of Dadowchang should be decided by all
citizens.
(Informant, T.1 1)
Their vision was particularly supported by citizens who had been discontented as the
urban environment became dominated by profit-seeking development. As mentioned
before, the late 1980s was a critical stage for Taipei's housing market. The fiscal
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measures used by the state to combat property speculation were in default since fmancial
capitalists and business groupings already began to exercise their influence over the
decision-making of the state. This had a serious effect on people living in the urban area.
The majority of the moderate-income population in Taipei was unable to obtain decent
housing from the market. They turned to push the public-elected local government to
take action against profit-seeking development. Several letters received by the YFCE
revealed their anger and frustration at the situation in Dihua Street:
Owners of shophouses in Dihua Street are running good business or earning good rent. I guess
their monthly income is at least 200,000 dollars. They are richer than most of us, but still want
to earn more money by selling their four-generation shophouses. They do not care anything else
apart from making money. This kind of mentality threaten the very existence of Taiwan as a
civilised society.
Let's talk about a normal citizen, for instance, a high school teacher like my sister. She is now
earning 35,000 dollars per month. Even she can save her salary for ten years without spending
on food and rent, she can not afford to pay 10 per cent of the deposit for buying a new flat. We
think landlords in Dihua Street are incredibly greedy.
(YFCE, 1988)
The message was very clear: 'any form of property speculation at the expense of
historical heritage would not be tolerated by the public'. It seems that conservation
evolved into a process in which people used cultural reasons to argue against a well-
established development doctrine (Hsia, 1990, p.1 1).
The YFCE gathered four thousand signatures from civil organisations and individuals
for their petition to save shophouses in Dadowchang from the hands of private owners.
Many citizens supported the YFCE not only through sending letters or writing articles to
newspapers but also by collective actions. A large demonstration involving thousand
citizens and several civil groups such as Organisation of Urban Reformists and Kuo-Fon
Heritage Society, took place in Taipei (United News, 22, Aug., 1989). As described by
one of the preservation activities: 'People suffer enough and desire to speak out. They
also learn that ballot paper can make a change' (Informant, T. 12). Hence, if the govern-
ment compromised with the landlords, 'they will certainly have serious political conse-
quences.' (Informant, T.13).
To play down political pressures and to diffuse social discontent, the local govern-
ment sought to demonstrate its neutrality by avoiding any connection with development
interests.
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The richness of our people is internationally famous, so is our greed. Nowadays people buy
properties, stocks, shares, etc., on a large scale, in the hope of being able to sell them again to
make a profit. All kinds of money games have destroyed the root of our society. Now it is time
for us to recover our traditional values and cultural spirit that have been lost. There are some
things in this life that are more valuable than being rich. A country without culture will not
have any respect from other countries. We are still secondary citizens in the international
community.
(UPB, 1989).
In 1989, the YFCE was granted a research project by the local government to study the
redevelopment of the DSSZ. A research team, from the Graduate School of Building and
Environment of National Taiwan University, was entrusted by the YFCE to carry out
this project. According to their opinion survey, which interviewed two hundreds and
twenty local residents, including landlords and tenants, about 30 per cent of them
supported conservation, whilst another 32 percent were against it (YFCE, 1989, p.62).
The reality was far less optimistic as it was also noted that most of the supporters were
tenants rather than landlords. Moreover, because of the multiple ownership of the land,
landlords who supported conservation did not fully represent other landlords who had
the same rights to the land. However, during this process, the research team built up
contact with landlords, tenants and opinion leaders in Dadowchang. The communication
between preservationists and some landlords also began to develop. Their efforts had
strong influence on a subsequent planning project launched by the municipal government
in the following year. This project, aiming to produce a practical plan for conservation on
the basis of public participation, was organised by the Architecture Department of
Chung-Yuan University. A workshop involving professionals, students, members from
civil organisations and some landlords who supported conservation, began to function,
and a studio was established on this account at No. 233 Dihua Street (UDD, 1990,
p.148).
After completing the above surveys, the Detail Plan for Dadowchang Special Zoning
(DPDSZ) was finally released by the municipal government in 1992.16 This detailed plan
differs from the GDDSZ in a number of ways. The boundary of the conservation area
extended to that proposed by the YFCE: an area bounded by Mingchung West Road,
Hungha North Road, Nanking West Road and Anshi Street (Map 5.7.2). Land use of the
western side of Dihua Street was adjusted from residential use to commercial use. Not
16 Dihua Street Special Zoning was renamed as Dadowchang Special Zoning (DSZ) according to this
plan.
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only shophouses in the middle section of Dihua Street but all shophouses were assessed
and a total of seventy-seven of them were selected as historical buildings. These shop-
houses were further classified by a three-grade system, making them subject to different
development control. Shophouses belonged to the first and the second group would be
designated as historical heritage and by which the owners of these shophouses could gain
extra benefit from tax reduction, rehabilitation subsidies and bank loans according to the
Cultural Heritage Preservation Act. Also, with the introduction of a revised Urban
Renewal Ordinance, land use change and excess plot ratio would be rewarded to owners
who engaged in the restoration of historical buildings. Local traffic and public security
would be improved through more investment in public facilities. However, to make the
decision flexible, the original road-widening plan was still incorporated as an alternative
plan.
5.7.2 Defending Property Right in the Name of Grassroots Democracy
The DPDSZ aimed to preserve the physical and social fabric of Dadowchang - the
ascribed 'local community'- as a whole. Unfortunately, the local community by then was
divided by the conflicting views of shophouse conservation. Local residents were also
affected by the growing consciousness of democracy and civil rights in society. They
became more active and learned how to organised themselves to take part in local
politics. The YFCE's earlier involvement initiated the formulation of the Dadowchang
Redevelopment Association (DDCRA) - a local organisation consisting of tenants, local
opinion leaders and a small number of landlords who supported urban conservation. The
majority of landlords who were on the whole against urban conservation also quickly
organised themselves and formed another local organisation - the Dihua Street Revival
Association (DHSRA).
The government's ignorance of historical heritage and its vacillating position on
planning in the past meant that its commitment at this stage could be easily challenged.
The DHSRA had a low degree of trust toward any kind of official plans.
The government always writes cheques easily, but from our experience, none of them will be
cashed. You cannot ever trust the government...The government's policy is too vague and
unreliable. Policy is nothing more than a piece of paper, Can we expect these problems to be
resolved by a piece of paper?
(Informant, T.4)
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The government widened the southern section of Dihua Street and demolished our traditional
wet market in order to build its administrative centre. The KMT was also allowed to demolish
their old headquarters office. Why we citizens are not allowed to do the same thing? What kind
of double standard is it?
(Informant, T. 1)
The government conducted several opinion surveys in Dihua Street. Owners who lived outside
this area were not informed. They acknowledged the results of opinion surveys only from the
newspaper. Therefore, these opinion surveys arc not convincing. Public opinions have been
distorted.
(Informant, T.2)
The DHSRA felt that they were fully legitimised to protect their 'individual right' or
'property right' in this planning process.
My shophouse is my personal property. Tenants are just tenants. They are not the owners of the
houses so they do not have any right to say a word about my property. How to deal with my
property is my own business. Who dares to speak for me? The government cannot do anything
they want without my permission..
(Informant, T.3)
My father and I work fifteen hours a day to keep this business going. My family earn this land
and property by hard work. We deserve the right and the benefit. Now we are forced to give up
our right and share the benefit with the others just because some people think cultural heritage
should be communal. Is it reasonable? Is it fair to us?
(Informant, T.4)
My family have been living here for four generations. We are the ones who know the problems
of this area. We are the ones who know what the solutions are. We are the ones who have the
right to decide our own future. Those outsides are entitled to their personal opinions, but how
dare they intervene the ways we deal with our properties?
(Informant, T.5)
Therefore, any forms of intervention were considered to be 'external forces' and were
against the principle of 'grassroots democracy':
The government is affected by conservationist groups. These people are giving wrong messages
to the authority. This is all part of a conspiracy to deprive us of our development interest. I want
those so-called intellectuals and heritage experts to come here and give us proper explanations.
Do they dare to come?
(Informant, T.6)
My opinion? Very simple. I do not agree with shophouse conservation and there is no room for
negotiation' We have been discussing this issue for fifteen years. I do not want to discuss it
anymore......We are in a democratic society now. The government can not take whatever they
want like they did in the past. They should count my opinion. This is the principle of
democracy.
(Informant, T.5)
Frustration and anger led them 'to fight for their own right'. The DHSRA continued
appealing to change the policy and 'if there was no better solution, members were ready
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to demolish shophouses by themselves' (China Times, 27, Jan., 1995). The confrontation
among the government, the local community and civil groups became enormously
intensive. The Cultural Construction Committee thus became more reluctant to interfere,
and left the Dadowchang Special Zoning as a sole effort made by the local government.
It became undeniably clear that the claim of historical preservation and the interest of
redevelopment could not be easily reconciled. The policy-making process was bounded
by divided interests among social groups, with profit-seeking on the one hand and anti-
profit-seeking on the other. The planning process of the DSZ - the first conservation area
in Taipei - evolved into a Gordian Knot. Over one decade, efforts from several sectors of
society were made to save 'the common heritage' from development interest. During this
period, seventeen public inquiries were issued by the local government. Forty-five formal
and informal meetings were organised by the authority, the local community and civil
groups respectively. Four surveys were completed, involving two workshops established
in Dihua Street to encourage public participation. Several alternative strategies were
proposed by the local government and also some property investment companies. The
progress of conservation plans was rather disappointing:
The government is very good at producing plans. We do not need plans anymore. We demand
actions.....If the government could carry out their conservation plan five years ago, we would
have the opportunity to preserve sixty per cent of the shophouses. For the time being, only forty
per cent of them still have some original characters. Everything seems to be too late.
(Informant, T.7.)
We are all tired of discussing this issue. We have been through hundreds of meetings,
conferences, protests, etc.....The policy has been changing all the time. I do not know what is
the right thing to do. I used to strongly support conservation, but now I do not care anymore.
(Informant, T. 10)
The local planning authority had its own frustration:
We want to play a big part in changing the physical environment of the city for the 21st
century. To be honest, we have not developed effective measures and proper legislative
framework to deal with a problem like thi&...But you have to understand, the local government
has very limited power and financial resource. If the big brother (the state) disagree, you hardly
can do anything.
(Informant, T.15)
However, the municipal government and the local assembly of Taipei were reformed by
two opposition parties - the DPP and the CNP- after the general election in 1994. The
municipal government still could not afford a road-widening plan because their budget
was not enough to purchase the 'reserved land' in Dihua street. Also, there was a huge
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political cost behind this traffic plan as middle-class voters were on the whole against it.
But, without the landlords' co-operation, historical preservation in Dihua Street was
deadlocked. It delayed the regeneration of Dadowchang as a whole. Hence, although
historic preservation was asserted as a principle by the new government, it now needed
to be repackaged with a 'developmentalist' terminology. A new solution was sought in
the framework of urban renewal. In 1995, the Urban Renewal Division of the Urban
Development Department (UDD) was assigned to formulate a new Dadowchang
Redevelopment Plan (DRP). The priority was given to the revival of local businesses,
land values and environmental quality in this area as a whole.
The objectives of this plan are first, to initiate the redevelopment of Dadowdhang for the
balance of urban development; second, to attract private investment and residential population
back into this area through the improvement of infrastructure and environmental quality; and
third, to enhance local economy by developing commercial, cultural and leisure activities on the
basis of historical and human resources.
(Section 2, Dadowchang Redevelopment Plan).
Three alternative development plans of Dihua Street were proposed in the DRP. The first
and the second ones proposed to widen the street from 7.8m to 20m, also, to remove the
original facades or arcades to the new front lines of building sites and to reinstall them on
new buildings. The third plan was as the same as the previous conservation plan
proposed by the GDDSZ. Public incentives embraced in the urban renewal legislation
such as tax reduction, excess plot ratio and zoning adjustment were applied to encourage
shop-house conservation. The third plan was preferred by the authority hut it could not
be implemented without gaining the support from the local community.
The DRP also embraced action plans including several aims: to enhance local
facilities which were related to public safety; to rehabilitate some historic buildings with
unsafe internal structure; to improve local transport systems; to revive the local economy
by introducing cultural and tourist-related business; to complete the legislative frame-
work for urban conservation; and to initiate public-participation in the policy decision-
making process. Infrastructure improvement, transport management and public partici-
pation were given first priority because in the short run, they appeared to be less contro-
vercial and could be the only way to 'restore the local community's trust in the govern-
ment' (UDD, 1994, p.!). A special task force was formed under the UDD. Green space,
car parks and other public facilities such as fire-alarms and fire-hydrants would be
installed. Newsletters or leaflets canying relevant information were sent to local people.
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Again, a studio was set up at No. 10 Dihua Street. It served as a forum for the inter-
change of ideas, and helped the local people through face-to-face discussion. However,
the final decision was left open until the agreement among protest groups, the local
community, the parliament, the central and the local government was achieved (Section
5, Dadowchang Redevelopment Plan).
5.6 Conclusion
The call for historic preservation in both countries was motivated by a set of forces
operating in particular circumstances. Singapore witnessed an increasing interest in
historic and cultural heritage in the public domain in the late 1970s. The state was driven
by the need to counter foreign cultural influence caused by the bilingual language policy,
and by the demand for enhancing the attitudes and values of the working population in
the face of growing competition in the global market. However, although the state spoke
of its enthusiasm about historic buildings, its concept was vague and its policy was no
more than a statement. The planning authority did not seriously consider conservation as
an alternative of urban development and thus lacked motivation to move forward. This is
because at this stage, the state clearly had other development priorities. The planning
authority adopted a growth-through-investment strategy, aiming to counter the cyclical
downturn of the national economy. Building investment was initiated by the public sector
through direct construction and the land sale scheme. To support this policy, vast
amounts of land had to be made available. Meanwhile, practical methods of conservation
were not fully developed and the economic viability of conservation was still in dispute.
Hence, whether to release those valuable land parcels in the Central Area from high-
density development and gave them away to historical preservation was highly debatable.
Historic and cultural subjects entered into political discourse in a vigorous and
sustained manner in the early 1980s. The political and economic crisis forced the state to
engender a collective sentiment, by which society could be more effectively motivated to
achieve the development objectives and the internal cohesion of society could be
enhanced. The state realised that historical preservation was not only about the
rehabilitation of historical buildings, but the attitude and values which were associated
with the legacy of the past. Historical buildings can be re-invented to serve the current
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need, that is, a need to construct national myths, identities and loyalties. However, the
planning process for conservation did not begin until the mid-1980s when there were
needs to create a visual spectacle for the image creation of a global city, to regulate
building investment, to form a sub-market in the property market, and to produce high
value-added commodities for property investment. It seems that the changes in urban
planning policy, as a response to new development strategy, determined the formulation
of conservation-based redevelopment policy in the last instance.
Like Singapore, Taiwan also experienced the search for historical and cultural
heritage in the late 1970s. The motives behind the scene are very different. From the
beginning, the mainlander-controlled state marginalised Taiwanese in political and
cultural spheres through its social and ideological control. Taiwanese were forced to
accept a Chinese nationalist agenda which had nothing to do with their local culture and
history. The diplomatic set-back in the international community in the mid-1970s
destroyed the ground to aspire Chinese nationalism and provoked a call for new national
identity. This desire crystallised into political and cultural movements, aiming to termi-
nate the political and ideological domination of the state. The change in political context
forced the ruling party to make concessions by restructuring its internal structure and
allowing native Taiwanese to share power with mainlanders. This at the same time
opened a new room for Taiwanese to change the official view of their past. The efforts
made by preservationists to reclaim historical heritage, in peculiar historic buildings
which represent local history and culture, could be ascribed to the awakening of political
and cultural consciousness of local society.
The political and ideological crisis intensified in the mid-1980s in line with economic
stagnation. The state recognised that as the mood of national survival faded away and the
existing nationalist discourse bankrupted, a national ideology had to be built on other
grounds. Yet the state seems to have been much more hesitant in using historical and
cultural subjects for engendering a sense of unity. The policy for historic preservation
was ambiguous and only acted to diffuse tension. The complexity of political and
ideological conflicts among competing powers and different fractions within the society
threatened the very foundation of nation-building. The state was reluctant to address any
form of collective discourse which can potentially cause social integration. Also, the
escalation of property price in the early 1980s already encouraged land owners to sell
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land for redevelopment. The legislation of historic preservation emphasises on the
authenticity of historical buildings, namely, the correct style of a lost historical epoch or a
ideal notion of historical form, making historic buildings pure objects for display or
exhibition. Private owners were not given much incentives to restore shophouses. Hence,
as preservationists began to promote the preservation of vernacular buildings, a strong
resistance emerged among property owners. Their political influence prevented the state
from taking any move to obstruct development interests involved in the built environ-
ment.
However, the demand for historical conservation in Taipei was an unique process in
which people used cultural reasons to argue against profit-seeking development. As
pluralist politics had came into existence in the capital city, preservationists' request were
taken into account in the decision-making process because the ruling party was faced
with the pressure of losing votes in the capital city. Also, there was a need to upgrade the
physical structure and to transform the image for the capital city that was aspiring an
international status, yet the local government was incapable to initiate road construction
and urban renewal in the run-down areas of the city due to the lack of financial resource
and effective planning powers. The deadline of purchasing reserved land in Dihua Street
for the original road-widening plan approached yet the local authority was unable to act.
Hence, even without the definite support from the central state, the local government
chose to take the move in conservation, using some short-term devices to prevent the
further destruction of shophouses.
The political process of policy-making in Singapore and Taiwan differed significantly.
The policy-making in Singapore was controlled by the state. The state had absolute
power to decide whether to conserve and how to conserve. The planning authority re-
placed the role of the preservation authority, and took on the main task of policy-
making. The planning authority was well equipped with legislative and planning devices
for initiating plans. It applied several measures for conservation practice, such as direct
investment in infrastructure and shophouse restoration, the provision of technical
assistance for private investors, the arrangement for the evicted tenants, the exercise of
compulsory acquisition, and the corporation with private sector through the land sale
scheme. The underlying logic of this policy was to make historic conservation compatible
with economic objectives because profit-making seems to have been the major motive of
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the private sector to take part in restoration. The flexible interpretation of historical form
of shophouses allowed private investors to renovate shophouses in accordance with their
needs and expectations. Having seen that many architects had revealed their interests and
views of historical preservation, the planning authority worked in collaboration with
those active individuals through the mediation of the professional associations, instead of
allowing them to proceed with mobilising more participants and forming another organi-
sation. Since information has been kept away from public view, local communities have
been totally excluded from the decision-making process. The official decisions have been
sometimes made simply by discretionary judgement from a bureaucratic point of view or
by implicit political determination. The efforts to inscribe grassroots interpretation of
heritage failed as the decision-making process of urban conservation worked to the
exclusion of public opinion. Although there was a resistance emerging against this form
of decision-making, but it was too weak to constitute a force of challenge. As a result,
the state could choose to ignore contradictory opinions and proceed with its original
decision. It was too much a reflection of every aspect of Singaporean life where the state
was involved.
The policy-making process in Taipei was bounded by the interplay of social and
political forces. The city's pluralist politics created a situation that any form of interven-
tion in urban development was affected by the operation of different interest groups. The
conflicts in the preservation of Dadowchang evolved around the issues of challenging
property rights, obtaining user control of cultural resources and popular participation in
the creation of public benefit. Private owners of shophouses and preservationists
mobilised themselves to dispute the right of territory. The policy decision-making was
shared by these groups which possessed different kind of political influence. The
planning regime was not designed for public participation but in which they were being
asked to operate in the environment of interest-group pluralism. Hence, the policy was
changed several times in order to create an acceptable agenda. The situation was dead-
locked and there seems to have been a great uncertainty about the future of the policy.
To manage this problem, fmancial resource, expertise in public participation, legislation
and commitment to the policy were mostly needed. Unfortunately, urban policy as a form
of state intervention was not consistent. The local planning authority failed to act in
many circumstances due to the lack of autonomy and financial sources. However, even
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fundamental problems in the planning regime could be resolved, in an era that the
government gradually kept their hand off the political and economic spheres, the re-
emphasis on the role of public sector in urban development would be considered to be
inadequate. The policy-making process analysed above does not only reflect the nature
of urban planning, but also the changing relationship between the state and society.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE TRANSFORMATION OF HISTORICAL
URBAN CENTRES: SINGAPORE AND TAIPEI
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter explored the main differences between the conservation-based
redevelopment policy in Singapore and Taipei in terms of the way in which they are
produced. In what follows, I examine the actual practice of these redevelopment
strategies, with special reference to the transformation of two historic urban centres - the
Chinatown Historic District (CHD) in Singapore and the Dadowchang Special Zoning
(DSZ) in Taipei. The Chinatown Historic District is located adjacent to the current
financial district of Singapore. It consists of four sub-areas, Kreta Ayer, Telok Ayer,
Tanjong Pagar and Bukit Pasoh, with a total number of 1,111 shophouses on a land area
of 25 hectares. Amongst the four sub-areas, Tanjong Pagar is the place where shophouse
restoration first started. A total number of 291 shophouses on a land area of 8 hectares
have been scheduled for conservation since 1987. The Dadowchang Special Zoning is
located at the eastern bank of the Tamshui River and a distance of two miles north of the
old CBD of Taipei. It covers a land area of 12 hectares bounded by Minchung West
Road, Anshi Street, Hungha North Road and Nanking East Road. A total number of 297
shophouses in Dihua Street and other buildings in its surrounding area have been
incorporated into the Special Zoning by phases since 1983 and subject to different types
of development control.
The historical development of the locality is as critical as other external forces
because new development of a place cannot emerge without interacting with the nature
of the locality as shaped by its previous development. In this chapter, I firstly examine
the historical urban centre in its historical context, with particular attention paid to
physical development and the local economy. Changes in property value and land use are
also emphasised here as important indicators of the development of the locality. I then
provide an in-depth account of the transformation of each historical urban centre after
the implementation of conservation-based redevelopment strategies. I focus on the
progress of shophouse restoration and the changes in property value and land use in the
conservation area. This exercise enables me to discover to what extent these strategies
have affected the development of the locality. Another major line of this chapter is a
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study of the common or contradictory interests of social agents who have been influential
in the planning process. This inquiry provides the means of understanding the political
and social process of the transformation.
Singapore
6.2 Historical Development of the Locality: Chinatown
6.2.1 Chinatown and Singapore's Colonial Past
It was earlier noted that prior to the nineteenth century, Arab and Chinese merchants
were already active in Southeast Asia and helped to develop trade activities in this region
(Wong, L., 1978, p.51). On the long sea-route from China, India to Europe, the central
location of Singapore in the Malay Archipelago provided it with a great geographical
advantage for shipping. Singapore was granted free-port status in 1819 by the British
government and became one of the most important entrepots in Southeast Asia. From
that time onwards, manufacturing goods produced in the European countries were trans-
ported to Singapore and redistributed to its neighbouring countries. Agricultural pro-
ducts from these countries, such as rubber, coffee, gambier and spices, were carried by
small boats to Singapore for sorting, processing and grading before they were re-
exported to the European countries. Trade activities were mainly conducted at ports
along the Singapore River and at the Telok Ayer Basin.
During this period, most foreign trade was controlled by the European-owned 'agent
houses' (Earl, 1971, pp. 415-16). Chinese merchants played an intermediary role in trade
activities. More precisely, they acted as the 'middlemen' - such as distributor, commis-
sion agents, wholesalers and retailers, who directly dealt with agent houses on the one
hand, local suppliers and consumers on the other (Wong, L., 1978, p.83; Chiang, H.,
1970, p.255). Many firms and factories speciaJising in sorting, grading, repacking and
processing were established by Chinese merchants on the waterfront in the current
Central Area (Singapore Half-yearly Trade &atistics: Import and Export). The two
largest dialect groups of the Chinese - Hokkien and Teochew - competed for trade and
space) Hokkien merchants were major rice importers and also dealt with products such
'The Chinese originated from different dialect groups (Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese, etc.) and did not
form a single, cohesive population.
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as beans, copra, coffee, sugar and animal fodder. Large wholesalers had their offices by
the Singapore River and godowns some distance away, while small wholesalers operated
from the ground floors of shophouses along the current South Bridge Road. Teochew
merchants were mainly gambier exporters and importers of vegetables and firewood.
Their wholesale businesses were mainly located at the upstream of the Singapore River
while some small wholesalers concentrated in the current New Bridge Road. Chinese
settlements, generally known as 'Chinese Campong', began to spread over the flank of
the Singapore River (Berry, 1982, pp. 42-46).
These wholesale businesses hired a great number of unskilled workers for trans-
porting and possessing goods. Large shipping and dock companies also required labour
for coal and cargo-handling. They altogether created a large job market for coolies,
richshaw pullers, coal workers and wharfingers. Owing to the rising demand for labour,
some Chinese were involved in coolie trade and worked as coolie agents or headmen.
Coolie lodging houses were established close to the Chinese settlements and functioned
as the main supplier of daily-paid labour for the nearby businesses. 2 Apart from trade and
its related activities, some Chinese also worked in a large bazaar sector lying at the
bottom of the retailing continuum. This sector consisted of a number of individual
retailers such as hawkers, street vendors and stallholders. They also tended to locate
close to where the wholesalers and working population concentrated. The Chinese
population in Singapore increased rapidly following on the expansion of foreign trade
and job markets. The largest Chinese Campong emerged in Telok Ayer (the current Chin
Chew Street, Nankin Street, Hokkien Street and Pickering Street in the CHD) while the
British government leased out twenty-two pieces of land to Chinese settlers in 1826
(Song, 0., 1923; pp. 23-25).
As discussed previously, to prevent violence and conflicts amongst different ethnic
groups, the colonial government launched a Town Plan in 1828 by which ethnic groups
were forced to live separately. Telok Ayer and Kreta Ayer (an area between the Singa-
pore River and the Chinese burial ground) were designated as the main residential area
for the Chinese population and were thus referred to as the 'old Chinatown' (Map 6.2.1).
2 In 1863 the attention of the governement and the police was directed to coolie trade operated by the
Chinese secret society. The treatment that these immigrants received were described as being 'a species
of slavery of the worst description'. Many 'stations' for these slave trade were located in Kreta Ayer
(Archive and Oral History Department, 1983, p.83).
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South Bridge Road and New Bridge Road were reconstructed and functioned as major
routes linking old Chinatown and the administrative centre at the northern bank of the
Singapore River. 3
 Many shophouses were built subsequently. These shophouses were
mainly two or three-floors high with roofs of red Chinese tiles. The smaller shops were
4.8m wide and 25.9m deep while the bigger ones were 5.5m wide and 30.4m deep (Tieh,
P., 1988, p.105). They were all constructed in long contiguous blocks, connected by
adjoining party walls and a covered passageway called 'five-foot way', also lined back to
back with those of the neighbouring road. The ground floors of shophouses were mainly
used by businesses while the upper floors were for residential use. The 'five-foot way'
was owned by the property owner but the public had the right of way. Thus it was
generally used as an extension of shops on the ground floor, or to accommodate Street
hawkers or small food-stalls. Telok Ayer was fully occupied by shophouses in a rather
short period. Kreta Ayer also began to develop when the government granted several
land parcels between Pagoda Street and Sago Lane to the Chinese in 1843 (Archives and
Oral History Department, 1983, p.14).
It was noted that the Chinese population on this island increased to 35,000 at the end
of the 1840s, and nearly half of them lived in the old Chinatown (Buckley, 1965, p.83).
Further expansion became difficult because Kreta Ayer was largely hemmed in by small
hills to the south. Most part of these small hills (the later Tanjong Pagar and Bukit
Pasoh) was still covered with gambier, nutmeg and fruit plants, although a small number
of luxury properties had been built by European settlers or wealthier Chinese merchants
in the search for country estates (Lee, K. L., 1989, p.51). However, the population
density of the old Chinatown increased remarkably and the most obvious and least
expensive way to solve housing shortage was simply to make building plots smaller or to
sub-divide the building into an ever greater number of units. Most of the upper floors of
shophouses were divided into small cubicles and rented out to new immigrants or coolies
(Kaye, 1960, p.2; Ommanney, 1960, p.37). Due to the lack of building regulations,
sanitary problems surfaced in line with environmental decay.
South Bridge Road was extended by a earth road calied Tanjong Road (the current Tanjong Pagar
Road) during 1823-24, and connected with North Bridge Road by Elgin Bridge - the first bridge built
cross the river. The second bridge, the New Bridge, was completed in 1845, connecting with New
Bridge road which lay on the western side of Telok Ayer.
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The opening of the Suez Canal in the late nineteenth century placed Singapore on the
direct sea-route to the Far-Eastern market and therefore enhanced its position as a
trading centre for this region in the coming years. To meet the new shipping demand, the
colonial government embarked on several projects to renovate the ageing port facilities
in Singapore. A new harbour (the Kepple Harbour) was built in 1850 at the southern
coast (Trimmer, 1933, p.17). It was made up of a sheltered deep-water harbour and
modern wharves which could cater for large ocean vessels. Dock companies serving the
new harbour, such as the Tanjong Pagar Dock Company and the New Harbour Dock
Company, were established at the southern end of Tanjong Pagar Road in 1864. Tanjong
Pagar Road and South Bridge Road thus became the main routes for the transportation
of goods and workers between the old Chinatown and the new harbour. Rickshaws were
introduced to Tanjong Pagar Road in 1880 and a steam tramway started working on
South Bridge Road in 1885. The number of rickshaw and traditional bullock carts
increased over time since they were more convenient and flexible means of transport for
shophouse business. For better access to the new harbour, trade and wholesale busi-
nesses spread from old Chinatown to the south through Tanjong Pagar Road and Neil
Road. Many shophouses were built along the roads after agricultural land was converted
to residential land. Meanwhile, the wealthier European and Chinese merchants in
Tanjong Pagar and Bukit Posah began to move out to the new suburban areas such as
Katong and Bukit Timah.
The job market expanded quickly because of the dock activities and transport service
on the thoroughfares. Dock companies at the new harbour altogether employed more
than 4,500 contracted coolies in 1884 as the steam vessels needed manual labour for
coal-handling. 4 The largest rickshaw station in the city also set up at the junction of
Tanjong Pagar Road and Neil Road registered more than 1,800 pullers in 1886 (Tanjong
Pagar Citizens' Consultative Committee, 1989, p.24). These indentured coolies rented
cubicles in shophouses or stayed in licensed coolie stations. Unlike Telok Ayer and Kreta
Ayer, Tanjong Pagar and Bukit Pasoh were ethnically-mixed communities. The Chinese
4 The method of handling the coal between ship and stack was for each pair of coolies to carry, by means
of a bamboo pole resting on their shoulders. The compant paid and charged fixed rates for handling coal
(Trimmer, 1933, p.26).
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lived at the northern end and the Indian and the Malays settled at the western and the
southern areas (Yeoh and Kong, 1995, p.49).
However, Tanjong Pagar and Bukit Pasoh became increasingly integrated with Telok
Ayer and Kreta Ayer, in the closing decade of the nineteenth century (Tan, C., 1989,
p.1 6). Shophouses were occupied by wholesalers and retailers on the ground floors,
while coal cooties, stevedores and richshaw pullers stayed in small cubicles on the top
floors. Kreta Ayer particularly, was an entertainment centre for the Chinese community
in this area (Map 6.2.2). Sago Street, Temple Street and Pagoda Street were bustling
with open-air wet markets during the day and food hawking at night. Theatres and
brothels also emerged in Temple Street, Smith Street and Trengganu Street. A large
theatrical hail was built in Smith Street by clan associations and used to stage Cantonese
opera for their members.
The general pattern of urban growth in the early twentieth century was simple. Land
in the Central Area was fully occupied and population density was very high, particularly
in those ethnic enclaves. There was an observable increase in population in areas adjacent
to the Central Area, such as Pasir Panjang and Katong, but a significant movement of
people from the city to the suburban areas had not emerged. In view of the fact that
Chinatown's physical and social environment was threatened by high population density,
the General Improvement Plan was initiated by the Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT)
to tackle housing shortage and public health problems in this area. The SIT started
public-housing projects in Telok Ayer and Kreta Ayer, including a row of four-floor flats
in Upper Cross Street and Mosque Street (1930); a four-floor flat around the corner of
Smith Street and Trengganu Street and a row of two-floor flats in Saga Street (1927). A
hawker market was also built in 1922 near People's Park in Bukit Pasoh to accommo-
date Street stalls. A new regulation for building control (the Backlane Order), with effect
from 1935, enabled the authority to open backlanes for better access to the back-to-back
shophouses (Singapore Housing Committee, 1947, p.2). Some of the dilapidated shop-
houses were demolished, restored and reconstructed by private owners in accordance
with new building regulations. However, the SIT projects were small in scale and the
purpose was simply to improve the physical environment Hence, they had very limited
influence on the social-economic characteristics of this area.
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Meanwhile, the physical appearance of main traffic routes in Chinatown changed
more drastically due to property development initiated by private owners. Modern trans-
port began to function in most parts of the city. The trolley bus, introduced in 1929,
quickly gained popularity and replaced the rickshaw as the main transport used by
people. New Bridge Road and South Bridge Road were widened and functioned as
thoroughfares linking the central city and the southern coast. Many shophouses along
these roads were demolished and replaced by modem buildings. New development was
mainly initiated by clan associations which served as community centres for different
dialect groups. Musical hails and traditional opera houses erected alongside large
theatres for silent movies and modem hostels for new immigrants. New Bridge Road,
particularly, emerged as a centre of communication and entertainment for the Chinese
community in Singapore (Archives and Oral History Department, 1983, pp. 122-34).
6.2.2 Chinatown in the Post-War Development
Singapore was occupied by the Japanese during 1942-45 and served as a base for their
administrative and military command in the Malaya region. Many shophouses in the
Central Area were torn down during the war; and this made the problem of housing
shortage more accurate. The Chinese settlements in the Central Area were heavily con-
gested after the war. The colonial government did not make further efforts to solve the
housing problem in Chinatown apart from building three nine-floor flats in Upper
Pickering Street and Upper Hokkien Street during the period 1952-53. In 1956, there
were intensive areas in Chinatown where population densities reached 1,700 persons per
hectares; some blocks even reached 2,470 persons per hectares or more. A survey
conducted in Upper Nanking Street revealed that 56 per cent of the population lived in
single cubicles exclusively occupied by one household, and 7 per cent lived in cubicles
shared by two or more households (Kaye, 1960, p.4.9).
After obtaining its independence in 1965, the Singapore government placed slum
clearance and housing development on the centre of its policy agenda. The Housing and
Development Board (HDB), with its efficiency and determination, built a great number
of public estates in the 1960s in order to resettle the population who were by then
crowded in slums. Most of their projects took place along main traffic arteries radiating
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out from the Central Area; many of them ran westward from Chinatown to Queenstown
(Planning Department Annual Report, 1970). Several residential and commercial projects
were initiated by the housing authority in Chinatown to tackle housing shortages and
environmental decay. These projects were located on public land which had previously
been acquired or redeveloped by the SIT. Large estates such as People's Park Complex,
Kreta Ayer Centre, Tanjong Pagar Plaza, Chinatown Complex and Hong Lim Complex
erected in the 1970s. These buildings were directly built by the housing authority or by
private developers who bought land through the Sale of Site Programme. 3
 The scale of
these projects was massive. Tanjong Pagar Plaza, for instance, was the largest public
estate in Chinatown and consisted of seven tower-blocks of apartments, a hawker market
with ninety-six stalls and a podium plaza with one hundred and forty shops (Ho, E. 1987,
p.15). Many residents who lived in shophouses were soon resettled to the public estates
built in the surrounding area or to those in the outskirts of the city. Stall holders
crowding the 'five-foot way' were relocated in the retail centres in the public estates.
Street hawkers were removed to newly constructed hawker markets or food centres,
supplied with electricity, piped water, sewerage, etc. As a result, population density in
Chinatown began to decline.
Some fundamental changes in the national economy and urban development seem to
have affected the dynamic of shophouse business in Chinatown. Since the state decided
to adopt an export-orientated strategy for industrialisation, manufacturing industries
produced for export markets gained substantial growth. The nature of export changed
from a concentration on primary products to more diversified exports, including semi-
and fully-manufactured goods. There was a sharp increase in capital goods and other
materials, such as machinery, industrial components and transport equipment, to meet
the industrial process; and a relative decline of importance of the traditional consumer
goods as major commodities for re-export. The finance, banking and advanced-service
sectors also grew up in line with the expansion of manufacturing industries for the inter-
national market. The economy thus was transformed from an entrepot economy to one
based on manufacturing, external trade, financial and business services. The secondary
sector, as represented by manufacturing and construction industries, replaced the tradi-
People's Park Complex for instance, a thirty-floor residential/commercial building, was the first
product of the Sale of Site Programme.
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tionally dominant service sector as the principal source of employment. Trade and
wholesale businesses, which were associated with the transportation and processing raw
materials, declined.
The physical environment of the central city was also undergoing a dramatic change.
To meet the increasing demand for office and commercial space, the physical structure of
the Central Area was largely improved under the guidance of the government. A financial
district, generally known as the Golden Shoe Area, was established in the mid-1970s in
an area bounded by Singapore River, Raffles Quay, Shenton Way, Maxwell Road and
Telok Ayer Street. Public land in the Orchard Road Corridor, North and South Bridge
Roads was sold for the development of shopping centres, retail and entertainment
facilities. Office and commercial development soon expanded in the vicinities of these
areas. The staged redevelopment led by the URA began to target precincts on the fringe
of Chinatown in the late 1970s. For instance, a massive project was initiated in an area
between the eastern side of Telok Ayer and the Telok Basin reclamation. After rede-
velopment, this area was incorporated into the Golden Shoe financial district. Private-
sector development concentrated mainly on the southern section of Tanjong Pagar, along
the arterial roads. Many shophouses were demolished and redeveloped into high-rise
buildings for office and commercial uses, such as International Plaza, Maxwell House,
Nelson Buildings, Union Building, Reality Centre, Kepple House, and Jit Poh Building.
Urban redevelopment in the fringe area of Chinatown accelerated in the early 1980s
as more land was released to private developers through the Sale of Site Programme.
Land in Tanjong Pagar, in particular, was redeveloped by private investment. High-rise
buildings such as Chinatown Plaza, Sanford Building, Amara Hotel, STP Building and
IBM Tower erected along Tanjong Pagar Road, Anson Road, and Cantonment Road.
The new MRT station was constructed at the junction of Anson Road and Maxwell
Road. A triangular area (part of the current Tanjong Pagar Conservation Area) bounded
by Tanjong Pagar Road, Neil Road and Craig Road, which had been acquired by the
HDB in 1981, then transferred to the URA in 1984, was also ready to be sold for further
redevelopment.
Under these circumstances, private owners of rent-controlled properties, such as old
shophouses, were particularly attracted by the success of property development. In the
past, their properties were rented out at a standard rate fixed by the Rent Conciliation
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Board. The taxable value or the market rental value had no significance in the deter-
mination of the controlled rent. Also, the standard rent did not alter with the change of
tenancy. Since the low rent was inadequate to cover the cost for maintaining ageing
properties, further improvement or investment was discouraged. Shophouses therefore
fell into physical deterioration because owners' profits were squeezed between fixed rent
revenues and rising operating and maintaining costs. Private owners were in favour of
redevelopment by which a higher financial return could be obtained. Although, under the
rent-control regulation, property owners could only evict tenants under certain
circumstances, it was widely believed that many businesses were forced to end their lease
contracts in order to release the land for redevelopment.
Following on the rejuvenating project of the Singapore River by which all the barges
and lighters were removed to the Pasir Panjang Port, the wholesale business in China-
town, which was closely associated with the barges, moved to the upstream of the river.
The hawker sector was also expelled from the streets and settled in nearby shopping
centres. Many of the small industries in shophouses also moved to the planned industrial
estates outside the city, such as Jurong Industrial Estate, for better infrastructure and
services. Moreover, the new transport regulation in the central area, such as a one-way
traffic system, parking restrictions, high parking fees and the Area Licensing Scheme,
increased the operational costs of businesses. The lack of labour due to the increase of
industrial employment, and the loss of clientele links resulting from the decentralisation
of population, both threatened the vitality of shophouse business in Chinatown. Interest-
ingly, it is also suggested that the planned suburban centres were not drawing away any
of the downtown retailers. Most of the growth of retail business in the suburbs were new
and did not come from the established shopping district (Sim, L., 1981, pp. 223-33). A
survey conducted by the URA in 1986 shows that most of the retail business in the
Central Area did not move frequently. Approximately 68.5 per cent of retailers have not
moved since they started their businesses. For retail businesses which were located in
shophouse areas, the average period of occupancy was as long as 24.7 years (URA,
1986b). Hence, retail business in Chinatown might be the sector which was less affected
by the undergoing changes in the post-war development. This will be carefully examined
in the coming section.
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6.2.3 Changes in Land Value and Land Use (1965.1986)
It is argued that the decline in land values and the disparity of values between the present
use and the potential use detennine the degree of profit appreciation and the timing of re-
investment in the inner-city areas (Smith, 1982). In the following section I first analyse
the change in land value in Chinatown in relation to land values in the Central Business
District and three other areas located at different distances away from the centre. It is
helpful for a proper understanding of whether and to what extent the decline in land
value in Chinatown made re-investment a rational market response.
Before analysing the change in land value, the first thing one has to consider is that
the nature of land ownership and land value in Singapore was determined by the land-
holding system and the rent-control legislation rather than market forces. The land-
holding system in Singapore differs as between freehold and leasehold property. In the
case of a freehold property both the land and the building are owned outright by the
purchaser. In the case of a leasehold property, the purchasers do not own the land or the
buildings but obtain the right to use them for specific period according to the property
law. Therefore, different properties belong to different landowning states; and their
leases also close at different times. At the end of that time, properties return back to the
freehold landlords. As mentioned before, in Singapore, the state has control of the land
ownership; and the private sector's participation in the development of land is mainly
based on a leasehold basis (Motha and Yeoh, 1989, pp. 7-8). This meant that most
property owners might not own the land on which their properties are situated; as such
the building itself is more important than land. Hence, in the property market, the
concept of real estate is directly related to property rather than to land. Land value and
building value have been combined into one single categoiy: property value. In detail, the
value of the property is the amount at which it could reasonably be expected to sell the
property with different forms of land tenure (freehold or leasehold granted between 99
and 999 years), or the price it would command on the open market, paid by a willing
buyer to a willing seller.
Another crucial factor which determines the nature of land value is the rent-control
legislation. The rent-control legislation plays a decisive role in determining the land value
of the property with sitting tenants (Musterd and Van Weesep, 1991, p.12). Under this
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legislation, landlords are not allowed to charge rent in excess of the 'standard rent'
which has been fixed by the Rent Conciliation Board (The Control of Rent Ordinance,
1953, section 2). The selling price of a tenanted property represents the market valuation
of land value with reference to its annual rental income. The rents of controlled premises
are almost invariably far below the true market values; land values have been artificially
depressed.6
 As a result, there were two set of values when the property was transferred.
One is property value with vacant possession and the other one is property value with
tenanted possession. The former represents a market evaluation of the expected value of
the sold property in its future use and the later reflects the value of the sold properties
under its current use.
However, not unexpectedly, while coming to analysing land value, one will find the
first difficulty is to differentiate land value from property value since they have been
combined in all kinds of data. Property value is thus the only indicator to observe the
change in land value. Property value includes a component for land value with the value
added in the form of improvement. Therefore, property value does not represent the
actual land value.7 Fortunately, this imperfection is not serious enough to invalidate the
analysis of land value in shophouse areas. The value of a shophouse is low enough to be
ignored since it is ageing and decayed. Hence, although the selling price of a shophouse
is not exactly the same as the land value, it is very close to the actual land value. Gener-
ally, property value differs between vacant possession and tenanted possession. The
prices of vacant and tenanted shophouses could be applied to measure the disparity of
land values between potential use and present use.
In this study, property prices of shophouses were obtained from the actual trans-
action records provided by the SISV. 8 For analytical purposes, a total number of 463
transaction records were selected from five locations, including the CBD, Chinatown,
6 It has been estimated that most properties under rent control should fetch about three times the 1939
rent in the free market in 1966. For a detailed discussion see Koh, T., 1966, pp.2; 32-45; 176-232.
' According to neo-classical models of ground rent, land value referrs to the price of an undeveloped plot
and the expected income from its use. Property value is the price when a building is sold, including the
value of the land. In general, these values are determined by two separate market systems and constitute
different basis for taxation (Hoyt, 1933).
8 The transaction records over years were provided by the Singapore Institute of Surveyer and Valuer. In
six areas, a total number of 463 transactions of shophouses were recorded from 1960. The computer data
after 1984 was not acccessible for legal reasons. Therefore, the transaction records used were between
1960 and 1983.
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Table 6.2.1 Property Values in Shophouse Areas, Singapore, 1964-1983
Golden Shoe Telok Ayer
	 Tanjong South-North- Orchard
	 Fringe of
(CBD)	 and Krera Pagar(Ikm) New Bridge Road(2kin)
	 Central
Ayer(O.Skm)	 Road(1.Skm)	 Area(2.5ks'n)
................................................................Vacant........................................- ...............................
1964	 883	 530	 576	 622	 388	 ..6
1965	 1111	 659	 716	 773	 482	 144
1966	 1262	 748	 812	 877	 547	 164
1967	 1462	 890	 967	 1044	 651	 195
1968	 1612	 1072	 1165	 1258	 632	 207
1969	 1623	 1294	 1406	 1518	 240
1970	 1634	 1414	 1537	 1659	 832	 268
1971	 2064	 1325	 1697	 2068	 1204	 293
1972	 2688	 1398	 2011	 2624	 1306	 299
1973	 4913	 1599	 2150	 2700	 2158	 398
1974	 4503	 1382	 1845	 2308	 2436	 344
1975	 3280	 1168	 1560	 1951	 2410	 364
1976	 4418	 2069	 2762	 3455	 409
1977	 6031	 2069	 2762	 3455	 2434	 433
1978	 1904	 2541	 3179	 2920	 458
1979	 6746	 2053	 2740	 3428	 4279	 577
1980	 7324	 2202	 2939	 3677	 4499	 838
1981	 7902	 2351	 3138	 3926	 4872	 1197
1982	 8481	 2510	 3351	 4192	 5244	 1161
1983	 9059	 2669	 3563	 4457	 5616	 1506
Tenanted
1964	 353	 144	 245	 346	 249	 48
1965	 403	 161	 274	 387	 279	 54
1966	 476	 191	 325	 459	 330	 64
1967	 509	 204	 347	 491	 353	 68
1968	 628	 245	 417	 589	 376	 72
1969	 1002	 275	 468	 661	 550	 108
1970	 1100	 272	 463	 654	 582	 100
1971	 1092	 267	 476	 684	 633	 104
1972	 1074	 292	 282	 271	 502	 106
1973	 1451	 325	 546	 767	 838	 143
1974	 1262	 296	 617	 937	 515	 100
1975	 1559	 267	 555	 844	 872	 87
1976	 1677	 325	 678	 1030	 938	 119
1977	 2116	 189	 393	 598	 1003	 123
1978	 1584	 210	 438	 666	 1069	 126
1979	 1921	 281	 586	 890	 1461	 182
1980	 2129	 293	 611	 928	 1621	 164
1981	 2336	 307	 640	 972	 1700	 224
1982	 2544	 317	 661	 1005	 1902	 226
1983	 2729	 329	 686	 1043	 2027	 275
Data Source: SISV Computer Database, 1995
redeveloped into high-rise office and commercial buildings, thereby the prices for vacant
shophouses jumped greatly. This tendency was reinforced in the 1980s. The gaps in
values in areas located within 1.0-1.5 km distance away from the CBD also widened
while more urban renewal projects were undertaken on the fringe of Chinatown and
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Figure 6.2.1 Distribution of Property Values, Singapore
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Figure 6.2.2 Property Values in Chinatown, Singapore
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many shophouses along the main roads, such as Tanjong Pagar Road, North and South
Bridge Road, were redeveloped. Apart from Chinatown, ithe disparity of values in the
above areas was more than two and half times bigger than in the previous period. The
disparity of land values between vacant possessions and tenanted possessions in
Chinatown was obviously smaller than that in other places in the Central Area.
As can be seen from Figure 6.2.2, land values in Chinatown dropped significantly
during 1974-75 and 1982-83. I have mentioned in the previous chapter that Singapore's
property booms occurred in the mid-1970s and the mid-l980s. The increasing supply of
floor space generally would lead to the decrease in property prices and as a result, land
values might have been brought down at the same time. Yet land values in Chinatown
declined almost immediately after the property booms started. Compared with the other
four areas, land values in Chinatown during boom periods drooped more significantly
(Table 6.2.2). This development could be partly ascribed to the government's public
housing and urban renewal policies. The former emphasised new town development at
the periphery after the 1970s in order to remove the majority of population from the
overcrowded Central Area, and the latter first targeted the CBD and Orchard Road in
the Central Area, thus neglecting those ethnic areas where land was less available. As
public and private investment flowed into other parts of the city during the property
booms, physical development in Chinatown was relatively slow, and land in this area was
devalued.
Also, in Chinatown, land values of tenanted possessions were constantly lower than
those of vacant possessions. There was an increasing disparity between the two sets of
values. According to the rent-gap hypothesis, the larger the gap, the more profit could be
generated by offering the land for its best and highest use. Yet as mentioned, in compari-
son with other places in the Central Area, the disparity of the two values in Chinatown
was not so significant. Also, during the boom periods, the gap decreased as land values
of vacant possessions sharply declined. Since the disparity of land values represents a
possible opportunity for reinvestment, shophouses in Chinatown seem to have provided
less profitable prospects than those in other places in the Central Area.
The change in land use in Chinatown must be emphasised here for a proper under-
standing of the development of the locality. Historic data on land use were generated
from the land-use surveys conducted by the URA in 1978 and 1983 respectively. Land
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use prior to 1978 could not be studied since there was an absence of data. There were
923 data from the 1978 survey and 779 data from the 1983 survey. For analytical
purposes, these data were grouped into four classifications: commercial use, residential
use, office use and vacant. The first classification (commercial use) was further divided
into sub-categories for understanding the change in commercial activities in this area.
These sub-categories were: first, locally specific trade, including local food outlets
(Chinese, Indian and Malay food shops), wet provisions (butchers, vegetable and wet
spice stalls), dry provisions (general provisions, traditional medicines) and special trades
(Chinese, Indian, Arab traditional retail shops); second, general trade and services,
including barbers, pawnshops, clinics, tailors, etc.; third, recreational services, including
fast food, restaurants, pubs, entertainment establishment, etc. The percentage share of
each use was also calculated. I also made Tanjong Pagar a separate category. Since this
was the sub-area of Chinatown where conservation was first initiated, separate data for it
might help to examine the situation more precisely.
The first thing to be noted in Table 6.2.2 is that the ground floors of shophouses in
Chinatown were dominated by commercial use over time. In 1978, about 56.3 per cent
of ground-floor space was for commercial use. The percentage share rose to 66.7 per
cent in 1983, a gain of 10.4 per cent increase over that time. More precisely, there was a
16.3 per cent increase of locally specific trade, and a 4.7 per cent reduction in general
trade and services. Residential use accounted for 30.4 per cent of ground-floor space in
1978 and decreased to 20.2 per cent in 1983. There was a 10.2 per cent reduction in
residential use. Office use was only 15.9 per cent in 1978 and 12.1 per cent in 1983.
The upper floors of shophouses were dominated by residential use but office use
displayed a significant increase through time. Residential use accounted for 86.7 per cent
on the second floor, and 86.1 per cent on the third floor in 1978. The figures slipped by
24 per cent and 22 per cent over time, and the percentage shares reduced to 62.4 per
cent and 64.3 per cent in 1983. Office use increased from 9.1 per cent to 24.9 per cent
on the second floor, and from 4.9 per cent to 14.9 per cent on the third floor. This means
that office use increased 15.8 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. Commercial use on
the second floor also gained 6.5 per cent increase through time, as a result of the growth
of locally specific trade. In addition, there was an increasing presence of vacant units on
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Table 6.2.2 Land Use Change in Chinatown Historic District (1978, 1983)
1978	 1983	 1978	 1983	 1978-1983
Land Use Pattern	 Number of Shophouses	 % of Total	 % Change
Ground floor
Vacant	 16	 8	 1.7	 1.0	 -0.7
Commercial use
	 520	 519	 56.3	 66.6	 10.3
Locally specific trade	 178	 277	 19.3	 35.6	 16.3
General trade and service	 230	 157	 24.9	 20.2	 -4.7
Recreational service	 112	 85	 12.1	 10.9	 -1.2
Residential use
	 281	 157	 30.4	 20.2	 10.2
Office use	 106	 95	 11.5	 12.2	 -0.7
Total	 923	 779	 100.0	 100.0	 -
Second floor
vacant	 3	 15	 0.3	 1.9	 1.6
Commercial use	 40	 84	 4.3	 10.8	 6.5
Locally specific trade
	 3	 38	 0.3	 4.9	 4.6
Genera] trade and service	 2	 8	 0.2	 1.0	 0.8
Recreational service	 35	 38	 3.8	 4.9	 1.1
Residential use	 800	 486	 86.7	 62.4	 -24.3
Office use	 84	 194	 9.1	 24.9	 15.8
Total	 923	 779	 100.0	 100.0	 -
Third floor
Vacant	 30	 100	 4.8	 19.1	 4.3
Commercial use	 14	 5	 2.2	 0.9	 1.3
Locally specific trade	 0	 0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0
Genera] trade and service	 0	 0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0
Recreational service 	 14	 5	 2.2	 0.9	 1.3
Residential use	 541	 337	 86.0	 64.3	 -21.7
Office use	 30	 77	 4.8	 14.7	 9.7
Total	 629	 524	 100.0	 100.0	 -
Source: Field Survey in 1996; Urban Redevelopment Authority Singapore.
the third floor; the share of floor space changed from 4.9 per cent in 1978 to 19.3 per
cent in 1983.
Several trends in land use in Chinatown could be observed before the conservation
plan started. Firstly, commercial use was expanding and replacing residential use on the
ground floor. Office use was also increasing and mainly replaced residential use on the
upper floors. Therefore, it was clear that commercial and office uses already took some
of the floor space which was previously occupied by residential use. Second, the overall
residential use in this area decreased as a result of the out-move of local residents. The
decline in residential use could be seen as the main reason for the decrease in general
trade and services, since they were mainly sustained by the residential population. Third,
the expansion of commercial use could be attributed to the growth of locally specific
trade. This indicates that retail businesses related to traditional activities were still very
strong in competition with other commercial activities.
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Tanjong Pagar was an unique case amongst the four sub-areas in terms of its land use
pattern. As shown in Table 6.2.3, the ground floors of shophouses were dominated by
commercial use in 1978 but the percentage share decreased in 1983 for the reason that
some of the floor space was left vacant. In 1978, about 53 per cent of ground-floor space
was for commercial activities. The percentage share slipped by 20.3 per cent and reduced
to 32.7 per cent in 1983. In detail, there was a 21.1 per cent reduction of general trade
and services and 6.2 per cent decrease of recreational services. Interestingly, even though
commercial use was in decline, there was a 16.3 per cent increase in locally specific
trade. Residential use accounted for 30.0 per cent of ground-floor space in 1978 and
reduced to 2.0 per cent in 1983. There was a 28 per cent decrease in residential use in
total. Most importantly, in 1983, 53.2 per cent of ground floor space was left vacant.
The upper floors were dominated by residential use in 1978 but most of them were
Table 6.2.3 Land Use Change in Tanjong Pagar (1978, 1983)
1978	 1983
	
1978	 1983	 1978-1983
Land Use Pattern	 Number of Shopho uses	 % of the Total	 % Change
Ground floor
Vacant	 3	 77	 1.1	 53.2	 52.1
Commercial use	 139	 47	 53.0	 32.7	 -20.0
Locally specific trade	 34	 29	 12.9	 20.0	 7.1
General trade and service	 60	 3	 23.0	 1.8	 -21.2
Recreational service	 45	 16	 17.1	 10.9	 -6.2
Residential use	 79	 3	 30.0	 2.0	 -28.0
Officeuse	 42	 18	 15,9	 12.1	 -3.8
Total	 262	 145	 100.0	 100.0	 -
Second floor
Vacant	 0	 0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0
Commercial use	 21	 23	 8.0	 16.0	 8.0
Locallyspecifictrade	 0	 15	 0.0	 10.0	 10.0
General trade and service 	 0	 1	 0.0	 1.0	 1.0
Recreational service	 21	 7	 8.0	 5.0	 -3.0
Residential use	 223	 10	 85.0	 7.0	 -78.0
Office use	 18	 112	 7.0	 77.0	 70.0
Total	 283	 168	 100.0	 100.0	 -
Third floor
Vacant	 4	 24	 4.0	 42.0	 38.0
Commercial use	 7	 2	 7.0	 3.0	 -4.0
Locally specific trade	 0	 2	 0.0	 3.0	 3.0
General trade and service 	 0	 0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0
Recreational service	 7	 0	 7.0	 0.0	 -7.0
Residential use	 89	 3	 86.0	 6.0	 -80.0
Office use	 3	 28	 3.0	 49.0	 46.0
Total	 104	 58	 100.0	 100.0	 -
Source: Urban Redevelopment Authority, Singapore.
Chapter Six
	 275
replaced by office use or left vacant in 1983. Residential use accounted for 86.7 per cent
on the second floor, and 86.1 per cent on the third floor in 1978. In 1983, residential use
almost disappeared on the upper floors and the percentage shares were only 7 percent on
the second floor and 7 per cent on the third floor. On the contrary, office use witnessed a
remarkable increase, accounting for 77 per cent on the second floor and 49 per cent on
the third floor. Most importantly, it is also noted that in 1983, about 42 per cent of third-
floor space was left vacant.
However, the decrease in commercial activities and the large number of vacant units
in Tanjong Pagar appeared to have been exceptional in Chinatown. The main reason for
a large number of shophouses being left vacant was that a triangular area on the western
side of Tanjong Pagar Road with 279 shophouses was acquired in 1981 by the housing
authority for public-housing development. Because there were subsequent changes in
government policy to discontinue public-housing construction in the Central Area, these
shophouses were handed to the URA in 1983 for commercial development. During this
process, many residents and commercial premises on the ground floor were resettled to
the public estates. Interestingly, under these circumstances, the total number of locally
special trade in Tanjong Pagar almost remained the same. This once again proves that
locally specific trade was more attached to the locality than other commercial activities.
Additionally, as an extension to the financial district, Tanjong Pagar witnessed a
larger presence of office activities than Chinatown as a whole. This could be attributed to
urban redevelopment in this area initiated by the URA after the late 1970s. Office and
commercial buildings already took over most of the land in the southern part of Tanjong
Pagar. Many small and medium sized firms which could not find floor space in these
high-rise buildings, but demanded a good location closer to the centre, considered
renting shophouses in Tanjong Pagar as an alternative solution. These firms began to
operate on the upper floors of shophouses as the residential population had gradually
moved to the public estates.
6.3 'Raising a Phoenix from the Ashes': A Chinatown Fairy-
Tale?
The Chinatown Historic District was designated under the Conservation Master Plan in
1985. It was composed of four sub-areas of Chinatown with a total number of 1,111 old
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shophouses gazetted for conservation. Shophouse conservation in the CHD first started
in 1987, involving 279 shophouses in a triangular area bounded by Tanjong Pagar Road
and Neil Road in Tanjong Pagar (Map 6.3.1-2). The reason, as mentioned before, was
that most of these shophouses had been acquired by the HDB and handed to the URA at
the beginning of the 1980s. When the conservation plan arrived, these shoplhouses were
already under public ownership. Also, Tanjong Pagar developed much later than other
sub-areas such as Telok Ayer and Kreta Ayer. The physical structure of shop-houses and
the overall streetscape in this area were in relatively better condition. This would make
restoration easier.
However, during 1986-88, 32 out of 279 shophouses were restored by the URA as a
pilot project. Decorative features of shophouses such as ornamental plastework and
woodwork were preserved with the damaged and missing ones restored. The internal
structure of shophouses was upgraded, including the replacement of all timber floors and
staircase, roof members and tiles; also the installation of water supplies, sanitary system,
sewer and electricity. This project cost the authority a total amount of S$ 4.2 miffion for
rehabilitation and over S$ 7.1 millions for basic infrastructure and service. When this
project was completed in 1988, shophouses were handed to the Pidemco Land, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of the URA, and rented out on two or three years leases (Straits
Times, 7, Oct. 1988; Business Times, 24, Oct. 1994).
The remaining 247 shophouses in this area were sold to private investors by tender
during the period 1987-89. At the same time, the URA introduced a plan in furtherance
of the quality of physical environment in Tanjong Pagar. Infrastructure improvement was
carried out through the co-operation with other authorities. For instance, the Public
Works Department reinstated the original backlanes to provide service access to shop-
houses from the rear. The Public Utilities Board surveyed the proper substation sites for
public facilities to be installed. The Ministry of Environment helped to clean up streets
and remove unsuitable activities. The URA itself was responsible for upgrading the
pedestrian system including pavements, plants and street furniture. To make sure that
shophouse renovation by the private sector proceeded at the same time as infrastructure
was installed, private investors were given a standard two-month rent-free period to
decorate their premises.
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Map 6.3.2. Tanjong Pagar Conservation Area
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As shophouses in the CHD were all exempted from the rent-control legislation in
1989, private owners were expected to repossess their shophouses from tenants and
begin to restore them under the guidelines laid down by the authority. To accelerate this
process, the URA started another pilot project in Kreta Ayer in 1989 which involved the
restoration of a block of 45 shophouses bounded by Sago Street, Trenganu Street, Smith
Street and South Bridge Road. The whole project took eighteen months to fmish and the
total cost was S$ 5.4 million. After restoration, 26 shophouses fronting South Bridge
Road and Sago Street were sold to private investors on a 99-year lease. This sale
attracted 93 bids and brought up S$ 23 million in return. The remaining 19 units were
handed to Pidemco Land (Straits Times, 18, Jan., 1991).
Generally, if private owners failed to act before the deadline fixed by the authority,
their shophouses would be acquired and sold to other private investors through the
tender system. This measure in fact was inherited from a long-established paradigm in
urban redevelopment which created a partnership between the public sector and large
private capital in physical development. The exercise of compulsory acquisition and the
land-sale scheme were not uncommon in the CHD. During the period 1990-95, in order
to complete conservation in Tanjong Pagar, the URA acquired the remaining 104 shop-
houses in an area bounded by Tanjong Pagar Road, Gopeng Street, Peck Street, and
Maxwell Road, and sold them by tender or auction. Adding to the 247 shophouses which
Table 6.3.! Shophouses in the Chinatown Historic District Sold by Tender, 1987-1995
Year	 Sub-areas of Chinatown	 Number of	 Number of Land	 Number of
Historic District	 Shophouse	 Parcel	 Bidder
1987	 TanjongPagar	 38	 16	 84
1988	 TanjongPagar	 67	 28	 98
1988	 TanjongPagar	 81	 66	 186
1989	 TanjongPagar	 93	 80	 153
1990	 TelokAyer	 14	 8	 70
Data Source: Skyline 1991-1995; Strait Times; Land Department of the URA, Singapore.
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had been sold in the previous period, a total of 361 shophouses in Tanjong Pagar were
sold to private investors. To give investors more options, several land parcels were
combined into one single land parcel and contained a row of three or four shophouses.
These shophouses were sold altogether to one investor. Compulsory acquisition also
took place in other sub-areas in the CHD but the scope was relatively limited. Only a
small number of 14 shophouses in Telok Ayer and 14 shophouses in Kreta Ayer were
subsequently purchased and offered for sale. However, by the end of 1995, 421 out of
1,111 shophouses in the CHD were compulsorily acquired by the URA, re-divided into
322 land parcels and then sold through the tender system (Table 6.3.1).
The sale of shophouses appears to have been successful as each sale involved a great
number of bidders. For instance, the sale of three shophouses in Tanjong Pagar in 1992
even attracted a total of 112 bidders. It shows that there was an growing interest by the
private sector in shophouse investment. The enthusiasm of private investors also pushed
up bidding prices over time. Interestingly, there was a disparity between the highest and
the average bidding price in each sale. As can be seen from Table 6.3.2, the average
bidding price of the sale of 87 shophouses in Tanjong Pagar in 1989 was only S$ 2,500
p.sq.m. land area, while the highest bidding price approached S$ 10,800 p.sq.m. land
area. It indicates that bidders either had quite different evaluation of the economic
Table 6.3.2 Bidders and Bidding Prices in the Tender of Shophouses, Singapore, 1987-1995
Year Sub-areas of Chinatown Number of Bid Won by Average Bidding Highest Bidding
Historic District
	 Successful	 Original Price($p.sq.m. land Price($p.sq.m.
Bidders	 Owners	 area)	 land area)
Total	 316	 18
Data Source: Skyline, 1991-1995; Strait Times, 1987-1994; Land Department of URA, Singapore
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prospects of shophouses, or that they simply had different financial ability to enter the
bid. This issue will be brought back to the discussion later.
To preserve the genuine characteristics of the physical setting of the CHD, certain
constraints had to be imposed on the restoration of shophouses. The authority adopted a
more pragmatic and flexible approach which allowed new additions, alterations, or
extensions to historical buildings on condition that the visual quality of the original urban
form could to some extent be maintained. The conservation area was divided into two
grades. Shophouse restoration in the 'First-Grade Conservation Area' was required to
preserve the external structure of the whole building but the rear portion of the building
was allowed to be extended or topped up to the eaves of the main roof. In the 'Secon-
dary Conservation Area', the first section of the building must be restored but the back
portion was allowed to be entirely demolished. New extensions to the building had to be
built following the official guidelines that ensured the scale and architectural expression
were compatible to the main building conserved at the front.
To understand the progress of conservation in the CHD, I assessed a total number of
1,111 shophouses and then divided them into four main categories - dilapidated (also not
in use), not restored, under restoration and restored - according to the stage of restora-
tion. Restored shophouse were further divided according to their condition of occupancy
to make the picture more precise. As can be seen from Table 6.3.3, about 56.6 per cent
of shophouses in the CHD were already restored. There were 9.6 per cent under restora-
tion, 25.8 per cent were not renovated and 7.9 percent were dilapidated. The occupancy
rate of the restored shophouses was estimated at 77.6 per cent. Shophouse renovation in
the CHD seems to have gradually gathered pace.
The stage of renovation also varied among four sub-areas. Shophouse renovation in
Telok Ayer, the oldest part of the Cl-ID, was relatively slow. About 48.1 per cent of
shophouses were restored, 8 per cent under restoration and 31.2 per cent left unrestored.
Approximately 70 per cent of the restored shophouses were occupied. Shophouse
renovation in Tanjong Pagar, where the public sector had been largely involved, had
made the biggest progress. About 71.5 per cent of shophouses in this area were restored,
8.9 per cent were undergoing restoration and only 19.6 per cent were left unrestored.
The occupancy rate of the restored shophouses was 86.5 per cent, the highest in the
CHD.
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Table 6.3.3 Shophouse Renovation in the Chinatown Historic District, Singapore, 1995
Conservation Dilapidated Not
	 Under	 Restci red! Restored!
	 Total Occupancy
Area	 Restored Restoration occupied Vacant
	 Rate
Chinatown H.D.
Number	 88	 287	 107	 488	 141	 1,111	 -
%of the total	 7.9%	 25.8%	 9.6%	 43.9%	 12.7%	 100%	 77.6%
Tanjong Pagar
Number	 0	 57	 26	 180	 28	 291	 -
%of the total	 0.0%	 19.6%	 8.9%	 61.9%	 9.6%	 100%	 86.5%
Kreta Aycr
Number	 34	 72	 24	 109	 37	 276	 -
%of the total	 12.3%	 26.1%	 8.7%	 39.5%	 13.4%	 100%	 74.1%
Bukit Pasoh
Number	 13	 57	 31	 90	 29	 220	 -
%ofthetotal	 5.9%	 25.9%	 14.1%	 40.9%	 13.2%	 100%	 75.0%
Telok Ayer
Number	 41	 101	 26	 109	 47	 324	 -
%ofthetotal	 12.7%	 31.2%	 8.0%	 33.6%	 14.5%	 100%	 70.2%
Data Source: Field Survey Conducted by the Author in 1995
Land use in the CHD changed significantly in line with the renovation of the physical
environment. 9
 Commercial use was still the predominant use on the ground floor as it
shared 62.4 per cent of total floor space. Yet there was a more complicated change in the
nature of commercial use. Locally specific trade witnessed a reduction of 11 per cent
after 1983 as the share of floor space declined to 24.3 per cent. Recreational service,
which was a minority among the sub-categories of commercial use in the past, gained 7
per cent growth over time, and the percentage share jumped to 17.6 per cent. Residential
use experienced a decrease of 8.3 per cent and the percentage share dropped to 11.7 per
cent. It was countered by an increasing presence of office use. The percentage share
gained 10.8 per cent growth over time and rose to 23 per cent (Table 6.3.4).
On the upper floors, residential use slipped by 32.4 per cent and 38 per cent on the
second and the third floors. The percentage shares fell to 30 per cent and 26.5 per cent
respectively. By contrast, office use gained 10 per cent increase on the second floor and
11 per cent on the third floor. The percentage shares became 34.9 per cent and 25.8 per
cent respectively. Interestingly, among the sub-categories of commercial use, localJy
To compare land use with the previous analysis, I divided 1,111 shophouses in the CHD by main
categories - vacant, commercial use, office use and residential use, also by sub-categories - locally
special trade, general trade and service and recreational service. The percentage share of each use was
also calculated.
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specific trade and recreational service both shared more floor space than before. Their
percentage shares increased about 3-5 per cent on each floor.
Land use in Tanjong Pagar experienced the most drastic transition. Commercial use
was predominant on the ground floor with a percentage share of 66 per cent. Amongst
the sub-categories of commercial use, recreational service increased to 29.8 per cent but
locally specific trade declined to 18.1 per cent. Office use accounted for 30 per cent,
59.1 per cent and 38 per cent on each floor-level. Residential use only shared 0.2 per
cent of floor space on the ground floor, 1.0 per cent on the second floor and completely
disappeared on the third floor.
In short, since the conservation plan started in the CHD, several changes in land use
could be identified. Commercial use maintained its dominance on the ground floor owing
Table 6.3.4 Land Use in the Chinatown Historic District, Singapore, 1995
	
Chinatown Historic District
	 Tanjong Pagar
	
1995	 1995 1983-1995 1995
	 1995	 1983-1995
Land use pattern	 Number % of Total % Change Number % of Total % Change
Ground floor
Vacant	 31	 2.8	 2.0	 11	 3.9	 -4.9
Commercial use
	
674	 62.4	 -4.0	 192	 65.9	 33.0
Locallyspecifictrade	 270	 24.3	 -11.0	 53	 18.1	 -2.0
General trade and service	 208	 20.5	 0.0	 52	 18.0	 16.0
Recreational service	 196	 17.6	 7.0	 87	 29.8	 19.0
Residential use	 130	 11.7	 -8.0	 1	 0.2	 -2.0
Office use	 276	 23.0	 11.0	 87	 30.0	 18.0
Total	 111	 100.0	 -	 291	 100.0	 -
Second floor
vacant	 144	 13.0	 11.0	 50	 17.2	 17.0
Commercial use	 246	 22.1	 11.0	 66	 22.7	 7.0
Locally specific trade	 91	 8.2	 3.0	 20	 7.0	 -3.0
General trade and service	 44	 4.0	 3.0	 17	 5.9	 5.0
Recreational service 	 111	 10.0	 5.0	 29	 9.8	 5.0
Residential use	 333	 30.0	 -32.0	 3	 1.0	 -6.0
Office use	 388	 34.9	 10.0	 172	 59.1	 -18.0
Total	 liii	 100.0	 -	 357	 100.0	 -
Third floor
vacant	 215	 25.8	 7.0	 64	 55.0	 13.0
Commercial use	 91	 11.0	 10.0	 8	 7.0	 4.0
Locally specific trade	 29	 3.5	 4.0	 2	 2.0	 -1.0
General trade and service	 22	 2.6	 3.0	 3	 3.0	 3.0
Recreational service 	 40	 4.8	 4.0	 2	 2.0	 2.0
Residential use	 220	 26.5	 -38.0	 0	 0.0	 -6.0
Office use	 215	 25.8	 11.0	 44	 38.0	 -11.0
Total	 832	 100.0	 -	 116	 100.0	 -
Source: Field Survey Conducted in 1995
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to the growth of recreational service. Locally specific trade decreased substantially.
Some businesses moved to the upper floors and took some space which had been under
residential use. Office use was becoming the major sector in this area. It replaced
residential use on the upper floors, and took over some floor space on the ground floor
which used to be occupied by commercial use. There was a substantial decline in
residential use on each floor level, especially on the upper floors. Tanjong Pagar, as the
first conservation area in the CHD, already faced a significant change from a residential
community which associated with general and traditional trade to an enclave of offices
and recreational activities. Hence, it is believed that land-use gentrification took place
soon after the conservation process. Land use in the CHD would gradually transform
from a mixture of traditional and residential uses to commercial and office uses (Straits
Times, 2, Jul., 1989; 10, Sept., 1991).
After restoration, most of the shophouses were put into the sale or rental markets by
their investors. It is argued that the selling prices and monthly rents of shophouses also
rose up enormously. To understand the situation, shophouses in Tanjong Pagar, sold to
developers for restoration as early as between 1987 and 1989, were put under a detailed
examination.' 0 Before conservation, the monthly rents of shophouses in the CHD were
determined by a standard rate fixed by the Rent-Control Act. This rent was much lower
than the market rate and was the major reason that sustained low-income population as
well as traditional trades in this area. As can be seen from Table 6.3.5, in 1981, shop-
houses in Tanjong Pagar Road were rented out at an average price of S$ 0.5 p.sq.m floor
area. The average monthly rent for shophouses in Duxton Road was only about S$ 0.3
p.sq.m. floor area.
However, these shophouses were exempted from rent control in 1987 and released to
the rental or sale markets by their new owners during 1989-91. The average monthly rent
of shophouses in Tanjong Pagar Road jumped to S$ 34.4 p.sq.m. floor area. The average
monthly rent on the Duxton road also increased to S$ 33.6 p.sq.m. floor area. It means
that shopowners only paid an average rent of S$ 62-81.7 for a shophouse unit before
conservation, by then they had to pay an average rent of S$ 5,804-7,680 instead. For
10 Questionnaires concerning tender price, restoration cost, monthly rental income and sale price (if the
property has been re-sold) were delivered a total of sixty-four selected shophouses and answered by their
previous and current occupants (owners and tenants). Their information had also been re-confirmed by
telephone interviews with the landlords and personal interviews with the tenants.
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Table 6.3.5 Monthly Rent of Shophouses in Tanjong Pagar(1981, 1991)
Address	 Land Area Ground Floor Total Floor
	 Monthly Rent(SP Dollars)
(sq.m.)	 Area(sq.m.)	 Area(sq.m.)
Tan long Pagar Road
No44	 134.0	 113.0	 226.0	 71.3	 13,000
No.48	 131.0	 112.0	 224.0	 71.3	 7,392
No.50	 126.0	 107.0	 214.0	 71.3	 7,062
No.54	 126.0	 107.0	 214.0	 35.3	 7,062
No.66	 103.0	 87.5	 175.0	 62.5	 5,775
NO.68	 103.0	 87.5	 175.0	 51.0	 5,775
No.70	 103.0	 87.5	 175.0	 51.0	 5,775
No.80	 92.5	 80.9	 161.8	 76.0	 5,339
No.84/86	 183.0	 155.0	 310.0	 150.0	 10,230
No.89/90	 195.0	 158.0	 316.0	 220.0	 10,428
No.92/94	 205.0	 169.0	 338.0	 171.2	 11,154
No.96/98	 216.0	 183.0	 366.0	 160.0	 12,078
No.100/102	 184.6	 158.3	 316.6	 128.6	 10,448
No.108/110	 87.0	 74.0	 148.0	 120.0	 4,884
No.124/126	 159.0	 135.0	 270.0	 182.0	 8,910
No.128	 126.0	 101.0	 202.0	 100.0	 6,666
No.130/132/134	 293.0	 287.0	 574.0	 402.0	 18,942
	
.................................................................................................05	 .4
	
................................................................................8.1:7 	 ..&P4..
Duxton Rd
No.24	 113.0	 96.0	 192.0	 70.0	 11,250
No.29	 107.0	 91.0	 182.0	 32.1	 6,006
No.31	 103.0	 93.8	 187.6	 55.0	 6,191
No.32	 104.0	 88.0	 176.0	 57.0	 5,808
No.34	 107.0	 91.0	 182.0	 26.3	 6,006
No.36	 116.0	 98.6	 197.2	 35.0	 6,508
No.37	 121.0	 100.0	 200.0	 35.0	 6,600
No.38	 122.0	 103.7	 207.4	 36.0	 6,844
No.39	 125.0	 106.0	 212.0	 35.0	 6,996
No.41	 117.0	 99.0	 198.0	 46.4	 6,534
No.42	 122.0	 103.7	 207.4	 110.0	 6,844
No.43	 116.0	 98.6	 197.2	 55.9	 6,508
No.45	 106.0	 91.4	 182.8	 50.0	 6,032
No.47	 115.0	 98.0	 196.0	 75.0	 6,468
No.52/53	 229.0	 194.6	 389.2	 62.6	 12,844
No.54	 120.0	 102.0	 204.0	 31.3	 6,732
No.61	 121.0	 102.8	 205.6	 75.0	 6,785
No.70171	 326.0	 271.0	 542.0	 98.6	 17,886
No.72173	 326.0	 277.0	 554.0	 110.4	 18,282
No.74/75	 260.0	 221.0	 442.0	 101.8	 14,586
No.76177	 268.0	 227.0	 454.0	 144.0	 14,982
No.78179	 264.0	 224.0	 448.0	 124.4	 14,784
No.80-87	 1064.0	 904.0	 1,808.0	 640.0	 59,664
Average Monthly Rent (S$ per unit)	 62.0	 7,680.6
Data Source: Questionnaire Survey Conducted in by the Author in August, 1995; Inland Revenue Department of
Singapore.
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instance, No. 44 Tanjong Pagar Road, a two-floor shophouse located at the junction of
Tanjong Pagar Road and Duxton Hill, was occupied by a dry-food business which paid a
monthly rent of S$ 71.3 in 1981. After restoration, this building was rented to a luxury
Chinese restaurant in 1991 at a monthly rent of S$ 13,000 - the highest rent in this area.
The shophouse at No. 24 Duxton Road was another typical case. It was occupied by a
traditional-craft shop which paid a monthly rent of S$ 70. Under the conservation plan,
this three-generation business gave way to a four-star modern hotel which paid a rent of
S$ 11,250 per month.
Table 6.3.6 indicates that after restoration, a total number of 25 shophouses in Tan-
jong Pagar were sold to other investors. Four out of them were sold twice during five or
six years. For instance, the shophouse at No. 73 Tanjong Pagar Road was sold by tender
in 1991 at a price of S$ 3,185 p.sq.m. land area. After restoration, which took about two
years, the original bidder directly sold it to the second owner at a price of S$ 18,675
p.sq.m. land area. The second owner again sold it at a price of S$ 20,529 p.sq.m. land
area a year later, which meant that a handsome profit of S$ 0.4 million in total could be
easily obtained from this transition.
The rise in shophouse values did not only affect the rental and re-sale markets but
also the bidding prices in the subsequent sale (Straits Times, 11, Nov., 1993). The bid-
ding prices have soared as fast as the rent and re-sale prices. The average bidding price
of shophouses in Tanjong Pagar was S$ 1,650 p.sq.m. land area during the first sale in
1987. It increased to S$ 4,044 p.sq.m. in 1991 and soared to S$ 12,408 p.sq.m. in 1995.
The bidding price in the latest sale in Tanjong Pagar was almost eight times higher than
that in the earliest sale (Table 6.3.2).
Land use and land rent after conservation were sharply different from those in the
preceding period. The gentrification of land use could not be separated from the rise of
land rent since they had a mutual relationship with each other. Nevertheless, there were
other crucial factors which helped to determine this change. Firstly, the location of
Chinatown provided several advantages, such as relatively low property values and
walking distance to the fmancial district. Commercial and office uses in the CHD had
already to some extent replaced residential use before the conservation plan started.
Many small- and medium-sized firms rented shophouses in the CHD, especially in
Tanjong Pagar. It was estimated that about 12.1 per cent of ground floor space and 77
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Table 6.3.6 Bidding and Re-sale Price of Shophouses in Tanjong Pagar (Vacant Possession)
	
1987	 1988	 1990	 1991	 1993	 1994	 1995
S$p.sq.m. Land Area
Tanjong Pagar Rd.
No.71	 *4136
	 6,975	 14,320
No.73	 *3,185	 18,675	 20,529
No.75	 *3,389	 19,594
No.88/90	 *1,483	 1,2531
No.92/94	 *1,608	 7,692
No.100/102	 *1,444	 11,876
No.110	 *1,208
	 18,486
No.130/132/134	 *3,8	 10,013
Duxton Rd.
No.31	 *1,296
	 12,899
No.37	 *1,108	 11,983
No.43	 *1,108	 14,227
No.47/48	 *1,206	 12,341
No.49/50	 * 1,633	 9,392
No.51	 *1,633	 9,521	 12,829
Duxton Hill
No.34	 *1,600	 7,770	 14,374
No.37	 *1,550	 16,697
No.39	 *1,550	 15,416
No.44	 *2,115
	
8,015
Data Source: Urban Redevelopment Authority, Singapore; Field Survey Conducted by the Author in 1995.
Note: * The Price of the Winning Bid in Tender
per cent of second floor space had been taken by offices in 1983 (Table 6.2.2). During
the conservation process, infrastructure and services in the CHD were largely improved.
Private investors could normally obtain a row of three or four shophouses together as
one land parcel, and alter the internal structure in terms of their own need. In view of a
fact that small- and medium-sized firms in the service sector were searching for places in
a location close to the CBD, investors renovated shophouses to accommodate the new
demand. Consequently, the supply was increased and more floor space was taken by
offices.
Secondly, for the authority, the priority in shophouse restoration was given to
retaining important architectural elements and the visual quality of the overall environ-
ment. The protection of housing stock and traditional trade in the conservation area was
very limited:
If the future use of shophouses complies with our planning regulations, even it happens to
enable someone making huge profit Out of cheap office or commercial space, what is wrong
with that9....Lifestyle has been changing ever since shophouses were built. I think life style at
the time of conservation is only a snapshot in historical progression. There is no earthly reason
to say that you must freeze it at the point of restoration.
(Informant S.8)
Chapter Six
	 288
Shophouses in the conservation area were exempted from the zoning regulation laid
down by the Master Plan. Initially, the ground floors of shophouses were designated for
commercial use and the upper floors were restricted for residential use according to the
land-use plan of the Central Area. Under the conservation guidelines, shophouses could
be used for residential use or commercial use except for polluting uses, industry, storage
and obnoxious trades. The CHD was exempted from rent control after the late 1980s and
property values were no longer repressed by regulation. Market demand and the exercise
of the Sale of Site Programme both added to the latent inflation of property prices. The
authority took a stance of 'survival of the fittest' with regard to land use in the conserva-
tion area and as a result, the ultimate use of shophouses was entirely left to market forces
(Straits Times, 29, Jul. 1990). Under these circumstances, the change to higher-rank land
use appears to have been inevitable.
The authority introduced some measures aiming at 'enabling the traditional ambience
to be retained through the restoration and adaptive reuse' (URA, 1991b, Section 2.2).
Several blocks of shophouses where activities and trade traditionally located were
defined as the 'Core Areas'. Commercial uses such as banks, pubs, fast-food stores or
supermarkets, generally referred to as 'incompatible trades' by the authority, were re-
stricted in the core areas. Retail businesses such as traditional food outlets, wet and dry
provision shops or special trade were encouraged. Office use was also not allowed on
the ground floors, but permitted on the upper floors of shophouses. In actual practice,
the core areas of the CHD were located in Kreta Ayer and Telok Ayer. Tanjong Pagar
and Bukit Pasoh were completely free from this regulation (URA, 1995). The core areas
covered a total of 214 shophouses or about 18 per cent of the shophouses in the CHD.
Apart from the designation of the core areas, the authority did not provide any substan-
tial assistance to the locally specific trades that previously existed in the conservation
area. Although most retail businesses were enthusiastic to return to the core areas, with-
out financial aid or rent control, they were very vulnerable under the threat of rising rent
and the loss of local ambience (Business Times, 3, Mar., 1991).
The issue of preserving traditional trade and life style has been universally debated in
conservation endeavours and more so in the developing countries, where traditional
trade appears to be under economic and social pressures to fade away. As mentioned
before, from 1978 to 1983, there was a total of 16.3 per cent increase of locally specific
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trade on the ground floors of shophouses in the CHD. In the sub-area such as Tanjong
Pagar, even though commercial use was in decline owing to the resettlement of commer-
cial premises led by the housing authority, there was still a 7 per cent increase in locally
specific trade. This sector was composed of local food shops, butchers, vegetable and
wet spice stalls, dry-food provisions, traditional medicines and special trades related to
Chinese, Indian and Arab traditional activities. They did not only serve individuals who
lived or worked in shophouse areas but also the majority of the ethnic population on the
island. It was particularly important for the minority groups such as the Indians and the
Malays, since these traditional activities have been the major source to sustain a
culturally-specific way of life.
However, the URA's measure regarding traditional lifestyle and activities in the
conservation area seems to have been too simplistic. Land use in the conservation area
was quickly gentrified as a result of the deregulation of land rent and land use. The
restored shophouses became a solution for businesses and firms which required office
space in a location close to the CBD, and also an opportunity for recreational services
which mainly catered for the white-collar working population. This development process
was not without undesirable consequences. Firstly, the displacement of traditional trades
and activities in the conservation area devastated the unique ambience the locality once
possessed. For people who were culturally articulated to the locality, the outcome of
conservation was obviously disappointing. The URA was blamed for its 'criminal inten-
tion in letting beauty die' "
I remember the very long communal tables and benches on the street where all families and
friends sat alongside one another and had their food. The waiters with towels thrown over their
shoulders sang orders to the cooks. Orders were never written down but, amazingly, you always
got what you ordered.. .For us, the spirit of Chinatown has disappeared. Regret will never bring
back the street culture that has been lost in this place. Urban planners, property developers and
private investors may argue that they are cleaning out poverty. I think that they are regardless
of whatever they destroy.
(Informant S.1O)
Since shophouse renovation became the most buoyant sector in the property market and
there was a lack of measures to interfere with the play of market forces, speculative
investment seems to have been inevitable. Property developers viewed shophouses as
'the goose which lays the golden egg' (Straits Times, 29, Jul., 1990). Many of them took
Straits Times, 31, Oct., 1991; 18, Apr., 1992; Roots, May, 1992, pp. 2,7.
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part in conservation for a quick profit. Although the URA intended to maintain the
quality of restoration through technical guidelines, it did not guarantee that shophouses
could be restored to the same quality. Some developers paid a relatively low cost for
restoration. They did not pay much attention to the original structure and the foundation,
just decorated the internal space and painted the facade, then rented it out quickly. As a
result, shophouses 'look just like houses we see in a cartoon' (Informant, S.4).
Our old shophouse now is occupied by a publishing company and a coffee house. Six months
ago my father and I past through this area and we could not recognise our old shophouse. We
then realised that the new owner actually re-painted the front facade of the building with a very
strange pink colour. My father felt ridiculous and disgusted because our shophouse looks like a
eighty- year old women wearing a heavy make-up. Since then he never goes back to visit, even
though the shophouse is very near to us.
(Informant, S. 12)
The future of commercial activities in the conservation area, especially retail businesses,
was also questionable. The locality already lost the main character that attracted the
majority of the population in the past.
We do not even go back there for shopping. We go to Tanjong Pagar Plaza or Chinatown Com-
plex because some traditional shops have moved there. These are the places you can find the
busy crowd and the real life of the Singapore Chinese. Tourists also like to go where local
people go. I have been told that doing business there is much better than in the conservation
area.
(Informant, S.5)
Owing to the speculative demand, the selling prices of shophouses were pushed up artifi-
cially. Therefore, after changing hands, the new owner would increase the rent to cover
the cost. It made the entire business environment very unstable. The incoming commer-
cial activities, especially retail businesses, were faced with unexpected difficulties. Retail
businesses in Tanjong Pagar for instance, could not attract enough clients and their profit
was also not enough to sustain the rising rent (Informant, S.9). In a customer count con-
ducted in this area, there were only 102 customers and patrons visiting the shops and
eating places on a typical weekday afternoon, and 124 on a weekend afternoon. The
situation is no better in the evenings when a similar count yielded only 56 and 110 clients
on a weekday and a weekend respectively.
If you are a shopowner in Tanjong Pagar, you have more than enough time to watch videos, in
fact, you can watch several re-runs before a customer walks in. This is a place hardly anyone
comes for shopping. Business is so bad. Some shops do not even open. We are the third tenant
in this shophouse. Before us there was a clog souvenirs shop and a herbal-tea shop. Businesses
come and go easily. Not many businesses can survive more than two years.
(Informant, S.2)
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There should be some forms of rent control. When property is hot, owners can do whatever they
want. The rent has increased 40 per cent since we moved in. Small business like us can not sur-
vive because there is no rent control. We work just for paying the rent.... For the moment, I
think no one is going to put his money down and says that the whole idea is a mistake. We are
all tied to Tanjong Pagar.
(Informant, S.3)
The whole place has to be more viable. If you do not make effort, it goes down and down. We
still expect that Tanjong Pagar will be successful in the long run. We do not know whether it
will become an office district or an arts/craft district. It depends on market forces. We really
like this shophouse and we will try two years more. If things still remain the same, then it is
time to move.
(Informant, S.4)
Although the conservation area was still appealing to a certain type of retail business, the
out-movement of newly-established businesses was evident. The location of businesses in
and out of this area which was unstable in its nature made the commercial atmosphere of
the locality difficult to build up and vice versa. In the long term, Tanjong Pagar would
probably resemble its adjacent financial district where not many activities took place after
working hours. From the public point of view, Tanjong Pagar was changing from a
centre of citizen's life to 'a virtual ghost town, a town 'hardly any one goes to' (Straits
Times, 2, 29, Jul., 1990; Business Times, 3, Mar., 1991).
6.4 Agent Reconsidered: Property Developers on the Stage and
the Absence of Local Community
Among the issues I broached above, it could be asserted that the policy itself did not
have too defmite an intention to prevent displacement or gentrification. During the late
1980s, a total number of 2,425 residents and 970 commercial premises were displaced
from the Chinatown Historic District (URA, Annual Report, 1990/91). The original
occupants of shophouses who eventually 'lost their properties for a good cause', felt
betrayed. Numerous letters sent to newspapers demonstrated that the residential and
commercial potential of conservation projects was exploited by the better-placed elite
rather than the local residents (Straits Times, 11, Apr., 1990). This brings to the fore a
more fundamental question: Who should be in a position to ensure a just allocation of
cost and benefit and how they are defined. The role of the local community and private
investors played in relation to the state thus needs to be carefully examined.
The URA emphasised that the government would work in close collaboration with
the private sector since 'their efforts were critical to the success of conservation' (Ibid.,
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30, Apr., 1990). Yet for the authority, investors who had large capital, such as property
developers and construction companies, were favoured to carry Out shophouse restora-
tion in the conservation areas. The exercise of the Sale of Site Programme was a way
that 'gives big investors who have not owned shophouses an opportunity to exercise
their entrepreneurial role by contributing both finance and expertise to restoration' (Ibid.,
21, Jan., 1991). Public incentives were also given to encourage their participation. As
mentioned before, private investors could decorate shophouses in terms of their own
need since new additions, alterations or extensions to shophouses were allowed to great
extent. Rent-control and zoning regulations were removed to ensure shophouses could
adopt the best use in the market. Apart from that, development charges would be waived
if shophouse restoration was completed under the conservation guidelines)2
Shophouse investment soon became a growing sector in the property market. As
discussed earlier, the property market failed in the late 1 980s. Office and commercial
buildings in the Central Area became more difficult to rent out, especially those units in
larger sizes. Many property developers held a large number of vacant units in hand.
Shophouses in the conservation area offered them a new investment opportunity:
For businessmen, any new-move takes some risks. Yet we are very optimistic about investment
in the CHD. Many small firms engaging in the service industry would like to rent places near
the centre at cheaper prices. The internal structure of shophouses could be changed to fit the
function of modern offices. The location is just right for small business. We think there is
definitely a market there.
(Informant, S. 15)
It seems that the anticipated value-increase after the removal of rent control and the
scarcity of shophouses both have affected their business decisions:
Shophouses are rent-control properties. It means that their values have been frozen for more
than a century. On authority of the conservation guidelines, rent control will be abolished after
restoration. Therefore, in any case, the rent will go up immediately following the normal logic
of the property market.
(Informant, S.17)
12 Development charge was first introduced by the Planning (Amendment) Ordinance in 1964. The
underlying principle was that landowners who benefited from a written permission which permited
development over and above that envisaged in the Master Plan should contribute to the state part of the
benefit derived from the written permission. According to the Planning Act (amendent) in 1985,
development charge should be paid to the state at a rate which was based on 50 per cent of the
appreciation in land value arising from the grant of planning permission to develop over or above the
prescribed densisity and use in the Master Plan.
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There are not too many shophouses left in this country, especially in the Central Area.
Shophouses are some sort of scarce goods. From a developer's point of view, if you preserve
them properly, they will only become more and more valuable in the future. I can say that there
is a very small chance to fail.
(Informant, S. 16)
Most importantly, private investors seem to have been confident about the official policy.
Since its beginning, the government has committed to the control of urban development
through its heavy spending on building investment, consistent urban polices and well-
established planning regime. Urban redevelopment in the past has established a solid
public-private partnership through the Sale of Site Programme. Therefore, for private
investors, the government's faith in the implementation of the conservation plans has for
long been beyond doubt.
We know the government very well. It could be difficult for them in the beginning; but we
know that they are going to make it right anyway. The advantage you could gain from this
government is that they are really efficient. They make clear rules for investors to follow. They
also have good business sense and know how to make profit, both for private investors and for
themselves
(Informant, S.4)
The profit obtained from shophouse investment seems to have been the main drive for
their participants. As can be seen from Table 6.4.1, the bidding prices for shophouses in
Tanjong Pagar during 1987-89 ranged from S$ 1,108 p.sq.m. land area to S$ 3,174
p.sq.m. land area. The disparity of prices was due to different estimation of restoration
cost and speculation of future profit. However, in average, the bidding price was about
S$ 1,626 p.sq.m. land area. It means that private investors should have paid a bidding
price of S$ 201,102 for buying a two-floor shophouse from the government. The
average cost for restoration at that time was about S$ 728 p.sq.m. floor area. A two-
floor shophouse would cost S$ 149,428 for restoration. This cost was equivalent to 75
per cent of the original bidding price. In general, private investors should have a
necessaiy capital of S$ 350,000 to bid for a two-floor shophouse unit and to complete
restoration work.
After restoration, if investors released shophouses onto the rental market, a two-floor
shophouse unit could generate a rental income of S$ 80,859 every year. This income was
equivalent to 20 per cent of the initial payment (including bidding cost, restoration cost,
interest payment and maintaining cost, etc.). It meant that by renting out shophouses to
companies or businesses, the initial payment could be returned within five years. If
investors offered shophouses for sale, the average price for a two-floor shophouse unit
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Table 6.4.1 Shophouse Investment in Tanjong Pagar by the Private Sector, 1995
Address	 Floor Bidding Bidding Resrorasion Annual Re-sale
	 Ownership
Area Price	 Cost	 Cost	 Rental Income
(sq.m.) (sq.m.) (1987-88) (1989-90)
	 Income
S$1,000 sg.m.
TanionR PaRar Rd
No.44	 226	 2.1	 283.4	 169.5	 156.0	 Suhartanto and Mdm Hetty
No.48	 224	 1.9	 255.8	 168.0	 10.9 1,050(90) NG Chee Beng
No.50	 214	 1.6	 202.9	 160.5	 16.0	 Hem Yang Construction Ltd.
No.54	 214	 1.3	 169.5	 160.5	 22.5	 Hem Yang Construction Ltd.
No.66	 175	 1.3	 138.7	 131.3	 6.4	 Stragis Pie Ltd
NO.68	 175	 3.1	 326.9	 131.3	 13.3	 Chin Woo Athletic Association
No.70	 175	 1.9	 205.9	 131.3	 27.7	 Chin Woo Athletic Association
No.80	 162	 1.3	 125.6	 121.4	 10.5	 Cooperation Packaging Co Ltd
No.84/86	 310	 1.9	 355.4	 232.5	 14.0	 Chip Eng Leong Enterprise Ltd
No.88/90	 316	 1.4	 289.2	 237.0	 11.7	 1,980(93) Vni Hock Development Ltd
No.92/94	 338	 1.6	 329.6	 253.5	 13.0	 1,300(95) ShanghaiBankCoLtd.
No.96/98	 366	 1.3	 288.1	 274.5	 12.5	 MamFongOonYong
No.100/102	 317	 1.4	 266.6	 237.5	 11.0	 1,880(94) LorelntOteLtd.
No.110	 148	 1.2	 105.1	 111.0	 9.3	 1,368(94) JianFuDevelopmentLtd.
No.124/126	 270	 1.5	 243.3	 202.5	 12.2	 Chan Fook Pong
No.128	 202	 1.6	 202.9	 151.5	 10.2	 Yaniatai Plastic Industry
.44	 ....8989	 .4.Q5 4L...$Q(.?.4)... . Ip.J.°
Duxton Rd
No.24	 192.0	 2.1	 239.2	 144.0	 135.0	 Architects Team 3 Holdings
No.29	 182.0	 1.9	 213.9	 136.5	 13.7	 Singapore Chin Woo
No.31	 187.6	 1.2	 133.5	 140.7	 5.7	 1,210(94) GEContrade Pte Ltd
No.32	 176.0	 1.5	 153.9	 132.0	 12.6	 Eng Seng Cement Products Ltd
No.34	 182.0	 1.5	 159.1	 136.5	 12.8	 Greatearth ConstructionPie Ltd
No.36	 197.2	 1.1	 128.5	 147.9	 52.2	 Dr Lieu Lian SZE
No.37	 200.0	 1.1	 134.1	 150.0	 50.5	 1450(95) Strofort Investment Ltd
No.38	 207.4	 1.1	 135.2	 155.6	 55.8	 Pek Tiong Seng
No.39	 212.0	 1.2	 152.9	 159.0	 11.5	 Thye Cheong Realty Pte Ltd
No.41	 198.0	 1.1	 129.6	 148.5	 57.6	 Thye Cheong Realty Pte Ltd
No.42	 207.4	 1.1	 135.2	 155.6	 58.2	 Thye Cheong Realty Pte Ltd
No.43	 197.2	 1.1	 128.5	 147.9	 52.2	 1,363(94) Martin Clinch
No.45	 182.8	 1.2	 127.8	 137.!	 5.4	 Tan Chuan Wee
No.47	 196.0	 1.6	 186.1	 147.0	 15.0	 1,128(94) KwokChuonWei
No.49/SO	 404.6	 1.6	 388.7	 303.5	 0.0	 2,235(93)
No.51	 176.8	 1.6	 169.8	 132.6	 0.0	 1,334(94)
No.52153	 389.2	 1.4	 324.3	 291.9	 14.4	 HuangShanDevelopment Ltd
No.54	 204.0	 2.0	 240.7	 153.0	 10.9	 WeePaul Advertising /Design
No.61	 205.6	 1.5	 185.1	 154.2	 8.3	 Goh Kin Thian
No.70/71	 542.0	 1.7	 570.5	 406.5	 17.5	 Commercial Property Holdings
No.72173	 554.0	 1.7	 570.5	 415.5	 17.1	 Commercial Property Holdings
No.74175	 442.0	 1.7	 455.0	 331.5	 19.3	 Commercial Property Holdings
No.76/77	 454.0	 1.7	 469.0	 340.5	 19.1	 Commercial Property Holdings
No.78179	 448.0	 1.7	 462.0	 336.0	 19.1	 Commercial Property Holdings
,808:0 :.L ....2.,53:6	 .,356:Q94L....	 9g.!JytC9•15tTI..tiOn
.7LP........	 ..935	 5,124....................................
Average	 117.0	 1.6	 202.0	 149.4	 80.8	 -
Data Source: Questionnair Survey Conducted by the Author in Auguest, 1995
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ranged from S$ 1.1 million to S$ 2.9 million. In the cases shown in Table 6.3.1, those
shophouses sold by the original bidders had been rented out for a period of three or four
years. After deducting the initial payment from the gross profit (equals to three-four
years rental income plus the re-sale income), in general, investors who sold shophouses
gained at least S$ 1.5 million net profit from each shophouse unit.
The public-private partnership exercised through the Sale of Site Programme also
helped to reduce the financial burdens of the government. The total investment by the
private sector for bidding and restoring 64 shophouse units was estimated at S$ 22
million. This means that the same amount of public spending had been saved through this
scheme. Also, the sale of total 64 shophouses in Tanjong Pagar during the period 1987-
89 had directly generated an extra income of S$ 12 million for the government (Table
6.4.1). If the bidding prices in tender were pushed up, the government could obtain more
financial return from the sale scheme.
The fact that both the government and private investors obtained huge profit from
conservation was called into question (Business Times, 10, Sept., 1991).
My father agreed to sell the shophouse to the government because the government promised
him a brand-new apartment in the public estate, which is where we live now.....My father feels
betrayed by the government since he has witnessed an enormous increase in housing prices in
the conservation area. He thinks that if we did not sell the property to the government, we could
be very rich now. The government has been unfair to us.
(Informant, S .5)
Civil organisations such as the Heritage Society of Singapore (HSS), which was formed
by architects and planning professionals who promoted urban conservation from the very
beginning, were on the whole against the sale scheme. In their opinion, the government
should put the intangible interests of preserving cultural heritage and history for the
people as their first priority. They also suggested the URA to allow non-government
organisations to restore and maintain historic heritage with public assistance, instead of
handing them to private developers (Straits Times, 10, Sept., 1991). The government did
not consider modifying their policy in response to public feedback.
What is wrong with making money out of old shophouses? I think in five-years time, people
will not even bat an eyelid about this issue. I am very happy that property prices in Tanjong
Pagar have appreciated because the whole area is going to be lively when that happens. The
owners will stretch their minds to put it to the best use.
(Informant, S.1)
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Another way of looking at the situation is through studying the role that the local com-
munity played in this planning process. The tender system was open to the public and
everyone had an equal right to participate. Some owners could not take part in tendering
because they lacked sufficient capital to restore shophouses. The participation of pro-
perty developers also helped to push the bidding prices higher than anticipated. Hence,
even though original owners entered the tender, only a few of them had chances to win
the bids. As indicated in Table 6.3.2, in the past ten years, only 18 out of 316 successful
bidders of shophouses were their original owners. The overwhelming majority of suc-
cessful bidders were investment companies, property developers or other individuals
outside of the community. It is thus believed that if shophouses were acquired by the
authority and sold through tender, the chance for the original owners to regain their
properties back was less than 10 per cent (Informant S.8).
Private owners in the conservation areas were frustrated by the exercise of compul-
sory acquisition which 'squeezed them out' from their own homes, and by the operation
of a tender system which 'offered them no chance to return' (Ibid., 29, Apr., 1988; 16,
Jan., 1990; 2, 3, Mar.; 13, May, 1991). Since the conservation plan was implemented in
the CHD, several owners appealed to the authority to give them more time to restore
their own properties or provide them chances to buy back their shophouses through the
tender system (Ibid., 11, Apr.; 8, 23, May, 1990). Tenants were in a more difficult situa-
tion. The lifting of rent control in the conservation areas enabled the government or
private owners to repossess shophouses from the sitting tenants. This meant that tenants
of shophouses would not have any legal right to oppose the eviction as they did under
the rent-control legislation. Hence, once the conservation process began, the tenants had
no other choice but to leave. Small traders who rented shophouses in the CHD for
decades were in fear of losing their places and their entire business environment. After
being asked to quit their premises without being offered many alternatives, a total of 124
occupiers of shophouses in Kreta Ayer and Telok Ayer collectively appealed to the
authority to let them stay (Straits Times, 29, Apr., 1988; 22, Apr., 1993).
From the public point of view, the government should be blamed for their bias
against private owners in this planning process. Hence, 'for justice to be seen to be
done', the URA should 'return these three-generation properties to the original owner at
a mutually agreed price, instead of offering them for sale by tender' (Ibid., 8, 23, May,
Chapter Six
	 297
1990). The evicted tenants, such as traditional businesses, should be able to return
through the employment of rent control or public subsidy because 'they had existed for
decades and already became an inseparable part of local history' (Ibid., 6, June, 1990).
Their voices remained unheard. For the government, most of the residents in the
CHD were offered chances to resettle in the public estates. Local businesses displaced
could move to nearby estates such as Tanjong Pagar Plaza, Chinatown Complex or Kreta
Ayer Centre, which were developed in the late 1970s and the early 1980s by the urban
renewal policy. The interests of private owners and tenants were already safely regarded.
The original occupants in one of the earliest cases of conservation - Georgetown in Washington
D.C. - were kicked out without public housing provided. We look after local residents who are
affected definitely better than similar projects in other countries. Where the local residents in
Singapore's conservation areas are concerned, the public authority has a scheme to resettle
them in the nearby public estates. It aims at upgrading their life style and bringing them back to
a similar neighbourhood so they are still in contact with each other.
(Informant, S.1)
Considering the cases described above, one can reasonably argue that the government
has drawn attention to the crucial role of private developers in determining the success of
shophouse conservation. Yet the co-operation with private capital and the conformity
with free-play of market forces have never meant the rejection of extensive government
intervention. The conservation plan has worked to the exclusion of civil groups and
original occupants, including both owners and tenants. They have had a growing feeling
that policy changes are necessary after seeing the undesirable consequences. In a context
that the government has controlled citizens' dissent through putting barriers to any kind
of political mobilisation, many residents have struggled on an individual basis and their
efforts are not easily translated into organisation. As long as they cannot organise
collectively and effectively, they have no bargaining power vis-à-vis the coalition of
private developers and the govermnent. The grass-roots inputs into policy decision-
making still remained to be seen.
Taipei
6.5 Historical Development of the Locality: Dadowchang
6.5.1 Dadowchang under the Chinese Regime
The city of Taipei is located on a triangular alluvial basin of the north of Taiwan. This
basin is drained by the Tamshui River and its tributaries - the Keelung River,. the Hsintien
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River and the Takokan River. Unlike other coastal Cities in the central and southern
plains of Taiwan which were developed as early as in the sixteenth century, Chinese
settlement in the Taipei Basin did not emerge until 1709, when the Chin government in
China granted a permission to Chen Lai-Chang - a farmer from the Fujian province who
wished to cultivate land in Taipei. Gradually, immigrants from two coastal cities of
Fujian - Chuanchow and Changchu - came to settle at the confluence of the Takokan
River and the Hsintein River. They developed trade activities with the aborigines. 13
 These
riverside settlements were generally referred to as Moungar ('canoe' in native language)
(Wu, 1975, pp. 4-5).
Trade activities between Taiwan and Fukien were developed by Chinese merchants in
the eighteenth century. Taiwan's agricultural products such as tea, camphor and sugar
were assembled, processed and packaged in its coastal settlements then transported to
Fukien. Manual crafts were brought back and sold to domestic markets (Bannister, 1933,
pp. 142; Dun, C., 1990, pp. 38-48). Moungar was the most important trade port along
the Tamshui River because the silting of the Takokan river prevented large junks to go as
far as upstream. In 1853, trade activities boosted a population of eighteen thousand in
Moungar. Accordingly, Moungar surpassed other coastal settlements of Taiwan which
developed previously and became the third largest settlement (Wu, 1975, pp. 6-8).
Prior to the early nineteenth century, Dadowchang was an agricultural village of the
Pingpu tribe located downstream of the Tamshui River at a distance of 2.4 km away
from Moungar.' 4 The first Chinese settler in Dadowchang - a Chuanchow merchant -
arrived in 1853 and built three shophouses in Middle Street (the first and second sections
of Dihua Street). Shortly after his arrival, violence broke out between Chuanchow and
Changchu settlers in Moungar. It provoked a wave of immigration during the period
1853-59. The defeated Chuanchow fled to Dadowchang for a safer place to live. Local
population in this area became to increase. Owing to the influx of Chinese immigrants,
the Pingpu tribe was forced to move out from this area. Chuanchow merchants built the
' Before the arrival of Chinese immigrants, Taipei Basin was occupied by its original occupants - the
Pingpu tribe of Taiwan aborigines. The Pingpu tribe used canoes to exchange agricultural products with
the Chinese at a earlier settlement in Ilsinchung, a place located at some 25 km the upstream of the
Tamsui River It is widely believed that in the I 820s, the Pingpu tribe completely withdrew from the
Taipei Basin (Chai, C., 1967).
There was a public space in this village for all the farmers to dry their crops. Seasonal celebrations
also took place here after harvest. 'Dadow' means 'paddy' and 'Change' means 'square' in native
language. This village was named as 'Dadowchange' to demonstrate the harvest (Yen, C, 1991, p.56).
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Dadowchang Harbour (near the current Taipei Bridge) for trade at the end of the
nineteenth century. As the Tamshui River continued to silt up and the Moungar Harbour
was rendered inaccessible, Dadowchang located downstream of the river replaced
Moungar and became the most important port along the river (Chen, C., 1956, pp. 8-10;
Chang, S., 1970, pp. 40-5).
The nature of cross-strait trade between Taiwan and China was in course of change
at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Due to the defeat in the Opium War in 1842,
the Chin regime in China was forced to yield trading concessions to the European
countries. Foreign merchants were thus allowed to develop their trade businesses in
some port cities and enjoyed extra privileges. Agricultural products from China, particu-
larly tea and sugar, were exported to the world market through these trade ports (Dun,
C., 1990, pp. 51-4).' The Tientsin Treaty signed in 1858 and the Beijing Treaty signed
in 1860 opened more coastal ports for foreign trade, including large ports on both sides
of the Taiwan Strait, such as Hsiamen in Fukien, Tamsui, Takao, Keelung and Anping in
Taiwan. Major ports along the Tamshui River such as Moungar, Tamshui and Dadow-
chang were also subject to the new trading concessions (Hsu, C., 1970, pp. 45).
Because of this change, Dadowchang became a tea processing, wholesale and export
centre from the I 860s. John Dodd, a Scottish merchant who had established a small tea-
firing business in Moungar, moved to Dadowchang in 1869 and opened his business on
the bank of the Tamshui River (Dodd, 1895, p.569). His success encouraged more Euro-
pean merchants to come and set up their trade companies, agent-houses and tea-refining
houses. Chinese merchants mainly performed a role as the 'middlemen' in the chain of
tea production and exportation.' 6 For instance, local 'chafans' (tea buyers) were the ones
who made contact with tea growers. 'Chafans' sold tea to 'chazhuang' - tea reprocessing
workshops established by native merchants with small financial capital. Tea was re-fired,
packed and then sold to 'chazhans' or 'chahangs'- large tea warehouses and tea firms
5 From 1860 to 1870, tea exported from Taiwan to foreign countries increased 40 per cent every year,
with about 90 per cent of them were sold to the US and 7 per cent to the UK. Sugar also had a large
presence in export market, mainly sold to Japan and Australia. Approximately 70-80 per cent of
camphor in the world market was produced in Taiwan. By the end of this century, tea, sugar and
camphor were three major products for export. The percentage share accounted for 58.4 per cent, 23 per
cent and 9 per cent of total export (Dun, C., 1990, pp.51-4).
16 For instance, comprador Li Chunsheng, who had helped European merchant in building up contacts
with local growers, managed to establish his wholesale business. His success encouraged many Chinese
compradors to follow (Nakanishi, 1908, p.21).
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established by wealthier native merchants - for storage and marketing. European agent-
houses and local brokerages bought final products from tea warehouses or tea firms, and
exported to foreign market or to the Fujian province. 17
 At the end of this century, about
91 per cent of tea exported from Taiwan was through Dadowchang. There were 5
European agent-houses, 10 large chahangs, 252 small chazhans with 3,612 employees
involved in tea processing and exportation in Dadowchang. Local population increased
to 30,000 persons.'8
Apart from foreign trade, traditional cross-strait trade also continually grew in this
area. Unlike tea export, this sector was predominantly controlled by native merchants.
Small traders of textile, wood, crops and dry foods which developed in the previous
period gradually evolved into large wholesalers. As the riverside area was predominately
occupied by the European-owned agent houses, warehouses, and foreign banks, these
wholesalers concentrated at the shophouses in Middle Street, Middle-North Street and
North Street. To protect their collective interests, wholesalers organised themselves
through the Jiaws ('Guild' in native language).' 9 Two religious buildings - Chunghung
Temple and Matsu Temple - were built in South Street and became the focal point for
members of Jiaws to develop their social network and group identity.2°
The physical infrastructure of Dadowchang witnessed its first change at the end of
the nineteenth century as a result of the 'Modernisation Movement' initiated by the
Chinese government.2' In 1895, Taiwan was made one of the eighteen provinces of
China with Taipei designated as its capital. There was a determined effort made by
Taiwan's first governor, Liu Ming-Chung, to open up more of the forest for camphor
and timber industries, also to improve the ability of local merchants in competition with
foreign merchants (Wu, L., 1970, pp. 40-5). During the period 1885-90, Liu established
several administrative bodies, government-owned banks, tele-cominunication and foreign
17 Merchants purchased tea after they had been crudely processed by the growers. They then re-fired tea
at their tea-firing houses and restored in places which were adjacent to the firing houses. The actual
export operation was controlled by their agency houses (Gardella, 1994, PP. 63-9).18 See Wen, 1978, pp. 1-10; Lamley, 1977a, pp 168-73; Zeng, 1957, p101.
' A great number of Jaws were formed, such as Tang Jiaw (Sugar Guild), Mi Jiaw (Rice Guild) and Bu
Jiaw (Textile Guild), etc. They became the basic organization of local society (Yen, C, 1991, P.73).
See Zhou, 1957, p.88; King, 1988, pp. 504-5.
21 This movement, also known as the 'Self-Strengthening Movement', was initiated by the Chin Regime
after China was defeated by France in the 1884 Sino-France War. For a detail discussion of this
movement see Goddard, 1966 and Berr, 1974.
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language schools in Dadowchang. A railway line connecting Keelung, Taipei and
Hsinchu was constructed with a local station at the south of Dadowchang. It linked
Dadowchang with the Keelung Harbour, which was newly-built around a deep gulf about
26 km at the north of Taipei and served as the trade outlet for the Taipei Basin.
6.5.2 Dadowchang and Taiwan's Colonial Past
The Japanese demanded Taiwan as a colony in 1895 and determined to transfer this
island into a major agricultural supplier for Japan (cf. Kerr, 1966; Davison, 1903). To
accelerate the economic exploitation of this island, the colonial government introduced
high-yielding rice seeds, fertiiser and agricultural techniques into the agricultural sector
to increase productivity. Many traffic roads, railways and harbours were built subse-
quently to open more land for cultivation and to help the transportation of agricultural
products from the rural areas to large ports. In the early twentieth century, about 90 per
cent of sugar and 20 per cent of rice produced in Taiwan, together with other products
such as camphor, salt, wood, liquor, tobacco and opium, were exported to Japan. At the
same time, textile, food and metal products were imported from Japan and sold to the
local market of Taiwan.
Taipei's role as an administrative and commercial centre for Taiwan was resumed by
the colonial government. The 'City Area Modification Plan' was introduced to the city in
1905, under which Dadowchang was designed as a trade and commercial district. The
colonial government enhanced the function of the railway line between Keelung and
Dadowchang and built a new road (the present Yenping North Road) passing through
Dadowchang and Chengnei (the current CBD). North-middle Street, Middle Street and
South Street in Dadowchang were widened and combined to create another new road
(the current Dihua Street). The irregular street-pattern of Dadowchang was changed to a
grid system; and traffic flow was largely improved through resigning, realigning and
paving local roads (Map 6.5.1-2). Dadowcharig was re-divided into three Tings
('neighbourhood' in Japanese) - Taiping, Yunla and Zuhsin separated by Dihua Street
and Yenping North Road.
Government offices such as Mechanic Bureau, Trade Bureau, Custom Office, Border Control Office
and Currancy Bureau, were established between 1885 and 1890.
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The physical structure of Dadowchang was largely changed and most shophouses
were re-built during this period. These shophouses were constructed in contiguous
blocks connected by adjoining party walls and a covered passageway. They were also
clustered back to back with those at the neighbouring road. Shophouses were vezy
narrow in width (5m-8m) and long in length (above 24m) because all shops demanded
space fronting the main Street. They were two- or three-floors high and consisted of
three buildings Separated by two courtyards. This spatial arrangement enabled commer-
cial activities, residential space and workshop to be combined together without
disturbing each other. The covered passageway was generally used by shop owners for
displaying their goods (Yen, C., 1991, pp. 68-75).
Because of the rising demand for exports, tea processing and rice milling factories
continued to grow in Dadowchang. Not surprisingly, these export sectors were soon
monopolised by Japanese merchants. Their agent houses and tea factories replaced the
role that European-owned businesses and local producers had played previously. Tea
exports enabled Japan to take a decisive lead in the world market. Additionally, a large
rice-market for storage and marketing was built by the colonial government in an area
adjacent to the Taipei Railway Station. It aimed to help Japanese merchants in control-
ling the supply of rice more effectively. As a result, local merchants were forced to
withdraw from tea and rice exports. They turned to become Chinese medicine and rice
wholesalers serving the demand of the domestic market.
Foreign trade which heavily relied on tea and rice continued to flourish in this area
until the 1930s, when some changes in export markets occurred. First, tea exported from
Japan (and Taiwan) to the US decreased from 45 per cent to 25 per cent in 1930 while a
deluge of black tea from India, Ceylon and the Dutch East Indies controlled almost 60
percent of the US Market. Secondly, because of the world-wide recession, Japan's
economic development experienced its worst slump over years. Market prices of rice and
tea fell sharply because of over-supply. To protect its domestic agriculture industry,
Japan reduced the demand for importing rice and tea from their colonies. The change in
export markets seriously affected the local economy of Dadowchang. Local businesses
which thrived on the export of tea and rice exports began to become defunct.
See Pan, 1924, p.128; Sugiyama, 1988, pp. 145-52; Klopstock, 1936, p.31.
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Map 6.5.1 The Original Settlements of Taipei
Map 6.5.2 Dadowchang in I 895
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In the late 1 930s, Japan planned to conquer more territories in Southeast Asia
through military invasion. The Japanese used Taiwan as an army base and a place for
processing the raw materials extracted from their colonies (Behr, 1989; Davidson, 1988).
As a result, stockpiles, refuelling stations and garrisons for the imperial force were
located in Taiwan and some light industries, such as wood, rubber and food manu-
facturing sectors, were encouraged to develop in large cities. Taiwan began to witness
primary industrialisation. Industrial products accounted for 88.7 per cent of total produc-
tivity in 1942. The food-processing industry alone occupied 54 per cent of total industrial
output (Chen, 1951, pp. 18-9). The rise of the food-processing industry in Taipei
boosted the dry-food wholesale business in Dadowchang. There was a larger presence of
dry-food wholesalers in the second and the third sections of Dihua Street than in the
previous period. Textile and Chinese-medicine wholesalers, which were more import-
oriented, were small in numbers but remained relatively stable.
6.5.3 Dadowchang in the Post-War Development
The administrative boundary of Taipei remained the same after the KMT takeover, but
the whole area was re-divided into ten districts. The original settlements of the city -
Moungar, Dadowchang and Chengnei - were covered by four districts: Lungshan, Yen-
ping, Chengchung and Cheincheng. They were generally referred to as 'the old central
area'. By the end of the 1950s, the old central area had the highest density in terms of
population, commercial and industrial premises. As discussed previously, an import-
substitution strategy was adopted by the KMT government at this stage for economic
development. Manufacturing industries such as food, textile, wood and basic metal pro-
duction gained substantial growth in large cities. The number of registered factories in
Taipei increased to 4,448 in 1954. Since most of the peripheral area of the city had not
been developed, about 55 per cent of these factories were located in the old central area.
Although the land area of the four districts altogether only accounted for 20.8 per cent of
the total land area of Taipei, they provided 62 per cent of floor space for industrial and
commercial premises in the city (Chung, Y, 1987, p.6).
It was estimated that during this period, 14.5 per cent of food-processing industries,
13.9 per cent of textile and clothing industries, and 13.3 per cent of wood industries in
the city were located in Yenping District (Dodowchang). The number of registered
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factories in this area represented 13 per cent of the total in Taipei (Selya, 1995, p.73).
Due to the lack of floor space, some food-processing and textile factories packed
themselves into residential blocks. Textile and dry-food wholesalers in Dihua Street
regained their supply from these new factories and thus remained as the predominant
sectors in this area. The emergence of factories led to the expansion of the job market
and the influx of workers in Yenping District. The population increased from 58,000 in
1950 to the peak at 63,000 persons in 1964 (Census of Population, 1970, p5). The
population density became the highest among thirteen districts of Taipei. Several road-
widening plans were initiated by the government in Yenping District in the 1960s for
defence purposes. For instance, Chunching North Road and Chungta Road were both
widened to 30m in 1965. Taipei Bridge was rebuilt in 1968. Tachung Street was built as
a by-pass connecting Dihua Street and Chunghsiao West Road. Housing shortages
became more acute since many shophouses were demolished for road construction. As a
result, the remaining shophouses were rebuilt or altered to add more floor space. The
increase in residential population encouraged the growth of retail business in this area.
The riverside area was fully occupied by numerous squat houses, illegal factories and
transport companies. The overall physical environment began to decline.
Population and industries in Taipei both experienced a rapid growth in the 1970s.
The fringe area of the city, especially along several through routes linking the city and
the county, began to develop. Urban growth first occurred at a distance of 6.5 km from
the old core of the city during 1969-74 and at 10.5 km during 1975-79 (Chiang and
Hsiao, 1985, p.109). New development in the county area and the environmental decline
in the old central area caused an out-movement of population and industries. From 1968
to 1978, the population in the city area increased 47 per cent, while that of the county
area rose 126.6 per cent. Registered factories in the city area gained only a 25 per cent
increase, but the number of factories in the county area increased 244 per cent. The old
central area displayed a substantial loss of population and factories. The population in
this period slipped by 29.6 per cent in Lungshan, 30.8 per cent in Chenchung, 40.6 per
cent in Chiengchen and 38.3 per cent in Yenping.
The total population in Yenping District declined to 39,000 in 1978 (Tsai, T., 1985,
pp. 130-34). The wholesale business in this area was least affected by the out-movement
of industries and population. As mentioned before, textile and clothing industries in
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Taiwan both witnessed a remarkable growth in the export-oriented development after the
1970s. These industries had a large presence in the county area on the other side of the
Tamshui River. The expansion of the textile market resulted in the increasing number of
textile wholesalers - who acted as 'middlemen' between suppliers (domestic-owned
textile industries or textile importers) and consumers (clothing factories and retail shops).
The location of Yenping District provided wholesalers with a great advantage because
they could easily reach local suppliers in the county area through the Taipei Bridge. By
the end of the 1970s, about 80 per cent, or 420, textile wholesalers in Taiwan were
located in Dihua Street and its surrounding area. Apart from textile wholesalers, dry-
food wholesalers were also active in this area. They obtained raw materials from local
growers or import from other countries, such as China and Japan, then re-sell to food-
processing factories, retail shops and restaurants. The number of Chinese medicine
wholesalers was relatively small due to the lack of supply. But this sector gained its
growth from the 1980s when traders were allowed to import raw materials from China.
Although the government started squatter clearance and urban renewal in Yenping
District, the main purpose of the official plans was to solve traffic congestion. Thus they
had very little to do with the regeneration of the overall environment. For instance, a
urban renewal plan (Wanda Plan) was implemented during 1972-74 by which all squatter
houses on the riverside area were removed. Following on the squatter clearance, the
government demolished old agent-houses on the riverside area in 1978 to enable Hungha
North Road to be widened to 30m. Kuisui Street was also widened in 1979 with its
street market removed. Yunla market - a traditional wet market at the southern end of
Dihua Street - was demolished in 1980 and replaced by a large office and shopping
complex. Land parcels along major traffic roads such as Chungching North Road,
Nanking West road and Yenping North Road, were gradually redeveloped by landlords
who were in partnership with real estate companies. However, the remaining shophouses
concentrated in Dihua Street and were occupied by dry food, Chinese medicine and
textile wholesalers. Many shophouses lost their residential function and were only used
as working places since many family members of these local businesses had already
moved out to other areas (Yen, C., 1991, p.92).
6.5.4 Changes in Land Value and Land Use (1965-1983)
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The above analysis provides a general account of the changes in the physical structure
and the local economy in Dadowchang over time. What follows is an analysis of land
values in Yenping District in relation to the Central Business District and other areas
located at different distances from the centre. Given the fact that the Dadowchang
Special Zoning only covers one part of Yenping District, I also study land values in the
DSZ in relation to its adjacent area and Yenping District as a whole. The main purpose is
to understand the changes in land values and their implications for property investment in
the DSZ. They also prepare the background for our discussion of the impacts of policy
on land values in the later section.
It is generally accepted that the transaction price has been the best way to illustrate
the market value of land. The first point that one should note is that in Taiwan's context,
the transaction price of land means the value of land with vacant possession. This is
because the land-holding system ensures that owners have absolute property right.
Generally, sitting tenants would be evicted when owners decide to sell their land or
properties. In Taipei, transaction data can be obtained from real estate agencies and law
companies who have helped to organise the deals, or from the National Tax Revenue
Board and the land department of the local government. Unexpectedly, there have been
some problems of collecting data at a city scale.
First, in some areas of Taipei where land ownership is highly fragmented, land trans-
actions have not been through professional agencies (Chang, L, 1986, p.32). This is
because property development in these areas has been initiated through co-operative
construction during which landlords form a partnership with developers to develop their
land with a joint construction contract signed to share the finished units. Landlords
generally can obtain 40-60 per cent of the finished units. Developers do not need any
initial payment for land and 20-30 per cent down payment is enough to cover the
material and labour cost. In this type of co-operative construction, the deal is not
arranged by professional agencies but by members of the partnership. The arrangement is
on a private agreement thus both parties are not subject to pay business contract tax. The
details of transaction are difficult to access by a third party. The land department of the
municipal government releases two sets of land values - the 'officially announced land
value' (OLV) and the 'official announced market value' (OMV) - every year. The former
is the value of land under its present use while the later represents the market price of
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land. As mentioned previously, the OMV has been modified for several reasons and can
not represent the real transaction price. The actual price can be obtained from the
original assessment reports generated by land surveyors from the land department. These
reports are made at a neighbourhood scale and contain the details of land transactions,
including land value, land ownership, land area, etc. Unfortunately, the information has
been recorded on hundreds of notebooks in hand-writing. Some of these reports have
been lost or become unreadable. This makes a study of land value at a city scale become
extremely difficult. Finally, transaction prices recorded by the National Tax Revenue
Board are probably the most accurate data but are not released to the public for privacy
reasons.
Hence, to generate land value at a city scale for a long time-period, I applied a land-
value index to the transaction prices obtained from the assessment reports completed in
1980 (Appendix 1. 28)?' Land values in Chengchung (CBD) and seven districts located
at different distances away from the centre, including Lungshang, Yenping, Chungshan,
Taan, Shungshan, Chingmei and Neihu, were selected for analysis. The average land
values in these districts at four different time points - 1965, 1970, 1975 and 1980 - were
plotted against the distance between the CBD and the centroid of each district (Figure
6.5.1).
The value curves of 1965 and 1970 suggest that in the 1960s, land values declined
with increasing distance from the CBD. The difference of land values among districts
such as Lungshang, Yenping, Chungshan and Taan was not very significant. Land value
in Chungshan was slightly higher than others owing to a large presence of offices, hotels
and restaurants, which served the US military force and a growing number of foreign
traders (Tsen, S., 1994, p.154). Land values in Shungshan, Chingmei and Neihu were
relatively low. It seems that at this stage, urban development was limited to a 4 km
radius from the centre.
Land values in selected districts increased at a different pace in the early 1970s.
Urban development accelerated in Chungshang and Shungshan, therefore resulting in a
24 Land value index created on the basis of transaction data is by far the most applicable way to speculate
the change in land value over time (Lim, Y.,1975, 1987, Li, C. 1964, Yen, S., 1980). Lim (1987)
combined statistical methods and 60,000 samples obtained from the land department and the National
Tax Revenue Board to generate land index for each district from 1964 to 1986.
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Figure 6.5.1 Distribution of Land Values, Taipei
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Figure 6.5.2 Land Values in Venping District, Taipei
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substantial increase in land values in both areas. The observable rise in land values in
Neihu also suggested that at this stage, urban development in the peripheral area began
to take shape. Land values in Lungshang and Yenping did not increase as much as in
other districts. The distribution of land values in the city changed drastically. As can be
seen from Figure 6.5.1, the value curve of 1975 already evolved into a bimodal curve.
Lungshan and Yenping were at the lowest point of the curve, giving a land value level
quite at variance with other districts within 4 km distance from the centre.
This trend appears to have continued in the late 1970s. There was a smaller increase
in land values in Lungshang and Yenping where property development was slow and
halting. Land values in Shungshan, by contrast, exhibited a substantial growth. This
could be ascribed to the designation of the Hsinyi Sub-Centre Special Zoning in the
south of Shunshan District. Land and property development in this area was accelerated
by giant enterprise groups and life-insurance companies. Shungshan thus surpassed other
districts and became the second most expensive area of the city. This development had a
great impact on Taan District, which was located at only 1 km distance away from
Shungshan. Land values also experienced a substantial increase in the late 1970s.
Furthermore, urban development in the suburban area also continued. Land values in
Neihu gradually surpassed Lungshang and Yenping.
Drawing on these, it is without much doubt that in the 1970s, urban development in
the city was moving from the CBD towards certain areas around the Hsinyi Sub-Centre,
also to certain areas in the periphery. Accordingly, land values in the sub-centre, the
fringe area of the sub-centre and the suburban area witnessed sharp increases. The
disparity of land values among areas was evident. Land values in the CBD and the sub-
centre were even 2.8 times higher than that in Lungshang and Yenping (Appendix 1.27).
At a neighbourhood scale, there are some subtle differences of land values between
the Dadowchang Special Zoning and its adjacent area. The data used here have been
obtained directly from the assessment reports. For analytical purposes, I divide the DSZ
into two areas - Dihua Street and Hungha North Road - for reason that the former is
directed controlled by the conservation guidelines but the later is less affected. Land
values at blocks fronting Yenping North Road and Chungching North Road - two main
roads running parallel to Dihua Street some distance away - were added for comparison.
Chapter Six
	 312
It will be noted that during the period of 1968-78, the average land values in the four
sub-areas were far below that in Yenping District as a whole. The Chunching North
Road area had the highest land value among four areas since Chunching North Road had
been widened to 30m in 1965. Even so, the average land value in this area only
accounted for one-third of that in Yenping District. Nevertheless, land values in the
Dihua Street area, the Hunghua North Road area and the Yenping North Road area rose
more significantly than the overall Yenping district. The Hunghua North Road area,
especially, gained a 532 per cent increase in land value over time. This could be ascribed
to the implementation of the Wanda Plan during the period of 1972-74.
Entering the period of 1979-83, land values in the four sub-areas grew at a faster
pace than Yenping District as a whole. The release of the road-widening plan in 1978,
the removal of a street market in Kuasui Street (a division of Dihua street) in 1979 and
the construction of Yunla Shopping Complex in the south of Dihua Street in 1980 might
Table 6.5.1 Land Value in the Dadowchang Special Zoning and its Adjacent Area, 1964-1988
	
Dadowchang Special Zoning	 Adjacent Area	 Yenping District
Dihua Street	 Hungha ND	 Chunching ND Yenping ND
	MV	 MV	 MV	 % MV %
	
MV	 %
(sq.m.) Change (sq.m.) Change (sq.m.) Change (sq.m.) Change (sq.m.)
	 Change
1968	 7,696	 -	 5,577	 -	 12,914	 -	 3,920	 -	 16,848
1969	 8,938	 16.1	 6,064	 8.7	 15,231	 17.9	 4,884	 24.6	 19,856	 17.9
1970	 8,938	 0.0	 6,310	 4.1	 15,231	 0.0	 5,170	 5.9	 20,057	 1.0
1971	 9,036	 1.1	 6,573	 4.2	 15,311	 0.5	 5,170	 0.0	 20,051	 0.5
1972	 13,926	 54.1	 6,869	 4.5	 15,311	 0.0	 7,491	 44.9	 20,051	 0.0
1973	 14,873	 6.8	 12,603	 83.5	 17,945	 17.2	 9,002	 20.2	 24,157	 19.1
1974	 22,384	 50.5	 18,167	 44.2	 34,908	 94.5	 13,117	 45.7	 24,008	 102.3
1975	 21,116	 -5.7	 21,615	 19.0	 37,146	 6.4	 13,622	 3.8	 48,578	 1.2
1976	 25.767	 22.0	 27,540	 27.4	 40,437	 8.9	 17,298	 27.0	 49,180	 21.8
1977	 32,226	 25.1	 31,314	 13.7	 48,971	 21.1	 22,759	 31.6	 59,890	 16.6
1978	 32,337	 0.3	 35,265	 12.6	 49,278	 0.6	 23,387	 2.8	 70,881	 1.5
1964-
1978
1979	 44,598
1980	 66,493
1981	 94,024
1982	 97,231
1983	 99,931
320.2
	
37.9	 46,303
	
49.1	 59,317
	
41.4	 69,981
	
3.4	 73,582
	
2.8	 74,946
532.3	 281.6
	
31.3	 66,324	 34.6
	
28.1	 77,650	 17.1
	
18.0	 107,256	 38.1
	
5.1	 108,903	 1.5
	
10.0	 120,883	 11.0
496.6	 320.7
	
34,038	 45.5	 97,457	 37.5
	
57,338	 68.5	 104,256	 7.0
	
100,962 76.1	 134,743	 29.2
	
102,885	 1.9	 136,548	 1.3
	
105,568	 2.6	 137,992	 1.1
1979-	 124.1	 61.9	 82.3	 210.1	 41.61983
Source: Land Department, Taipei Municipal Department
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have helped the increase in land value in the Dihua Street area. The percentage change in
land value in this area was 124 per cent, almost three times of that in Yenping District.
The growth of land value in the Yenping North Road area was also evident after the
change of zoning from residential use to commercial use in 1979. Land value in this area
increased 210 per cent, more than five times than in Yenping District.
However, in the early 1980s, land values in the four sub-areas moved closer to each
other. Land value in the Chungching North Road area in particular, was almost similar to
that in Yenping District. It is difficult to measure to what extent land values were directly
affected by public construction because other economic and social factors were not
included and analysed. Yet there is little doubt that a substantial increase in land values
did take place spontaneously or after urban renewal and road widening. The distribution
of land values in the four selected areas became more even than the previous period.
The change in land use provided another important aspect of the development of the
locality. The historic data on land use were generated from two land-use surveys,
conducted by the Urban Planning Board in 1952 and 1969 respectively. One should be
aware that in both surveys, only land use on the ground floors in Dihua Street was re-
corded. Hence, land use on the upper floors remained unclear. Additionally, after the
above mentioned period, for some reasons land-use survey did not continue. The lack of
data made the study of land-use change in the 1970s impossible. However, there were
317 land-use data from each survey respectively. I divided land use into three categories:
residential use, commercial use and vacant. Commercial use was further divided into five
sub-categories, including Chinese medicine, dry food, rice, textile, general trade/service.
Dihua Street consisted of four sections from the north to the south (Map 6.5.3). The
data were firstly grouped according to their location and then classified by the categories
of land use.
As can be seen from Table 6.5.2, about 65 per cent of shophouses in Dihua Street
were used for commercial use in 1952 and the remaining 35 per cent were for residential
use. Among the sub-categories of commercial use, general trade and service which
mainly served the residential population was the strongest sector. The percentage share
was high, at 28.7 per cent of the total. Chinese medicine, dry food, rice and textile
wholesales, altogether represented 36.1 per cent of the total. From 1952 to 1969,
residential use had witnessed a 15 per cent reduction and the percentage share decreased
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to 20.2 per cent. It was countered by the increase in commercial use, which accounted
for 80 per cent of the total in 1969. Amongst the sub-categories of commercial use, rice
wholesale, general trade and service increased 10.8 per Cent and 3.8 per cent respec-
tively. Dry food, Chinese medicine and textile wholesales seems to have remained stable.
It is well asserted that land use on Dihua Street became more commercialised due to the
growth of general trade and services. The variety of retail and service in this sector con-
tributed to the diversity of commercial activities in this area.
Table 6.5.2 Change in Land Use in Dihua Street, Taipei, 1952-1969
Residential	 Commercial	 Vacant Total
Use	 Use
Chinese	 Dry	 Rice Textile General Sub-total
Medicine food
Section (1)
Number	 35	 16	 4	 5	 0	 41	 66	 0	 101
%of Total	 34.6	 15.8	 3.9	 4.9	 0.0	 40.5	 65.3	 0.0	 100
Section (2)
Number	 38	 17	 14	 5	 0	 6	 42	 0	 80
%of Total	 47.5	 21.2	 17.5	 6.2	 0.0	 7.5	 52.5	 0.0	 100
Section (3)
Number	 18	 9	 17	 2	 0	 4	 32	 0	 50
% of Total	 36.0	 18.0	 34.0	 4.0	 0.0	 8.0	 64.0	 0.0	 100
Section (4)
Number	 20	 4	 5	 0	 17	 40	 66	 0	 86
%of Total	 23.2	 4.6	 5.8	 0.0	 19.7	 46.5	 76.7	 0.0	 100
Total
Number	 111	 46	 40	 12	 17	 91	 206	 0	 317
%of Total	 35.0	 14.5	 12.6	 3.7	 5.3	 28.7	 64.9	 0.0	 100
1969
Section (1)
Number	 17	 26	 9	 13	 3	 33	 84	 0	 101
% of Total	 16.8	 25.7	 8.9	 12.9	 3.0	 32.7	 83.2	 0.0	 100
Section (2)
Number	 27	 4	 16	 23	 0	 10	 53	 0	 80
%of Total	 33.8	 5.0	 20.0	 28.8	 0.0	 12.5	 66.3	 0.0	 100
Section(3)
Number	 14	 9	 11	 6	 0	 10	 36	 0	 50
% of Total	 28.0	 18.0	 22.0	 12.0	 0.0	 20.0	 72.0	 0.0	 100
Section (4)
Number	 6	 9	 3	 4	 14	 50	 80	 0	 86
% of Total	 7.0	 10.5	 3.5	 4.7	 16.3	 58.1	 93.0	 0.0	 100
Total
Number	 64	 48	 39	 46	 17	 103	 253	 0	 .317
%of Total	 20.2	 15.1	 12.3	 14.5	 5.4	 32.5	 79.8	 0.0	 100
Percentage Change
Section (1)	 -17.8	 9.9	 5.0	 8.0	 3.0	 -7.8	 17.9	 0.0	 -
Section (2)	 -13.7	 -16.2	 2.5	 22.6	 0.0	 5.0	 13.8	 0.0	 -
Section (3)
	
-8.0	 0.0	 -12.0	 8.0	 0.0	 12.0	 8.0	 0.0	 -
Section (4)	 -16.2	 5.9	 -2.3	 4.7	 -3.4	 1.6	 16.3	 0.0	 -
Total	 -15	 0.7	 -0.3	 10.8	 0.1	 3.8	 14.9	 0.0	 -
Source: YFCE, 1989
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It is also noted that there was an agglomeration of commercial activities at different
locations on Dihua Street. Dry food wholesalers tended to concentrate in the second and
the third sections, while rice wholesalers occupied the first and the second sections, and
textile wholesalers were located in the forth section. General trade and services, which
expanded as a result of the increase of residential population, tended to concentrate at
the northern and southern ends of the street. Chinese medicine wholesalers, who consti-
tuted a relatively small sector, were in the first and the second sections in 1952, then
moved north to the first section in 1969. Nevertheless, dry food, rice and textile whole-
salers had developed at the locations mentioned from the colonial period onwards. Their
position seems to have not been changed.
6.6 The Decade of Chaos: Conservation Dilemma in Dadowchang
The road-widening plan for Dihua Street was abandoned in 1983 due to the designation
of the Dadowchang Special Zoning. The local government adopted a conservation-based
redevelopment strategy aiming to renovate the locality through the preservation of shop-
houses in Dihua Street. During the planning process, divergent views on shophouse pre-
servation emerged amongst civil groups, the local community and different levels of
government. Private owners of shophouses and preservationists mobiised themselves to
dispute the right of territory. The policy decision-making was thus shared by these
groups which possessed different kinds of political influence. The planning authority was
in a transitional situation in which the planning regime itself was not designed for public
participation but in which they were asked to operate in the environment of interest-
group pluralism. Hence, from 1983 to 1995, the policy and the boundary of the DSZ
were changed several times in order to create an acceptable agenda. Yet the situation
was still deadlocked and there seems to have been a great uncertainty about the future of
the policy.
Under these circumstances, both the public and private sectors were poorly moti-
vated and their plans had hardly got off the ground. Due to the lack of investment,
numerous problems existing in the locality before the introduction of the DSZ, such as
traffic congestion, the excessive fragmentation of land ownership, the decline in property
values and the shortage of public facilities, remained largely unsolved. Furthermore, as
long as the debate continued, the Cultural Construction Committee would not take any
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move to gazette shophouses as historical heritage; thus there existed no formal
legislation to preserve them. Although the local planning authority could prevent the
demolition of shophouses by ceasing building permission for comprehensive redevelop-
ment, they were unable to prohibit alteration of shophouses, which was accepted by the
planning law. Many owners, in attempts to reduce costs, carried out repairs with inferior
and unsuitable materials. The authority had no means to interfere if owners did not main-
tain shophouses in a proper manner or created damages to them deliberately. Since the
policy of the DSZ was distorted in a number of ways, physical development of Dihua
Street turned into chaos.
I wonder whether the government know what they are doing. The boundary of the DSZ has
changed many times since 1983. It is really annoying because my shophouse has been
constantly in and out of the DSZ. I do not know how to follow the policy really........... I have to
rebuild the back portion of the shophouse because the roof almost falls down and it is very
dangerous to work there....I do not care what they say. No one actually knows what is going to
happen in the future.
(Informant T.1)
The government first allowed me to repair the second portion of the shophouse and build an
additional floor on the top of it.. As the policy changed, they came to tell me my plan to rebuild
the front portion of this house was illegal.......... I
 am a law-abiding citizen. But, the policy
changes all the time and even planning officers do not know what to follow. If you listen to
them, you will turn out to be an idiot. Now I am doing things in my own way.
(Informant, T.4)
Table 6.6.1 shows that in 1995, only 9 per cent of shophouses in Dihua Street were
preserved or partly preserved according to the conservation guidelines, while a majority
of 40.7 per cent were altered, 26.9 per cent were reconstructed, 3.4 per cent were under
reconstruction and another 19.5 per cent were left di1apidated. More precisely, the
northern sections of Dihua Street had a higher percentage of shophouses reconstructed
or under reconstruction (59.8 per cent and 22.0 per cent respectively) and a lower
percentage of shophouses preserved or partly preserved (7.2 per cent and 6.6 per cent).
The southern sections, on the contrary, had a relatively small percentage of shophouses
To understand the physical development of the locality, I firstly divided a total of 297 remaining
shophouses in Dihua Street into five categories according to their physical state. Amongst these
categories, I classified shophouses restored under the official guidelines as 'preserved or partly
preserved'. Shophouses which were left vacant and seriously damaged due to the lack of maintenance
was placed under the category of 'dilapidated'. A distinction was also made between shophouses which
were 'altered' and which were 'reconstructed'. The former meant the replacement of internal structure
with new materials, and the latter meant the entire change of internal and external structure through
building new additions or extensions.
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Table 6.6.1 Shophouse Renovation in Dihua Street, Taipei, 1995
Preserved or Dilapidated Altered
	 Under re- Reconstructed Total
Partly preserved	 construction
Section(l )-(4)
Number	 28	 58	 121	 10	 80	 297
%of the total	 9.6	 19.5	 40.7	 3.4	 26.9	 100
Section (1)
Number	 7	 20	 12	 4	 54	 97
% of the total 	 7.2	 20.6	 12.4	 4.1	 55.7	 100
Section (2)
Number	 6	 17	 48	 3	 17	 91
%of the total	 6.6	 18.7	 52.7	 3.3	 18.7	 100
Section (3)
Number	 9	 8	 29	 1	 0	 47
% of the total 	 19.1	 17.0	 61.7	 2.1	 0.0	 100
Section (4)
Number	 6	 12	 30	 2	 8	 58
%of the total	 10.4	 20.7	 51.7	 3.4	 13.8	 100
Source: Field Survey Conducted by the Author in 1995
reconstructed or under reconstruction (2.1 per cent and 17.2 per cent), a very large
proportion of shophouses altered (61.7 per cent and 51.7 per cent), and a higher percent-
age of shophouses preserved or partly preserved (19.1 per cent and 10.4 per cent). In
short, there was only a small proportion of shophouses restored or redeveloped in
conformity with the official plans, but a majority of shophouses altered or re-constructed
by their private owners to accommodate their present use. Most importantly, there was a
great number of shophouses left dilapidated as some landlords boycotted the policy.
The aesthetic and physical deterioration caused by the uncertainty of the policy threw
a dark shadow on the property market in the DSZ.
The physical appearance of Dihua Street turns to be an absolute mess. Most shophouses have
been altered or extended to adopt new uses. Some shophouses have been abandoned or left
decayed because their owners are against conservation. For property developers or home-buyers,
this area does not have too much attraction.
(Informant T.4)
The authority allows private owners to build new buildings behind the front portions of
shophouses. The combination turns out to be an absolute failure. These buildings look so ugly.
Someone even says they look like tombs. This image represents death and bad fortune. The
good 'Fung Shui' in this area has been destroyed. That is why no one wants to buy these flats.
(Informant T.5)
During the period 1983-95, there were a total of twenty-one property development
projects involving the redevelopment of thirty-one shophouses taking place in Dihua
Street. The data is presented in Table 6.6.2 and divided by three periods: 1983-85, 1986-
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92, 1993-96 on the ground that these projects had been redeveloped according to
various regulations in different time periods. It is shown that six out of twenty-one
projects were completed in Dihua Street during the initial period, namely, between the
announcement of the DSZ and the release of legislation for development control (the
GB C). Due to the policy vacuum, all of them involved the entire demolition of shop-
houses and the redevelopment of land according to urban design guidelines. After re-
development, a total number of eighty-nine flats were released to the market and sold at
prices of NT$ 84,000-105,000 p.sq.m. The prices were very similar to the average price
of newly-built flats in Yenping District during the same period (Appendix, 1.22). It is
also notified that 80-100 per cent of flats generated from these projects were sold
successfully.
Ten development projects were undertaken in Dihua Street between 1986 and 1992.
Five out of them involved shophouses which were listed as 'third grade historic
buildings' by the GDSSZ. It means that some part of the front portions of shophouses
would be retained but new buildings were allowed to be constructed at their back. The
other five projects were located in Kanku Street, Anshi Street and Kuasui Street - the
sub-divisions of Dihua Street. The original shophouses were entirely demolished and new
buildings were constructed according to design guidelines. However, after redevelop-
ment, a total of ninety-three flats were completed and sold to the market. Interestingly,
new flats completed in 1986 were sold at prices of NT$ 80,000-12,000 p.sq.m. The
prices jumped almost three times to NT$ 289,000-315,000 p.sq.m. in 1989. This situa-
tion needs to be carefully examined. As we have seen before, the late 1980s was a critical
period for Taipei's property market. The prices for newly-built flats in Taipei increased
enormously since the price mechanism of the property market was broken down by the
speculative demand. For instance, the average price for newly-built flats in Yenping Dis-
trict was NT$ 845,000 in 1986. It soared more than three times to NT$ 267,9000
p.sq.m. in 1989 (Appendix 1.22). Hence, the remarkable increase in prices of newly-built
flats in Dihua Street during the period 1986-89 should not be considered as an individual
event but a reflection of the general trend in the property market in Taipei in the late
1980s.
The seffing rate of new flats generated from these project provides another important
aspect. It is reported that six out of ten projects did not sell out completely. The selling
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Table 6.6.2 Housing Development in the Dadowchang Special Zoning, Taipei, 1983-1995
Address	 Year of	 Type of Development Number of Price(NT$1O,000 Selling rate
Construction	 Unit	 p.sq.m.)	 (%)
1981-1985
Dihua Street
Section(2)
No.258	 1983	 5F apartment	 5	 9.2	 100%
No.238-40	 1984	 7F apartment	 14	 8.4	 90%
Section(3)
No.147	 1983	 8Fapartment	 8	 10.2	 100%
Section(4)
No.63	 1983	 SF apartment	 32	 10.3	 90%
No.99	 1983	 5Fapartment	 10	 10.6	 80%
No.48-50	 1983	 IOF apartment	 20	 10.5	 90%
1986-1 992
Dihua Street
Section(1)
No.304-306	 1989	 7F apartment	 7	 24.6	 29%
No.267-277	 1989	 1OF apartment	 22	 31.5	 59%
No.279-285	 1990	 1OF apartment	 30	 30.0	 33%
Section(2)
No.214	 1987	 5Fapartment	 10	 10.9	 40%
Section(4)
No.104	 1991	 (Permission granted but no construction)
No.89-91	 1986	 8Fapartment	 24	 11.9	 55%
Kanku Street
No.22	 1986	 6F apartment	 24	 7.9	 75%
No.35	 1990	 16F office	 26	 48.0	 42%
Anshi Street
No.99	 1989	 SF studio fIat 	 10	 19.7	 80%
Kuasui Street
No.170	 1989	 llFstudioflat	 40	 28.9	 91%
No.4	 1986	 1OF apartment	 40	 7.6	 25%
1992-1995
Dihua Street
Section(1)
No.339	 1992	 (Permission granted but no construction)
No.356	 1992	 (Permission granted but no construction)
No.309	 1992	 (Permission granted but no construction)
No.366	 1993	 (Permission granted but no construction)
No.345	 1995	 9F apartment	 (Under construction)
Source: Liba Real Estate, Taipei; Public Works Department, Taipei Municipal Government
rate of these new flats was in a range between 30 and 50 per cent. The acceptance of
these flats by the market appears to have been questionable. It affected the development
projects initiated in the later period. For instance, the owners of the shophouse at No.
114 Dihua Street had obtained permission in 1991 to redevelop their land. In conditions
that made new flats difficult to sell, they decided to suspend their development project
(Informant T.1). The property glut became evident after the release of the DPDSZ in
1992. Five projects were granted building permission during the period 1992-95. Four of
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them were completely withdrawn, with only one project under construction (Table
6.6.2).
Another way to inspect the development of the locality is through the change in land
use. In the previous section I mentioned that the absence of data after 1969 created diffi-
culties for our understanding of land use in the 1970s. Alternatively, I compared the
1969 data with the data obtained from a land-use survey which was conducted by the
YFCE in 1989. The comparison could present the major differences between land use at
two points of time, but has little to say whether the designation of the DSZ in 1983 and
the introduction of the GBC in 1985 have directly affected this change. The data of land
use obtained from my field survey in 1995 was added to the analysis. This enables me to
study the changes in land use after the introduction of the GDSSZ in 1988 and the
DPDSZ in 1992.
Table 6.6.3 Land Use in Dihua Street, Taipei, 1989, 1995
Residential	 Commercial	 Office Vacant Total
Use	 Use	 Use
Chinese Dry Rice Textile General Sub-
Medicine food	 total
Section (1)
Number	 29	 6	 27	 1	 1	 36	 71	 0	 1	 101
% of the total	 28.7	 5.9	 26.7	 1.0	 1.0	 35.6	 70.3	 0	 1.0	 100
Section (2)
Number	 4	 5	 45	 1	 1	 21	 73	 0	 3	 80
%ofthetotal	 5.0	 6.3	 56.3	 1.3	 1.3	 26.3	 91.3	 0	 3.8	 100
Section (3)
Number	 0	 13	 33	 0	 0	 4	 50	 0	 0	 50
% of the total	 0.0	 26.0	 66.0	 0.0	 0.0	 8.0	 100.0	 0.0	 0.0	 100
Section (4)
Number	 0	 29	 10	 0	 36	 26	 101	 0	 3	 104
%of the total	 0.0	 27.9	 9.6	 0.0	 34.6	 25.0	 97.1	 0	 2.9	 100
Total
Number	 33	 53	 115	 2	 38	 87	 295	 0	 7	 335
% of the total	 9.9	 15.8	 34.3	 0.6	 11.3	 26.0	 88.1	 0.0	 2.1	 100
Section (1)
Number	 23	 4	 12	 4	 3	 26	 49	 3	 15	 90
%of the total	 25.6	 4.4	 13.3	 4.4	 3.3	 28.9	 54.4	 3.3	 16.7	 100
Section (2)
Number	 13	 7	 38	 6	 0	 20	 71	 2	 4	 90
%ofthetotal	 14.4	 7.8	 42.2	 6.7	 0.0	 22.2	 78.9	 2.2	 4.4	 100
Section (3)
Number	 0	 23	 28	 2	 0	 2	 55	 1	 0	 56
%of the total	 0.0	 41.1	 50.0	 3.6	 0.0	 3.6	 98.2	 1.8	 0.0	 100
Section (4)
Number	 0	 33	 22	 0	 29	 5	 89	 5	 5	 99
%of the total	 0.0	 33.3	 22.2	 0.0	 29.3	 5.1	 89.9	 5.1	 5.1	 100
Total
Number	 36	 67	 100	 12	 32	 53	 264	 11	 24	 335
% of the total	 10.7	 20.0	 29.9	 3.6	 9.6	 15.8	 78.8	 3.3	 7.2	 100
Source: YFCE, 1989; Field Survey Conducted by the Author in 1995
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According to the 1989 survey, residential use in Dihua Street witnessed a 10.3 per
cent decline since 1969 while commercial use increased 8.2 per cent. The percentage
share of residential use thus decreased to 9.9 per cent in 1989 and commercial use
accounted for 88 per cent of the total. It also notified that 2.1 per cent of floor space was
left vacant. Amongst the sub-categories of commercial uses, rice wholesale and general
trade declined 13.9 per cent and 6.5 per cent respectively. They were countered by the
increase of dry food, Chinese medicine and textile wholesalers, which accounted for 22
per cent, 0.7 per cent and 6 per cent respectively. In 1989, three sectors altogether made
up 60.2 per cent of the total (Table 6.6.3-4). It is obvious that land use on Dihua Street
was more commercialjsed in 1989 than in 1969. Moreover, commercial activities were
more specialised and were dominated by Chinese medicine, dry-food and textile whole-
salers. General trade and services declined as a result of the out-movement of residential
population in the 1970s. The agglomeration of commercial activities remained largely
unchanged, except that Chinese medicine wholesalers, which previously concentrated in
the second section of Dihua Street, by then moved to the third and the forth sections.
From 1989 to 1995, commercial use experienced a 9.3 per cent decline, and the per-
centage share dropped to 78.8 per cent. Residential use accounted for 10 per cent of the
total. Approximately 3.3 per cent of shophouses were under office use and 7.2 per cent
of them were left vacant. The number of shophouses used by dry food, Chinese medicine
Table 6.6.4 Change in Land Use in Dihua Street, Taipei, 1969-89, 1989-1995
Residential	 Commercial	 Office Vacant
Use	 Use	 Use
	
Chinese Dry	 Rice	 Textile General Sub-total
Medicine Food
% Change of Land Use
1969-1989
Dihua Street	 -10.3	 0.7	 22.0	 -13.9	 6.0	 -6.5	 8.2	 -	 -
Section(1)	 11.9	 -19.8	 17.8	 -11.9	 -2.0	 3.0	 -12.9	 -	 -
Section(2)	 -28.8	 1.3	 36.3	 -27.5	 1.3	 13.8	 25.0	 -	 -
Section(3)	 -28.0	 8.0	 44.0	 -12.0	 0.0	 -12.0	 28.0	 -	 -
Section(4)	 -7.0	 17.4	 6.1	 -4.7	 18.3	 -33.1	 4.1	 -	 -
1989-1 995
Dihua Street	 0.9	 4.2	 -4.5	 3.0	 -1.8	 -10.1	 -9.3	 3.3	 5.1
Section(1)	 -3.2	 -1.5	 -13.4	 3.5	 2.3	 -6.8	 -15.9	 2.2	 15.7
Section(2)	 9.4	 1.5	 -14.0	 5.4	 -1.3	 -4.0	 -12.4	 1.8	 0.7
Section(3)	 0.0	 15.1	 -16.0	 3.6	 0.0	 -4.4	 -1.8	 5.1	 0.0
Section(4)	 0.0	 5.4	 12.6	 0.0	 -5.3	 -19.9	 -7.2	 3.3	 2.2
Source: YFCE, 1989; Field Survey Conducted by the Author in 1995
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and textile wholesalers remained stable. Altogether they made up 59.5 per cent of the
total. General trade and service experienced a sharp decline and the percentage share fell
to 15.8 per cent. It seems that the commercialisation of land use led by the growth of
general trade and service in the previous period had already ceased. There were fewer
shophouses used for commercial activities and more of them under residential use or left
vacant. Commercial specialisation in this area appears to have continued and the pattern
of agglomeration remained the same.
The trends of property development and land use in Dihua Street reflected on land
values. From 1984 to 1995, the average land value in the Dihua Street area increased
130 per cent while that in the Hungha North Road area rose 104 per cent (Table 6.6.5).
The increase in land value in the DSZ seems to have been limited in comparison with that
in the previous period (Table 6.5.1). Yet it is also noticed that the average land value in
Yenping District only increased 50 per cent. This is because at this stage, the focus of
urban development had already moved to the sub-centre and the suburban area. Hence,
land values in most places in Yenping District were affected. The change in land values in
the DSZ could be just a reflection of the general situation in Yenping District.
Table 6.6.5 Land Values in the Dadowchang Special Zoning and its Adjacent Area, 1984-1995
	
Dadowchang Special Zoning 	 Adjacent Area	 Yenping District
Dihua Street	 Hungha ND
	
Chunching ND Yenping ND
MV	 MV	 MV	 % MV %	 MV	 %
(sq.m.) Change (sq.m.) Change (sq.m.) Change (sq.m.) Change (sq.m.)	 Change
1984	 116,646	 16.7	 76,855	 8.5	 135,65!	 12.2	 170,557	 61.6	 138,794	 0.6
1985	 131,484	 12.7	 77,359	 0.6	 151,311	 11.5	 180,690	 5.9	 139,797	 0.7
1986	 147,216	 12.0	 79,883	 2.9	 167,874	 10.9	 192,566	 6.6	 140,600	 0.6
1987	 163,841	 11.3	 100,215	 10.3	 185,340	 10.4	 218,263	 13.3	 140,800	 0.1
1988	 181,360	 10.7	 108,584	 8.4	 203,707	 9.9	 245,525	 12.5	 145,213	 3.1
1989	 199,773	 10.2	 117,276	 8.0	 222,978	 9.5	 274,352	 11.7	 149,567	 2.7
1990	 219,170	 9.7	 126,293	 7.7	 243,150	 9.0	 304,744	 11.1	 157,543	 5.3
1991	 239,460	 9.3	 135,632	 7.4	 264,225	 8.7	 336,700 10.5	 168,772	 7.0
1992	 258,440	 7.9	 142,132	 4.8	 283,400	 7.3	 369,840	 9.8	 173,986	 2.9
1993	 260,780	 0.9	 145,603	 2.4	 305,350	 7.7	 406,500	 9.9	 187,998	 8.1
1994	 264,160	 1.3	 149,243	 2.5	 333,400	 9.2	 443,500	 9.1	 193,221	 3.2
1995	 268,320	 1.6	 154,296	 3.4	 356,430	 6.9	 467,000	 5.3	 208,527	 7.7
130	 104	 163	 174	 50.3
1995
Source: Land Department, Taipei Municipal Department
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Interestingly, the increase in land values in the adjacent area of the DSZ was more
significant than in the DSZ. The percentage increase in land values in the Yenping North
Road area and the Chungching North Road area stood at 163 per cent and 174 per cent
respectively. In 1995, land values in both areas exceeded the average land value in Yen-
ping District. The disparity of land values between the DSZ and its adjacent area was
also enlarged as land value in the Yenping North Road area was 1.5 times higher than the
Dihua Street area and 3 times higher than the Hungha North Road area. At a closer
inspection, while two preceding legislation, the GBC and the GDSSZ enacted in 1985
and 1988, the percentage change of land values in the DSZ seems to have been similar to
that in its adjacent area (Table 6.6.5). Yet the release of the DPDSZ in 1992 led to a
slowdown of the percentage change of land values in the DSZ in the coming years. Land
values in the Dihua Street area, where shophouse conservation was initiated, came to a
standstill.
The analysis developed here suggests that the introduction of the DSZ did not bring
positive effects on land and property values. On the one hand, the economic viability of a
conservation-based redevelopment strategy was in serious doubt. Many landlords were
convinced that the idea of increasing land value on the basis of historical and cultural
resources, was basically wrong. This added a deeper tone to the picture as the policy was
originally born without their consent.
Do not mention any plan to me. The whole idea is crap. This is a government which cannot
even clean the rubbish on the street properly. What do you expect from them? The DSZ is not
the first case which failed. The government always wants to get things done without paying any
cost.....However, I am not fixing old house any more. It will quickly fall by itself any way. I am
just waiting here. Time is standing on my side.
(Informant T.6)
On the other hand, trade activities in Dihua Street such as dry food, textile and Chinese
medicine wholesale businesses, which had been associated with the locality for centuries,
and which had been taking the advantage of cheap rent, still thrived in this area. The
designation of the DSZ, to all intents and purposes, helped to prevent the displacement
of these trade activities caused by any substantial increase in land and property values.
Although the historical landscape of this area was gradually fading away, the original
community of long-time residents, a community largely bounded by business ties and
social interaction, somehow found its place to survive.
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6.7 Agents Reconsidered
6.7.1 Community as a Site of Resistance? A Land Interest Inquiry
The local community was divided by contradictory views on the Dadowchang Special
Zoning. Two neighbourhood organisations, the DHSRA and the DDCRA, were formed
during the planning process and both of them played important part in the policy
decision-making. The DHSRA was mainly composed of landlords and local real-estate
developers who were in favour of the original road-widening plan. They worked closely
with parliament members and local politicians, aiming to get the official decision reversed
(Informant T.6). The DDCRA consisted of local residents who supported shophouse
conservation. Unlike the DHSRA, it was a less homogeneous group. Although the core
members were landlords who owned properties in Dihua Street, the DDCRA also
included landlords and tenants who owned properties or lived in the surrounding area.
They operated in partnership with other civil groups and determined to seek support
from the general public (Informant T. 10).
The conflicts within the local community seem to have been one of the major reasons
that prevented the policy getting off the ground. To closely examine the situation, a
questionnaire survey was conducted in 1995 targeting a total number of 232 occupants
in Dihua Street, including landlords and tenants. The first thing to be noted is that most
of the land and shophouses in Dihua Street were privately-owned and a great majority of
them were owner-occupied. Land ownership was highly fragmented as land was divided
by family members. As shown in Table 6.7.1, in 1995, about 62 per cent of
Table 6.7.1 Land Ownership in Dihua Street, Taipei, 1995
Section (1)
	
Section (2)	 Section (3)	 Section (4)	 Total
Owner occupied
Number	 44	 46	 27	 26	 143
%of the total	 65.7	 63.9	 61.4	 54.2	 61.9
Tenanted
Number	 23	 26	 17	 22	 88
%of the total	 34.3	 36.1	 38.6	 45.8	 38.1
Ownership in average
Number	 3.3	 2.98	 2.25	 1.5	 2.5
Land area in average
Area (p.sq.m.)	 279	 416	 616	 580	 450
Source: A Field Survey Conducted in 1995
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Table 6.7.2 Result of the Opinion Survey in Dihua Street. 1995
Section(1) Section(2)
	 Section(3) Section(4)
	 Total
Landlord
Support or conditional support
Opposite
Unwilling to reply
	
12	 8
	
9.3%	 6.2%
	
35	 20
27.3%	 15.6%
	
7	 3
	
5.4%	 2.3%
	
17	 11	 47
13.2%	 8.6%	 36.7%
	
7	 10	 62
	
5.4%	 7.8%	 48.4%
	
3	 6	 19
	
2.3%	 4.6%	 14.8%
Tenant
Support or conditional support	 7	 4	 8	 Ii	 30
	
9.5%	 5.4%	 10.8%	 14.8%	 39.2%
Opposite	 8	 5	 1	 4	 18
	
10.8%	 6.8%	 1.4%	 5.4%	 24.3%
No opinion	 12	 9	 3	 2	 26
	
16.2%	 12.2%	 4.1%	 2.7%	 35.1%
Source: Field Survey Conducted by the Author in 1995
shophouses in Dihua Street were owner-occupied while 38 per cent of them were ten-
anted. The percentage share of owner occupation was 65.7 per cent in the first section
and 54.2 per cent in the fourth section. This means that more shophouses in the southern
sections were rented out rather than owner-occupied. The average number of owners of
each land-parcel was 2.5 persons. Secondly, amongst landlords, 48.4 per cent of them
opposed conservation, while 36.7 per cent of them supported or conditionally supported
conservation, and 14.8 per cent of them reserved their opinions. Moreover, 24.3 per cent
of current tenants were against conservation, while 39.2 per cent of them supported or
conditionally supported it. A very large proportion of tenants, about 35.1 per cent of the
total, reserved their opinions (Table 6.7.2). This is because tenants had limited rights and
protection in the legal system, thus having little to say about the ways that landlords were
dealing with properties.
The analysis given previously already provides some explanations of the resistance of
local residents to the DSZ: Urban policy was not consistent in the past and the planning
authority often failed to act in many issues. Property development in Yenping District
was slow and halting in comparison with the fringe area of the sub-centre and the
suburban area which were rapidly developed since the 1970s. The difference in land
values between Yenping District and these districts became evident. Due to the lack of
public and private investment, this area was plagued by inadequate infrastructure which
was not properly maintained. Local residents suffered greater discrimination in the
provision of public services and facilities for a long period. Thus, it is not surprising that
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the feeling of being left behind was a commonly shared experience. The resistance of
local residents to the DSZ was a product of the pent-up frustration and the hope for
change:
Taipei has experienced rapid development over the last two decades. Dadowchang has been ne-
glected by the government. People who live in other districts have better public services and
environment quality. We have to suffer from traffic congestion and the lack of public
facilities...If Djhua Street is widened, our businesses will become more viable because good
accessibility and image will attract more customers to come. As you can see, business in Kuasui
Street has become much better since it was widened.
(Informant T. 1)
This brings to the fore another interesting question. The above mentioned problems
mainly stem from the wider political and economic environment and are generally shared
by all members of the community. Thus, how could we explain why for some residents,
they overrode the importance of preserving cultural and historical spirits of their living
space but not for others?
The possible explanations could be firstly sought at an ideological level. Local
residents had different ideas about historical and cultural values of shophouses. Those
who supported conservation had more emotional attachment to shophouses and the net-
work of solidarity in the neighbourhood:
Some people (members of the DHSRA) say that shophouses have nothing to do with Taiwanese
culture and history, but only remind us the sham of Japanese colonisation. What a hypocrisy!
Two persons I know even have Japanese grandmothers. Their children are also studying in
Japan. How can they never mention it 9....I think all historical buildings on this island are part
of our history and culture and worth to preserve. The future generation should not forget their
roots on this island.
(Informant, T.8)
Money is not everything. Can I bring all the money to my grave after death 9....My father left
this shophouse to me ten years ago. I want to preserve it and none of my children is allowed to
sell it. My family has run this business since the colonial period. This house tells the story of
how a hard-working Taiwanese family like us manage to live through different regimes. The
spirit is something that all Taiwanese should be proud of.
(Informant T.9)
Those who opposed conservation, questioned the historical and cultural value of old
shophouses:
Most of shophouses were built during the colonial period. The building styles have very strong
Japanese and European influences. This kind of shophouse does not represent our own history
and culture but only remind us of a tragic period in Chinese history. This is why the govern-
ment has to destroy colonial heritage. We should not be deceived by those outsiders (preserva-
tionists). Their motives are very dubious.
(Informant T.2)
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These shophouses are too old. The dark corners are grassy and full of mice and cockroaches.
They need a lot of money and work to install facilities for modern living. We are modern citi-
zens living in the twentieth century. Why should we live in these nineteenth-century houses?
Historic preservation is just a nostalgia for the old days. One should not be self-satisfied in such
an idealistic and illusory fantasy.
(Informant, T.5).
The ideological conflict has been one of the factors shaping public opinions in the DSZ.
It is a reflection of a deeply-seated identity crisis that has come to the surface. However,
this does not explain in the first place why some landlords perceived things differently
from the way others perceived them. The most interesting event in this debate was that
anti-conservation residents were described by their opponents as 'short-sighted money-
grabbers' (Informant, T.6). In reply to this challenge, they alleged that pro-conservation
residents were nothing but 'hypocrites' pretending they do not care about money. The
main argument in favour of this claim was that pro-conservation residents were moti-
vated by their land interest rather than cultural sentiment.
If you think we are the only ones who like money, you are making a terrible mistake. Who does
not want money9... .Those who support conservation often speak in moral tones and consider
themselves are right and mighty. You have been given wrong ideas. They junt want to use
conservation for moralising the pursuit of their personal interest. Don't forget, those people are
also businessmen like us. Every inch of the land has been taken into account; and every move
they take has been carefully calculated.
(Informant T.2).
Table 6.7.2 reveals a spatial dimension of this conflict. Local residents who hold similar
opinions, especially those who were against conservation, tended to live in similar
locations. It is noted that 55 out of 62 landlords opposing conservation owned properties
in the first and the second sections of Dihua Street. At the same time, 28 out of 47 of
landlords who supported conservation were those who owned properties in the third and
the forth sections. Landlords living in the southern sections appeared to prefer conserva-
tion more than those who dwelled in the northern sections. Tenants in general preferred
conservation to redevelopment because they did not want to be evicted. Hence, it is not
surprising that the number of tenants who supported conservation was almost twice as
high as those who opposed conservation. Interestingly, tenants who supported conserva-
tion represented a overwhelming majority in the southern sections. Yet in the northern
sections, two-thirds of tenants actually supported redevelopment or reserved their
opinions. This testified to the importance of location in deciding public opinions.
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A necessary step here is to examine the subtle differences between two locations. Re-
calling the data of land use presented in the previous section, there seems to have been a
variation of land use between the southern sections and the northern sections of Dihua
Street (Table 6.6.3-4). In 1989, the south sections were totally occupied by commercial
use, except for 3 shophouses at the third section, which were left vacant. None of the
shophouses in this area was used for residential use. Although rice wholesale and general
trade/service decreased remarkably, their places were soon taken by dry food, Chinese
medicine and textile wholesales. These sectors altogether accounted for 92 per cent in
the third section and 75 per cent in the fourth section in 1989. This trend seems to have
been continued in 1995. The south sections were mainly occupied by commercial use,
except for six shophouses were under office use and five shophouses which were left
vacant. Chinese medicine, dry food and textile wholesalers altogether accounted for 91.1
per cent in the third section and 84.8 per cent in the fourth section. It suggests that the
southern sections were favourable business locations for the growing sectors such as
Chinese medicine, dry food and textile wholesalers in this area.
Land use in the northern sections of Dihua Street differed in many ways. In the first
section, 28.7 per cent of shophouses were under residential use while 70.3 per cent of
them were used by businesses in 1989. Residential use rose 11.9 per cent during 1969-89
while commercial use had a reduction of 12.9 per cent as a result of remarkable declines
in both rice and Chinese medicine wholesalers. In the second section, 91.3 per cent of
shophouses were under commercial use. The percentage share increased 25 per cent over
time owing to the growth of general trade and services. Rice wholesalers, on the con-
trary, witnessed a sharp decrease. However, land use in the northern sections was
dominated by residential use and general trade and services. This development was in
reverse of the general trend in Dihua Street as a whole - a decline of residential popula-
tion and the relevant commercial activities. In 1995, a larger number of shophouses in
the northern sections were used for residential purposes or left vacant, and the number of
dry food wholesalers continued to fall. In the first section, 16.7 per cent of shophouses
were vacant and 25.6 per cent were under residential use. The percentage shares in the
second section was 4.4 per cent and 14.4 per cent respectively. It suggests that land use
in the northern sections changed from commercial use to residential use or left vacant.
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It is also obvious that land values were lower in the northern sections and were
higher at the southern sections (Table 6.7.3). The average land values were about NT$
150,007 sq.m. in the first section and NT$ 190,117 sq.m. in the fourth section in 1983.
Land value in the fourth section was 1.2 times higher than that in the first section. From
1983 to 1995, land values in the northern sections increased 12 per cent while those at
the southern sections rose up 25-26 per cent. The contrast of land values between two
areas became more evident. The average land value in the fourth section was almost 1.5
times higher than that in the first section. It is obvious that under the current land use,
land in the northern sections was less valuable than that in the southern sections.
The possible explanations for the difference of land use and land value between the
two areas were firstly, the urban renewal projects initiated by the government in the
1970s mainly concentrated in the south. Although the average value of land in Dihua
Street increased after the implementation of this plan, the southern sections seem to have
benefited more than the northern sections. Secondly, traffic congestion caused the out-
movement of wholesale businesses from the northern sections. Traffic on the Taipei
Bridge became increasingly busy from the 1970s because Mingchung West road became
an important thoroughfare linking the city and the county. It created serious congestion
at the junction of Dihua Street and Mingchung West Road. Wholesalers in the northern
sections had more difficulties in loading or delivering goods. Rice wholesalers, which
Table 6.7.3 Change in Land Value in Dihua Street by Sections, Taipei, 1978-1995
Section(1)	 Section(2)	 Section(3)	 Section(4)
Block(a)	 Block(b)
1978	 60,892	 67,406	 -	 71,992	 77,707
1980	 94,335	 104,630	 -	 118,574	 122,628
1983	 150,007	 164,390	 -	 185,061	 190,117
1985	 148,848	 164,390	 -	 185,061	 190,117
1988	 162,379	 173,042	 205,187	 201,153	 209,916
1991	 156,000	 166,000	 189,000	 202,000	 208,000
1992	 166,000	 180,000	 204,000	 216,000	 228,000
I 993	 166,000	 180,000	 204,000	 221,000	 232,000
1994	 168,000	 184,000	 204,000	 224,000	 236,000
1995	 168,000	 184,000	 208,000	 232,000	 240,000
	
12.1%	 12.0%	 -	 25.0%	 26.3%
Source: Land Department, Taipei Municipal Government
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demanded large areas for parking, moved out to the county area from the 1980s. They
were followed by dry food wholesalers who also sought to leave in the 1990s. Hence, for
residents in the northern section of Dihua Street, the traffic problem and its effects on the
business environment were critical. This can partly explain the reason why the road-
widening plan was more appealing to landlords and tenants in this area.
For residents in the southern sections of Dihua Street, land values were relatively
higher as most shophouses were under commercial use. The development of property for
sale would cause the loss of land. As mentioned before, if landlords developed their land
in partnership with real-estate companies, generally they would yield land in exchange
with about forty per cent of newly-generated floor space. Additionally, the southern
sections were where Chinese medicine, dry food and textile wholesalers concentrated.
The rich cultural and historical background created an image needed by these type of
businesses. Hence, landlords were less interested in changing the character of the neigh -
bourhood but wished only to protect it from further deterioration.
However, apart from the factors stemming from the external environment, we still
need to look into the internal decision-making process that individual landlords have
been through. I select the data from landlords in two opinion groups for a detailed
analysis. The first group consists of landlords who support or conditionally support con-
servation and the second group is made up of landlords who are against conservation
(Table 6.7.4-5). It is revealed that landlords in the first group had relatively little land in
comparison with those in the second group. The average land-area owned by the first
group was 374.9 sq.m. while that of the second group was 657.3 sq.m.- almost twice as
big. Different type of land use could also be summarised in two opinion groups. All of
landlords in the first group had land currently under commercial use. Amongst 47
landlords in this group, 13 of them were Chinese medicine wholesalers and 23 of them
owned dry food businesses. It is also notified that in the second group, only 69 per cent,
or 49 landlords had shophouses under commercial use. Amongst these landlords, 26 of
them were thy food or Chinese medicine wholesalers, 16 of them managed general trade
and service, and another 6 landlords were rice wholesalers. Also, 32 per cent or 23
landlords in the second group had shophouses under residential use or left vacant. It
seems that landlords in the first group managed the kind of businesses which were more
vigorous in this area.
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Table 6.7.4 Land Area, Land Ownership and Land Use in Dihua Street by Opinion Groups, 1995
Land Area Ownership
	Land use
Commercial Residential 	 Vacant	 Total
	
(Sg.m.)	 (Person)	 No. (PercentaRe)
Landlords -support conservation
Section(l)	 172.5	 3.2	 12 (100)	 0 (0)	 0 (0)	 12(100)
Section(2)	 343.0	 2.1	 7 (100)	 0 (0)	 0 (0)	 7 (100)
Section(3)	 432.0	 2.6	 17 (100)	 0 (0)	 0 (0)	 17 (100)
Section(4)	 552.0	 1.7	 11(100)	 0(0)	 0(0)	 11(100)
Total	 -	 -	 47 (100)	 0 (0)	 0 (0)	 47 (100)
Average	 374.9	 2.4	 -	 -	 -
Landlords- oppose conservation
Section(1)	 386.3	 3.3	 19 (54)	 12 (34)	 4 (11)	 35 (100)
Section(2)	 730.0	 3.9	 13 (65)	 4(20)	 3 (15)	 20(100)
Section(3)	 801.0	 2.0	 7(100)	 0(0)	 0(0)	 7(100)
Section(4)	 730.0	 1.2	 10(100)	 0(0)	 0(0)	 10(100)
Total	 -	 -	 49 (69)	 16 (23)	 7 (10)	 62 (100)
Average	 661.0	 2.6	 -	 -	 -	 -
Source: Field Survey Conducted by the Author in 1995
For landlords in the first group, road-widening and comprehensive redevelopment were
not economically feasible. First, to widen Dihua Street, the authority must purchase the
designated 'reserved land' from private landlords. Landlords would receive compen-
sation at a price of the 'officially announced market value'. As discussed earlier, this
value is much lower than the actual transaction price of land in the market. Hence, land-
lords who owned valuable land were unwilling to sell it to the authority. Secondly, after
acquisition, landlords who had land parcels of smaller size would not have too much land
left. According to the planning regulations, while land parcels were smaller than the
minimal size of building site, they could not be developed without combining with
adjacent land parcels. The market value of small parcels thus was always depressed.
Moreover, three or four land parcels of this kind had to be combined in order to meet the
requirement for development. As mentioned before, the average number of owners was
2.4 for each land parcel (Table 6.7.4). Co-operative development became more difficult
because it would take a longer time to achieve an agreement. It is not surprising that
landlords who held small land parcels were not in favour of the road-widening plan.
To meet the requirement, a redevelopment project on average will involve three or four land
parcels. Land in this area is usually shared by many owners. Some of them are dead, some have
gone abroad. It is very difficult to obtain an agreement from all owners. In my case, the neigh-
bouring land of mine is owned by twelve people. Co-operative development is almost
impossible.
(Informant T. 9)
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Table 6.7.5 Land Use in Dihua Street by Sectors and Opinion Groups, 1995
Residential	 Commercial	 Vacant Total
Use	 Use
Chinese	 Dry	 Rice Textile General Sub-total
Medicine food
Landlord- support conservation
Section (1)
	 0	 2	 2	 0	 1	 7	 12	 0	 12
Section (2)
	 0	 1	 6	 0	 0	 0	 7	 0	 7
Section (3)
	 0	 3	 14	 0	 0	 0	 17	 0	 17
...
o 	 .7	 .....	 .0	 ...p ........................
Total	 0	 13	 23	 2	 2	 7	 47	 0	 47
Landlord- oppose conservation
Section (1)
	 12	 0	 9	 0	 0	 10	 19	 4	 35
Section (2)
	 4	 3	 7	 1	 0	 2	 13	 3	 20
Section (3)	 0	 1	 2	 0	 0	 4	 7	 0	 7
................................................................................ ...............................0 	 ....9....
Total	 16	 6	 20	 6	 1	 16	 49	 7	 62
Source: Field Survey Conducted by the Author in 1995
As long as their business were still making good profits, landlords were likely to pay the
cost for restoration rather than to redevelop the land - which could risk the benefit that
they already possessed.
My monthly income is partly generated from renting Out this shophouse. It is about 60,000
dollars per month. I will lose rent for at least three years if I redevelop the land. That is two
millions. Some people prefer to invest in property development with hope of reaping substantial
short-term profit. I do not think it is a good strategy. As long as business is good, I do not want
any drastic change.
(Informant, T.7)
For shop owners, the confluence of customers is very important. The agglomeration of busi-
nesses here has created advantage for us. Redevelopment will take at least four-five years.
During this transitional period, we will have to move to somewhere else and will suffer from
the loss of customers. At the end of the day, what you have lost will be greater than what you
have gained.
(Informant, T.8)
Hence, it is not surprising that they will utiise this controversial agenda to preserve their
advantage. This can partly explain why many landlords declared their enthusiasm for
conservation but only a few of them actually put it into practice.
For landlords in the second group, their land parcels were of larger size. Although
road-widening would cause the loss of land, the remaining land parcels were still big
enough and could be redeveloped without combining with other land parcels. The nego-
tiation process would be less complicated as the average of number of owners for each
land parcel was only about 2.6. Furthermore, the present use of their land did not bring
too much advantage to these landlords. The income generated from operating their own
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business or renting their properties out were declining. It was countered by the
increasing cost of maintaining the ageing shophouses. The widespread belief that the area
was soon to be levelled for road construction had accelerated the de-investment. Real
estate was thus the most important economic commodity for them to capture. However,
for these landlords, not only was the road-widening plan among the most important
battlegrounds, but also the width of the street was a matter for serious concern. This
once again proves that the size of land after the implementation of the road-widening
plan was a critical matter, although it has never been mentioned explicitly.
From our point of view, a 20m-wide road is good enough. Traffic congestion can be solved, our
land can be redeveloped, and, the commercial atmosphere can be retained. If the road is to be
widened to 30 m or 40m, it will bring a dramatic change to this area. The atmosphere will be
completely destroyed. Also, I will lose half of my land......I support the original road-widening
plan as long as it does not take away too much of my land.
(Informant. T.3)
Drawing on these, one could reasonably argued that to see the conifict as purely a matter
of the collective psychology of local residents could be misleading. The size of land
parcel and the present use of land actually played an important part in the internal
decision-making process that landlords were going through. For landlords, land interest
was as important as cultural sentiment in shaping their opinions. Hence, there was an
similar economic rationale underlying the ideological conflict between two groups of
landlords. This is a legacy of the entire economic and ideological system which was de-
signed for pursuing profit. Although many efforts have been made by the authority and
civil groups to seek agreement within the community, it could not be achieved easily
without tackling the fundamental issue that was now coming out into the open.
6.7.2 Civil Groups' Strategic Moves against Profit-seeking Development
Another important factor precipitating the development of the Dadowchang Special
Zoning was the political involvement of two civil organisations - The Yoshan Foundation
of Culture and Education (YFCE) and the Organisation of Urban Reformists (OURS).
The former was the main organisation pressing their demand for shophouse conservation
in Dihua Street, while the latter intended to change the formula of policy decision-
making and open up the government administration for public participation.
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The YFCE was established in 1986 by a group of people who had been active partici-
pants in social and cultural movements, and particularly linked by their common
experience in area conservation. Their objectives were straightforward - to protect
social, historical and human resources and to awaken the society to a sense of its neglect
of the living environment (Informant T. 1 1). From its beginning, the YFCE has engaged
in promoting area conservation in places such as Sanshia, Juifan and Dadowchang, and
has acted as an effective opposition voice against the demolition of historical heritage.
Although the organisation itself was not based on large numbers, they built up a
supportive network extending through academia and other civil groups. Their consistent
contribution to historical preservation and success in combining a variety of social
resources made them the leading organisation of the conservation movement in Taiwan.
The YFCE began their campaigns in Dadowchang in 1988 because the conservation
strategy favoured by the government, in so far as they perceived it, was one biased to-
wards landlords' private interests. They started with a very clear cultural demand - to
save shophouses in Dihua Street from the hands of landlords and property developers,
and to increase residents' individual consciousness of their responsibility to the common
heritage. A protest was quickly organised on the basis of a broader coalition with cultural
associations, neighbourhood organisations, professional associations and academia. It
thus successfully drew press attention, by which means a vast body of public opinion was
developed for an alternative strategy for the DSZ. The political impact was obvious. As
discussed in the previous chapter, the YFCE convinced the government to keep more
options open, and won itself a research project in 1989 which gave it a real chance to
transform the government's approach to the DSZ. The YFCE then allied itself with
another civil organisation- the Organisation of Urban Reformists (OURS) - in view of the
fact that more planning expertise was needed to carry out this project.
The OURS was formed in 1989 by a group of architects and planning professionals
who believed in a new form of professionalism developed on the basis of a separate
planning function within or in contact with grassroots organisations. Members intro-
duced public participation into their professional practice, worked with neighbourhood
organisations, provided knowledge and expertise and helped in resolving environmental
problems. By doing so, they carved out an intermediary role for themselves that earlier
planners had not needed to play.
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Our environmental problems are deeply-seated and very complicated. The government often fail
to touch the real issues.....People gradually realise that they cannot wait for a competent
government to come.. If they do not take action, they will be neglected as usual.....The planning
process should be open to citizens who are to be affected. They understand their own problems
well and should have the right.
(Informant, T.14)
In answer to the request of the YFCE, a research team was formed by members who
were currently working at universities and shared a common interest in shophouse con-
servation. The research team studied the traffic plan in detail and became convinced that
the original idea was an overly narrow one. First, road widening was not a solution for
traffic congestion in Dihua Street. By contrast, it could make the situation worse while
people living in the surrounding area started to use Dihua Street as a short cut to the old
CBD. In their opinion, traffic congestion could as easily be handled by improvement in
local streets at less cost, for instance, through establishing a one-way system and control-
ling Street parking. Add to this, if shop owners agreed to withdraw goods displaying in
the front areas of shophouses, a pleasant footpath under the arcade could be created for
pedestrians. It would also be helpful for traffic flow on the street (Informant, T. 13).
Secondly, road-widening itself did not provide enough initiative for property
development. It was a combination of external and internal reasons such as the trend of
uneven development, aesthetic and physical deterioration of the general environment, the
complicated nature of land ownership, and the over-heated land prices due to landlords'
expectation of profit-return, made land and housing in this area less appealing to
property developers and home-buyers. These problems could not be solved easily. Under
these circumstances, shophouse conservation could generate a different kind of property
value. It could be done through combining traditional trade with culture and leisure -
related activities, such as folk museums, cultural centres and art schools, also by using
the river as a major source for developing tourism in this area. Shophouse conservation
could be more economically viable in comparison with comprehensive redevelopment
(Informant, T. l3).
The research team also believed the idea that the government should purchase
shophouses from original owners at market prices and hand them to property developers
or private investors for restoration, as proposed by some landlords, was wrong. The pur-
Their judgement was based on the cost-benefit analysis conducted by Tai-Ding Real Estate Ltd and
Chung-Hua Property Accessment and Evaluation Company.
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chase itself demanded huge public-spending. The local government would not be able to
pay without financial support from the central government, whose stand on urban con-
servation was still uncertain. Even if the local government could afford the cost of the
road construction plan, they had to consider the underlying political cost, as the majority
of citizens did not want their tax payments flowing into landlord's private pockets
(Informant, T.13). They suggested that private owners should play a leading role in
conservation, not only because most of shophouses were privately-owned and were
owner-occupied, but also because many owners were long-time residents in this area.
Their businesses and social network were as valuable as historic buildings. To preserve
the social and economic life of the locality, any policy move which could cause replace-
ment should be carefully avoided. Moreover, they encouraged the formulation of neigh-
bourhood organisations, since it was a necessary step to develop local leaders and to give
people an opportunity to exercise their political skills from chairing meetings, talking to
the press, making speeches or lobbying parliament members (Informant, T.14). This idea
obviously had a populist tone reminiscent of the democratic movement of the period.
The research team's response to policies and strategies developed as follows: extend-
ing the Special Zoning to an area bounded by Nanking West Road, Hungha North Road,
Mingchung West Road and Anshi Street; renaming the Dihua Street Special Zoning 'the
Dadowchang Special Zoning'; revising the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act and intro-
ducing the Transfer of Development Right (TDR); establishing a locally-based heritage
management system and a committee under the municipal government for co-ordinating
separate departments (YFCE, 1989, pp. 107-10). They also proposed three alternatives
for shophouse conservation, including the preservation of the first section of every
shophouse in Dihua Street, the preservation of shophouses on the basis of assessment,
and the preservation of the frontage and arcade of every shophouse (UDD, 1990, pp. 55-
63). As discussed earlier, their reports had some immediate impacts on policy. The
authority had the name changed and the boundary lines adjusted so that the entire
neighbourhood fell in one district. The assessment of shophouses according to a three-
grade system was also initiated.
However, the research team thought there was less profit to be made in land specula-
tion in this area, thus they were in a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis these interests.
This idea proved to be wrong. Some landlords and local real estate developers still
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believed that comprehensive development was the least risky way of bringing speculative
increase in land value. The earlier initiative of public participation already implied a
certain enlightenment in local politics, thus it is not surprising to see them forming a solid
front to defend their property rights. The slogan 'public interest' was expropriated by
these landlords and was used as a weapon to oppose the research team. It created a
dilemma to the OURS as their members strongly believed in grassroots democracy and
attempted to generate a populist programme 'in the interest of the present population of
Dihua Street'.
What has happened in the DSZ challenges what we believe - a grassroots democracy. If more
than fifty per cent of local residents say to you: 'We know our own problems better than you;
and the best solution for us is to demolish shophouses'. What are you going to do? The situation
in the DSZ is becoming more and more difficult.
We are all victims of previous policies; and now we are fighting again each other.....Sometimes
I think: 'All right, let us give up; let it become what it should be'.....Maybe this is the cost we
have to pay for grassroots democracy.
(Informant, T. 15)
To end the seemingly irreconcilable conflicts, the YFCE turned to create a new concep-
tion of 'public interest' in which the majority of citizens could be included. They also
attempted to increase public participation so that the policy decision-making could rest
more on a mass base and less on organised interest groups. Most importantly, they
recognised the importance of developing pro-conservation citizens as a voting bloc and
engaging in electoral politics. Their strategy combined first, direct action tactics which
aimed to keep citizens in motion, such as demonstrations and rallies associated with
other grassroots organisations; and second, electoral politics which targeted pro-
conservation candidates in local elections and ensured that they enacted favourable
legislation.
Conflict is a common feature in democratisation process. We will not give up as long as there
are some people supporting us, both within and outside the neighbourhood....The government
should not have any 'backdoor policy'; and this dilemma has to be resolved openly. To get
everybody out of this impasse, we suggest to have a referendum.
(Informant, T. 11)
However, the city's shift to pluralist politics became evident as a result of the social and
political changes in the late 1 980s. As discussed before, Taiwanese witnessed a dramatic
upsurge of environmental groups of all kinds. A history of organised experience in the
political and social movement created a strong demand for participation in politics and an
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alternative of growth-oriented policy. It was this change in political perception that gave
the YFCE and the OURS the opportunity to reinforce the kind of policy and politics they
believed in. The new government elected in the early 1990s were enthusiastic to show
that they were more efficient than the previous administration. The importance of the
DSZ was assured by the new regime and several strategic moves were taken. What the
government did in the mid-1990s was to regain the trust of the local community and to
open the administration up to wider participation. It started with finding the solution for
environmental problems such as to provide parking space, good transport management,
public facilities and services, since these problems were the shared experience between
two community organisations which were currently confronting each other. However, it
could be well asserted that even if faced with the resistance of landlords, the municipal
government would still keep the DSZ on their agenda, as long as it opened a way to elec-
toral victory in the city.
6.8 Conclusion
The nature of the locality shaped by its previous development has produced different
influences on this planning process in the two cases. In Singapore, Chinatown represents
the city's original arrangement as a conglomeration of separate enclaves for its various
ethnic groups. As a colonial heritage, it perfectly fits in the narrative of the national past
invented by the state. Historically, this place had the largest concentration of retail and
wholesale businesses associated with foreign trade, operated by local merchants in
shophouses. It also accommodated a great number of working-class population em-
ployed by traditional businesses. The history of the locality thus became an important
source for the state elite during their search for cultural elements that could demonstrate
local enterpreneualism, traditional moral values and working ethics. Because of the con-
centration of businesses and population, inappropriate building regulation and under-
maintenance, Chinatown began to experience housing shortages and physical deteriora-
tion at the end of the colonial period. The post-war urban expansion, as a result of trans-
portation and public housing development, led to the out-movement of population and
businesses from the Central Area to the periphery. Urban redevelopment in the Central
Area started in the 1970s but mainly took place in the CBD and Orchard Road. As public
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and private investment concentrated in the peripheral area of the city and a small part of
the Central Area, physical development in Chinatown was relatively slow; and land in
this area was devalued. The increase in land values in Chinatown dropped significantly
during property booms. Theoretically, the devaluation of the physical assets would open
longer term possibilities for investment. Yet shophouses in Chinatown seem to have
provided less profitable prospects than those in other places in the Central Area, since
the disparity of land values between vacant shophouses and tenanted shophouses was
smaller, and the gap even decreased during the property booms. Rehabilitation instead of
comprehensive redevelopment, can be seen as a rational response to the market situation
after the mid-1980s. The change in foreign exports, the growth of industrial employment
and the development of physical infrastructure of the city all affected the dynamics of
shophouse businesses. Traditional businesses, which were associated with the distribu-
tion and processing raw materials and consumer goods, rapidly declined, although retail
businesses, which basically served the domestic market, still thrived. The expansion of
finance, banking and advanced services, in line with the establishment of the fmancial
district in the late 1970s, had impacts on Chinatown. Tanjong Pagar, in particular,
became a target for small- and medium-sized firms who demanded a good location close
to the financial district. The staged redevelopment initiated by the planning authority
began to target precincts in the fringe area of Chinatown, while the majority of popula-
tion had already moved to the public estates. A triangular area of Tanjong Pagar, with a
total of 279 shophouses, was acquired by the housing authority and transferred to the
planning authority for redevelopment in the early 1980s. Hence, before this planning
process started, more than two-third of shophouses in Tanjong Pagar were already
converted into public ownership with residents and commercial premises resettled to the
public estates. This paved the way for a pilot project to take place immediately after the
release of the conservation plan.
Dadowchang first emerged as a trading port for goods exchange between mainland-
China and Taiwan, and then became associated with foreign trade as a result of the treaty
signed between China and the Western imperial powers. The earlier physical develop-
ment illustrated an effort made by the Chinese rulers to strengthen the local economy
against foreign challenges. Dadowchang continued to function as a processing, wholesale
and export centre for both foreign trade and cross-strait trade under the Japanese
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colonisation. The original townscape, a legacy of Chinese governance, was changed by
the colonial planning, with most of the shophouses reconstructed. Since the locality was
an outcome of both Chinese and Japanese influences at different time in history, the
interpretation of local history became a battlefield for those who had conflict identities.
Dadowchang witnessed a rapid expansion of factories and the labour market during the
post-war development. The lack of planning regulations and the subsequent road-
construction for defence purposes worsened the problem of housing shortage and
physical deterioration. The development of the county area in the 1970s resulted in the
decentralisation of industrial activities and population from the city area. Urban rede-
velopment in the city area mainly focused on the Hsinyi Sub-Centre and its surrounding
districts rather than the old CBD, where land was less available. Land values in
Dadowchang increased slowly, while capital investment took place at the periphery and
in the vicinity of the sub-centre. However, squatter clearance and road construction in
Dadowchang in the late 1970s, although small in scale, had a positive effect on land
values, particular for land in blocks along major traffic roads. Physical reconstruction
matched the expectations of landowners since they had been seeking opportunities to
redevelop their land. Traditional businesses in Dihua Street, composed of dry food,
textile and Chinese medicine wholesalers, were least affected by the out-movement of
factories and population owing to the expansion of food, textile and clothing industries at
the initial stage of industrialisation. General trade and services in the street also
continued to grow, and contributed to the diversity of commercial activities in this area.
There was also a clear agglomeration of commercial activities at different locations in the
street. The prosperity of these remaining businesses played a crucial role in deciding the
further land use and land values in this area.
This planning process has produced very different outcomes in Chinatown and
Dadowchang. Chinatown has witnessed a sharp rise in land values and the gentrification
of land use after conservation. Tanjong Pagar, where the public sector has been largely
involved, has been transformed from a centre of traditional trade to an enclave of small
offices and recreational activities catering for the white-collar working population. This
has three clear implications. First, shophouse renovation has been the most buoyant
sector in the property market because the removal of rent-control and the de-regulation
of land-use have made investment profitable. Shophouse renovation has offered property
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developers and construction companies new investment opportunity after the slump in
property development in the mid-1980s. Second, the government has made great efforts
to encourage local enterprises to adapt to the demand of the most advanced sector of
international capital and to take part in the service economy from the mid-1980s. After
conservation, shophouses have provided alternatives for local firms which want to have
good contact with headquarters and banks in the financial district. Third, the physical
infrastructure of Chinatown has been upgraded due to the inflow of public and private
investment. The authority has adopted a more pragmatic and flexible approach, allowing
investors to restore or to modernise shophouses for new uses, but maintaining the visual
quality of the original urban form. The renovation of Chinatown has contributed to the
aesthetic diversity of the Central Area by providing a visual image strikingly in contrast
to the previous image of the city as a concrete jungle. However, this planning process
also has generated some undesirable consequences. The enthusiasm of private investors
has pushed up the bidding price over time and has discouraged the original owners. The
displacement of traditional trades and activities has devastated the unique ambience the
locality once possessed. The soaring prices caused by speculative investment also has
made the business environment very unstable. All these turn shophouse renovation into
potential sources of social conflict.
Dadowchang has only seen a small proportion of shophouses restored or redeveloped
in conformity with the official plan. The planning authority failed to act not only because
of the lack of adequate legislation, autonomy and financial source, but also because of
the pressure brought by various interests involving in land and property development.
The aesthetic and physical deterioration caused by the uncertainty of the policy has
thrown a dark shadow on property values. The recent development has already seen
fewer shophouses used for commercial activities and more of them were left under
residential use or left vacant. The economic viability of shophouse renovation has still
been in dispute. Due to the lack of public and private investment, numerous problems
existing in the locality before the introduction of this policy, such as traffic congestion,
the excessive fragmentation of land ownership, the decline in property value and the
shortage of public facilities, have remained largely unsolved. However, traditional trade
activities such as dry food, textile and Chinese medicine wholesalers, which have been
taking the advantage of location and cheap rent, still thrive in this area. The local
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community, formed by long-time residents and bounded by business ties and social
networks, somehow has found a place to survive.
The planning authorities have played different roles and responded differently to the
conflicts generated during their practice. The planning authority of Singapore has used
compulsory acquisition, rent-control exemption and the land sale scheme to take the
property right away from private owners and tenants. Property developers, construction
companies, or those who have sufficient capital, have been offered public incentives and
opportunities to work in a partnership with the planning authority. Private owners have
found it hard to participate due to the lack of capital to restore shophouses. Since the
very beginning, cultural diversity has been the very foundation of nation-building and has
been given much more prestige in the public domain. Those activities evolved by
tradition have existed in ethnic areas for decades and have been the major source to
sustain a culturally-specific way of life for citizens. Heritage preservation in first instance
originated in the call for cultural identity. Many citizens thus were convinced that
traditional activities already threatened by the development process could to some extent
be preserved by the government's policy. Yet the government's effort to protect housing
stock and traditional trade has been very limited. The controversy regarding conservation
practice has evolved around the displacement of traditional businesses and the exclusion
of local residents and civil groups. Although they have recognised their own interests and
understood the causes of their problems, they have not been able to act on this
knowledge for structural reasons that are beyond their control. The planning process
once again testifies to the crucial fact that the economic rationale overrode the cultural
and political aspect of this policy.
The planning authority of Taipei has encouraged original owners to renovate shop-
houses according to the official guidelines. Yet the divergent views of the landlords
become one of the major reasons that prevent the policy to getting off the ground. The
resistance of local residents to the policy is a direct product of the pent-up frustration
and the hope for change. In the past, urban policy was not consistent and the planning
authority often failed to act in many issues. Because of the lack of investment, the local-
ity was plagued by inadequate infrastructure which was not properly maintained. Local
residents suffered greater discrimination in the provision of public services and facilities.
The stagnation of property development and the decline in land value became more evi-
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dent particular during property booms. It is not surprising that the feeling of being left
behind was a commonly shared experience. Although land owners have been divided by
their different thinking about historical and cultural values of shophouses, there has been
a similar economic rationale behind the battle between two groups of landlords. Land
interest has been a more crucial factor than cultural sentiment in shaping their decisions.
However, under competitive politics, the local government has been pressed to find a
vote-getting formula that can match the expectation of citizens. The government has
tried to maintain a balance between competing interests in order to obtain basic support.
There has been a determined effort to build a more open government structure and to
reach out to more people. This planning process has played a major part in increasing
social and political participation. The authority has gradually developed a framework to
mediate various interest and to co-operate their activities. Although the policy itself has
been constantly shaped by the outcome of bargaining among competing interests, the
process of public participation obviously has enabled the conflicts to be solved without
damaging political stability.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
Singapore and Taipei both have witnessed the re-orientation of urban redevelopment
policy in their historical centres since the mid-1980s. The new planning policy has com-
bined the objective of re-inventing historical and spatial icons with the attempt to re-
invest in the built environment that has aesthetic significance. This thesis demonstrates
how the interplay of economic interest, political power and cultural identity has created
specific conditions shaping the underlying logic of urban policy, planning regime, pro-
perty market and cultural practice. The internal dynamics and conflicts of these institu-
tional factors, together with the development in the previous stage, have produced direct
or indirect impacts on the process of policy decision-making, the formulation of planning
strategies, and the implementation of these strategies.
Singapore
In Singapore, the planning process of the re-invention and re-investment in the historical
urban centre has been conditioned by the operation of several forces:
1. The shift of emphasis in the state's development strategy
The state-led industrial restructuring process began in the late 1970s, aiming to upgrade
the industrial system and to reduce the reliance on labour-intensive industries for econo-
mic growth. The industrial restructuring process did not proceed smoothly at the start
because a radical wage policy introduced by the state to displace labour-intensive
industries in turn discouraged the inflow of foreign investment; and at the same time, the
growth of capital-intensive industries was limited by the decline in export markets and
intensive competition from neighbouring countries. The economic recession in 1985
came as a cataclysmic crisis for the state. The development strategy was thus reformu-
lated in the mid-1980s, aiming to build a strong base for service-sector growth, and to
constitute a favourable environment for domestic enterprises. The expansion of small-
and medium-sized local enterprises and the development of local entrepreneurship
assumed greater importance on the official agenda. A corporatist framework, comprising
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company welfarism and a team-work model, was introduced in the workplace to improve
productivity and enhance industrial relations. Urban planning policy, as an important
development device, reflected these new development objectives. The role of the Central
Area as a financial and command centre for international co-operations was to be
reinforced. The aesthetic aspect of physical environment in the Central Area began to
receive serious concern. Historical shophouses became valuable assets for a city that was
seeking a distinctive image. They were also seen as visible icons of local entrepreneur-
ship, since local enterprises had been closely associated with traditional trade in the
historical centre before industrial development. The corporatist and paternalist relation-
ship between employers and employees, and the traditional work ethic and group solidar-
ity, both had their roots in the operation of traditional trade businesses. As the state
made attempts to inspire workers and to reshape their working attitude by means of
these traditional ideas, historical shophouses became an important cultural source for
promoting devotion to these corporate objectives.
2. The development of consultative politics and the demand for moral regulation
under the pressure of political liberation
The growth of fmancial services and government activities in the past led to the increase
of workers in professional and managerial occupations. This sizeable middle-class popu-
lation had greater exposure to political culture and life style outside the city-state. There
emerged a popular demand for an accountable political opposition which could balance
the overwhelming domination of the ruling party. The out-looking policy in the previous
stage of economic development created serious structural obstacles for local firms. The
bias against local enterprises gradually evolved into a political issue, pushing the state to
initiate economic reform. The loss of seats in general elections in the early 1980s came as
a shock to the ruling party which had been accustomed to its total dominance of the
parliament. The recession in the mid-1980s seriously tested the ruling party's ability to
maintain economic growth. The government launched a campaign of social mobilisation
to grapple with the latent political crisis. Several measures were introduced to integrate
the domestic bourgeoisie and the middle class into consultative politics. A new wave of
political consolidation was initiated during this transitional period. To meet the require-
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ment of moral regulation, traditional values of trust, strong leadership and social har-
mony were particularly addressed in the official agenda. However, the demand for
political liberalisation since the early 1980s has not brought any fundamental changes to
the authoritarian regime. Although democracy is a legal form in politics, strict limits have
been placed on civil and political life. The state is to a great extent freed from the need to
respond to political pressures from social forces.
3. The demand for traditionalism to counter foreign cultural influence and to
pursue a sense of national unity
To create a common language for communication among citizens, a bilingual language
policy was introduced into the national education system in the late 1960s. The Chinese-
educated intellectuals protested against this policy which caused the disappearance of the
Chinese heritage. Traditionalism thus made its first appearance on the public agenda in
the late 1 970s as a balancing move to reassure the Chinese community that their heritage
was a matter of national importance. Foreign cultural influence, an inevitable outcome of
the language policy, was seen as the major cause of social discontent in the early 1980s.
Traditionalism was again addressed by the state as a cultural ballast against foreign
influence. A strong sense of collective survival and group interest was pursued by the
state in its effort to enforce political consolidation in the late 1980s. For a collective
sentiment to emerge, the state called for appreciation of, and respect for, traditional
social values of different races. A national ideology, or what came to be officially re-
ferred to as the 'shared value', was formulated on the ground of common traditional
ideas without too much reference to the diversity of their origin. Historical shophouses in
the previous ethnic enclaves assumed more importance since they could provide the
grounds for a nation to relate ancient customs, traditions and cultural values of different
races to the current nationalist discourse.
4. The over-accumulation crisis in building investment and the search for a new
niche market
Through public housing development and the land sale scheme, the state has played a key
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role in construction investment and has used it as a means to satisfy the requirements of
its development policy. At the beginning of the industrial restructuring process, the state
increased construction investment to stimulate domestic capital formation, to absorb the
labour force displaced from labour-intensive industries, and to decrease inflationary
pressure caused by the radical wage policy. This policy resulted in the construction boom
in the early 1980s. The economic crisis in the mid-1980s proved the limit of construction
investment as a counter-cyclical device. The emphasis on building investment caused a
continuous flow of capital into property development, thereby obstructing capital invest-
ment in productive sectors. The over-supply of floor space resulted in the stagnation of
the property market, as the market itself needed time to absorb the accumulated floor
space. The economic recession forced the state to take immediate actions to rationalise
the supply of land for building investment. A new niche market for property developers
and construction companies was sought in shophouse restoration, since the adaptive-
reuse of parts of the built environment, with particular images and aesthetic value, could
generate profit without increasing floor space and the density of activities on land.
S. The downturn of the property market and the falling demand for land in the
Central Area
After two decades of housing development and urban renewal, the Central Area experi-
enced a serious decline in population. As the majority of the population already lived in
the public estates, the demand for residential space gradually approached its limit. The
government thus decided to restrict housing development within the Central Area in the
early 1980s. The slowdown of the economy during the restructuring process already had
a hidden impact on the effective demand for office and commercial space. The over-
supply situation in the mid-1980s also caused a fall in the occupancy rate and property
prices. To tackle this problem, public housing development and the land sale scheme
were both postponed. The decentralisation of office development was led by the public
sector as a response to the declining market in the Central Area. All these effectively
reduced the demand for land in the Central Area, and made conservation a practical
proposition.
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6. The concentration of power on the planning authority in the policy decision-
making process
The absence of a landlord class at the beginning has given the planning authority greater
autonomy. Planning policies have been formulated in a relatively isolated environment in
which the authority has had absolute power to decide what it believes to be most appro-
priate. The public have been given very little chance to participate, even if their interests
are affected. Although the planning authority has sometime worked in collaboration
with active individuals, the main purpose has been to channel dissent through its own
institution, instead of allowing them to proceed by mobilising more participants. Al-
though resistance has emerged in civil society against this form of decision-making, it has
been too weak to constitute a force of challenge. The planning authority can ignore
contrary opinions and impose its original decisions. The formulation of plans has been
simply an effort made by the planning authority, conducted strictly within the confines of
the state.
7. The efficiency of policy measures in the control over urban redevelopment
The state inherited a comprehensive legal system of development control from the colo-
nial administration. The legislative framework has given the state absolute power to
acquire land and property from private owners for development purposes. The state thus
has monopolised land ownership. The private sector has participated in the development
of land on a leasehold basis. The redevelopment of the Central Area has always been the
central concern in the post-war planning. Several measures, such as compulsory acquisi-
tion, exemption of rent-control, tenant resettlement and land sale, have been broadly
applied to achieve redevelopment objectives. The conservation of vernacular building has
been considered as an integrated part of urban redevelopment, and has been placed under
the powerful control of one single planning authority, which is well equipped with
administrative and legislative instruments to implement its plans.
8. The devaluation of land in Chinatown caused by previous development
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The post-war urban expansion, as a result of transportation and public housing develop-
ment, caused the out-movement of population and businesses from the Central Area. As
public and private investment flowed into the peripheral area, physical development in
Chinatown was relatively slow, and land in this area was devalued. Urban redevelopment
in the Central Area in the mid-1970s concentrated on the Golden Shoe Area and Orchard
Road. The disparity of land values between vacant shophouses and tenanted shophouses
in Chinatown was smaller than in these mentioned areas, and the gap decreased during
the property booms. Although official and commercial development began to occur in
the fringe area of Chinatown after the late 1970s, this place provided less profitable
prospects than the other two areas even if land was used for comprehensive redevelop-
ment. A conservation-based redevelopment strategy was seen as a rational response to
the current market situation.
9. The change in land use in Chinatown due to the expansion of the financiaL
district
The expansion of financial, banking and advanced services in the fmancial district in the
late 1970s had some direct impact on land use in Chinatown. In the past, historical
shophouses in this area were subject to rent-control regulation, so that land values were
much lower than normal market levels. Many small- and medium-sized firms which
demanded a good location close to the financial district, but could not afford high rents
in large office buildings, moved into shophouses in Chinatown. Chinatown thus wit-
nessed an expansion of commercial and office uses and a decline of residential use in the
early 1980s. Tanjong Pagar, in particular, had a larger presence of office activities than
Chinatown as a whole. The change in land use from residential use to office use indicated
the existence of a potential market.
10. The guarantee of economic viability of shophouse restoration
The functional division between two national authorities suggests that at the very
beginning, the state made a clear distinction between the preservation of historical monu-
ments and the conservation of vernacular buildings. The planning authority adopted a
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pragmatic and flexible approach, allowing investors to renew or modernise shophouses
for new uses which maintaining a modicum of the visual quality of the original urban
form. The removal of rent control, the adjustment of zoning regulation, and the minimum
protection of traditional businesses, altogether combined to increase the prospect of
profit-making. To facilitate the restoration process, the authority purchased historic
buildings from their original owners and sold them to private developers who had suffi-
cient financial capital. The prospect of profit-making and the effectiveness of planning
policy, increased the confidence of private investors and successfully channelled invest-
ment into shophouse restoration.
11. The conversion of land ownership in Chinatown by planning practice
Housing development and urban renewal initiated by the planning authority already
began to target precincts in the fringe area of Chinatown in the late l970s. Many land
parcels in the conservation area were converted to state ownership through the exercise
of compulsory acquisition. More than two-third of shophouses in Tanjong Pagar were
already purchased by the housing authority, with residents and commercial premises on
the ground floors resettled to the public estates. Since there were subsequent changes in
government policy to discontinue public housing development in the core of the Central
Area in the early 1980s, these land parcels were handed to the URA. The large presence
of vacant units made it easier to initiate its pilot project and to improve infrastructure
and facilities in this area.
Taipei
In Taipei, the planning process of the re-invention and re-investment in the historical
urban centre has been shaped by factors listed below:
1. The shift of emphasis in the state's development strategy
The state-led industrial restructuring process began in the late 1970s, aiming to transform
the local productive structure from labour-intensive to capital-intensive industries. The
slowdown in the economy was evident at the beginning, because locally-based labour-
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intensive industries which produced for export markets were faced with upgrading diffi-
culties. The state took an initiative in economic liberation in the mid-1980s to attract a
new wave of foreign-based capital to Taiwan. The state removed many sectional restric-
tions on foreign investment and unveiled a long-term development plan to create a
regional operational centre for international co-operations. The emphasis on the open-
ness to international capital in the new development strategy has compelled the local
government of Taipei to transform the capital city into a regional centre for foreign-
based firms. The local government made an effort to assure a active role in upgrading
infrastructure and services in the capital city. The planning policy for redevelopment and
rehabilitation of the old central area was considered as one major part of the new agenda,
as it could help to release land for office and commercial development, and could trans-
form the existing image of the city. The preservation of historic buildings was integrated
into urban redevelopment strategies, since the aesthetic aspect of physical environment
became a matter of some importance.
2. The progress of political reform and the ideological battles in a multi-party
politics
The authoritarian regime was challenged in the mid-1970s by a well-organised political
opposition which declared a distinct Taiwanese identity and struggled to end the ruling
party's domination in national politics. The reform of the ruling party began in the late
1970s, opening the party organisation to Taiwanese members and enhancing their role in
the decision-making process. The deterioration of international status, the loss of control
over anti-government riots and the failure to win an overwhelming victory in parliamen-
tary elections forced the state to facilitate political reform in the mid-1980s. Martial law
and the ban on political parties were both removed, and direct elections for mayor were
introduced at the local government level. The development of political democracy weak-
ened a single-minded view of Taiwan's political status and cultural identity. The division
of views intensified political conflicts between political parties, with the re-unification
with China on the one hand and Taiwanese independence on the other. The issue of eco-
nomic liberation was also closely associated with the power struggle between two
factions inside the KMI' and later among political parties. The mainlander faction of the
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KMT, which was steeped in the statist tradition and which battled to keep their domina-
tion of the party, was defeated by the Taiwanese faction, mainly supported by financial
capitalists and representatives of business communities. The mainlander faction later
formed another party with a clear ideology of anti-monopolies, anti-corruption and anti-
Taiwanese independence, and remained as a powerful political force against any form of
concession to economic liberalism.
3. The uncertainty of international status and the confusion of cultural identities
The desire to preserve Taiwan's historical heritage, as presented in the cultural move-
ment in the late 1 970s, stemmed from the awakening of political and cultural conscious-
ness among the native Taiwanese. The aspiration to an alternative form of nationhood
later contributed to the development of political movement, which aimed to terminate the
political and ideological domination of the KMT. To create a collective sentiment among
the population and to foster national unity, a consolidation process was initiated by the
state. Taiwan's international status and internal conflicts made it difficult for the state to
shape a common identity on the base of local history and culture. The state was reluctant
to address any form of collective discourse that could potentially intensify political crisis
or could cause social disintegration. The interpretation of the historical built environment
was a battle field for those who had conflicting cultural identities. The state policy
regarding historic preservation was thus ambiguous and was mainly designed to play
down political pressures.
4. Market-operated building investment and the monopoly right of landlords in the
urban areas
The private sector has played a dominant role in building investment. The state has initi-
ated infrastructure development, provided credit to property developers and imposed
relatively weak planning regulation to reduce the costs of property development, in order
to create a favourable environment for private investment. The state's direct intervention
has only taken place when there is a need to control the inflation rate and housing prices,
both for internal cohesion and fiscal stability. Market-operated building investment has
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provided an alternative way of making profits for those enterprises which were originally
engaged in industrial production. The state's policy regarding land acquisition, land re-
plotting and taxation has not effectively applied in the urban areas. Most of urban land
has been under private ownership and the owners has held exclusive property rights. This
control over the critical material source has given landlords decisive advantages in their
ability to influence policy-making. Landlords have had considerable autonomy from the
state and have been able to exercise influence against it if they foresaw any risk from
planning policies to their interests. Many public plans in the urban area have paralysed
because of the increasing difficulty in acquiring land from private owners. The ownership
of land and properties in Dadowchang has been fragmented, mostly belonging to individ-
ual landlords. Landlords have been divided by contradictory views regarding the conser-
vation-based redevelopment policy, yet their individual decisions have been basically
driven more by economic rationale rather than by cultural identity. The monopoly right
of landlords has made it difficult for the local government to initiate plans except with
their consent.
5. The collapse of the price mechanism and the demand for combating property
speculation
During the industrial restructuring process, capital formation was relatively slow and
there was an excess of national savings in the private sector which could not be directed
into productive investment. The accumulation of domestic savings created inflation pres-
sures and generated a tremendous demand for property and financial assets. Many
enterprise groups, which were involved in property development, established life-
insurance corporations, trust and investment companies to avoid state fmancial regula-
tions. Speculative demand, triggered by latent inflation and the operation of enterprise-
owned property development companies, forced up property prices in the early 1980s.
Several policy measures were introduced by the state to combat the widespread specula-
tion. These measures could only control development companies which relied heavily on
public subsidy and bank loans to finance their projects. As financial capitalists began to
exercise their influence over the policy-making process, the fiscal measures used by the
state to combat speculation were inadequate. The price mechanism of the housing
Chapter Seven
	 355
market was finally broken in the late 1980s. The general public became discontented with
the distribution of the wealth in the country and the business groupings' excessive influ-
ence in politics. The conservation movement became a process in which citizens used
cultural arguments to oppose a profit-orientated development doctrine.
6. The deficiency of planning devices in the control over urban development
Although the local government has been entitled to formulate plans and to apply planning
devices such as land re-plotting and compulsory acquisition to obtain land for develop-
ment purposes, it failed to act in most cases due to its lack of autonomy and financial
sources. Major development projects have been initiated mainly by the planning agency
of the central government. The function of the local planning authority has been reduced
to administration, offering assistance to infrastructure projects and opening sites for
private development. Urban renewal was neglected in the past and only played a small
part in overall urban development. An adequate legislation for urban renewal formally
arrived only in the early 1980s, when there was a urgent need to release land for property
development and to upgrade the physical structure of the capital city. The local govern-
ment has not succeeded in completing urban renewal projects because of the excessive
fragmentation of land ownership and the deficiency of planning powers. Comprehensive
redevelopment of land in the old central area has proceeded at a relatively slow pace,
making a conservation-based redevelopment strategy an obvious alternative.
7. The conflicting interests in land and property development
The development strategy in the past caused economic resources to be diffused into a
private sector largely controlled by Taiwanese-owned businesses. The accumulation of
private capital was fostered. Following the political reform, financial capitalists and the
representatives of business groupings have increased their political influence through
collaboration with the ruling party or through participating in parliament elections. They
have been in favour of economic liberation and have challenged the state's independence
of policy decision-making. At the same time, pressure groups and neighbourhood organi-
sations representing particular interests or areas, have become more organised and arti-
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culated. They have demonstrated a massive need for some efficient way to generate
collective goods that government has failed to deliver, and have challenged the primacy
of liberal values that property rights and market decision-making have long established.
Decision-making in planning has become more and more bounded by divided interests
among social groups, with profit-seeking development on the one hand and non profit-
seeking development on the other. This divided interest has been exaggerated because of
the complexity of political and ideological conflicts among competing powers and
different factions within the political regime. The local government has sought to demon-
strate its neutrality by avoiding any connection with the growth-coalition in urban devel-
opment. The 'controlled-growth' ideology has been employed to play down political
pressures and to diffuse social discontent.
8. The stagnation of land and property development in Dadowchang
The switch of building investment from the core area to the periphery of the city caused
the substantial devaluation of land and property in Dadowchang. The disparity of hous-
ing prices between this area and other districts in the city widened during the property
booms. Although the underdevelopment of land opened longer-term possibilities for new
investment, property development was hindered due to the lack of public investment in
infrastructure, the excessive fragmentation of land ownership, and the nature of land use.
As less profit could be made in land speculation in this area, the local government was
convinced that it was in a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis the pro-redevelopment
interests.
9. The popular mobilisation in Dadowchang to oppose state intervention
As a form of state intervention, urban policy was not consistent and generally acted to
remove political pressures. Landlords whose land was officially reserved for public plans
suffered from the lower compensation prices and the delay in state action. They lost
confidence in any form of planning policy. The deterioration of the physical environment
and the decline in property values in Dadowchang were evident due to the lack of invest-
ment. Landlords in this area suffered discrimination in the provision of public services
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and facilities. Their frustration therefore generated a tremendous pressure for change.
The legislation for historical preservation emphasis on the authenticity of historical
buildings, making these buildings pure objects for display and offering private owners
little incentive to restore shophouses. Most importantly, as political and economic libera-
tion were both in progress, the re-emphasis on the role of the public sector in urban
development was seen as a serious intrusion in private affairs. The earlier initiative of
public participation already implied a certain enlightenment in local politics. Landlords
mobilised themselves to dispute the right of territory. Their action had a pluralist tone,
reminiscent of the democracy movement of the same period.
10. The search for social consent through public participation
As direct elections have been introduced into the capital city, political leaders have been
pressed to take account of the balance among all relevant interests and to match the
expectation of citizens. The policy decision-making process has been more pluralistic and
subject to effective challenges from popular demands. There has been a determinant
effort made by the local government to build a open government structure and to give
people an opportunity to exercise their political rights. Planning issues have played a
major role in increasing such participation. The policy decision-making process has been
generally shared by groups which possessed different kinds of political influence.
Although the objections of private landlords in Dadowchang have seriously obstructed
the implementation of the new planning policy, the local government has been favour of
private owners rather than property developers as the leading agent in shophouse resto-
ration. This decision can be seen as a comprise offered to landlords, but also has the clear
aim of appealing to social participation and distributive justice rather than profit-making
to generate popular support.
To sum up, in Singapore, this policy has been an integrated part of a new develop-
ment strategy, with the aim of overcoming the over-accumulation crisis in building
investment, providing a favourable environment for small firms in the service economy,
and creating a distinctive visual image for the capital city. This policy has aimed to
provide the ground for the state to relate the attitudes and values associated with
historical heritage to the need to mobilise support for a new development strategy. It has
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also been formulated for the purpose of moral regulation, thereby enhancing the status
and power of the ruling elite and dominant interests. The policy decision-making process
has been technocrat-rational, in which professional expertise within a bureaucratic system
has initiated decisions and has influenced the general direction of the policy. The plan-
ning authority has had a high degree of autonomy to define planning objectives and has
been given unusual power to get these goals accomplished. This policy has turned
shophouse restoration into a useful field of building investment, enhanced the aesthetic
diversity of urban form, and transformed the historic district into an enclave for small
firms seeking location near the downtown core. At the same time, it also has generated
several controversial issues concerning the displacement of traditional activities and the
exclusion of local residents and civil groups.
In Taiwan, the policy has been formulated for the aesthetic improvement of the capi-
tal city, motivated by a new development strategy. This policy also has been conceived to
correct the failure of planning to initiate urban renewal. It has been a compromise made
by the state to play down political pressures stemming from aspirations to an alternative
form of nationhood. This policy also has aimed to diffuse social discontent caused by a
market failure in building investment, and to satisfy the popular demand for an alternative
to profit-orientated property development. The policy decision-making process has
involved not only the efforts of the planning authority and civil groups to promote
historical preservation, but also persistent challenges made by the local community to the
legitimacy of state intervention. The planning process has been directed not towards the
achievement of policy goals but towards the resolution of conflicts between neighbour-
hood organisations and among interest groups. Although the conflicts remain unsolved,
the planning process has played an very important part in increasing social and political
participation. Through opening up the policy decision-making process, local government
has generated popular support and maintained political stability
This thesis also reveals that the origins and the consequences of this planning process
in both countries were conditioned in a transitional period in which several significant
changes took place in economic, political and cultural spheres: a new development
strategy was formulated to overcome the difficulties in the export-oriented economy; the
one-party regime and its authoritarian rule were challenged by the increasing demand for
political liberation; the ideological basis of the state was weakened by the downturn of
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the national economy and the conflicts among cultural identities. By reconstructing the
specific historical context, in which this planning process evolved, we explore the
changing nature of the nation-building process in both countries.
Singapore and Taiwan, as developmental states, took advantage of the dynamics of
global capitalism to achieve development objectives; developed a strong apparatus to
define strategies in pursuing economic growth; and relied on economic success to facili-
tate political integration and national unity. As authoritarian states, they obtained a
higher degree of bureaucratic autonomy to protect their development objectives from
giving away to political pressure, and depended on a combination of organised violence,
harsh repression and ideological control to secure this autonomy. As nation states, they
combined civil-territorial and cultural-symbolic instruments in their distinctive ways to
create political communities out of their local societies. The built-in conflicts presented in
the initial stage of the nation-building process thus remained hidden by these historical
circumstances.
The national-building process, in which developmentalist, authoritarian and national-
ist discourses worked together, was both internal and externally conditioned, and was
constantly insecure. The constant changes in the global economy, such as the take-off of
manufacturing industries in neighbouring countries, the decline in export markets caused
by protectionism and the changing direction of foreign investment, caused the develop-
mentalist promise of further material rewards to become increasingly insecure. The
turbulent nature of regional politics, which justified the use of organised violence or re-
striction on political activities by the repressive state, was changed by the increasing
demand for economic corporation among countries. Also, there were new forms of con-
flicts created by new socio-economic divisions under the operation of the capitalist
economy. They combined with conflicts which were temporarily repressed by the forces
operating in peculiar historical circumstances, and acted together to weaken the social
and ideological bases of the state.
The state had to reform its economic and political strategies in order to meet a new
set of challenges from both internal politics and the global economy. In doing so, it
responded to and anticipated opportunities n the global economy, set up long-term
development objectives, adjusted itself to the changing market conditions, directed
capital and labour out of declining sectors, and helped to remove obstacles to economic
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development. However, the success of the new development strategy was decided politi-
cally depending on the need to secure social bases of support for that strategy. The state
had to secure social consensus and social integration among citizens, thereby recreating
legitimacy for the new development strategy. The attitudes and values associated with
historical and spatial icons were used as cultural sources, mobilising individuals and
institutions to act in certain ways, and helping to create a stable political environment for
capital investment. They constituted the basis for moral exercise or regulation, enabling
the state to enhance the unity of the society and to mobilise support for the new devel-
opment strategy.
The ideology of capitalist development, which effectively mobilised the population
into a collective process of pursuing growth was no longer sufficient to sustain an unified
identity over a long period, since the national economy had begun to show a cyclical
downturn. The state began to seek integrative elements in other grounds. The state of
Singapore insisted on preventing the extension of civil and political rights, yet increas-
ingly relied on enhancing cultural-symbolic instrument to perform the key integrative
function for society. The nature of the authoritarian regime was not changed by political
pressures. There was no political opposition competing for power, and were no oppor-
tunities for organised groups to access the political system. There was thus no ground
for a pluralist politics to develop and for citizens to fully practice their political and civil
rights. The alternative way of securing the national solidarity was through discovering
and revitalising ethnic ties and sentiments. Yet there was no common ethnic experience
among the populace. The national past was carefully selected to fulfil a current purpose.
The state identified national myths and symbols on the basis of 'spiritual kinship' or
'ideological descents' from similar values and ideals in the past.
In Taiwan, the earlier expression of Chinese nationalist sentiment could not survive
to become the basis of nation formation. The legitimacy of the state became more reliant
on a currently-governed territory and membership in a common political culture for its
self definition, rather than the fictitious claim of sovereignty over mainland China. Yet
because of the complexity of political and ideological conflicts, the state seems to have
been much more hesitant in using historical and cultural subjects for engendering a sense
of unity. The essential foundation of the nation became a matter not of identity but of
political principle and collective citizenry, bounded by common duties and citizenship
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rights. As there was an acceptance of democracy in society, the state recognised that it
could no longer rely on harsh repression as a means to achieve political stability and
long-term predictability of the system. The sense of national unity had to be generated by
social and political participation, namely, by the practice of civil and political rights. It
could engender a sense of belonging, play down political pressure and diffuse social
discontent, thereby strengthening the base of political and social integration.
The above discussion suggests that the interplay between economic interest, political
power and national identity, explored in this thesis, is a meaningful relationship and not
just a historical coincidence. However, the origins and consequences of this planning
process were also conditioned by the internal dynamics and conflicts of urban policy, the
planning regime and the property market. The reconstruction of the institutional setting,
in which this planning process evolved, has explored the fundamental difference of the
production of the built environment in the two countries. Although construction invest-
ment has had a subtle relationship with the rhythm and periodicity of economic cycles in
both countries, the nature of construction investment and the degree of state intervention
have been very different.
Construction investment in Singapore has been integrated into the state's develop-
ment strategy and has acted as a productive force for the national economy. The produc-
tion of the built environment has been largely controlled by the public sector and has
been used as a counter-cyclical device to control economic deviations. The government
has assisted the circulation of capital between the primary circuit and the property circuit
through its direct investment, regulation, subsidisation and taxation. The investment in
the property circuit has been unstable and contradictory, since it has been affected by
many external forces operating in specific historical circumstances. The government has
also taken actions to rationalise capital investment in the property circuit whenever over-
investment in the built environment has acted as a barrier to growth or caused further
crisis.
Construction investment in Taiwan has been less influential in leading the dynamics
of capital investment and has assumed lesser importance in the state's development
strategy. The production of the built environment has been largely controlled by the
private sector. The role of the government has been to provide a favourable environment
for private capital to perform its function. The government has taken actions to regulate
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and to facilitate the operation of private market whenever the market itself could not
work perfectly. As property speculation has caused inflation and widened income
disparities, the government has also been obliged to respond to the interest of the general
public by imposing certain regulatory measures on the interests of capital. Through
short-term compromise and re-forms, the government has retained financial stability and
has played down political pressures.
The purpose of this thesis has been to discover the mechanisms of interaction
between economic interest, political power and national identity in the nation-building
process. By considering this planning process as the outcome of an endless negotiation
between these different and conflicting forces, we begin to understand the nature of the
nation-building process in two different spatial situations and historical contexts. This
thesis has also shown the way in which political, economic and cultural mechanisms
interact with each other, both on structural and institutional levels, to produce this plan-
fling policy and its consequences. It suggests that the historical built environment should
not be reduced to cultural symbols, detached from the exercise of political power and
economic interest that helps to destroy or reproduce them. The understanding of reha-
bilitation or redevelopment of the historical built environment in a fast-growing region
should not be separated from the complexity of its historical context.
Finally, an interesting exercise would be to apply the theoretical tools developed in
this thesis to a study of the regeneration of historical urban centres in other newly indus-
trialised countries. It would help to re-examine the theoretical framework developed in
this study, and open the way for the discovery of the mechanisms of the nation-building
process in another historical and spatial context. Also, this thesis has revealed that the
production of the built environment in Singapore and Taiwan is different in nature. The
major differences lie in the relationship between construction investment and economic
development, the role of state intervention, the function of the planning regime and the
logic of the property market. The forces that contribute to these differences have not
been fully explored in this study and can provide an important field for further research.
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APPENDIX 1
SUPPLEMENTARY STATISTICS
Appendix 1.1 Basic Economic Indicators, Singapore, 1960-1993
Gross Real Deposit Consumer Consumer Gross Domestic Gross National GNS/
Domestic Interest Rate Prices 	 Price-	 Capital	 Savings! GDP	 GDCF
Product	 Housing For,nationf GDP
% Change % Change % Change % Change	 %	 %
1960	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
1961	 8.6	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
1962	 5.6	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
1963	 11.6	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
1964	 0.6	 -	 1.6	 1.7	 -	 -	 -
1965	 11.3	 -	 0.3	 2.1	 -	 -	 -
1966	 12.7	 3.5	 2.1	 0.2	 -	 -	 -
1967	 12.5	 4.1	 3.5	 3.3	 -	 -	 -
1968	 15.2	 4.9	 0.8	 1.6	 -	 -	 -
1969	 16.3	 3.9	 -0.3	 2.3	 -	 -	 -
	
9.4	 4.1	 1.3	 1.9	 -	 -	 -
1970	 15.6	 4.0	 0.4	 1.4	 -	 -	 -
1971	 17.6	 2.3	 2.1	 2.1	 43.7	 19.9	 45.6
1972	 29.8	 0.3	 2.4	 1.7	 41.1	 22.8	 55.5
1973	 25.6	 -3.8	 26.0	 7.4	 39.1	 24.6	 62.9
1974	 22.8	 -5.2	 27.0	 14.8	 45.0	 23.3	 51.7
1975	 6.3	 0.1	 5.7	 2.9	 37.6	 26.9	 71.5
1976	 9.0	 3.8	 -1.8	 5.4	 37.7	 25.7	 68.2
1977	 9.6	 4.4	 3.0	 1.5	 33.3	 26.1	 78.3
1978	 9.9	 4.2	 4.8	 1.2	 35.6	 26.0	 73.0
1979	 16.9	 4.1	 4.0	 4.8	 43.4	 35.6	 82.0
1970-	 16.3	 1.4	 7.4	 4.3	 39.6	 25.7	 65.4
....1.9.29...........................................................................................................................................................................................................
1980	 22.3	 4.0	 8.2	 11.2	 46.3	 33.0	 71.2
1981	 16.9	 5.3	 8.2	 4.3	 46.3	 35.7	 77.1
1982	 11.4	 6.7	 3.9	 2.2	 47.9	 39.4	 82.3
1983	 12.4	 2.3	 1.2	 0.3	 47.9	 444	 92.7
1984	 9.0	 -	 2.6	 2.1	 48.5	 46.4	 95.8
1985	 -2.8	 -	 0.5	 2.5	 42.5	 42.5	 100.0
1986	 -1.8	 -	 -1.4	 -1.9	 38.2	 41.3	 108.1
1987	 10.0	 -	 0.5	 -1.0	 39.1	 41.9	 107.1
1988	 14.3	 -	 1.5	 0.2	 36.6	 43.6	 119.0
1989	 19.6	 -	 2.8	 1.6	 35.8	 44.9	 125.4
1980-	 11.1	 2.8	 2.8	 2.2	 42.9	 41.3	 97.9
	
....l.989............................................................................----
	
....-
	
.....
1990	 15.2	 -	 3.5	 5.9	 39.5	 45.2	 114.5
1991	 10.4	 -	 3.7	 2.0	 38.0	 47.4	 124.9
1992	 8.3	 -	 2.5	 2.2	 40.4	 48.2	 119.1
1993	 12.5	 -	 2.7	 4.0	 43.8	 47.5	 108.4
1990-	 11.6	 -	 3.1	 3.5	 40.4	 47.1	 116.7
1 gg
Source: Year Book of Statistics, Singapore.
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Appendix 1.2 Basic Economic Indicators, Taiwan, 1952-1993
Gross	 Real	 Consumer Consumer Gross Domestic Gross Naitonal
	 GNS/
	
Domestic Deposit	 Price	 Price-	 Capital	 Savings/GDP	 GDCF
Product	 Interest	 tfousin Formation/GDP
% Change % Change % Change % Change 	 %
1952	 12.0	 -	 -	 -	 15.3	 8.6	 99.8
1955	 8.1	 -	 -	 -	 13.3	 11.9	 109.2
1956	 -	 -	 10.5	 -	 -	 -
1957	 -	 -	 7.5	 10.1	 -	 -	 -
1958	 -	 -	 1.3	 6.2	 -	 -	 -
1959	 -	 -	 10.6	 7.9	 -	 -	 -
	
10.1	 -	 7.5	 8.1	 14.3	 10.2	 104.5
1960	 6.3	 -	 18.5	 4.0	 20.2	 9.5	 88.0
1961	 -	 -	 7.8	 1.9	 -	 -	 -
1962	 -	 -	 2.4	 4.1	 -	 -	 -
1963	 -	 -	 2.2	 3.3	 -	 -	 -
1964	 -	 -	 -0.2	 -0.6	 -	 -	 -
1965	 11.1	 -	 -0.1	 3.4	 22.7	 11.6	 91.2
1966	 8.9	 -	 2.0	 2.0	 21.2	 15.8	 104.5
1967	 10.7	 7.4	 3.4	 5.7	 24.6	 13.5	 93.5
1968	 9.2	 5.4	 7.9	 8.9	 25.1	 15.5	 89.0
1969	 8.9	 3.1	 5.1	 6.4	 24.4	 18.0	 97.0
1960-	 9.2	 5.3	 4.9	 3.9	 23.0	 14.9	 95.0
1970	 11.4	 3.5	 3.6	 3.8	 25.5	 18.2	 100.1
1971	 12.9	 6.3	 2.8	 1.1	 26.2	 21.4	 109.9
1972	 13.3	 6.0	 3.0	 0.5	 25.6	 25.4	 125.3
1973	 12.8	 2.9	 8.2	 6.0	 29.1	 23.8	 118.1
1974	 1.4	 -5.0	 47.5	 23.4	 39.2	 19.2	 80.4
1975	 4.8	 -14.4	 5.2	 2.2	 30.4	 26.3	 87.5
1976	 13.7	 9.3	 2.5	 7.1	 30.8	 24.1	 105.1
1977	 10.2	 5.8	 7.0	 5.5	 28.1	 27.7	 115.2
1978	 13.6	 3.5	 5.8	 2.8	 28.2	 26.6	 121.6
1979	 8.2	 4.5	 9.8	 13.2	 32.9	 23.3	 101.5
1970-	 10.2	 2.2	 9.5	 6.6	 29.6	 23.6	 106.5
1979
1980	 7.3	 -0.3	 19.0	 24.2	 33.8	 24.9	 95.4
1981	 6.2	 -3.1	 16.3	 19.7	 29.9	 27.9	 104.4
1982	 3.6	 1.4	 3.0	 2.2	 25.2	 31.0	 119.2
1983	 8.4	 6.9	 1.4	 1.6	 23.5	 30.1	 137.1
1984	 10.6	 5.6	 0.0	 0.7	 22.2	 31.3	 154.1
1985	 4.9	 -	 -0.2	 0.4	 19.1	 36.5	 179.1
1986	 11.7	 -	 0.7	 -0.2	 17.5	 37.4	 224.7
1987	 12.3	 -	 0.5	 0.5	 20.5	 29.9	 191.7
1988	 7.4	 -	 1.3	 0.6	 23.3	 28.8	 151.3
1989	 7.7	 -	 4.4	 3.8	 22.8	 29.8	 138.2
1980-	 8.0	 1.6	 4.6	 5.4	 23.8	 30.7	 149.5
1989
1990	 4.9	 -	 4.1	 5.1	 22.4	 28.9	 133.4
1991	 7.2	 -	 3.6	 6.0	 24.8	 27.7	 132.5
1992	 6.5	 -	 4.5	 3.5	 24.2	 25.9	 118.0
1993	 6.1	 -	 2.9	 3.9	 25.2	 27.0	 113.0
1990-	 6.2	 -	 3.8	 4.6	 23.7	 27.4	 124.2
1993
Source: Year Book of Statistics, Taiwan, 1950-1993.
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Appendix 1.3 Share of GDP by Sectors, Singapore, 1967-1993
Agri?ulture Construction Manufacturing Commerce Transport and Financial and
Communication Business Service
1967	 3.0	 5.6	 16.8	 30.0	 10.6	 8.2
1968	 2.8	 5.9	 17.8	 29.8	 11.0	 8.4
1969	 2.6	 5.8	 19.2	 29.2	 11.1	 8.9
1970	 2.3	 6.3	 20.0	 28.0	 11.2	 8.9
1971	 2.3	 6.4	 21.6	 27.4	 11.4	 9.4
1972	 2.1	 6.6	 22.0	 26.6	 12.0	 9.5
1973	 1.8	 5.4	 23.0	 26.6	 13.0	 10.1
1974	 1.6	 5.4	 23.0	 27.7	 13.2	 10.4
1975	 1.6	 8.1	 24.0	 26.9	 11.3	 15.8
1976	 1.6	 8.3	 24.0	 26.1	 12.3	 15.3
1977	 1.5	 7.5	 25.0	 26.5	 13.2	 14.7
1978	 1.5	 6.3	 26.0	 26.0	 14.7	 14.5
1979	 1.4	 6.0	 28.0	 25.1	 14.2	 15.3
1980	 1.3	 6.5	 28.4	 23.2	 14.6	 17.4
1981	 1.2	 7.4	 29.0	 21.4	 14.1	 19.6
1982	 1.1	 9.7	 25.0	 21.2	 14.0	 20.3
1983	 1.0	 11.5	 24.0	 19.9	 13.8	 20.7
1984	 0.9	 12.4	 25.0	 18.7	 14.0	 21.5
1985	 0.8	 10.7	 23.0	 18.4	 14.2	 22.8
1986	 0.6	 8.1	 25.0	 16.7	 14.3	 26.3
1987	 0.5	 6.7	 26.8	 16.9	 14.2	 26.5
1988	 0.4	 5.8	 28.5	 17.7	 14.1	 25.3
1989	 0.3	 5.3	 28.6	 17.5	 14.1	 25.3
1990	 0.3	 5.3	 28.8	 17.9	 14.2	 26.0
1991	 0.2	 6.0	 28.4	 18.3	 14.3	 26.2
1992	 0.2	 6.9	 27.5	 18.1	 14.3	 26.1
1993	 0.2	 6.7	 27.5	 17.1	 14.4	 26.8
1994	 0.2	 7.1	 28.2	 17.6	 14.5	 26.5
Source: Year Book of Statistics, Singapore, 1994
Appendix	 366
Appendix 1.4 Share of GDP by Sectors, Taiwan, 1952-1993
Agriculture Construction Manufacturing Commerce Transport and Financial and
Comm unication	 Business
1952	 32.2	 3.9	 12.9	 17.9	 4.2	 9.6
1955	 29.1	 4.8	 15.6	 16.6	 4.3	 9.5
1960	 28.5	 3.9	 19.1	 15.3	 4.7	 9.0
1965	 23.6	 4.0	 22.3	 15.8	 5.4	 9.2
1966	 22.5	 4.0	 22.5	 15.4	 5.8	 9.2
1967	 20.6	 4.2	 24.9	 14.5	 5.4	 9.3
1968	 19.0	 4.3	 26.5	 14.2	 5.8	 9.3
1969	 15.9	 4.2	 29.1	 14.7	 5.9	 9.7
1970	 15.5	 3.9	 29.2	 14.5	 6.0	 9.8
1971	 13.1	 3.9	 31.5	 14.5	 6.2	 9.6
1972	 12.2	 4.0	 34.3	 13.7	 6.1	 9.5
1973	 12.1	 4.0	 36.8	 12.3	 5.9	 9.6
1974	 12.4	 4.5	 32.8	 13.8	 5.8	 10.1
1975	 12.7	 5.3	 30.9	 13.2	 6.0	 10.5
1976	 11.4	 5.7	 33.8	 12.5	 5.9	 10.5
1977	 10.6	 6.1	 34.2	 12.4	 5.9	 10.6
1978	 9.4	 6.1	 35.6	 12.1	 6.0	 10.9
1979	 8.6	 6.2	 35.9	 12.3	 5.9	 12.1
1980	 7.7	 6.3	 36.0	 13.1	 6.0	 12.7
1981	 7.3	 5.7	 35.6	 13.5	 6.0	 13.8
1982	 7.7	 5.0	 35.2	 13.6	 6.0	 13.7
1983	 7.3	 4.6	 36.0	 13.3	 6.0	 13.1
1984	 6.3	 4.3	 37.6	 13.5	 6.3	 13.3
1985	 5.8	 4.1	 37.6	 13.8	 6.4	 13.8
1986	 5.5	 3.9	 39.7	 14.1	 6.2	 13.1
1987	 5.3	 3.9	 39.5	 14.0	 6.1	 14.0
1988	 5.0	 4.3	 37.8	 14.3	 6.2	 15.7
1989	 4.9	 4.6	 35.6	 14.6	 6.2	 17.9
1990	 4.1	 4.9	 34.4	 15.4	 6.1	 18.9
1991	 3.7	 4.9	 34.4	 15.8	 6.2	 18.8
1992	 3.5	 5.2	 32.9	 16.3	 6.3	 19.2
1993	 3.5	 5.6	 31.6	 16.5	 6.4	 19.9
1994	 3.4	 5.5	 32.0	 16.7	 6.6	 20.0
Source: Year Book of Statistics, Taiwan, 1994
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Appendix 1.5 Gross National Savings by Sectors, Singapore, 1974-1993
Public Sector Savings	 Private Sector Savings
Total	 CPF	 Total
5$ Million % of GNS S$ Million % of GNS 5$ Million
	 % of GNS
1974	 736	 643	 20.7	 2366	 76.3
1975	 1362	 35.4	 821	 21.3	 2489	 64.6
1976	 1470	 33.2	 831	 18.7	 2971	 66.9
1977	 2021	 41.2	 888	 18.1	 2883	 58.8
1978	 2230	 39.5	 1027	 18.2	 3419	 60.5
1979	 2801	 403	 1534	 22.1	 4146	 59.7
	
1970-1979	 1770	 31.6	 957	 19.9	 3046	 64.5
1980	 3407	 44.6	 2036	 26.6	 4235	 55.4
1981	 4261	 43.0	 2599	 26.2	 5645	 57.0
1982	 5936	 51.6	 3506	 30.5	 5572	 48.4
1983	 8649	 61.7	 3849	 27.5	 5371	 38.3
1984	 11291	 64.0	 3166	 17.9	 6354	 36.0
1985	 11052	 69.3	 4159	 26.1	 4902	 30.7
1986	 11867	 51.0	 3411	 18.3	 4577	 30.4
1987	 12344	 43.0	 3566	 18.4	 5120	 29.8
1988	 14600	 56.0	 4035	 23.6	 5347	 29.0
1989	 16899	 67.0	 4233	 28.9	 5500	 27.8
	
1980-1989	 10031	 55.1	 3456	 24.4	 8771	 38.3
1990	 18776	 69.4	 4136	 26.7	 5240	 29.5
1991	 19700	 64.2	 4056	 24.6	 4967	 29.0
1992	 22040	 61.4	 4359	 26.2	 5290	 29.8
1993	 23667	 56.7	 4120	 27.8	 5120	 27.0
	
1990-1993	 21045	 62.9	 4167	 26.3	 5154	 28.8
Source: Economic Survey of Singapore, Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1993
Note: Value= 1986 Price
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Appendix 1.6 Gross National Savings by Sectors, Taiwan, 1952-1993
	Total	 Government	 Public Enterprises	 Private Sector
Value(Million) Va! ue(Million) % Share Value(Million) % Share Value(Million) % Share
1952	 1,727	 854	 49.4	 64	 3.7	 809	 468
1955	 2,717	 1,372	 50.5	 231	 8.5	 1,114	 41.0
1960	 6,726	 2,155	 32.0	 1,155	 17.2	 3,416	 50.8
1965	 15,705	 2,407	 15.3	 1,929	 12.3	 11,369	 72.4
1966	 19,536	 2,539	 13.0	 1,668	 8.5	 15,329	 78.5
1967	 23,642	 2,890	 12.2	 2,693	 11.4	 18,509	 78.3
1968	 26,328	 5,743	 21.8	 4,502	 17.1	 16,083	 61.1
1969	 32,904	 8,459	 25.7	 6,323	 19.2	 18,086	 55.0
1970	 41,509	 6,965	 16.8	 5,770	 13.9	 28,774	 69.3
1971	 56,336	 9,525	 16.9	 5,469	 9.7	 41,342	 73.4
1972	 77,256	 18,626	 24.1	 6,048	 7.8	 52,582	 68.1
1973	 109,694	 22,958	 20.9	 5,359	 4.9	 81,377	 74.2
1974	 132,738	 42,154	 31.8	 9,687	 7.3	 80,897	 60.9
1975	 111,389	 37,195	 33.4	 12,404	 11.1	 61,790	 55.5
1976	 170,513	 53,116	 31.2	 16,797	 9.9	 100,600	 59.0
1977	 199,782	 57,651	 28.9	 17,728	 8.9	 124,403	 62.3
1978	 255,717	 77,778	 30.4	 20,658	 8.1	 157,281	 61.5
1979	 298,230	 103,128	 34.6	 23,536	 7.9	 171,566	 57.5
1980	 360,249	 106,678	 29.6	 41,727	 11.6	 211,846	 58.8
1981	 403,661	 105,590	 26.2	 41,029	 10.2	 257,042	 63.7
1982	 403,523	 84,406	 20.9	 46,312	 11.5	 272,805	 67.6
1983	 489,700	 104,452	 21.3	 56,838	 11.6	 328,410	 67.1
1984	 593,173	 121,297	 20.4	 77,391	 13.0	 394,485	 66.5
1985	 611,531	 115,090	 18.8	 60,129	 9.8	 436,312	 71.3
1986	 870,539	 109,711	 12.6	 61,863	 7.1	 698,965	 80.3
1987	 984,524	 187,623	 19.1	 54,485	 5.5	 742,416	 75.4
1988	 932,298	 238,372	 25.6	 65,769	 7.1	 628,157	 67.4
1989	 893,931	 287,255	 32.1	 50,861	 5.7	 555,815	 62.2
1990	 897,604	 224,559	 25.0	 53,616	 6.0	 619,429	 69.0
1991	 1,014,969	 96,186	 9.5	 96,681	 9.5	 822,102	 81.0
1992	 1,031,628	 201,516	 19.5	 70,549	 6.8	 759,563	 73.6
1993	 1,117,321	 217,385	 19.5	 73,283	 6.6	 826,653	 74.0
Source: Year Book of Statistics, Taiwan, 1952-1993
Note: Value= 1986 price (NT million)
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Appendix 1.7 Construction Investment and Gross Domestic Fixed Capital
Formation, Singapore, 1960-1993
Percentage	 GDFCF Construction	 Construction	 Construction	 Housing
Change in GDP /GDP lndustry/GDP InvestmentlGDP lnvestment/GDFCF !nvestment/GDFCF
1960	
-	 6.7	 2.0	 -	 -	 -
1961	 8.6	 10.1	 2.9	 -	 -	 -
1962	 5.6	 10.8	 3.0	 -	 -	 -
1963	 11.6	 12.0	 3.5	 -	 -	 -
1964	 0.6	 15.3	 4.2	 -	 -
1965	 11.3	 15.7	 6.3	 -	 -	 -
1966	 12.7	 13.8	 5.6	 •	 -	 -
1967	 12.5	 13.7	 5.7	 -	 -	 -
1968	 15.2	 17.0	 5.9	 8.0	 46.9	 18.4
962	 ..6:3	 ..9.. .5.8	 ...........
	10.5	 13.5	 4.5	 8.1	 44.3	 16.6
1970	 15.6	 24.2	 6.8	 9.7	 40.2	 12.7
1971	 17.6	 27.2	 8.1	 11.2	 41.0	 18.6
1972	 29.8	 26.8	 8.5	 12.1	 45.2	 21.6
1973	 25.6	 28.8	 7.1	 11.9	 41.5	 22.9
1974	 22.8	 37.3	 7.4	 15.5	 41.6	 22.4
1975	 6.3	 35.1	 8.1	 15.9	 45.1	 22.4
1976	 9.0	 35.3	 8.3	 16.3	 46.1	 22.9
1977	 9.6	 32.9	 7.5	 14.6	 44.4	 22.5
1978	 9.9	 33.4	 6.3	 12.8	 38.5	 17.0
1979	 16.9	 31.2	 7.0	 13.1	 42.1	 18.7
1970-	 16.3	 31.2	 7.5	 13.3	 42.6	 20.2
1980	 22.3	 32.1	 7.1	 13.3	 41.3	 15.3
1981	 16.9	 35.2	 7.7	 14.6	 41.4	 14.1
1982	 11.4	 37.9	 9.8	 17.2	 45.4	 15.3
1983	 12.4	 42.2	 11.7	 22.2	 52.6	 22.1
1984	 9.0	 43.1	 12.5	 26.9	 62.4	 32.5
1985	 -2.8	 46.4	 10.7	 30.3	 65.2	 36.2
1986	 -1.8	 41.4	 8.2	 25.2	 60.9	 32.1
1987	 10.0	 33.6	 6.7	 19.0	 56.5	 25.6
1988	 14.3	 31.4	 5.7	 15.1	 48.1	 20.8
1989	 19.6	 30.8	 5.4	 12.2	 39.7	 19.1
1980-	 11.1	 37.4	 8.5	 19.6	 51.4	 23.3
1990	 15.2	 32.6	 5.3	 12.0	 36.7	 17.1
1991	 10.4	 34.8	 6.1	 11.8	 33.9	 14.1
1992	 8.3	 37.8	 6.7	 13.8	 36.5	 12.4
1993	 12.5	 37.3	 0.7	 12.5	 33.4	 13.1
1990-	 11.6	 35.6	 4.7	 12.5	 35.1	 14.2
1993
Source: Year Book of Statistics, Singapore 1960-1993.
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Appendix 1.8 Construction Investment and Gross Domestic Fixed Capital
Formation, Taiwan, 1952-1993
Percentage	 GDFCF	 Construction	 Construction	 Construction	 Housing
	
Change in GDP/GDP	 Jndustry/GDP !nvestment/GDP InvesrmenUGDFCF lnvestment/GDFCF
1952	 12.0	 11.2	 3.9	 4.9	 43.7	 9.2
1955	 8.1	 11.3	 4.8	 4.6	 40.8	 12.6
1960	 6.3	 16.6	 3.9	 6.7	 40.6	 13.6
1965	 11.1	 16.9	 4.0	 6.1	 35.9	 9.7
1966	 8.9	 19.1	 4.0	 6.4	 33.7	 9.6
1967	 10.7	 20.6	 4.2	 7.1	 34.4	 11.1
1968	 9.2	 22.0	 4.3	 7.6	 34.5	 12.2
1969	 8.9	 22.1	 4.2	 7.5	 33.7	 11.1
	
9.2	 16.8	 3.4	 5.8	 28.7	 9.0
1970	 11.4	 21.6	 3.9	 6.3	 29.1	 9.3
1971	 12.9	 23.2	 3.9	 6.1	 26.1	 12.5
1972	 13.3	 23.7	 4.0	 6.3	 26.6	 10.9
1973	 12.8	 24.9	 4.0	 6.3	 25.3	 12.2
1974	 1.4	 28.5	 4.5	 7.7	 26.9	 9.6
1975	 4.8	 31.1	 5.3	 9.5	 30.6	 10.2
1976	 13.7	 27.9	 5.7	 9.0	 32.1	 11.8
1977	 10.2	 25.6	 6.1	 9.3	 36.4	 13.5
1978	 13.6	 25.8	 6.1	 8.9	 34.7	 16.0
1979	 8.2	 28.1	 6.2	 9.1	 32.5	 15.5
1970-	 10.2	 26.1	 5.0	 7.9	 30.0	 12.2
1979
1980	 7.3	 30.6	 6.3	 9.8	 32.2	 14.2
1981	 6.2	 27.9	 5.7	 8.5	 30.5	 14.7
1982	 3.6	 25.8	 5.0	 8.0	 31.0	 13.9
1983	 8.4	 22.8	 4.6	 7.1	 31.1	 13.5
1984	 10.6	 21.2	 4.3	 6.8	 32.0	 14.5
1985	 4.9	 18.9	 4.1	 6.7	 35.4	 15.5
1986	 11.7	 18.1	 3.9	 6.3	 34.9	 13.5
1987	 12.3	 19.2	 3.9	 6.3	 32.8	 14.3
1988	 7.4	 20.7	 4.3	 6.9	 33.4	 14.3
1989	 7.7	 22.1	 4.6	 7.2	 32.6	 14.6
1980-	 8.0	 22.7	 4.7	 7.4	 32.6	 14.3
989..................................................................................................................................................................................................................
1990	 4.9	 22.4	 4.9	 7.9	 35.1	 12.6
1991	 7.2	 22.2	 4.9	 8.4	 38.1	 11.5
1992	 6.5	 23.2	 5.2	 8.7	 37.6	 12.6
1993	 6.1	 24.0	 5.6	 9.4	 39.4	 13.1
1990-	 6.2	 23.0	 5.1	 8.6	 37.5	 12.5
I 993
Source: Year Book of Statistics, Taiwan, 1952-1993.
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Appendix 1.9 Construction Industry and Construction Investment, Singapore,
1960-1993
GDP	 Construction	 Gross Domestic Fixed Construction	 Housing
industry	 Capital Formation	 Investment	 Investment
Value	 Value % Change Value	 % change Value % Change Value % Change
1960	 2046	 41	 -	 137	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
1961	 2239	 66	 61.0	 226	 65.0	 -	 -	 -	 -
1962	 2371	 71	 7.6	 255	 12.8	 -	 -	 -	 -
1963	 2683	 94	 32.4	 323	 26.7	 -	 -	 -	 -
1964	 2700	 113	 20.2	 414	 28.2	 -	 -	 -	 -
1965	 2956	 186	 -0.1	 463	 11.8	 -	 -	 -	 -
1966	 3330	 187	 0.5	 461	 -0.4	 -	 -	 -	 -
1967	 3745	 213	 13.9	 512	 11.1	 -	 -	 -	 -
1968	 4315	 256	 20.2	 735	 43.6	 -	 -	 -	 -
1969	 5019	 293	 14.5	 996	 35.5	 -	 -	 -	 -
1970	 5804	 397	 35.5	 1403	 40.9	 -	 -	 -	 -
1971	 6283	 508	 28.0	 1712	 22.0	 -	 -	 -	 -
1972	 8155	 692	 36.2	 2188	 27.8	 -	 -	 -	 -
1973	 10240	 725	 4.8	 2945	 34.6	 -	 -	 -
1974	 12575	 929	 28.1	 4694	 59.4	 1951	 -	 1053	 -
1975	 13373	 1084	 16.7	 4698	 0.1	 2120	 8.7	 1051	 -0.2
1976	 14575	 1205	 11.2	 5149	 9.6	 2375	 12.0	 1180	 12.3
1977	 15974	 1199	 -0.5	 5259	 2.1	 2335	 -1.7	 1185	 0.4
1978	 17562	 1113	 -7.2	 5860	 11.4	 2254	 -3.5	 994	 -16.1
1979	 26284	 1852	 0.7	 8199	 39.9	 3454	 -	 1530	 -
1980	 28832	 2055	 11.0	 9257	 12.9	 3827	 10.8	 1416	 -7.5
1981	 31603	 2418	 17.7	 11126	 20.2	 4601	 20.2	 1573	 11.1
1982	 33772	 3299	 36.4	 12810	 15.1	 5815	 26.4	 1960	 24.6
1983	 36537	 4266	 29.3	 15405	 20.3	 8106	 39.4	 3403	 73.6
1984	 39572	 4927	 15.5	 17067	 10.8	 10647	 31.3	 5551	 63.1
1985	 38923	 4167	 -15.4	 18077	 5.9	 11780	 10.6	 6549	 18.0
1986	 39641	 3234	 -22.4	 16424	 -9.1	 10007	 -15.1	 5265	 -19.6
1987	 43141	 2897	 -10.4	 14503	 -11.7	 8195	 -18.1	 3720	 -29.3
1988	 47908	 2742	 -5.4	 15065	 3.9	 7244	 -11.6	 3129	 -15.9
1989	 52657	 2845	 3.8	 16226	 7.7	 6447	 -11.0	 3095	 -1.1
1990	 57049	 3050	 7.2	 18610	 14.7	 6825	 5.9	 3186	 2.9
1991	 60884	 3690	 21.0	 21190	 13.9	 7174	 5.1	 2989	 -6.2
1992	 64415	 4340	 17.6	 24329	 14.8	 8874	 23.7	 3011	 0.7
1993	 71212	 4761	 9.7	 26591	 9.3	 8891	 0.2	 3491	 15.9
Source: Year Book of Statistics, Singapoire, 1960-1993.
Note: Value =1985 Pric e (SD million)
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Appendix 1.10 Floor Area Built by Sectors and Uses, Singapore, 1963-1994
Four Area Builr(sq. m.)
Total	 Percentage By Public By Private	 Residential	 Commercial and
Change	 Sector	 Sector	 Industrial
1963	 990.0	 -	 -	 -	 772.0	 218.0
1964	 1013.0	 2.3	 -	 -	 787.0	 226.0
1965	 1445.0	 42.6	 -	 -	 1069.0	 376.0
1966	 1298.0	 -10.2	 -	 -	 1011.0	 287.0
1967	 1363.0	 5.0	 -	 -	 1001.0	 362.0
1968	 1487.0	 9.1	 -	 -	 1004.0	 483.0
1969	 1608.0	 8.1	 -	 -	 1161.0	 447.0
1970	 1819.0	 13.1	 -	 961.0	 858.0
1971	 2198.0	 20.8	 -	 -	 1315.0	 883.0
1972	 3049.0	 38.7	 -	 -	 1915.0	 1134.0
1973	 3505.0	 15.0	 2195.0	 1310.0	 2175.0	 1330.0
1974	 3913.0	 11.6	 2402.0	 1511.0	 2824.0	 1089.0
1975	 5035.0	 28.7	 3390.0	 1645.0	 3431.0	 1604.0
1976	 5228.0	 3.8	 3908.0	 1320.0	 3688.0	 1540.0
1977	 5182.0	 -0.9	 4146.0	 1036.0	 3570.0	 1612.0
1978	 5732.0	 10.6	 4317.0	 1415.0	 3898.0	 1834.0
1979	 4541.0	 -20.8	 3284.0	 1257.0	 3243.0	 1298.0
1980	 4693.0	 3.3	 2883.0	 1810.0	 2538.0	 2155.0
1981	 4358.0	 -7.1	 2637.0	 1725.0	 2001.0	 2357.0
1982	 5513.0	 26.5	 3400.0	 2151.0	 2886.0	 2627.0
1983	 8598.0	 56.0	 5886.0	 2712.0	 5740.0	 2858.0
1984	 14890.0	 73.2	 11648.0	 3244.0	 11194.0	 3696.0
1985	 11329.0	 -23.9	 8530.0	 2799.0	 9199.0	 2130.0
1986	 8965.0	 -20.9	 6215.0	 2750.0	 6231.0	 2734.0
1987	 7057.0	 -21.3	 5492.0	 1565.0	 5061.0	 1996.0
1988	 6273.0	 -11.1	 5038.0	 1235.0	 4830.0	 1443.0
1989	 4039.0	 -35.6	 2387.0	 1652.0	 2861.0	 1178.0
1990	 4719.0	 16.8	 2573.0	 2146.0	 2629.0	 2090.0
1991	 4263.0	 -9.7	 2250.0	 2013.0	 2557.0	 1706.0
1992	 6581.0	 54.4	 3979.0	 2602.0	 4216.0	 2365.0
1993	 6506.0	 -1.1	 3397.0	 3109.0	 3950.0	 2556.0
1994	 6212.0	 -4.5	 3428.0	 2784.0	 3999.0	 2213 0
Sourse: Building Statistics Quarterly 1974-1986; Construction and Real Estate Statistics Quarterly 1986-1989;
Constructure Statistics Quarterly 1989-1993, Urban Redevelopment Authority, Singapore
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Appendix 1.11 Public Housing Development in Singapore, 1960-
1994
Year	 HDB Flat Built Each Percentage Change % Population Live
Year(Unit)	 in 11DB Flats
1960	 1,682	 -	 9.0
1961	 7,320	 77.0	 11.4
1962	 12,230	 40.1	 15.3
1963	 10,085	 -21.3	 18.3
1964	 13,028	 22.6	 22.0
1965	 10,085	 -29.2	 23.0
1966	 12,659	 20.3	 23.0
1967	 12,098	 -4.6	 26.0
1968	 14,135	 14.4	 29.6
1969	 13,096	 -7.9	 32.6
1970	 14,251	 8.1	 35.9
1971	 16,147	 11.7	 38.1
1972	 20,252	 20.3	 43.7
1973	 23,224	 12.8	 45.1
1974	 26,169	 11.3	 50.0
1975	 28,027	 6.6	 54.8
1976	 30,024	 6.7	 60.2
1977	 30,406	 1.3	 64.7
1978	 30,176	 -0.8	 69.0
1979	 27,189	 -11.0	 71.9
1980	 19,875	 -36.8	 74.1
1981	 16,366	 -21.4	 74.1
1982	 20,918	 21.8	 75.0
1983	 42,400	 50.7	 77.0
1984	 70,345	 39.7	 81.0
1985	 50,348	 -39.7	 84.0
1986	 38,896	 -29.4	 85.0
1987	 29,203	 -33.2	 87.0
1988	 27,517	 -6.1	 88.0
1989	 11,979	 -129.7	 87.0
1990	 13,805	 13.2	 87.0
1991	 10,562	 -30.7	 87.0
1992	 18,623	 43.3	 86.0
1993	 17,900	 -4.0	 86.5
1994	 25,987	 31.1	 87.0
Source: Annual Report 1963-, Housing Development Board, Singapore
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Appendix 1.12 The Sale of Site Programme in Singapore, 1967-1982
Project	 Year	 Number of Number of Site Area(ha) Total Investment
Number	 Site	 Projects	 ($ million)
1	 1967	 13	 13	 13.93	 195.58
2	 1968	 14	 13	 5.28	 249.17
3	 1969	 19	 18	 7.62	 310.39
1971	 2	 2	 2.36	 3.30
4	 1974	 8	 8	 6.71	 108.58
5	 1976	 6	 4	 4.68	 131.92
6	 1977	 7	 7	 3.74	 322.79
7	 1978	 17	 II	 22.46	 1,436.80
8	 1979	 22	 18	 11.88	 1,431.55
9	 1980	 21	 17	 17.66	 2,531.72
10	 1981	 18	 15	 53.63	 1,365.53
11	 1982	 19	 17	 8.90	 854.61
Source: Urban Redevelopment Authority, 1983, p.11
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Appendix 1.13 Supply, Demand and Occupancy Rate of Floor Space, Singapore,
1981-1994
	Office Floor Space(sq. in.)	 Shop Floor Space(sq.m.) 	 Private Residential Unit
Supply	 Demand	 Supply	 Demand	 Supply	 Demand
1981	 1,834	 1,754	 834	 752	 19,755	 17,606
1982	 2,030	 1,891	 901	 813	 21,891	 20,304
1983	 2,200	 2,017	 1,013	 906	 25,070	 23,047
1984	 2,382	 2,127	 1,189	 1,034	 29,544	 26,075
1985	 2,630	 2,241	 1,257	 1,062	 35,694	 29,981
1986	 2,798	 2,309	 1,331	 1,129	 43,037	 34,567
1987	 3,074	 2,396	 1,480	 1,203	 47,045	 39,509
1988	 3,227	 2,641	 1,504	 1,287	 49,538	 44,204
1989	 3,302	 2,832	 1,520	 1,345	 51,310	 48,200
1990	 3,510	 3,201	 1,584	 1,438	 58,157	 54,318
1991	 3,649	 3,335	 1,613	 1,487	 61,948	 57,983
1992	 3,850	 3,414	 1,677	 1,576	 66,330	 61,421
1993	 4,384	 3,949	 2,844	 2,636	 71,299	 66,236
1994	 4,579	 4,230	 2,887	 2,676	 78,012	 72,551
Excessive	 Occupancy	 Excessive	 Occupancy	 Excessive Occupancy
Supply	 Rate	 Supply	 Rate	 Supply	 Rate
1981	 80	 95.6	 82	 90.2	 2,149	 89.1
1982	 139	 93.2	 88	 90.3	 1,587	 92.8
1983	 183	 91.7	 107	 89.4	 2,023	 91.9
1984	 255	 89.3	 155	 87.0	 3,469	 88.3
1985	 389	 85.2	 195	 84.5	 5,713	 84.0
1986	 489	 82.5	 202	 84.8	 8,470	 80.3
1987	 678	 78.0	 277	 81.3	 7,536	 84.0
1988	 586	 81.8	 217	 85.7	 5,334	 89.2
1989	 470	 85.8	 175	 88.5	 3,110	 93.9
1990	 309	 91.2	 146	 90.8	 3,839	 93.4
1991	 314	 91.4	 126	 92.2	 3,965	 93.6
1992	 436	 88.7	 101	 94.0	 4,909	 92.6
1993	 435	 90.1	 208	 92.7	 5,063	 92.9
1994	 349	 92.4	 211	 92.7	 5,461	 93.0
Source: Construction and Real Estate Statistics Quarterly 1986-1989; Potential Supply 1993-, Urban
Redevelopment Authority, Singapore
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Appendix 1.14 Property Price Index by Uses, Singapore, 1978-1995 (1985=100)
All Properties Residential	 Office	 Commercial	 Industrial
1978	 37	 32	 37	 70	 58
1979	 43	 39	 43	 85	 60
1980	 71	 65	 80	 115	 91
1981	 130	 111	 224	 197	 190
1982	 125	 112	 193	 166	 169
1983	 130	 126	 173	 149	 141
1984	 120	 119	 134	 134	 125
1985	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100
1986	 87	 88	 M	 96	 75
1987	 103	 103	 98	 114	 79
1988	 110	 110	 117	 124	 86
1989	 110.5	 110.8	 109	 114	 94
1990	 110.8	 111.5	 104	 108	 102
1991	 111.4	 112.6	 97.1	 101	 111
1992	 123	 127.3	 93.5	 93.5	 121
1993	 152.9	 163	 92.5	 90.7	 129
1994	 215	 234	 116	 106.4	 150
1995	 249	 267	 157	 123	 193
Source: Singapore Private Property Price Index, 1992-; Price and Rental Indices,1994, Urban Redevelopment
Authority, Singapore
Note: Statistics prior to 1984 are based on the original series complied by the Department Statistics, Ministry of
Trade and Industry, which has a different weight of distribution and based year 1979.
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Appendix 1.15 Share of Floor Space by Sectors, Singapore, 1985
Central Area	 Outside Central Area
CBD Inner CBD Outer Decentralized Fringe of	 Others
	
Core	 Core	 Zones	 CBD
Business Sector	 Floor Area(s.f)
Banking	 163,977	 0	 0	 1,838	 0
Professional Service/Consultants 	 39,932	 16,268	 5,525	 0	 937
Trading	 19,924	 3,051	 7,776	 480	 0
Oil/Petroleum	 6,667	 0	 0	 865	 17,468
Engineering/Construction	 11,137	 6,685	 5,789	 0	 0
Insurance	 21,592	 0	 0	 0	 0
Computer Service	 9,264	 0	 0	 0	 8,439
Finance Brokerage	 12,323	 3,901	 0	 0	 0
Shipping/Freight	 5,115	 0	 0	 0	 2,388
Others	 16,887	 5,025	 637	 4,055	 6,969
Total	 306,818	 34,930	 19,727	 7,238	 36,201
Banking	 98.8	 0.0	 0.0	 1.1	 100
Professional Service/Consultants	 63.7	 26.0	 8.8	 0.0	 100
Trading	 63.8	 9.8	 24.9	 1.5	 100
Oil/Petroleum	 26.7	 0.0	 0.0	 3.5	 100
Engineering/Construction	 47.2	 28.3	 24.5	 0.0	 100
Insurance	 100	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 100
Computer Service	 52.3	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 100
Finance Brokerage	 76.0	 24.0	 0.0	 0.0	 100
Shipping/Freight	 68.2	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 100
Others	 50.3	 15.0	 1.9	 12.1	 100
Total	 75.8	 8.6	 4.9	 1.8	 100
Source: The Gold Card Financial Supplement, May, 1985
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Appendix 1.16 Construction Industry and Construction Investment, Taiwan, 1952-
1993
GDP	 Construction	 Gross Domestic	 Construction Housing Investment
Industry	 Fixed Capital	 Investemnt
Formation
Value	 Value %Change Value % Change Value %Change Value %Change
1952	 17,251	 1,940	 -	 667	 -	 848	 -	 178	 -
1955	 29,981	 3,401	 -	 1,454	 -	 1,388	 -	 430	 -
1956	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
1957	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
1958	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
1959	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
1960	 62,507	 10,361	 -	 2,431	 -	 4,202	 -	 1,414	 -
1961	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
1962	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
1963	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
1964	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
1965	 112,627	 19,090	 -	 4,473	 -	 6,853	 -	 1,861	 -
1966	 126,022	 24,031	 25.9	 5,049	 12.9	 8,100	 18.2	 2,313	 24.3
1967	 145,817	 30,022	 24.9	 6,095	 20.7	 10,336	 27.6	 3,319	 43.5
1968	 169,905	 37,319	 24.3	 7,257	 19.1	 12,867	 24.5	 4,570	 37.7
1969	 196,845	 43,564	 16.7	 8,227	 13.4	 14,683	 14.1	 4,826	 5.6
1970	 226,805	 49,054	 12.6	 8,801	 7.0	 14,288	 -2.7	 4,544	 -5.8
1971	 263,676	 61,282	 24.9	 10,307	 17.1	 16,017	 12.1	 7,647	 68.3
1972	 316,172	 74,978	 22.3	 12,517	 21.4	 19,914	 24.3	 8,186	 7.0
1973	 410,405	 102,301	 36.4	 16,550	 32.2	 25,897	 30.0	 12,499	 52.7
1974	 549,577	 156,712	 53.2	 24,718	 49.4	 42,193	 62.9	 14,983	 19.9
1975	 589,651	 183,312	 17.0	 31,032	 25.5	 56,158	 33.1	 18,676	 24.6
1976	 701,710	 195,724	 6.8	 40,210	 29.6	 62,914	 12.0	 23,087	 23.6
1977	 828,995	 212,590	 8.6	 50,463	 25.5	 77,413	 23.0	 28,783	 24.7
1978	 991,602	 255,597	 20.2	 60,109	 19.1	 88,628	 14.5	 40,908	 42.1
1979	 1,195,838	 335,916	 31.4	 73,977	 23.1	 109,170	 23.2	 52,231	 27.7
1980	 1,491,059 456,446	 35.9	 93,350	 26.2	 146,854	 34.5	 64,694	 23.9
1981	 1,773,931	 494,043	 8.2	 100,656	 7.8	 150,879	 2.7	 72,817	 12.6
1982	 1,899,971	 490,923	 -0.6	 95,448	 -5.2	 152,332	 1.0	 68,060	 -6.5
1983	 2,100,005 478.430	 -2.5	 97,488	 2.1	 148,750	 -2.4	 64,363	 -5.4
1984	 2,343,078 496,281	 3.7	 99,927	 2.5	 158,840	 6.8	 71,745	 11.5
1985	 2,473,786 466,341	 -6.0	 102,023	 2.1	 165,143	 4.0	 72,086	 0.5
1986	 2,855,180 517,461	 11.0	 109,926	 7.7	 180,542	 9.3	 69,860	 -3.1
1987	 3,222,993 620,098	 19.8	 126,146	 14.8	 203,506	 12.7	 88,759	 27.1
1988	 3,496,951	 724,904	 16.9	 148,733	 17.9	 241,868	 18.9	 103.888	 17.0
1989	 3,878,547 855,292	 18.0	 176,977	 19.0	 279,144	 15.4	 125,120	 20.4
1990	 4,222,004 947,477	 10.8	 205,492	 16.1	 332,181	 19.0	 119,505	 -4.5
1991	 4,704,137 1,042,983	 10.1	 229,094	 11.5	 397,010	 19.5	 120,104	 0.5
1992	 5,198,505 1,207,845	 15.8	 269,986	 17.8	 454,269	 14.4	 151,805	 26.4
1993	 5,712,519 1,370,771	 13.5	 316,765	 17.3	 539,541	 18.8	 180,146	 18.7
Source: Yearbook of Statistics, Taiwan,1952-1993
Note: Value = 1986 Price (NT million)
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Appendix 1.17 Floor Area Built by Sectors, Taiwan, 1956-1993
Total	 By Public Sector	 By Private Sector 	 The Share of
Private Sector in
the Total
l,000sq.m. %Change l,000sq.m. 	 %Change l,000sq.m.	 %Change
1956	 573.7	 532.7	 41.0	 7.1
1957	 412.2	 -28.2	 380.2	 -28.6	 32.0	 -22.0	 7.8
1958	 347.9	 -15.6	 307.9	 -19.0	 40.0	 25.0	 11.5
1959	 25.6	 -92.6	 22.1	 -92.8	 3.5	 -91.3	 13.7
1960	 2,140.4	 8268.4	 1,852.4	 8290.6	 288.0	 8128.6	 13.5
1961	 1,380.8	 -35.5	 984.8	 -46.8	 396.0	 37.5	 28.7
1962	 1,377.8	 -0.2	 944.8	 -4.1	 433.0	 9.3	 31.4
1963	 818.7	 -40.6	 319.7	 -66.2	 499.0	 15.2	 61.0
1964	 2,464.2	 201.0	 1,878.2	 487.6	 586.0	 17.4	 23.8
1965	 1,910.4	 -22.5	 115.4	 -93.9	 1,795.0	 206.3	 94.0
1966	 4,612.0	 141.4	 1,745.0	 1411.7	 2,867.0	 59.7	 62.2
1967	 5,538.6	 20.1	 1,833.6	 5.1	 3,705.0	 29.2	 66.9
1968	 5,724.6	 3.4	 1,065.6	 -41.9	 4,659.0	 25.7	 81.4
1969	 5,959.8	 4.1	 149.8	 -85.9	 5,810.0	 24.7	 97.5
1970	 6,029.7	 1.2	 573.7	 283.0	 5,456.0	 -6.1	 90.5
1971	 6,902.3	 14.5	 507.3	 -11.6	 6,395.0	 17.2	 92.7
1972	 8,575.9	 24.2	 279.9	 -44.8	 8,296.0	 29.7	 96.7
1973	 9,892.6	 15.4	 184.6	 -34.0	 9,708.0	 17.0	 98.1
1974	 11,484.1	 16.1	 754.1	 308.4	 10,730.0	 10.5	 93.4
1975	 13,388.7	 16.6	 997.7	 32.3	 12,391.0	 15.5	 92.5
1976	 15,959.7	 19.2	 997.7	 0.0	 14,962.0	 20.7	 93.7
1977	 20,877.8	 30.8	 1,044.8	 4.7	 19,833.0	 32.6	 95.0
1978	 23,678.0	 13.4	 924.0	 -11.6	 22,754.0	 14.7	 96.1
1979	 29,593.8	 25.0	 832.8	 -9.9	 28,761.0	 26.4	 97.2
1980	 36,375.4	 22.9	 1,091.4	 31.1	 35,284.0	 22.7	 97.0
1981	 39,758.8	 9.3	 866.8	 -20.6	 38,892.0	 10.2	 97.8
1982	 29,181.2	 -26.6	 2,262.2	 161.0	 26,919.0	 -30.8	 92.2
1983	 26,355.5	 -9.7	 1,368.5	 -39.5	 24,987.0	 -7.2	 94.8
1984	 29,022.9	 10.1	 1,831.9	 33.9	 27,191.0	 8.8	 93.7
1985	 28,628.6	 -1.4	 515.6	 -71.9	 28,113.0	 3.4	 98.2
1986	 26,527.3	 -7.3	 568.3	 10.2	 25,959.0	 -7.7	 97.9
1987	 25,459.4	 -4.0	 280.4	 -50.7	 25,179.0	 -3.0	 98.9
1988	 30,053.1	 18.0	 287.1	 2.4	 29,766.0	 18.2	 99.0
1989	 31,521.5	 4.9	 265.5	 -7.5	 31,256.0	 5.0	 99.2
1990	 31,843.3	 1.0	 568.3	 114.0	 31,275.0	 0.1	 98.2
1991	 32,283.4	 1.4	 280.4	 -50.7	 32,003.0	 2.3	 99.1
1992	 37,201.1	 15.2	 287.1	 2.4	 36,914.0	 15.3	 99.2
1993	 47,798.5	 28.5	 265.5	 -7.5	 47,533.0	 28.8	 99.4
Source: Construction Statistics 1960-1993, Excutive Yuan, Taiwan
Appendix	 380
Appendix 1.18 Property Development by the Private Sector,
Taiwan, 1976-1994
Floor Area Built(I,000sg.m.)
Residential	 Commercial	 fndustrial
1976	 7,780	 4,189	 1,945
1977	 9,916	 5,752	 2,777
1978	 11,604	 6,599	 2,958
1979	 13,518	 9,491	 4,314
1980	 18,700	 9,879	 4,587
1981	 21,002	 10,917	 4,084
1982	 13,604	 6,729	 3,563
1983	 13,547	 5,779	 2,962
1984	 14,328	 5,633	 3,843
1985	 14,661	 5,697	 3,951
1986	 14,110	 4,310	 3,618
1987	 12,675	 3,881	 4,813
1988	 14,888	 4,784	 6,402
1989	 15,063	 6,066	 6,239
1990	 12,422	 9,694	 5,471
1991	 13,242	 9,474	 4,780
1992	 16,669	 10,109	 5,046
1993	 22,348	 14,449	 5,023
1994	 27,238	 16,674	 5,103
Data Source: Construction Statistics, 1994, Excutive Yuan, Taiwan
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Appendix 1.19 Public Housing Development in Taiwan, 1956.1993
Housing Unit Built by the Public Sector
Total	 General	 Housing Built in Military Low-income
Housing	 Dependent Village	 Housing
1956	 47,815	 5,381	 42,434	 -
1957	 3,840	 3,840	 -	 -
1958	 3,110	 3,110	 -	 -
1959	 223	 223	 -	 -
1960	 18,711	 18,711	 .	 -
1961	 9,947	 9,947	 -	 -
1962	 9,543	 9,543	 -	 -
1963	 3,229	 3,229	 -	 -
1964	 18,972	 18,972	 -	 -
1965	 1,166	 1,166	 -	 -
1966	 62,430	 17,626	 44,804	 -
1967	 18,521	 18,521	 -	 1,824
1968	 10,764	 10,764	 -	 128
1969	 1,513	 1,513	 -	 504
1970	 5,795	 5,795	 -	 884
1971	 5,124	 5,124	 -	 114
1972	 2,827	 2,827	 -
1973	 1,865	 1,865	 -
1974	 9,127	 7,617	 1,510	 3,841
1975	 12,158	 10,078	 2,080	 4,315
1976	 10,078	 -	 -	 -
1977	 10,554	 20,286	 -	 -
1978	 13,701	 9,333	 4,368	 -
1979	 8,412	 8,412	 -	 -
1980	 11,024	 11,024	 -	 -
1981	 8,756	 8,756	 -	 -
1982	 22,850	 22,850	 -	 -
1983	 13,823	 13,823	 -	 -
1984	 18,054	 18,504	 -	 -
1985	 28,613	 5,208	 23,405	 -
1986	 5,740	 5,740	 -	 -
1987	 2,832	 2,832	 -	 -
1988	 2,900	 2,900	 -	 -
1989	 2,682	 2,682	 -	 -
1990	 12,280	 5,760	 12,280	 -
1991	 2,220	 2,832	 2,220	 -
1992	 2,900	 2,900	 -	 -
1993	 2,684	 2,684	 -	 -
Total	 426,783	 302,378	 133,101	 11,610
Data Source: Economic Construction Committee, Excutive Yuan, Taiwan
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Appendix 1.20 Floor Area Built by Uses, Taipei, 1968-1993
Floor Area Built(1,000 sq.m.)
Total	 %Change	 Residential	 Commercial	 Industrial
1968	 6,084	 -	 5,686	 215	 183
1969	 2,109	 -65.3	 1,377	 220	 159
1970	 2,726	 29.3	 1,483	 652	 190
1971	 4,747	 74.1	 3,475	 600	 282
1972	 3,236	 -31.8	 2,282	 383	 207
1973	 4,586	 41.7	 3,686	 146	 544
1974	 2,047	 -55.4	 1,502	 177	 66
1975	 5,835	 185.1	 4,730	 674	 55
1976	 6,328	 8.4	 4,318	 1,560	 91
1977	 4,533	 -28.4	 3,092	 833	 81
1978	 5,509	 21.5	 3,794	 1,218	 146
1979	 5,718	 3.8	 3,498	 1,400	 184
1980	 5,954	 4.1	 4,629	 695	 121
1981	 8,521	 43.1	 6,770	 1,202	 138
1982	 6,437	 -24.5	 5,120	 819	 67
1983	 5,904	 -8.3	 4,139	 1,257	 48
1984	 5,172	 -12.4	 3,254	 1,041	 62
1985	 5,155	 -0.3	 3,306	 1,162	 37
1986	 3,517	 -31.8	 2,180	 766	 62
1987	 3,616	 2.8	 2,253	 667	 234
1988	 4,440	 22.8	 2,203	 821	 328
1989	 4,095	 -7.8	 2,158	 1,437	 105
1990	 3,940	 -3.8	 1,997	 770	 184
1991	 3,541	 -10.1	 1,786	 503	 151
1992	 4,174	 17.9	 2,683	 337	 66
1993	 5,877	 40.8	 3,725	 615	 301
Data Source: Annual Statistics 1968-1993, Department of Public Works, Taipei Municipal Government
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Appenidx 1.21 Floor Area Built Every Year by District, Taipei, 1975-1990
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Floor Area Built(1,000sq.m.)
Central area(west and east CBD)
Chengchung 106 359 224 339 20 40 200 30 30 70 120 30 30 30 261 66
Shungshan 314 990 699 814 580 1000 1050 520 450 680 700 210 500 550 1148 670
Fringe of the central area
Taan 239 933 489 584 400 600 1300 580 680 450 600 300 200 100 361 324
Chungshan 274 802 504 756 350 450 1400 550 600 400 350 200 180 100 326 507
Old central area
Lungshan	 31	 79 381 96	 14 32 42 45	 24 54 50 105 92	 50	 29	 15
Yenping	 55	 58	 92	 80	 10	 55	 38	 32	 16	 32	 32	 20	 12	 10	 13	 27
Chiencheng 20 74 25 45	 6	 26 16 35	 5	 9	 20	 8	 5	 4	 2	 30
Outer urban area
Tatong	 48 110 82 88	 60 40 100 80 70 50 170 50 30 50 114 83
Kuting	 155 468 361 221 170 235 210 280 260 90 170 220 120 70 273 187
Shuangyuan 99 149 153 127 80	 80 105 150 55	 95 100 30	 35	 15	 19	 28
Chingrnei	 163 255 193 274 230 270 220 100 20 20 65 	 50 70 90 248 197
Suburban area
Mucha	 110 212 120 154 150 260 340 90 25 	 30 65 130 95 250 202 306
Neihu	 41 278 278 514 400 500 850 1300 600 350 150 350 330 320 476 527
Nankang	 137 211 156 150 80 110 130 200 100 50	 80	 10	 30	 25	 115 176
Shihlin	 85 538 518 678 420 450 470 490 670 450 360 200 190 280 315 437
Peitou	 61 596 392 562 500 370 220 580 300 200 100 60 210 160 183 358
Source: Auunal Statistics, 1975-1990, Department of Public Works, Taipei Municiplal Government
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Appendix 1.23 Urban Renewal Programme, Taipei, 1959-
	
No.	 Year	 District	 Land Area(ha)	 Progress	 New developemnt
Shop	 Housing
1	 1959-1961	 Chenchung	 1.72	 Completed	 -	 1,644
	
2	 1969-1976	 Wanhwa	 12.70	 Completed	 -	 1,860
	
3	 1972-1974	 Shungyuan	 9.78	 Completed	 -	 4,126
	
4	 1972-	 TaLon	 12.35	 Incorporated into URLP	 -	 -
	
5	 1972-	 Chienchung	 3.60	 Incorporated into URLP	 -	 -
	
6	 1977-1979	 Mucha	 3.20	 Completed	 -	 536
	
7	 1978-	 Chungshan	 1.40	 Redevelopment in progess 	 -	 -
	
8	 1978-	 Chungshan	 1.20	 Incorporated into URLP	 -	 -
	
9	 1978-	 Taan	 1.20	 Incorporated into URLP 	 -	 -
	
10	 1976-1982	 Shihlin	 1.25	 Completed	 -	 309
	
11	 1980-	 Shihlin	 1.40	 Redevelopment in progess 	 -	 -
	
12	 1980-	 Shungyuan	 1.82	 Incorporated into URLP	 -	 -
	
13	 1982-1986	 Taton	 1.00	 Completed	 -	 49
	
14	 1983-1989	 Shungshan	 1.12	 Completed	 37	 97
	
15	 1984-	 Taan	 1.15	 Completed	 -	 120
	
16	 1984-	 Mucha	 1.85	 Incorporated into URLP	 -	 -
7........................................................... :9 ................ncpp.!:P.........................................................
	
Total	 37	 8741
Data Source: Urban Renewal Division, Urban Planning Board, 1985
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Appendix 1.24 Share of Fixed Capital in Total Capital by Sectors,
Taiwan, 1980-1990
Public Sector
Land and	 Machinery and
Buildings	 Equipment
Private Sector
Land and	 Machinery and
Buildings	 Equipment
1980	 12.1	 12.9	 12.2	 20.8
1981	 13.9	 12.4	 14.4	 21.1
1982	 14.1	 14.5	 14.8	 21.6
1983	 14.0	 13.3	 14.1	 20.2
1984	 14.1	 13.9	 14.0	 22.2
1985	 14.5	 14.0	 14.5	 21.6
1986	 14.5	 14.2	 14.4	 22.5
1987	 15.1	 14.4	 13.4	 19.8
1988	 15.7	 14.3	 15.4	 16.9
1989	 16.7	 14.1	 18.0	 15.0
1990	 17.9	 14.0	 19.5	 14.3
Data Source:Research Survey of Industrial Finance, Economic Research Department, The Taiwan
Bank
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Appendix 1.25 Changes in Gross Profit by Industries, Taiwan, 1984-1990
Percentage Change of Profit Rate
1984	 1985 1986
	 1987 1988 1989	 1990
Textiles Industry
	 10.1	 6.7	 10.4	 12.2	 4.9	 0.7	 0.5
Clothing Industry
	 6.3	 2.7	 13.2	 13.4	 3.6	 0.4	 0.3
Plastic Products 	 1.1	 1.3	 0.7	 -1.1	 1.9	 1.8	 1.6
Informational Products
	 -	 -	 -	 4.2	 6.2	 5.1	 6.5
Electronic Equipment	 8.3	 7.3	 8.9	 6.2	 7.0	 5.8	 6.2
Import Trade	 3.6	 3.4	 4.5	 3.6	 4.5	 4.0	 4.2
Export Trade	 1.2	 1.4	 1.6	 1.0	 1.9	 1.4	 1.6
Hotel and Tourist service	 7.8	 9.1	 17.9	 17.1	 19.3	 19.6	 18.5
Real Estate	 -	 -	 -	 13.3	 17.2	 21.6	 24.2
Construction	 -	 -	 -	 3.6	 2.3	 4.3	 4.5
Data Source: Taiwan Bank Association, 1987, 1990
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Appendix 1.26 Property Values in Shophouse Areas, Singapore
	Golden Shoe Telok Ayer
	 Tanjong South-North- Orchard
	 Fring of
(CBD)	 and Kreta Pagar(lkm) New Bridge Road(2k,n)
	 Central
	
Ayer(o.5k,n)	 Road(1.5km)	 Area(2.5km)
Vacant
1964	 883	 530	 576	 622	 388	 116
1965	 1111	 659	 716	 773	 482	 144
1966	 1262	 748	 812	 877	 547	 164
1967	 1462	 890	 967	 1044	 651	 195
1968	 1612	 1072	 1165	 1258	 632	 207
1969	 1623	 1294	 1406	 1518	 -	 240
1970	 1634	 1414	 1537	 1659	 832	 268
1971	 2064	 1325	 1697	 2068	 1204	 293
1972	 2688	 1398	 2011	 2624	 1306	 299
1973	 4913	 1599	 2150	 2700	 2158	 398
1974	 4503	 1382	 1845	 2308	 2436	 344
1975	 3280	 1168	 1560	 1951	 2410	 364
1976	 4418	 2069	 2762	 3455	 -	 409
1977	 6031	 2069	 2762	 3455	 2434	 433
1978	 1904	 2541	 3179	 2920	 458
1979	 6746	 2053	 2740	 3428	 4279	 577
1980	 7324	 2202	 2939	 3677	 4499	 838
1981	 7902	 2351	 3138	 3926	 4872	 1197
1982	 8481	 2510	 3351	 4192	 5244	 1161
1983	 9059	 2669	 3563	 4457	 5616	 1506
Tenanted
1964	 353	 144	 245	 346	 249	 48
1965	 403	 161	 274	 387	 279	 54
1966	 476	 191	 325	 459	 330	 64
1967	 509	 204	 347	 491	 353	 68
1968	 628	 245	 417	 589	 376	 72
1969	 1002	 275	 468	 661	 550	 108
1970	 1100	 272	 463	 654	 582	 100
1971	 1092	 267	 476	 684	 633	 104
1972	 1074	 292	 282	 271	 502	 106
1973	 1451	 325	 546	 767	 838	 143
1974	 1262	 296	 617	 937	 515	 100
1975	 1559	 267	 555	 844	 872	 87
1976	 1677	 325	 678	 1030	 938	 119
1977	 2116	 189	 393	 598	 1003	 123
1978	 1584	 210	 438	 666	 1069	 126
1979	 1921	 281	 586	 890	 1461	 182
1980	 2129	 293	 611	 928	 1621	 164
1981	 2336	 307	 640	 972	 1700	 224
1982	 2544	 317	 661	 1005	 1902	 226
1983	 2729	 329	 686	 1043	 2027	 275
Data Source: Computer Files, Singapore Institute of Surveyrrs and Valuers, Singapore
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Appendix 1.27 Land Values by Census Districts, Taipei
Officially Announced Market Value(1940-1994)
Chengchung: Lungshang Yenping Chungshang Taan Shungshan: Chingmei Neihu
	
WCBD(OKM) (1KM) (2KM) 	 (3KM) (4KM) ECBD( 5KM) (8KM) (10KM)
$sq.m.
1940	 20,000	 10,000	 10,000	 12,000	 10,000	 3,000	 3,000	 1,500
1970	 30,000	 12,000	 14,000	 18,000	 14,000	 5,000	 4,000	 2,000
1980	 50,000	 22,000	 20,000	 28,000	 19,000	 16,000	 8,000	 2,400
1985	 80,000	 35,000	 30,000	 35,000	 28,000	 30,000	 10,000	 8,000
1990	 120,000	 80,000	 75,000	 90,000	 98,000	 115,000	 50,000 40,000
1994	 150,000	 90,000	 77,000	 108,000	 108,000	 135,000	 50,000 40,000
Officially Announced Market Value-Urban Planning Area(1992, 1995)
$sq.m.
	1992(R)	 227,233	 152,196	 140,098	 176,566	 263,166	 182,167	 78,322 117,654
	
1992(C)	 502,977	 242,171	 207,871	 387,021	 524,295	 438,540	 169,842 257,750
	
1992(A)	 365,105	 197,184	 173,985	 281,794	 393,731	 310,354	 124,082 187,702
	
1995(R)	 233,948	 170,095	 151,246	 183,155	 288,042	 276,076	 85,060 125,319
	
1995(C)	 519,983	 256,087	 265,807	 396,527	 578,362	 861,020	 171,773 262,085
	
1995(A)	 376,966	 213,091	 208,527	 289,841	 433,202	 568,548	 128,417 193,702
Data Source: Chen, C, 1970; Don, S., 1980, Land Division Annual ReportI98O, 1985, 1990, 1994, 1995, Land
Department, UDD, Taipei
Note: R= Residential Zone;C=Commercial Zone; A=Average. Land value in urban planning area had been
collected since 1992.
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APPENDIX 2 LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
Singapore
S. 1. Liu, T. K. Ex-Chief of the Urban Redevelopment Authority.
S.2. Wang, F. H. Zhen Gallery, Tanjong Pagar.
S.3. Soon, L S. China Sea Art Shop, Tanjong Pagar.
S.4. Lee, S. C. Chairman, C&L Development Ltd.
S.5. Fong, C. H. Ex-Resident of No. 68 Neil Road.
S.6. Lim, F. C. Singapore Heritage Society
S.7. Kong, L.L. Singapore Heritage Society
S.8. Liu, Y. C. Excuetive Officer, Urban Redevelopment Authority
S.9. Woo, K. L. Ministry of National Development
S.10. Liu, C. C. Singapore Institute of Planners
S. 11. Chen, Y. K. Singapore Institute of Planners
S.12. Fong, K. L. Ex-Resident of No. 134 Tanjong Pagar Road
S.13. Tan, H. H. Tenant, No. 102 Tanjong Pagar Road
S.14. Yu, K. N. Tenant, No. 25 Neil Road
S. 15. Lu, Y. L. Commercial Property Hoiddings
S.16. Low, K. H. Low Keng Hunt Construction Ltd
S.17. Jian, F. 0. Jian Fu Ote Development Ltd
S.18. Da. J. L. Jones Lang Wooton Development Ltd
Taipei
T. 1. Yu, C. C. Chairman, Chinese Medicine Association
T.2. Wang, B. C. Owner of No. 237 Dihua Street
T.3. Lee, S. H. Owner of No. 114 Dihua Street
T.4. Cen, Y.H. Owner of No. 236 Dihua Street
T.5. Kuo, W. T. Owner of No. 318 Dihua Street
T.6. Sui, C. B. Owner of No. 102 Dihua Street
T.7. Chuo, D. K. Chairman, Dye Chemical Ltd
T.8. Kua, C. Y. Chairman, Dadowchang Textile Wholesalers' Association
T.9. Yu, S. F. Owner of No. 330 Dihua Street
T. 10. Chen, F. Y. Owner of No. 86 Dihua Street
T. 11. Cheo. Z. H. Yaoshen Culture and Education Foundation
T. 12. Cheng, W. L. Yaoshen Cultural and Education Foundation (DSZ Workshop)
T.13. Chen, C. W. Organisation of Urban Reformists
T. 14. Lim, S. F. Organisation of Urban Reformists (DSZ Workshop)
T.15. Tsai, D. F. Ex-Chief of the Urban Planning Board
T.16. Chang, J. S. Director, Urban Development Department
T.17. Yang, T. B. Li-Ba Real Estate
T. 18. Jong, D. K. Tai-Lien Real Estate
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